Malta & Crimea Conferences (ARGONAUT)

[NormanStewart]

CCS Report to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill

Yalta, 9 February 1945
Top secret
CCS 776/3

Report to the President and Prime Minister of the Agreed Summary of Conclusions Reached by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the ARGONAUT Conference

The agreed summary of the conclusions reached at ARGONAUT Conference is submitted herewith:

Overall Objective
In conjunction with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.

Overall Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War
In cooperation with Russia and other Allies, to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Germany.

Simultaneously, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers concerned, to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan with the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. The effect of any such extension on the overall objective to be given consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before action is taken.

Upon the defeat of Germany, in cooperation with other Pacific Powers and with Russia, to direct the full resources of the United States and Great Britain to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

Basic Undertakings in Support of Overall Strategic Concept
Whatever operations are decided on in support of the overall strategic concept, the following established undertakings will be a first charge against our resources, subject to review by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in keeping with the changing situation:

a. Maintain the security and warmaking capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Isles.

b. Support the warmaking capacity of our forces in all areas.

c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.

d. Continue the disruption of enemy sea communications.

e. Continue the offensive against Germany.

f. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable to aid the war effort of Russia to include coordinating the action of forces.

g. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally and as a base for operations against Japan.

h. Provide assistance to such of the forces of the liberated areas in Europe as can fulfill an active and effective role in the war against Germany and/or Japan. Within the limits of our available resources to assist other co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance against the Enemy Powers in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of the other basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the war-making capacity of the United Nations against Germany and/or Japan.

i. Reorient forces from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East as a matter of highest priority having regard to other agreed and/or inescapable commitments as soon as the German situation allows.

j. Continue operations leading to the earliest practicable invasion of Japan.

Execution of the Overall Strategic Concept

Defeat of Germany

The U-Boat War
We are concerned with the possibility that German U-boats may again constitute a serious threat to our North Atlantic shipping lanes. It is too early yet to assess the extent to which such an offensive could achieve success, and we propose to review the matter again on 1 April 1945.

Meanwhile, we have agreed on the following countermeasures:
a. To build up as much as is practicable the strength of surface hunting groups and anti-U-boat air squadrons.

b. To maintain and, if possible, increase “marginal” bomber effort on assembly yards, concentrating as far as is practicable against Hamburg and Bremen.

c. To maintain “marginal” effort against operating bases, being ready to increase this when bases become crowded beyond the capacity of concrete pens.

d. To increase, by 100% if possible, the air mining effort against U-boats, including the training areas.

e. To mine waters beyond range of d. above by using surface minelayers and carrier-borne aircraft.

f. To intensify operations against enemy minesweepers.

g. To maintain and intensify operations against the enemy shipping used to supply U-boat bases.

Operations in Northwest Europe
In two telegrams, SCAF 180 as amended by SCAF 194, the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, has presented his appreciation and his plan of operations for Northwest Europe. His plan is as follows:

a. To carry out immediately a series of operations north of the Moselle with a view to destroying the enemy and closing the Rhine north of Düsseldorf.

b. To direct our efforts to eliminating other enemy forces west of the Rhine, which still constitute an obstacle or a potential threat to our subsequent Rhine crossing operations.

c. To seize bridgeheads over the Rhine in the North and the South.

d. To deploy east of the Rhine and north of the Ruhr the maximum number of divisions which can be maintained (estimated at some 35 divisions). The initial task of this force, assisted by air action, will be to deny to the enemy the industries of the Ruhr.

e. To deploy east of the Rhine, on the axis Frankfurt-Kassel, such forces, if adequate, as may be available after providing 35 divisions for the North and essential security elsewhere. The task of this force will be to draw enemy forces away from the North by capturing Frankfurt and advancing on Kassel.

We have taken note of SCAF 180 as amended by SCAF 194 and of the Supreme Commander’s assurance that he will seize the Rhine crossings in the North just as soon as this is a feasible operation and without waiting to close the Rhine throughout its length. Further, that he will advance across the Rhine in the North with maximum strength and complete determination, immediately the situation in the South allows him to collect the necessary forces and do this without incurring unreasonable risks.

Strategy in the Mediterranean
We have reviewed our strategy in the Mediterranean in the light of the development of the situation in Europe and of the fact that the enemy is at liberty at any time to make a voluntary withdrawal in Italy. We have agreed that our primary object in the war against Germany should be to build up the maximum possible strength on the Western Front and to seek a decision in that theater.

In accordance with this concept we have agreed to withdraw certain forces from the Mediterranean Theater and to place them at the disposal of the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and to redefine the tasks of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean.

Our proposals are contained in the directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, attached as Appendix “A.”

The War Against Japan

Overall Objective in the War Against Japan
We have agreed that the overall objective in the war against Japan should be expressed as follows:

To force the unconditional surrender of Japan by:
a. Lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength.

b. Invading and seizing objectives in the industrial heart of Japan.

Operations in the Pacific Area
We have taken note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 417/11 (Appendix “B”).

Operations in Southeast Asia Command
We have agreed to the following policy in respect of employment in Southeast Asia Command of United States resources deployed in the India-Burma Theater:

a. The primary military object of the United States in the China and India-Burma Theaters is the continuance of aid to China on a scale that will permit the fullest utilization of the area and resources of China for operations against the Japanese. United States resources are deployed in India-Burma to provide direct or indirect support for China. These forces and resources participate not only in operating the base and the line of communications for United States and Chinese forces in China, but also constitute a reserve immediately available to China without permanently increasing the requirements for transport of supplies to China.

b. The United States Chiefs of Staff contemplate no change in their agreement to SACSEA’s use of resources of the U.S. India-Burma Theater in Burma when this use does not prevent the fulfillment of their primary object of rendering support to China including protection of the line of communications. Any transfer of forces engaged in approved operations in progress in Burma which is contemplated by the United States Chiefs of Staff and which, in the opinion of the British Chiefs of Staff, would jeopardize those operations, will be subject to discussion by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

We have reviewed the progress of the campaign in Burma and agreed upon the terms of a directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia. This directive is attached as Appendix “C.”

Planning Dates for the End of the War Against Germany and Japan
We feel that it is important to agree and promulgate planning dates for the end of the war against Germany and Japan. These dates are necessary for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower.

We recommend that the planning dates for the end of the war against Germany should be as follows:
a. Earliest date – 1 July 1945.
b. Date beyond which the war is unlikely to continue – 31 December 1945.

We recommend that the planning date for the end of the war against Japan should be set at 18 months after the defeat of Germany.

All the above dates to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

Shipping
We have reviewed the over-all cargo and troop shipping position for the remainder of 1945 under the assumption that Germany is defeated on 1 July 1945.

For the first half of 1945 the principal difficulty will be with cargo shipping, which will be tight and in which deficits will approach unmanageable proportions until V-E Day. We have issued instructions to theater commanders to exercise strict control of shipping and have agreed that deficits should be adjusted in accordance with the following principles:

In the event of a deficit in shipping resources, first priority should be given to the basic undertakings in support of the over-all strategic concepts as agreed in ARGONAUT.

So long as these first priority requirements are not adequately covered, shipping for other requirements will not be allocated without prior consultation with the appropriate Chiefs of Staff.

For the second half of 1945 the principal difficulty will be troop shipping, which will become particularly acute in the last quarter of the year. We have agreed that the matter should be reviewed and a report submitted to the Combined Chiefs of Staff not later than 1 April 1945. This report will take account, from the shipping point of view, of the possibility that the war against Germany may continue beyond 1 July 1945.

Oil
We have reviewed and agreed upon the levels of stocks of all petroleum products that should be maintained in all theaters. The text of our agreement is attached as Appendix “D.”

Equipment for Allied and Liberated Forces
The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean, has submitted proposals (NAF 841) designed to assist the Greek Government in forming their own army and so releasing British forces for employment elsewhere.

We have agreed that the British Chiefs of Staff should proceed to implement the Supreme Commander’s proposals, on the understanding that this will not interfere with the provision of equipment for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe, nor result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.

Appendix “A”

Directive to SAC, Mediterranean, Repeated to SCAEF

It is our primary intention in the war against Germany to build up the maximum possible strength on the Western Front and to seek a decision in that theater. We have, therefore, reviewed your directive and decided as follows:

Greece
The earliest possible discharge of British obligations in Greece must be your constant aim.

The object of British presence and operations in Greece is to secure that part of Greece which is necessary for the establishment of the authority of a free Greek Government.

This object must always be regarded in the light of the paramount need for releasing troops from Greece for use against the Germans. You should, therefore, concentrate on building up a Greek force on a national basis as soon as possible.

Italy
In pursuance of the policy given in paragraph 1, it has been decided to withdraw from your theater to the Western Front up to five divisions (of which not more than two should be armored) as follows:

a. At the earliest possible date three Allied divisions drawn from the Allied Armies in Italy.

b. Further complete formations as the forces now in Greece are released from that country.

c. It is intended to withdraw Canadian and British divisions. The nomination of ground formations to be withdrawn and the arrangements for their transfer will form the subject of a separate instruction. The program will be agreed between you and Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force, and approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff before any moves take place.

Air Forces
Two fighter groups of Twelfth Air Force will be moved to France at once. Combined Chiefs of Staff intend to move to France in the near future as much of the Twelfth Air Force as can be released without hazard to the accomplishment of your mission. You should consult with SCAEF and submit agreed proposals for confirmation by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

There will be no significant withdrawal of amphibious assault forces.

We recognize that these withdrawals will affect the scope of your operations in the Italian Theater. We, therefore, redefine your objects as follows:

a. Your first object should be to ensure that, subject to any minor adjustments you may find necessary, the front already reached in Italy is solidly held.

b. Within the limits of the forces remaining available to you after the withdrawals in paragraph 4 above have been effected, you should do your utmost, by means of such limited offensive action as may be possible and by the skillful use of cover and deception plans, to contain the German forces now in Italy and prevent their withdrawal to other fronts.

c. You should, in any case, remain prepared to take immediate advantage of any weakening or withdrawal of the German forces.

Adriatic
Subject to the requirements of the Italian Theater, you should continue to give all possible support to the Yugoslav Army of National Liberation, until the territory of Yugoslavia has been completely cleared. You will carry out such minor operations on the eastern shores of the Adriatic as your resources allow.

Appendix “C”

Directive to SAC, Southeast Asia

Your first object is to liberate Burma at the earliest date. (To be known as operation LOYALIST).

Subject to the accomplishment of this object, your next main task will be the liberation of Malaya and the opening of the Straits of Malacca (To be known as operation BROADSWORD).

In view of your recent success in Burma, and of the uncertainty of the date of the final defeat of Germany, you must aim at the accomplishment of your first object with the forces at present at your disposal. This does not preclude the dispatch of further reinforcements from the European Theater should circumstances make this possible.

You will prepare a program of operations for the approval of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

In transmitting the foregoing directive the Combined Chiefs of Staff direct your attention to the agreed policy in respect of the use in your theater of United States resources deployed in the India-Burma Theater (see paragraph 16 of the Report).

[NormanStewart]

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

	Present
United States		United Kingdom
President Roosevelt		Prime Minister Churchill
Mrs. Boettiger		Mrs. Oliver
Miss Harriman
Fleet Admiral Leahy
Mr. Byrnes
Mr. Harriman

According to Leahy: “The conversation centered around voting procedure in the proposed assembly of the world peace organization. Churchill agreed orally to an arrangement whereby the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Republics should have equal voting power in the Assembly.”

[NormanStewart]

Meeting of the American and Soviet Chiefs of Staff, 3:30 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

	Present
United States		Soviet Union
General of the Army Marshall		General of the Army Antonov
Fleet Admiral King		Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov
Major General Kuter		Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov (aided by a 2-star admiral)

Kuter Minutes

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, 3:30 p.m.
Top secret

General Antonov opened the meeting with the statement that he had discussed all of the points raised at the previous meeting with Marshal Stalin. Whereas his comments at the first meeting represented only his personal views, he was prepared for the second meeting to give definite and official replies to each of the points. General Antonov continued then to present brief statements on each of the questions that had been raised:

a. There is no change in intent and only minor change in the plans of operations in the Far East from those described to Mr. Harriman and General Deane in October. In October, it had been planned to begin the movement of units to the Far East in early 1945. The units which it had been proposed to move are now involved in the center of the line on the Russian front. The only change in the basic plan is therefore a delay in the movement of units eastward until they can be disengaged from the fighting now going on.

b. These Soviets will require specific supply routes after Soviet Japanese hostilities start. Sea routes are needed to provide food and all types of gasoline and other petroleum products. Air routes also will be required.

c. Agreement is given for the operation of U.S. Air Forces in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area. Advance reconnaissance and survey parties may be sent to that area without delay.

d. Due to the great distance from the bulk of Soviet military strength “U.S. assistance will be very useful” for the defense of Kamchatka.

e. Pre-hostility preparations, including construction, reception, and storage of U.S. stock piles in Eastern Siberia (Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk) and in Kamchatka, will be prepared by the Soviets for the U.S. air units to be based in Soviet territory. Final decision must naturally await decision as to the air base requirements. Material assistance may be needed from the United States. Knocked-down fuel storage tanks (and probably pumps, pipes, etc.) will be required. These requirements are in addition to all current requisitions. Supplies in the MILEPOST project have been computed as requirements for Soviet forces exclusively.

f. The departure of a survey party from Fairbanks to Kamchatka must be deferred “until the last moment.” In explanation for this decision considerable discussion ensued as to the fact that the presence of an American survey party in Kamchatka could not be kept a secret from the Japs.

g. After the beginning of hostilities the Soviets will take Southern Sakhalin unassisted by the United States. Although detailed plans are not yet firm, Soviet operations against Southern Sakhalin will be one of their first operations. Admiral King stated that his discussion with Admiral Kuznetsov was an adequate reply to our question concerning the La Perouse Strait. (See Appendix “A” of the notes on the meeting held 8 February 1945)

h. We had asked to be assured that combined planning in Moscow would be vigorously pursued. In his reply General Antonov replied: “We shall fulfill on our side the plan which was made.” General Marshall explained that we were not questioning Soviet good faith or ability to carry out plans. General Antonov then stated that combined planning in Moscow will proceed vigorously.

i. Our request for additional weather reporting stations in Siberia is approved. The details are to be handled by Military Mission in Moscow.

General Antonov then asked for a statement as to our airbase requirements in the Kamchatka-Nikolaevsk area. It was decided to have the Air Staffs (Marshal Khudyakov and General Kuter) continue with the discussion of air matters after the major meeting was completed.

General Marshall asked if the Soviets agreed that a high order of security was necessary in handling all Far Eastern matters because the Japs may attack if they learn of Soviet-American plans or of the movement of Soviet units. General Antonov agreed with this view.

General Marshall asked how many weeks it would be after the movement of Soviet units to the East began that the Soviets would be strong enough to meet a Jap attack. General Antonov replied that it would be “not less than three months.”

General Marshall asked when these movements Eastward would begin. General Antonov replied that the Soviets were initiating the movements of supplies at this time and stated that “units of troops, in any size, cannot be moved without attracting notice by the Japs.”

General Marshall asked if divisional equipment would precede the divisions. General Antonov stated that divisional armor and equipment would move with the divisions. However, supplies (ammunition, food, etc.) would precede the movement of divisions.

General Marshall asked how many divisions per week could be moved from the German to the Japanese front. General Antonov replied that a three-month period would be required to move the necessary forces.

General Marshall stated that Field Marshal Brooke will expedite and will extend the flow of information from London to Moscow concerning German movements and intentions.

The principal meeting was adjourned with an exchange of statements of pleasure at the free, frank, clear, and definite interchange of information achieved in these conferences between the Russian and American military staffs.

Marshal of Aviation Khudyakov and Major General Kuter continued to discuss the air side of the Soviet-American business for about two hours. The principal items covered in the discussion follow:

a. General Kuter gave to Marshal Khudyakov a prepared statement of our detailed requirements in expanding the weather reporting establishment in Siberia. He explained that Admiral Olsen was equipped with the same information and that further arrangements would be made in Moscow through the Military Mission.

b. General Kuter gave to Marshal Khudyakov a detailed statement of our requirements to permit the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey to operate on strategic air objectives which have already been captured by the Russians and those which might be captured in the future. It was agreed that further details would be arranged in Moscow with the Military Mission. Marshal Khudyakov requested that Soviet experts on bomb damage assessment would be permitted to accompany our survey parties. General Kuter stated that this was entirely acceptable, and furthermore, our reports of this survey would be made available to the Soviets on each of the targets within the Soviet area if those reports were desired.

c. General Kuter stated that our broad requirement in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area was for two large air bases, each to accommodate one group of very heavy bombers (B-29 Superfortresses). He stated the requirement for 8500-foot takeoff strips with good approaches, and the heavy construction needed for landing, takeoff, and dispersed parking by 150,000-pound aircraft. General discussion followed on the heavy bomb tonnages and very heavy 100-octane gasoline requirements of B-29 groups. Marshal Khudyakov appeared somewhat shaken by the magnitude of the air base requirement to handle our very heavy bombers. He repeated the probable necessity that we provide the materials to handle aviation gasoline storage and distribution, bomb trailers, and steel planking. Marshal Khudyakov stated that it might be difficult to find sufficient personnel to do the necessary construction and asked if American aviation engineers could be provided if needed for building. General Kuter replied that American aviation engineers would be available.

d. General Kuter stated that our request for air bases asked for the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area or some more suitable area. He explained the fact that two groups of B-29s in the far North in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk area could pour far fewer bombs on Japan than would be possible if much larger numbers of heavy bombers (B-17 and B-24) were based in the Vladivostok area within range of Japanese targets. General Kuter made it clear that he would not prejudice the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk decision by raising the issue of the bases in the Vladivostok area, and further that it was appreciated that supply difficulties and the requirement to base extensive tactical air forces in the Vladivostok area would probably postpone consideration of that area until after progress had been attained in the ground battle West from Vladivostok. Air Marshal Khudyakov clearly understood the desire not to prejudice other decisions and that Vladivostok probably could not be used as strategic air base area until the Russian ground war with the Japs in Manchuria had progressed, but stated that he was anxious to have heavy bombers attacking Japan and that he would initiate action toward making two bases on the scale of Poltava available to U.S. strategic air units in the Vladivostok area.

e. Marshal Khudyakov stated his requirement for C-54 type transport aircraft and acknowledged the reply that General Kuter could see no chance of providing that type transport. Discussion of C-47s followed and it was agreed that the Army Air Forces would cut down on proposed provision of C-47s to our troop carrier units in order to make additional C-47s available to the Red Air Force. (General Deane has been informed that we can provide an additional 100 C-47s to the Soviets during the first six months of 1945 and can provide 40 per month thereafter. This will more than double any scheduled flow of C-47s to the Red Air Force, and in my opinion, will tax their capacity to absorb transports.)

f. Marshal Khudyakov stated a requirement for four to five hundred single and twin-engine trainers, plus 1500 – 200 to 400 horsepower trainer engines. The engines are for installation in Russian trainers. This was a surprise request. General Kuter replied that single engine primary trainers could be provided if shipping is available and that sympathetic consideration would be given to the request when received in Washington.

g. The current tour of the Army Air Forces Band in the European Theater, and General McNarney’s suggestion that this band might be available to play in Moscow and the Balkan capitals was presented. General Kuter stated that if the Soviets wished to have the band, we would make it available and would request a visit to American bases by a Russian military choral group as a reciprocal gesture. Air Marshal Khudyakov voiced his personal hope that such arrangements could be made and requested that General Deane initiate the matter in writing in Moscow. General Deane will take this action.

h. General Kuter handed to Marshal Khudyakov a formal written statement of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff rejection of the Soviet’s proposal to prohibit strategic air attack on targets near the Russian front without Soviet-American agreement. Marshal Khudyakov inferred that he had pressed the adoption of the agreement reached in the Khudyakov-Portal-Kuter meeting but had been overridden by the General Staff. This matter also will be handled by the Military Mission in Moscow.

This meeting concluded in a friendly tone with the statement that the airmen can get along all right, but whatever the nationality, the airmen cannot guarantee agreement by General Staffs.

(Dictated to and transcribed by S/Sgt. Arthur Miller. General Kuter’s notes and Sgt. Miller’s shorthand notes have been destroyed.)

L. S. KUTER
Major General, USA

Three (3) copies originally prepared, with distribution made to the individuals indicated below:
Admiral Leahy -- No. 1
General Hill -- No. 2
General Kuter -- No. 3

Three (3) additional copies prepared, with distribution to the individuals indicated below:
General Marshall -- No. 4
Admiral King -- No. 5
General Hull -- No. 6

[NormanStewart]

Memorandum of Conversation

Yalta, 9 February 1945
Top secret

Memorandum for the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Subject: CONFERENCE WITH RUSSIAN STAFF

On the afternoon of Friday, February 9, General Antonov orally gave the following answers to the eleven questions propounded by the United States Chiefs of Staff the previous afternoon.

To the First Question – (Changes in projected operations). No change, except for delay in transfer of troops which it had been planned to get under way the first of the year. These troops are now engaged in the Central Sector on the Eastern Front, therefore the delay.

To the Second Question – (Necessity for Pacific Supply route). Marshal Stalin stated the Pacific Sea supply route will be required particularly for the delivery of food stuffs and petroleum products. Some air transport will probably be needed but due to its small carrying capacity the sea route is of first importance.

To the Third Question – (U.S. Airbases). Aviation bases in the Komsomolsk-Nikolaevsk region will be given the United States Air Forces. Reconnaissances can now be made.

To the Fourth Question – (U.S. Defenses Kamchatka). Because Kamchatka is very far from the mainland United States assistance there will be very helpful.

To the Fifth Question – (Soviet construction for U.S.). When it is finally decided in exactly what places and what types of construction are required for the United States Air Forces in the district mentioned in the third question, the Russians will be able to carry out this construction for the United States forces. Assistance in the way of matériel is very desirable—gasoline tankage, knock-down buildings, etc.

To the Sixth Question – (Kamchatka Survey party). With regard to the reconnaissance of the Kamchatka region we ask you to arrange for the departure of the party only at the very last moment because under present conditions it is impossible to make the reconnaissance in secrecy. This does not apply to the reconnaissance of the Amur River district.

To the Seventh Question – (Occupation of Sakhalin). The Russians will take the southern half of Sakhalin Island considering this should be one of the first operations.

(Opening of the Straits of La Perouse). Answer is the same as yesterday. The Russians will do this.

To the Eighth Question – (Moscow Planning). Marshal Stalin stated that “From our side we shall fulfill your desires to carry on the planning vigorously.”

To the Ninth Question – (Effect of weather on operations). From a ground force point of view the most difficult conditions will be experienced in the thaws and floods in April and May and although June is a favorable month, July and August are undesirable. As far as the ground forces are concerned weather will be most favorable in September, October and November. At sea weather is favorable in July, August and September.

To the Tenth Question – (Additional weather stations). Arrangements will be made to open additional stations if the details will be presented to the Russian authorities.

General Antonov expressed thanks for the information already given to him regarding the movements of Divisions to the Eastern Front and requested again that the Russian Staff be provided at the earliest moment with any information we might have regarding German concentrations and planned counterattacks.

General Marshall informed General Antonov that arrangements were being made to give General Deane a daily routine report covering all such details of information in our possession, that if the character of the information or the details regarding it were not of a character satisfactory to General Antonov he would please notify General Deane accordingly and we would endeavor to meet his wishes.

General Marshall also informed General Antonov that he had discussed this matter with Field Marshal Brooke who is undertaking the moment he returns to London arrangements amplifying the information now being transmitted and expediting it; furthermore that instructions to this end had already been dispatched.

General Marshall then asked General Antonov if the United States Chiefs of Staff estimate was correct in the opinion of the Russians that if the Japanese obtained any intimation of the Russian concentration and intention in the Far East, they themselves would launch an immediate offensive. General Antonov replied in the affirmative.

General Marshall then asked General Antonov how long a period was required for the concentration of additional troops and supplies on the Eastern Front and was told that three months was the desired period. General Antonov also stated that supplies, fuel and such were already being shipped but that the divisions could only go upon the completion of hostilities in Germany and then would be rushed. He stated that the equipment of the divisions would have to accompany them. It could not be sent in advance.

General Antonov requested that we keep the Russian Staff informed as to the deployment of the Japanese forces, particularly as regards Manchuria and as to the general progress of events in the Pacific.

[NormanStewart]

Sixth plenary meeting, 4:00 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
President Roosevelt	Prime Minister Churchill	Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Hopkins	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Vyshmsky
Mr. Byrnes	Sir Edward Bridges	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Harriman	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Wilson	Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Dixon	Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Bohlen	Major Birse

Bohlen Minutes

Leningrad, February 9, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

The President said he understood the Foreign Ministers had another report to make, and he would ask Mr. Stettinius, who presided today, to give it.

Mr. Stettinius then reported on the results of the discussion concerning the Polish question as follows:

The Foreign Ministers discussed at length the Polish Governmental question on the basis of a memorandum submitted by the American Delegation. This memorandum, in accordance with Mr. Molotov’s proposal, agreed to drop the question of the creation of a Presidential Committee.

With respect to reaching a formula on the question of the Polish Government, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to present to Marshal Stalin certain new considerations advanced in the American memorandum before making a final statement. It was decided to continue discussion of this question at a later date and to report that the three Foreign Ministers thus far had not reached an agreement on the matter.

It was decided, at Mr. Churchill’s request, that the Polish question would be discussed before Mr. Stettinius proceeded with the balance of his report.

Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation accepted as a basis of discussion the proposal put forward this morning at the meeting by Mr. Stettinius. He said the Soviet Delegation was very anxious to come to an agreement and he believed that this could be done with certain amendments to Mr. Stettinius’ proposal. First, he offered an amendment which dealt with the first sentence of the formula. He suggested that in place of the sentence in Mr. Stettinius’ draft that the following be substituted:

The present Provisional Government of Poland should be reorganized on a wider democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad, and in this connection this government would be called the National Provisional Government of Poland.

He added that the next two sentences remained unchanged, but he had a slight amendment to the last sentence, namely that the words “non-Fascist and anti-Fascist” be added before the words “democratic parties.” He then said that he felt the last sentence dealing with the responsibilities of the Ambassadors of the three Governments in Warsaw to observe and report on the carrying out of the free elections should be eliminated since he felt certain this would be offensive to the Poles and would needlessly complicate the discussions. He said that it was the first duty of Ambassadors anyway to observe and report, and therefore no such statement is necessary. He concluded that with these slight amendments Mr. Stettinius’ proposal made this morning was acceptable.

Mr. Molotov said he had one more request, and that was that the Subasic-Tito agreement in regard to Yugoslavia would be put into effect. He said that the Prime Minister, in messages to Marshal Stalin, had urged this, that there had been a series of delays, and he felt that agreement should be reached here. He felt that agreement should be reached here at this conference to put this agreement immediately into effect irrespective of the wishes of the King.

The Prime Minister replied he thought that the Yugoslavia question was virtually settled and would take no time, but he thought it better to proceed immediately to discuss the Polish question. He said he was glad to see that an advance had been made at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers and to hear Mr. Molotov’s proposal on the urgent, immediate and painful problem of Poland. He said he wished to make some general suggestions that he hoped would not affect the movements the President had in mind. He said that here, in a general atmosphere of agreement, we should not put our feet in the stirrups and ride off. He said that he felt it would be a great mistake to hurry this question – it is better to take a few days of latitude than to endanger bringing the ship into port. He said it was a great mistake to take hurried decisions on these grave matters. He felt he must study the Polish proposals before giving any opinion.

The President then proposed that Mr. Stettinius should finish his report on the meeting of Foreign Ministers this morning and then the conference would adjourn for half an hour in order to study Mr. Molotov’s amendments to the Polish proposals.

Marshal Stalin and the Prime Minister agreed.

The Prime Minister repeated that he felt that this great prize should not be imperilled by too much haste, and he definitely did not want to leave this conference without an agreement on the subject, which he felt to be the most important we had before us.

Mr. Stettinius then read the following report of the meeting of Foreign Ministers on the results of their discussions on reparations:

The American Delegation submitted a draft proposal on the basic principles of exacting reparations from Germany for study and recommendation by the Moscow Reparations Commission.

Agreement was reached on the first two points relative to which countries should receive reparations, and to the types of reparations in kind Germany should pay.

The Soviet and American Delegations reached agreement on the wording of the third (final) point to the effect that the Reparations Commission should consider in its initial studies as a basis for discussion the suggestion of the Soviet Government, that the total sum of the reparations in accordance with the points (a) and (b) of the preceding paragraph, should be twenty billion dollars and that 50% of it should go to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Eden reserved his position to await instructions from his Government.

The Soviet Delegation stated that reparations payments would be based upon 1938 prices, having possibly in mind increases of 10 to 15% on the prices of the items delivered.

Mr. Stettinius then reported on the results of the discussion at the meeting of Foreign Ministers on the matter of providing machinery in the World Organization for dealing with territorial trusteeships and dependent areas, as follows:

It was agreed that the five Governments which will have permanent seats on the Security Council should consult each other prior to the United Nations Conference [on] providing machinery in the World Charter for dealing with territorial trusteeship and dependent areas.

The Prime Minister interrupted with great vigor to say that he did not agree with one single word of this report on trusteeships. He said that he had not been consulted nor had he heard of this subject up to now. He said that under no circumstances would he ever consent to forty or fifty nations thrusting interfering fingers into the life’s existence of the British Empire. As long as he was Minister, he would never yield one scrap of their heritage. He continued in this vein for some minutes.

Mr. Stettinius explained that this reference to the creation of machinery was not intended to refer to the British Empire, but that it had in mind particularly dependent areas which would be taken out of enemy control, for example, the Japanese islands in the Pacific. He said that it was felt that provision had to be made for machinery to handle this question of trusteeship for dependent areas taken from the enemy and he repeated that this was not intended to refer to the British Empire.

The Prime Minister accepted Mr. Stettinius’ explanation but remarked it would be better to say it did not refer to the British Empire. He added that Great Britain did not desire any territorial aggrandizement but had no objection if the question of trusteeship was to be considered in relation to enemy territory. He asked how Marshal Stalin would feel if the suggestion was made that the Crimea should be internationalized for use as a summer resort.

Marshal Stalin said he would be glad to give the Crimea as a place to be used for meetings of the three powers.

Mr. Stettinius then completed reading the report of the meeting of Foreign Ministers, as follows:

Trusteeships (continued)

It was also agreed that this subject should be discussed at the United Nations Conference itself.

The Sub-Committee appointed yesterday is continuing its work and will report to the Foreign Ministers today. This report will include matters pertaining to the form of the invitation to the forthcoming Conference. This subject was discussed at today’s meeting, and there appears to be an identity of views thereon.

Iran

Sufficient time had not elapsed to permit the Soviet Delegation to give proper study to a paper submitted by Mr. Eden on this question. The subject was consequently not discussed.

Yugoslavia

On the proposal of the Chairman, it was agreed that representatives of Mr. Eden and Mr. Molotov should be appointed to draw up a statement on the Yugoslav situation.

There was also agreement that before the termination of the Crimean Conference it would be desirable that agreement should be reached on the execution of the Subasic-Tito agreement.

The Prime Minister then asked if the Soviet Government had agreed to the two amendments proposed by Mr. Eden in regard to the Subasic-Tito agreement.

Mr. Molotov replied that it was a question of putting the agreement speedily into effect and that amendments meant more delays. He said that it would be better to ask Tito and Subasic concerning the amendments after the agreement had gone into effect.

The Prime Minister inquired whether it was too much to ask that legislative acts of the temporary authorities be subject to confirmation by democratic processes.

Marshal Stalin said that delays were very undesirable and that if the British proposed two more amendments the Soviet Government might propose some of their own. In the meantime, the government of Yugoslavia was held in the balance.

The Prime Minister said you couldn’t say this, as Tito was a dictator and could do what he wants.

Marshal Stalin replied that Tito is not a dictator but the head of a national committee without any clear government, and this is not a good situation.

Mr. Eden replied that it was not a question of amendments before the agreement went into force but merely that this conference request that they be adopted. He said that Subasic was going to ask for it anyway and as Tito would agree everything would be all right.

Marshal Stalin said the first of the British amendments provided that any former members of the Skupshtina who had not collaborated with the Germans should be included in the anti-Fascist Vetch, and the second suggested that all legislative acts of the anti-Fascist Vetch should be confirmed by a regularly elected body. He said that he agreed with these amendments and found them good, but first he would like the government to be formed and then propose the amendments to it.

Mr. Eden remarked that he felt if we could agree here on the amendments then we could ask Tito after the agreement was in force to adopt them.

Marshal Stalin agreed to this proposal. He added that he thought it would be a good idea to send a telegram stating the desires of the three powers to have the agreement put into effect irrespective of the King’s wishes.

The Prime Minister and Mr. Eden explained that the question of the King had been settled and anyway wasn’t important, and Subasic was on his way to Yugoslavia, unless weather had prevented him, to put the agreement into effect. The Prime Minister added that he thought we should here agree to advise the adoption of the amendments.

Marshal Stalin said that he had already agreed, and as a man of his word he would not go back on it.

There was then a half-hour intermission for the study of the Polish proposals.

The President said that after studying Mr. Molotov’s amendment we were now very near agreement and it was only a matter of drafting. He said that for those governments which still recognized the London government the use of the words “Provisional Government” was somewhat difficult, and he felt that the first words of Mr. Molotov’s amendment might read “The Government now operating in Poland.” He said he felt it was very important for him in the United States that there be some gesture made for the six million Poles there indicating that the United States was in some way involved with the question of freedom of elections, and he therefore felt that the last sentence concerning the reports of the Ambassadors was important. He repeated that he felt, however, that it was only a matter of words and details and the three Foreign Ministers might meet tonight to discuss it.

The Prime Minister said he agreed with the President that progress had been made, but he felt that the draft might be tied up by the Foreign Ministers this afternoon. He said that he had two points now that he wished to emphasize. He felt it was desirable to mention in the beginning the new situation that had been created as a result of the liberation of Poland by the Red Army which called for a government more broadly based. He said this might be an ornament but nevertheless an important ornament. He said the second question was more important and related to the last sentence of the United States draft. He said he would make an appeal to Marshal Stalin in that one of the great difficulties in the Polish situation was the lack of accurate information, and we were thus called on to make a decision of great responsibility on the basis of inadequate information. He said that we know that there are bitter feelings among the Poles and fierce language had been used by Osobka-Morawski in regard to the London government, and that he understood the Lublin government had declared its intention to try as traitors the members of the Polish Home Army and the underground forces. He said these reports caused great anxiety and perplexity in England, and he hoped these two points would be considered with Marshal Stalin’s usual patience and kindness.

The Prime Minister continued that he personally would welcome observers of the three powers in any area where they appeared needed. He therefore felt that the last sentence of the United States draft in regard to responsibilities of the Ambassadors was very important. He said that he understood that Tito would have no objection to foreign observers when elections were to be held in Yugoslavia, and the British would welcome observers from the United States and the Soviet Union when elections were held in Greece, and the same would apply to Italy. He said these were not idle requests, since, for example, he knew in Egypt that whatever government held the elections won. He recalled that King Farouk for this reason refused to permit Nahas Pasha to hold an election while the latter was prime minister.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he understood the Egyptian elections where he had heard that the very greatest politicians spent their time buying each other, but this could not be compared with Poland since there was a high degree of literacy in Poland. He inquired as to the literacy in Egypt, and neither the Prime Minister or Mr. Eden had this information at hand.

The Prime Minister remarked that he did not mean to compare Poland with Egypt, but he had to give the House of Commons real assurance that free elections would be held. For instance, would Mikolajczyk be allowed to take part in these elections?

Marshal Stalin remarked that Mikolajczyk was a member of the Peasant Party which wasn’t a Fascist party and therefore he could take part in the elections.

The Prime Minister suggested this question be considered by the Foreign Ministers tonight.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he thought this was a matter which should be discussed in the presence of the Poles.

The Prime Minister said he thought this was a matter which was necessary to carry through and that it was important to assure the House of Commons that free elections would be held in Poland, …

Marshal Stalin, in reply to this observation, said they were good people and in olden times many of them were scientists. He mentioned Copernicus in this connection. He admitted that they were still quarrelsome and there were still some Fascist elements in Poland, and that was why “non-Fascist, etc.” had been added to the term “democratic parties.”

The President said he would like to add one word. He felt that the elections was the crux of the whole matter, and since it was true, as Marshal Stalin had said, that the Poles were quarrelsome people not only at home but also abroad, he would like to have some assurance for the six million Poles in the United States that these elections would be freely held, and he said he was sure if such assurance were present that elections would be held by the Poles there would be no doubt as to the sincerity of the agreement reached here.

Marshal Stalin then said he had before him the Declaration on Liberated Europe, and Mr. Molotov had one small change to propose. He said that in the fourth paragraph, after the part about consulting the other United Nations, he suggested adding the following:

In this connection, support will be given to the political leaders of those countries who have taken an active part in the struggle against the German invaders.

Marshal Stalin remarked that with this slight amendment he found the Declaration acceptable.

The President pointed out that the Declaration would of course apply to any areas or countries where needed as well as to Poland.

The Prime Minister said he did not dissent from the President’s proposed Declaration as long as it was clearly understood that the reference to the Atlantic Charter did not apply to the British Empire. He said he had already made plain in the House of Commons that as far as the British Empire was concerned the principles already applied. He said he had given Mr. Willkie a copy of his statement on this subject.

The President inquired if that was what had killed Mr. Willkie.

The President said that in earlier drafts France had been included but was now absent.

Marshal Stalin remarked that three powers were better than four.

The Prime Minister said it might be possible to ask France to associate itself with the Declaration.

The President suggested that this matter be considered by the three Foreign Ministers tonight.

Marshal Stalin said that the Prime Minister need have no anxiety that Mr. Molotov’s amendment was designed to apply to Greece.

The Prime Minister said he was not anxious about Greece – that he merely desired that everybody should have a fair chance and do his duty.

Marshal Stalin said he thought it would have been very dangerous if he had allowed other forces than his own to go into Greece.

The Prime Minister said he would welcome a Soviet observer in Greece.

Marshal Stalin said he had complete confidence in British policy in Greece.

The Prime Minister expressed gratification in this statement.

The Prime Minister then said that they should touch on, at this conference, the question of war criminals – that is, those whose crimes had no geographical limitation.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether his amendment to the Declaration was acceptable.

The President replied that he thought it should be considered by the Foreign Ministers.

Marshal Stalin said that we could then consider it agreed that the Tito-Subasic agreement should go into effect immediately.

The Prime Minister concurred.

Marshal Stalin made some reference to sending a telegram to Tito but the suggestion was not pursued.

The Prime Minister said that he personally had drafted the Declaration on German atrocities issued by the Moscow Conference which dealt with the subject of the main criminals whose crimes had no geographical location. He said it was an egg that he had laid himself and he thought a list of the major criminals of this category should be drawn up here. He said he thought they should be shot once their identity is established.

Marshal Stalin asked about Hess.

The Prime Minister said he thought that events would catch up with Hess. He said he believed these men should be given a judicial trial.

Marshal Stalin replied in the affirmative. He then asked if the war criminal question applied to prisoners of war.

The Prime Minister replied that it did if they had violated the laws of war. He said that we should merely have an exchange of views here and no publicity should be given to the matter.

Marshal Stalin inquired if the offensive on the Western Front had begun.

The Prime Minister said yes – about 100,000 British launched an attack yesterday morning and made an advance of about 3,000 yards over a five-mile front. He said the defense had been weak except in two villages, and were now in contact with the defenses of the Siegfried Line. He said the second wave, of the United States 9th Army, was to start tomorrow. He added that this offensive was to continue and grow in intensity.

The meeting then adjourned until four o’clock tomorrow.

[NormanStewart]

Tripartite meeting on the draft agreement regarding liberated prisoners of war and civilians, 4:30 p.m.

Vorontsov Villa, USSR

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
General Deane	Admiral Archer	Mr. Novikov Assistant
Mr. Page

Memorandum of Conversation

Alupka, February 9, 1945, 4:30 p.m.
Top secret

Subject: EXAMINATION OF THE DRAFT RELATING TO PRISONERS OF WAR AND CIVILIANS LIBERATED BY THE SOVIET AND ALLIED ARMIES

Preamble

No comment.

Article I

No comment.

Article II paragraph 1

Mr. Novikov requested that the words “undertake to follow all” be replaced by the words “at the same time take the necessary steps to implement.”

Article II, paragraph 3

Mr. Novikov requested that the words “notifying the competent Soviet or Allied authorities” be replaced by “effected as a rule by agreement or in any case only after notification to the competent Soviet or Allied authorities.”

Article III

Mr. Novikov said that he would prefer the text of Article III of the Soviet draft. This reads as follows:

3. The competent British and Soviet authorities will supply liberated Soviet citizens and British subjects with food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the authorities at the other side at places agreed upon between the sides on the following basis:

   (a) Ex-prisoners of war shall be provided with all forms of supply (stores and food) on a basis laid down respectively for privates, non-commissioned officers and officers.

   (b) Civilians will be supplied on a basis laid down for privates.

The parties will not mutually demand compensation for these or other services which their authorities may respectively supply to liberated Soviet citizens or British subjects.

It will be noticed that the Soviet draft makes no mention of UNRRA or other relief agencies and makes special provision of supplies to civilians.

In endeavoring to find a compromise the British suggested a draft omitting the first three lines of Article III (up to the parenthetical statement) and revise the last sentence of the first paragraph to read as follows:

The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall make distinction between military rank but shall apply to liberated civilians and liberated members of the respective forces.

The Soviets explained that the reference to UNRRA was superfluous since there was nothing in the agreement which would bar UNRRA or any other relief agency from operating. They said they would refer the British re-draft to their Government.

Article IV

The Soviets requested the insertion of the words “in agreement with the other party” twice after the words “liberty to use.”

Article V

The British wish to add the words “except for the cases of payment of Lira in Italy which shall be subject to future discussions” at the end of the second paragraph.

The Russians stated that they thought this insertion should read “except for the cases of payment of Lira,, and, in Italy, Rumania, and Bulgaria which shall be the subject of future discussions.”

Article VI

The British pointed out that they had added a new sentence which had not as yet been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This sentence which comes at the end of the article, reads as follows: “Any liberated member of the respective forces who is unwilling to perform such will be exercised under similar supervision.”

Article VII

No comment.

Article VIII

No comment.

In addition to the above comments, it was considered advisable to include an additional article reading to the effect that “the agreement enters into force upon signature.”

The British representative also stated that his Government desired to exchange notes with the Soviet Government concerning nationals of other countries, (Belgium, Holland, Poland), in British uniform who were liberated by the Russian armies.

The question also came up as to whether a tri-lateral or two bilateral agreements should be signed. The Russians indicated that they were prepared to sign either document.

It was suggested that a further meeting be called tomorrow at 3:30 p.m. and that endeavors be made to have the documents signed by Mr. Molotov, Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius no later than Sunday.

[Attachment]

Revised British Wording, Feb. 9.

Article 6

X [Ex-] Prisoners of War (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreement to be reached between the competent Soviet and

{United States/British authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between these authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their officers. Any liberated member of the respective forces who is unwilling to perform such work will be exercised under similar supervision.

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (February 9, 1945)

Background of news –
What they have done

By Bertram Benedict

This is the eighth great conference among the Allies. The enumeration includes the Moscow Conference, although it was of the foreign ministers, not of the heads of states. The enumeration excludes various joint conferences – such as those between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill in Washington, between Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin in Moscow – which seem to have been held chiefly to implement old decisions rather than to reach new decisions of wide import.

The previous seven great joint conferences have been:

• August 1941, on the Atlantic, between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. It produced the eight principles of the Atlantic Charter. The United States was not yet a belligerent, although aiding Britain.

• January 1943, at Casablanca, between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, who conferred also with Generals de Gaulle and Giraud.

• August 1943, at Quebec, between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill.

• October-November 1943, at Moscow, among the foreign ministers.

• November 1943, at Cairo, among Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek.

• November-December 1943, at Tehran, among Mr. Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin.

• September 1944, at Quebec, between Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill.

From three of these seven conferences – the one at Casablanca and the two at Quebec – the official statements said little except that military decisions had been agreed upon.

The important principles

The far-reaching principles produced by the other four great inter-Allied conferences so far can be thus summarized:

• Unconditional surrender of the Axis powers.

• No territorial or other aggrandizement, no territorial changes against the will of the peoples concerned. rights of all people to choose their own forms of government (Atlantic Charter).

• Restoration to China of all Chinese territory seized by Japan in the past, freedom of Korea, expulsion of Japan from other territory seized by Japan, including the mandated Pacific islands (Cairo).

• International organization, open to all states, to maintain peace (Atlantic Charter, Moscow, Tehran).

• Equal access, with respect to existing obligations, of all states to the vital raw materials and trade of the world (Atlantic Charter).

• Collaboration for better labor standards, economic advancement, social security, freedom from fear and want (Atlantic Charter).

• Freedom of the seas (Atlantic Charter).

• Disarmament of aggressor states, general reduction im armaments (Atlantic Charter, Moscow).

• Non-use of military forces within boundaries of other states after the war except for enforcing the peace settlements and preserving peace, law and order and security (Moscow).

• All measures deemed necessary to prevent violation of the terms imposed on the enemy (Moscow).

• Freedom and self-government for Italy, suppression of Italian Fascism, full consultation on Italian problems (Moscow).

• Freedom for Austria and consideration in the Austrian settlement for any Austrian contribution to its own freedom (Moscow).

• Assistance to Iran during and after the war and maintenance of Iran’s sovereignty and territorial integrity (Tehran).

• Trial and punishment of German war criminals, military or civilian, at the scene of their crimes, wherever committed and of arrest and transfer “to justice” of Italian Fascist “chiefs and army generals” charged with war crimes (Moscow).

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (February 9, 1945)

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 10:30 p.m.

Yusupov Palace, USSR

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Harriman	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Matthews	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Gusev
Mr. Bohlen	Mr. Roberts	Mr. Gromyko
	Mr. Allen	Mr. Golunsky

[NormanStewart]

Log of the Trip

Friday, February 9, 1945

1230: The President attended a plenary meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Livadia. Present were:

For the U.S.	For Great Britain
The President.	The Prime Minister.
Admiral Leahy.	Field Marshal Brooke.
General Marshall.	Air Marshal Portal.
Admiral King.	General Ismay.
General Kuter.	Admiral Cunningham.
General McFarland.	Brigadier Cornwall-Jones.

1330: Lunch at Livadia. – The President, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Boettiger, Mrs. Oliver, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Admiral Leahy and Justice Byrnes.

1600: The President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin and members of the American, British and Soviet Delegations met in the courtyard of Livadia where they sat for still and motion pictures.

1615: The Sixth Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present:

For the U.S.	For Great Britain	For the USSR
The President.	The Prime Minister.	Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius.	Mr. Eden.	Mr. Molotov.
Admiral Leahy.	Mr. Cadogan.	Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Hopkins.	Mr. Clark Kerr.	Mr. Maisky.
Justice Byrnes.	Mr. Jebb.	Mr. Gousev.
Mr. Harriman.	Mr. Bridges.	Mr. Gromyko.
Mr. Matthews.	Mr. Wilson.	Mr. Pavlov.
Mr. Hiss.	Mr. Dixon.
Mr. Bohlen.	Major Birse.

The meeting adjourned at 1950.

1930: Lieutenant (j.g.) W. K. Kloock, USNR, White House courier, arrived at Livadia with mail from Washington. He made the journey from Washington in three days.

2030: Dinner at Livadia. – The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Major General John E. Hull, Major General Kuter, Fleet Admiral Leahy and Vice Admiral C. M. Cooke.

[NormanStewart]

Völkischer Beobachter (February 10, 1945)

Wir und die Dreierkonferenz

vb. Wien, 9. Februar – Eine Reihe von Tagen ist schon vergangen, seitdem jene drei Männer, die für diesen Krieg und damit für alles Leid, das durch ihn über die Menschen gekommen ist, verantwortlich sind, ihre Konferenz im Schwarzen Meer begonnen haben, aber was man bisher davon gehört hat, War spärlich und ziemlich nichtssagend. Das will nicht heißen, dass wir etwa ungeduldig auf das „Ergebnis“ dieser Besprechungen warten würden, im Gegenteil, denn wir halten uns nur an die nackten Tatsachen. In dieser Hinsicht ist aber zweierlei Interessantes festzustellen.

Erstens ist bemerkenswert, dass diese Konferenz an sich scheinbar dringendst notwendig war, denn so leicht ist der schwerbewegliche Mann des Weißen Hauses nicht zu einer so weiten Reise zu veranlassen. Was Churchill betrifft, so sind genug Meldungen bekannt und veröffentlicht worden, die erkennen ließen, wie sehr er sich um das Zustandekommen der Konferenz bemüht hat, wie dienstbeflissen er Stalin sagen ließ, dass er „an jedem Ort und zu jeder Zeit bereit“ stünde. Das ist ein vielsagendes, ja untrügliches Zeichen dafür, dass es England sehr eilig und sehr nötig hat, irgendwie politisch mit erfolgversprechenden Ereignissen aufwarten zu können.

Die Zustände in Belgien und Frankreich, vor allem aber in Griechenland sprechen für die Welt eine zu deutliche Sprache von dem Tiefstand der politischen Ebene, auf die das englische Weltreich herabgesunken ist, seitdem Churchill das Steuer führt. So dumm und verblendet sind auch die Briten nicht, dass sie das Verhängnisvolle dieser Entwicklung nicht begriffen hätten. Die weihnachtliche „Siegesfeier“ ist eine Churchillsche Illusion geblieben und das ununterbrochene deutsche Vergeltungsfeuer auf London und Südengland trägt kaum dazu bei, solchen Illusionen für einen absehbaren späteren Zeitpunkt neuen Auftrieb zu geben. Im Gegenteil, wir wissen aus den Nachrichten, die von der Feindseite selbst verbreitet werden, dass das ehemals so stolze England schon mit sehr viel Wasser kochen muss…

Zweitens lässt sich aus der Tatsache, dass zum „Konferenzort“ die Wasser des Schwarzen Meeres gewählt wurden, von jedem Schuljungen die logische Folgerung ableiten, dass hier Stalins Wunsch der Befehl war, dem Roosevelt und Churchill Folge leisten mussten. Der Massenansturm der Bolschewisten gegen den deutschen Osten hat. Stalins bisher schon bestandenes politisches Übergewicht über seine beiden Komplicen derart verstärkt, dass sie einfach nur mehr Befehlsempfänger geworden sind. Was aber die Bolschewisten mit ihren Panzerarmeen erreichen wollen, nämlich die Niederringung des deutschen Widerstandes und die Brechung der deutschen Kampfkraft und Kampfmoral, das wollen Roosevelt und Churchill mit dem alten Betrug von 1918 Wilsonscher Prägung erreichen und so das Ihrige zum erhofften „Siege“ beitragen, um damit bei der Teilung der Beute noch halbwegs gut abzuschneiden.

Das deutsche Volk aber ist gewarnt, ja geradezu immun gegen das Gift scheinheiliger Versprechungen. Wir wissen, was uns blühen würde, wenn wir schwach würden, wenn wir die Waffen aus der Hand legten, ehe nicht Leben und Freiheit uns in unserem Sinne gesichert sind. Wir sahen, und sehen an dem Beispiel der Wehrlosen, die im Westen dem amerikanischen „Eroberer“ und im Osten den Bolschewisten in die Hände fielen, was das Schicksal ist, das sie uns im Falle ihres Sieges zu bereiten gedenken. Was sie uns angekündigt hatten, haben sie in beiden Fällen voll und ganz wahr gemacht. Wenn sie jetzt in lockenden Tönen vom „Weltfrieden“ reden wollten, kann uns das keinen Eindruck mehr machen, denn wir hatten uns, wie gesagt, nur an die nackten Tatsachen. Und die sind von vornherein der klarste Beweis für die lügenhaften Verkündungen, die man auf den Wellen des Schwarzen Meeres zusammenbraute. Schon in Teheran gedachte man sich mit einer „Botschaft“ an das deutsche Volk zu wenden und hat dann doch in letzter Minute davon Abstand genommen, weil die Sache zu aussichtslos erschien.

Noch leben ja zu viele Zeugen der Folgen des Novembers 1918. Die Deutschen in den Donau- und Alpengauen haben sich die Erinnerung an die Auswirkungen des Vertrages von St. Germain gut bewahrt. Sie war wohl etwas verblasst in den Jahren des harten täglichen Lebenskampfes, die nachher kamen und von den meisten als eine Art Naturnotwendigkeit hingenommen wurden. Als aber das Großdeutsche Reich geschmiedet war, da ist uns allen erst so richtig aufgegangen, was es heißt, Angehörige und Mitbestimmende eines großen Volksstaates zu sein, eines Staates, der wahrhaft für das Volk selbst und nicht für das Alleinwohl von Geldsäcken oder Gottesgnadenmenschen geschaffen ist.

Viel zu kurz nur war die Zeit, die gerade diesen Gauen gegönnt, war, um den neuen Aufschwung voll zu leben; denn das Komplott der Feinde war schon geschmiedet, die Schlinge, die das Reich erwürgen sollte, von den Juden in der ganzen Welt schon geknüpft. Aber gerade weil wir wissen, wie die wahre Freiheit eines tüchtigen und arbeitsamen Volkes beschaffen ist, was sie dem einzelnen bietet und gibt, gerade darum gewinnen wir auch aus uns selbst die Kraft, jedem feindlichen Ansturm zu widerstehen, in Zähigkeit und Beharrlichkeit auszuhalten, bis wir unsere Freiheit wiedergewonnen haben, ungeachtet der Opfer, die der Kampf uns noch auf erlogen macht.

Darum wird auch jener neue Feldzug unserer Feinde, der jetzt von dieser Dreierkonferenz ausgeht, weder mit den militärischen noch mit den agitatorischen Waffen zu dem vom Feind erstrebten Ziele führen, weil es lediglich an uns liegt, ihn abzuwehren mit jener unwiderstehlichen Kraft und Stärke, die in der deutschen Einheit und Einigkeit liegt. Ganz abgesehen von jenen militärischen Mitteln, die für uns noch im Schoss der nächsten Zukunft liegen…

A. E. T.

[NormanStewart]

Sowjetblatt bestätigt Vernichtungspläne

Stockholm, 9. Februar – Die sowjetische Iswestija nimmt in einem Kommentar zu der Dreierkonferenz Stellung und legt dabei eine Offenherzigkeit an den Tag, die alle Zweifel aus der Welt schafft.

Die Iswestija fasst in einem Satz das Endziel der bolschewistischen Politik gegenüber Deutschland zusammen und legt mit brutaler Ehrlichkeit den Plan vor, den der Kreml zu verwirklichen erstrebt, falls es gelänge, Deutschland in die Knie zu zwingen.

„In der Endphase des Krieges wird die Todesstrafe, die von der gesamten freiheitsliebenden Menschheit über Deutschland verhängt wurde, durchgeführt werden,“ so schreibt Iswestija.

An diesem Satz gibt es kein Deuteln: Moskaus Ziel ist die Ausrottung des deutschen Volkes, das wird hier noch einmal klar und unmissverständlich von dem führenden bolschewistischen Blatt bestätigt.

Es ist kennzeichnend, dass das englische Reuters-Büro von dem Iswestija-Kommentar gerade diesen einen Satz in die Welt verbreitet. Das bedeutet, dass England das bolschewistische Kriegsziel gutheißt und mit allen Mitteln unterstützt. Diese Erkenntnis ist für uns Deutsche nicht neu, aber jede Bestätigung gibt uns immer wieder die Gewissheit, dass wir mit einer geschlossenen Feindfront zu rechnen haben, wenn es sich darum handelt, Deutschland zu vernichten, das deutsche Volk zu dezimieren und seine Männer als Arbeitssklaven zu deportieren.

Unsere Antwort auf diesen Knechtungs- und Ausrottungsplan haben wir dem Gegner tausendmal ins Gesicht geschleudert. Was auch immer Stalin und seine plutokratischen Komplicen Roosevelt und Churchill bei ihrem Dreiertreffen aushandeln mögen oder mochten, es wird nichts an den Feindplänen ändern und wir werden dem nur noch eine fanatischere Entschlossenheit entgegenstellen. Dass wir um unser Leben kämpfen, ist uns gerade in den letzten Wochen, wo die bolschewistische Flut gegen das Deutsche Reich anbrandet, klarer denn je geworden, dass wir aber diesen Kampf bis zur letzten Entscheidung durchstehen, darüber dürfte es im Feindlager keinen Zweifel geben.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (February 10, 1945)

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon

Vorontsov Villa, USSR

	Present
United States	United Kingdom	Soviet Union
Secretary Stettinius	Foreign Secretary Eden	Foreign Commissar
Mr. Harriman	Sir Alexander Cadogan	Molotov
Mr. Matthews	Sir Archibald Clark Kerr	Mr. Vvshinskv
Mr. Hiss	Mr. Jebb	Mr. Maisky
Mr. Page	Mr. Dixon	Mr. Gusev
	Major Theakstone	Mr. Gromyko
		Mr. Pavlov

Page Minutes

Alupka, February 10, 1945, noon
Top secret

Subjects:

1. THE POLISH FORMULA
2. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE
3. YUGOSLAVIA
4. REPARATIONS
5. COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE
6. WORLD ORGANIZATION
7. AUSTRO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER
8. YUGOSLAV-ITALIAN FRONTIER
9. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS
10. IRAN

Mr. Eden, who presided, opened the meeting.

The Polish Formula

Mr. Stettinius stated that the American experts as well as the President had given serious study to the Polish formula and that the American Delegation was prepared to withdraw the last sentence, which Mr. Molotov had objected to, on the understanding that the President would be free to make any statement he felt necessary on Poland relative to his receiving information from his Ambassador on the question.

Later in the conversation Mr. Eden stated that he did not wish to indicate during the conversation on the Polish formula that he agreed with the American proposal to drop this last sentence.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he, of course, preferred the document as it existed. The President, however, was so anxious to reach agreement that he was willing to make this concession.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had several amendments to the formula. He proposed that “as soon as practicable” be changed to “as soon as possible.” He also proposed that the last part of the last paragraph be drafted to read: “the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Government as has been done by the Soviet Union.”

Mr. Stettinius stated that he could not agree with this second change.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that a special situation existed in Poland. The Soviet Government had accorded the Polish Government recognition, whereas, the United States and Great Britain had not.

Mr. Eden said that the Government referred to in the formula was a new government and that it was most necessary that the three Allies move together in recognizing it.

Mr. Stettinius supported Mr. Eden and added that it was vital for public opinion in the United States to adhere to the principle of a new Polish Government.

Mr. Molotov stated that the present situation was a different one and that the document would reflect this difference. He referred to the inadvisability of prejudicing the present situation or raising difficulties in the rear of the Red Army. He suggested that the matter be given consideration and be subsequently discussed. Mr. Molotov later suggested that Mr. Eden make a full report on last night’s and today’s discussion on the Polish situation for submission to the plenary session.

Declaration on Liberated Europe

Mr. Stettinius stated that he had consulted with his experts and with the President on the Declaration on Liberated Areas and that he was obliged to say that the American Government found it impossible to accept the amendment proposed by Mr. Molotov at the Plenary Session of February 9. To do so would cause untold difficulties in United States domestic affairs. The text of this Declaration, with Mr. Molotov’s amendment is attached hereto.

Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to submit a second amendment. He suggested that in the fifth paragraph the words “they will immediately establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration,” be replaced by the words “they will immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultation.”

Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden agreed to this formula.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to the status of Mr. Molotov’s amendment of February 9.

Mr. Molotov agreed that it should be dropped, though he remarked that he thought it very useful in that it might prevent recurrences similar to those in Greece.

Mr. Eden inquired whether the British proposals regarding French association were acceptable.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had not had sufficient time to give full consideration to this proposal. He suggested that it be discussed at the four o’clock meeting.

Mr. Stettinius observed that he approved highly the British proposal and recommended that it be included in the Declaration.

Yugoslavia

Mr. Eden stated that he had been informed that Subasic was due to leave today or tomorrow for Belgrade. The principal question under dispute, as he understood it, has been about the names of the Regents. However, in the British view, there was no reason why this should hold up the execution of the agreement. If Mr. Molotov so desired, Mr. Eden stated that Marshal Stalin’s proposal might be accepted to the effect that a telegram be sent setting forth the views of the Foreign Ministers on the Yugoslav situation.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether any mention should be made of Yugoslavia in the Crimea Conference Communiqué.

Mr. Eden suggested that both courses might be advisable.

Mr. Molotov recalled that Marshal Stalin had suggested that a telegram be sent to Tito and Subasic suggesting that they expedite the coming into force of the agreement.

Mr. Eden stated that he would submit such a draft telegram to the Foreign Ministers for consideration.

Reparations

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to reserve the position of the British Government with respect to pre-war debts and claims. He was in favor of setting up the Reparations Commission as soon as possible.

Mr. Maisky interjected that unless the British agreed to the American draft submitted February 9, the Commission would have no basis, no directives for its work.

Mr. Eden stated that he agreed on the principles involved in the American proposals concerning the immediate withdrawal of property from Germany and the annual contributions. However, he wished to submit a redraft of the proposals.

Mr. Eden stated that reparations should be considered in connection with the dismemberment of Germany. There seemed to be two Russian objectives which were difficult to reconcile – the depletion of German manufacturing capacity and the insuring of German ability to make large payments at a later date. The British were most anxious to avoid conditions in which it would be necessary for them to finance and feed Germany at a later date as a result of reparations. Furthermore, the British would like France on the Moscow Commission from the start. The British Government also felt that the question of labor should be considered by the Moscow Commission and that it would be inadvisable to name any figure for deliveries until the Moscow Commission had started its work. In addition, reparations arrangements should be made without prejudices to the restitution of looted property.

Mr. Molotov agreed to this last statement.

Mr. Maisky stated that Mr. Eden’s reply was very disappointing. Its whole spirit was to take from Germany as little as possible.

Mr. Eden interjected that this was not the case; however, he could say that the Prime Minister did not believe that the Russians would receive anywhere near as much as they hoped for.

Mr. Maisky stated that naturally when the dismemberment of Germany had been decided in a practical form the reparations plan must be adjusted. This problem was considered from its initiation. There was no contradiction. The amount of annual payments were quite possible after the contemplated removals. If Mr. Eden had any doubts the easiest way out was to accept the formula agreed upon by the Americans and Russians yesterday as the basis for discussion and to raise the British proposals in Moscow on this basis. He stated that the question of labor would certainly come up for discussion of the plan during the Commission studies of Germany. He pointed out that the formula did not commit the Allies to the exact figure. Taking into account all considerations advanced by Mr. Eden, Mr. Maisky maintained that the British could easily agree to the formula.

Mr. Eden maintained that the British wished a period shorter than ten years for the reparations payments. They preferred five years.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the ten-year period was merely mentioned as a basis for discussion. It might result that all the capital movements could be effected in seven years. He added that the Soviet Government was not committing itself to ten years or twenty billion dollars.

Mr. Eden inquired why this time limit should then be put in the formula.

Mr. Maisky replied that it was desired as a basis for discussion.

Mr. Eden stated that he would submit an alternative draft and that he hoped that the subject might be discussed at the 4:00 o’clock meeting.

Communiqué on the Crimean Conference

Mr. Molotov inquired whether any thought had been given to the communiqué on the Conference.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the American Delegation was drafting something for the consideration of the Foreign Ministers. He suggested that the first item on the afternoon’s agenda be the question of a communiqué and that the drafting of a communiqué be assigned to the Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden agreed to this suggestion.

World Organization

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to submit a report of the subcommittee.

Mr. Molotov stated that he agreed to both points contained in the report, i.e., regarding the method of consulting France and China and the text of the invitation to the Conference.

Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius also agreed.

Austro-Yugoslav Frontier

Mr. Eden stated that this problem would surely arise and that he did not wish a repetition of “Athens.” He wished to submit a small paper on the question.

Mr. Molotov stated that he would wish to study this paper before discussing it.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he felt that paragraph (b) on page two went beyond the period of occupation and that it might be improved by redrafting.

Yugoslav-Italian Frontier

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to submit a paper on this question. He added that he did not expect to discuss it at the present meeting. A copy of this document is attached.

Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations

In accordance with Mr. Eden’s suggestion, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty of alliance. The British Embassy in Moscow had transmitted to the Narkomindel a note on the Balkan Federation in which it was stressed that such a Federation might include Turkey. This was not an urgent matter at the present time; however there were conversations in progress between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on a treaty of friendship and alliance. The Soviet Government entertained favorable views on this treaty and had informed the British accordingly. The Bulgarians and Yugoslavs were collaborating militarily against the Germans in Yugoslavia. There should, consequently, be no objections to such a treaty.

Mr. Eden stated that this treaty raised the important question of principle. The British held the view that former enemy states should be debarred from entering into treaty relations with other states when they were under an occupational regime and certainly not without the permission of the Allies. Apart from this principle, the British were somewhat anxious concerning the effect of the treaty on reparations which Greece should obtain from Bulgaria. He wished to submit a separate memorandum on this matter.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Foreign Office had received a note from the British to the effect that former enemies under an armistice regime should not have treaty relations with other enemy states. But now it was a question of an ex-enemy and a friendly state. He maintained that the British had stated that they had no objections to treaties between ex-enemy and friendly states.

Mr. Eden questioned this.

Mr. Molotov continued that this principle was also implied in the British proposal concerning a Balkan Federation in which former enemy and friendly states would enter.

Mr. Eden maintained that he did not believe that states under an armistice regime should be permitted to make peace treaties without the permission of the Allies. Furthermore, the British never had in mind a Balkan Federation until the armistice period had terminated.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he was completely in accord with Mr. Eden’s views.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it would not be preferable for the states in question to wait.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had no power to speak for them.

Mr. Eden reminded him that Bulgaria had signed an armistice and was not free to do what it wished.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that this question be discussed by the Ambassadors and Mr. Molotov in Moscow promptly.

Mr. Molotov stated that it might be preferable to postpone discussion of this matter until tomorrow and then to seek agreement.

Iran

Mr. Eden inquired whether Mr. Molotov had considered the British document on Iran.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had nothing to add to what he had said several days ago on the subject.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it would not be advisable to issue a communiqué on Iran.

Mr. Molotov stated that this would be inadvisable.

Mr. Stettinius urged that some reference be made that Iranian problems had been discussed and clarified during the Crimean Conference.

Mr. Molotov stated that he opposed this idea.

Mr. Eden suggested that it be stated that the declaration on Iran had been reaffirmed and reexamined during the present meeting.

Mr. Molotov opposed this suggestion.

[NormanStewart]

Hiss Notes

Alupka, February 10, 1945, noon

Ed. chmn
2/10
For Mins
12.10 p m

ERS asked make statement

We are prepared to withdraw our insistence on the final sentence in the Polish memo, which Mr. Mol. objected to with the understanding that the Pres would be perfectly free to make any statement to the Am. people he might think he had to relative to receiving inform. from his Amb.

Mol. Would like to make a small amend. to yesterday’s text: one cond: as soon as possible

of U.S. & Gt Brit will est. dip. reis, with it as has been done by the Soviet Un

Ed. Objected – It’s to be a new govt

Mol we can leave out “as has been done by the Soviet Un” Ed. But we would all have to recognize it.

Mol. our sit. is diff. from that of U.S. We have already given recog. to present govt

Ed: Yes but this will be a new gov’t

ERS: Advisable that we all move together

Mol: Present sit. being different the doc. must reflect this diff. We quite agree on the future. Let us think about it.

ERS Decl, on Lib. Areas Have discussed Mr. Mol’s proposal Impossible for us to consider amend. Would create untold diffs. for us with respect to our dom, situation

Mol: Then I will propose another amend:

2nd ¶ from the end “they would immed. take measures for carrying out mutual consultation”

Suggests one or other amend.

Ed: An improvement

ERS I’m very favorably impressed

Mol. As to the former amend. Thinks it would be very useless because we don’t wish shots which have occurred in Athens to take place elsewhere

ERS. Sorry, I’m not authorized to consider this amend. any further.

New amend. agreed to

—>Mol Withdraws his former amend.

Ed: One other point. About Fr. sit. Proposed addition of a last ¶

Mol Hasn’t had time to study it, perhaps at 4.00

ERS As stated yesterday, thinks it most desirable

Ed. Little further inform. Re Yug. Sub. due leave today or tomorrow for Bel. Argument, as I as [sic] understand, has been about names of regents. But in our view no reason this should hold up coming into force of agt. We can send tel. setting forth our views as Mar. St. suggested

Mol. and communique?

Ed Can do that, too

Mol. Tel. telling them to hurry up That the agt. come into force immed.

Ed. Will show other 2 delegs. draft of tel.

Ed. Re Pol. – I didn’t mean to indicate agt. with Am. proposal to drop last sentence

ERS We would of course still prefer doc. as it exists but Pres so anxious reach agt, he is willing to make this concession

Mol. Thanks him Mr. Stett. very much

Reparations
Ed:

1. 1st reps should be considered in connection with dismemberment

2. Two R objects – depletion Ger. mfg. capacity & ensuring ability make large payments later – are difficult to reconcile We are very anxious to avoid conditions making it nec. finance or feed Ger later as result reparations

3. Would like Fr. on Mos. Commission from start

4. Labor should be considered too

5. Can’t name any figure for deliveries until Commission has studied matter

Mol: Any points Mr Ed. agrees on?

Ed. Add: These arrangements are without prejudice to restitution of looted property Mol. Of course

Ed. reserve position re pre-war claims We are in favor of Com. being set up in Mos as soon as possible

Mol: No basis for work of Com. We don’t give it any directives or principles on which to work.

Ed. We agree on principles: immediate withdrawal of machinery, etc – quicker the better – & annual payments Has a redraft

Maisky: Mr. Ed’s reply is very disappointing – Whole spirit of reply Spirit apparently is to take from Ger little as poss.

Ed: Never said anything of kind but can say my P.M. doesn’t think you’ll get anything like as much as you think.

Re Ed’s points

1. Naturally when dismemberment decided in practical form, plan be adjusted

2. Problem was considered from beginning. No contradiction. Ain’t of annual payments quite possible after contemplated removals. If you have doubts, shortest cut to accept our formula of yesterday – to take our proposals as basis for discussion & then bring up your points Never expected support Ger.

Nothing on 3

4. Labor certainly will come in in elaboration of whole plan, but as Com. studies q.

5. Our formula doesn’t commit you to the figures. Taking into account all your points, you can easily agree to formula agreed on by Sov & Am. delegs

Ed. We consider $20 billion equals 500,000,000£ a yr.

Maisky No in ten yrs

Ed: We wanted a shorter period

Mol. Let us write down 10 yrs

Ed: We prefer 5 yrs

ERS Its all a basis of discussion Might end up all these capital movements possible in 7 yrs Sov. Gov’t isn’t committing itself to 10 yrs or $20 billion

Maisky Certainly. In end might be 5 or 6

Ed Then why put in 10 yrs

Maisky: As basis for discussion

Ed. Let each put in its own plan Will give alternate draft & discuss at 4.00 p m Agreed

Mol. re communique

ERS We are hard at work drafting something for your consid.

Mol: You take initiative?

ERS There will be a draft, we would be glad to take initiative I would suggest 1st order bus. this afternoon that drafting of commun. be assigned to For Mins

Mol. Good

Ed. all right

World Org. report of subcommittee

Mol. I agree to both points – consultation of Ch & Fr. & the invitation

Ed We all agree then

Austria-Yug. frontiers

Ed: presented proposal

Mol. Translate & study

ERS: we feel (b) on p 2 should be pretty carefully considered. We feel that as phrased this goes beyond period of occupation

Ed: That is all that is meant Drafting may need to be made clearer

Yug-It frontier

Ed: proposal to be studied

Yug-Bul. relations

Mol. Mentioned treaty of alliance between Yug & Bul.

1. Recently For. Commissariat rec’d a note re federation, stressing federation might include Turkey. This is not an urgent q.

2. There are conversations between Yug & Bul about a treaty of friendship & alliance Sov. Govt holds a favorable view. They are collaborating militarily ag. Gers in Yug. There should be no objections to it.

Ed: Glad to hear treaty is not actual (?) Anxious about effect of this treaty on reparations we are anxious & all agreed Gr. should receive from Bul. Has separate memo on this.

Mol All obligs. of Bul. have been enforced. No one can change them without consent of 3 powers Bul & Rum. cannot have a treaty between them Now is q. of treaty between 1 friendly country & an ex-enemy There was a direct agt by Brit Govt to it. Q by Eden?

Mol. There were objections to treaty between 2 former enemies but not friendly & enemy

Ed. We do not think a country under armistice terms can make a treaty without consent of 3 powers. I never had it in mind a country under armistice would come into a federation until armistice over

ERS I’m completely in accord with Ed’s views

Ed: Can’t they wait?

Mol: Has no power to speak for them.

Ed. Bul. has signed armistice. Isn’t free to do as she wants. Although has threatened to shoot our planes coming here.

Mol. Our planes have been shot at in Yug but was mistake & our troops shot at by Am planes

Ed. I don’t know why Bul. can shoot at any planes Can we ask this wait awhile

Mol Can go on with discussions

ERS Suggest our Ambs discuss with Mol. in Mos. promptly Mol. Would wait until tomorrow

Iran
Mol. Has nothing to add

Ed: Would Mol like to put out communique

Mol: Undesirable. Can discuss this later

ERS I would urge some reference that Iranian problems have been discussed & clarified. Very troublesome q.

Mol Against that

Ed: Say re-examined & reaffirmed Teheran Decl.

Mol Against that

ERS status of Pol. Agreed Ed. to report on yesterday’s & today’s progress.

Reparations:
Mol.: mention in document just 2 figures as basis for discussion

[NormanStewart]

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Items Still Before the Foreign Ministers

Poland
There is probably no reason to discuss this until the plenary meeting.

Declaration of Liberated Europe
Same status as Number 1.

Iran
The British may propose adoption of their paper – Mr. Matthews has a copy of it.

Reparations
The British have not yet agreed to Soviet-American paper. The British or Russians may want to bring this up.

Mr. Eden Wants
(a) To have the provisions relating to the Hungarian Control Commission apply also in Bulgaria;
(b) To get an agreement for Bulgarian reparations to Greece;
(c) To express opposition to Russian proposal favoring an alliance between Tito and Bulgaria.

---

U.S. Delegation Memorandum On The Polish Government

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Text of Formula on Poland So Far Agreed by the Three Foreign Ministers

A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a provisional Polish government more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The provisional government now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad. This new government will then be called the “Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.” Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This “Polish Provisional Government of National Unity” would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties would have the right to take part and to put forth candidates.

When a “Polish Provisional Government of National Unity” has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition.

In lieu of the following sentence: “When a ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’ has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition.” Mr. Molotov suggests the following rewording:

When a “Polish Provisional Government of National Unity” has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with it as has been done by the Soviet Union.

This sentence was not accepted by Mr. Stettinius or Mr. Eden.

He said he would bring it up again at the four o’clock meeting this afternoon.

The British still advocate inclusion of the following sentence:

The ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.

---

U.S. Delegation Memorandum on the Soviet Proposal for the Final Paragraph of the Formula on Poland

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Mr. Molotov’s latest draft proposal for the end of the last sentence of the Polish formula:

… the Government of the USSR, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland and the Governments of Great Britain and the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. and will exchange Ambas. by whose reports the respect. Govts. will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

[NormanStewart]

British Amendment to the Draft Declaration on Liberated Europe

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

British Draft of Last Paragraph of Declaration on Liberated Europe

In issuing this Declaration the three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the action and the procedure suggested.

[NormanStewart]

British Proposal on Reparations

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

Basic Principles of Exaction of Reparation from Germany

1. The proportions in reparation allotted to the claimant countries shall be determined according to their respective contributions to the winning of the war and the degree of the material loss which they have suffered. Account shall be taken of deliveries made to the claimant countries by other enemy countries.

2. Reparation is to be exacted from Germany in the three following forms:

   (a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory. These removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany. Subject to the fulfilment of these aims Germany’s industrial capacity will not be reduced to a point which would endanger the economic existence of Germany and the execution of such obligations as may be imposed on her.

   (b) Annual deliveries from current production for a period to be considered.

   (c) Use of German labor and lorry service.

3. In fixing the amount of reparation to be exacted under paragraph two above account shall be taken of any arrangements made for the dismemberment of Germany, the requirements of the occupying forces, and Germany’s need to acquire from time to time sufficient foreign currency from her exports to pay for her current imports and the pre-war claims of the United Nations on Germany.

[NormanStewart]

Report to the Foreign Ministers by the Subcommittee on Arrangements for the United Nations Conference

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

Report to the Foreign Ministers

We were instructed on February 8 to prepare a report to the Foreign Ministers on the following subjects:

• a) The method of consultation with France and China in regard to the decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

• b) The text of the invitation which should be issued to all the nations which will take part in the United Nations Conference.

With regard to (a) we consider that the United States on behalf of the three powers should consult the Government of China and the Provisional French Government.

With regard to (b) we attach for the approval of the Ministers a draft invitation to all the nations which will take part in the conference.

[Attachment]

Invitation

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of __________ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at ______ in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above-named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

C. Voting

1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of _______ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.

[NormanStewart]

British Proposal Regarding the Austrian-Yugoslav Frontier

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

British Statement on Austro-Yugoslav Frontier

If the British proposals for the allocation of zones of occupation in Austria are approved, the whole length of the Austro-Yugoslav frontier will be a British responsibility. This may involve us in difficulties with Yugoslavia because though the Yugoslav Government have not so far asked for any alteration of the Styrian portion of this frontier they have advanced claims to Klagenfurt and those parts of Carinthia which they failed to obtain under the plebiscite held in 1919. Action may be required to resist Yugoslav efforts to assert these claims and to secure the withdrawal of Yugoslav partisans who in the course of operations may well advance into Carinthia and establish control over it. It would be invidious for HMG to be solely responsible for such action and after our experiences in Greece we must try to prevent British troops from becoming involved in fighting with Allied partisans. We hope, therefore that an agreement might be reached between the three powers for the maintenance of the 1937 Austro-Yugoslav frontier pending the final territorial settlement and for joint measures to ensure its maintenance and observance by Yugoslavia.

It is therefore suggested we should agree at the present conference:

• (a) that pending the final peace settlement the 1937 frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia shall be restored.

• (b) that the integrity of this frontier is the joint interest of the three powers, and that the USSR and the USA will support any action which HMG may see fit to take to preserve its integrity.

• (c) that the three powers should jointly inform the Yugoslav Government of decisions (a) and (b) above and request the Yugoslav Government to give an undertaking to preserve this frontier.

[NormanStewart]

British Proposal Regarding Venezia Giulia

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

Notes for the Secretaries of State in Regard to Venezia Giulia

I should like to draw the attention of my colleagues to the fact that the province of Venezia Giulia in the northeast of Italy is a potential powder magazine. It is therefore likely that there will, as the war draws to a close, be clashes in this area between the Yugoslavs and the Italians, and we must prevent these outbursts to the best of our ability.

We had originally intended to set up Allied Military Government over the whole province up to the 1937 frontier but we now have doubts whether this would be a very satisfactory course for the following reasons. Tito has not yet put his views in writing but he has made it pretty clear that he will not agree to such a proposal. He certainly intends to administer himself the considerable areas which he claims for Yugoslavia and part of which are already controlled by his Partisans. Even if under extreme pressure he was forced to accept Allied (British) Military Government his Partisans would remain in arms throughout the district and it would be a miracle if sooner or later they did not obstruct our Military administration. We should then have to take forceful measures to assert our authority and fighting might begin. Alternatively, there might be clashes between the Yugoslav Partisans and the Italian Partisans, both trying to hold as much territory as they could. In that case also we should have to intervene to keep the peace by force. I would therefore ask my colleagues to agree to establish some body for the purpose of working out a provisional line of demarcation in the Venezia Giulia between the area to be controlled by Tito and the area over which we should establish Allied Military Government. We have made an attempt ourselves to draw up such a line based for the most part of ethnic considerations. But obviously we cannot jointly agree on a line now, all we can do is agree to the principle that there should be such a line and that some body of technicians should be established for the purpose of determining it. After that it would no doubt be for His Majesty’s Government to obtain Tito’s acceptance of it. But if they do this His Majesty’s Government would like to be able to say that both their Allies agree with the proposal.

Finally, I would point out that in any case, even if the area west of my suggested provisional line is allotted to Tito, it will be necessary, in the early stages at any rate, for our Supreme Commander to make use of the communications from Trieste northwards in which case he would have to take suitable measures to that end. It might later be possible for him to arrange for his communications to Austria to pass further to the west.

[NormanStewart]

British Proposal Regarding the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

Allied (Soviet) Control Commission in Bulgaria

His Majesty’s Government regard it as essential (a) that their representatives in Bulgaria should enjoy reasonable freedom of movement and communication, and (b) that decisions about which they have not been consulted should not be taken in their name. In the case of Hungary, (a) has been satisfactorily dealt with in the “Statutes of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary,” and His Majesty’s Government suggest that identical Statutes should be adopted for the Control Commission in Bulgaria in order to meet the points made in the message from Mr. Eden which was delivered to M. Molotov on or about December 11, 1944.

His Majesty’s Government also consider that during the first period there should be prior consultation with the British and American representatives and that, should the Soviet Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds not covered in the Armistice, it should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government only.

During the second period, i.e. after the conclusion of hostilities with Germany, His Majesty’s Government wish to ensure that

• (a) The British and American representatives should take their places in the Control Commissions as full members and should have the right to attend all their meetings and to participate fully in the consideration of all questions before the Commissions. They should also have the right of direct access to the Bulgarian authorities.

• (b) Decisions of the Allied Control Commission should be unanimous and its name and authority should be used only where the representatives of all three powers are in agreement. If the Soviet High Command, being in de facto control of Bulgaria through the presence of Soviet troops, insist upon issuing directives to the local Government or taking action which has not been approved by both the British and American representatives they should act unilaterally in their own name.

• (c) The extent to which the British and Americans will share in the actual executive and administrative work of the Control Commission will be a matter to be settled on the spot. But they must certainly have the right to membership of any subcommittee or executive organ dealing with matters concerning British and American rights and property.

• (d) The detailed implications of these proposals should be worked out between the Soviet chairman and the British and American representatives on the Control Commission on the spot.