America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

8443

Radio reporter says Nazi homes are forts

‘Farmhouses’ are gun emplacements
By Si Steinhauser

…

8444

U.S. Navy Department (February 9, 1945)

Joint Statement

For Immediate Release
February 9, 1945

The following joint Anglo‑American statement on submarine and anti­submarine operations is issued under the authority of the President and the Prime Minister:

Throughout January the enemy’s U‑boat activity was slightly greater than in December, but losses of merchant shipping were not substantially different. The U‑boats making use of their new devices penetrated further into focal areas of shipping close in shore. Results of our countermeasures have been encouraging.

U.S. State Department (February 9, 1945)

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 10:30 p.m.

Yusupov Palace, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Matthews Mr. Jebb Mr. Gusev
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Roberts Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Allen Mr. Golunsky
8445

Log of the Trip

Friday, February 9, 1945

1230: The President attended a plenary meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Livadia. Present were:

For the U.S. For Great Britain
The President. The Prime Minister.
Admiral Leahy. Field Marshal Brooke.
General Marshall. Air Marshal Portal.
Admiral King. General Ismay.
General Kuter. Admiral Cunningham.
General McFarland. Brigadier Cornwall-Jones.

1330: Lunch at Livadia. – The President, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Boettiger, Mrs. Oliver, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Admiral Leahy and Justice Byrnes.

1600: The President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin and members of the American, British and Soviet Delegations met in the courtyard of Livadia where they sat for still and motion pictures.

1615: The Sixth Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present:

For the U.S. For Great Britain For the USSR
The President. The Prime Minister. Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius. Mr. Eden. Mr. Molotov.
Admiral Leahy. Mr. Cadogan. Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Hopkins. Mr. Clark Kerr. Mr. Maisky.
Justice Byrnes. Mr. Jebb. Mr. Gousev.
Mr. Harriman. Mr. Bridges. Mr. Gromyko.
Mr. Matthews. Mr. Wilson. Mr. Pavlov.
Mr. Hiss. Mr. Dixon.
Mr. Bohlen. Major Birse.

The meeting adjourned at 1950.

1930: Lieutenant (j.g.) W. K. Kloock, USNR, White House courier, arrived at Livadia with mail from Washington. He made the journey from Washington in three days.

2030: Dinner at Livadia. – The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Major General John E. Hull, Major General Kuter, Fleet Admiral Leahy and Vice Admiral C. M. Cooke.

8446

Völkischer Beobachter (February 10, 1945)

Verstärkte Kampftätigkeit im Westen

…

8447

Wir und die Dreierkonferenz

vb. Wien, 9. Februar – Eine Reihe von Tagen ist schon vergangen, seitdem jene drei Männer, die für diesen Krieg und damit für alles Leid, das durch ihn über die Menschen gekommen ist, verantwortlich sind, ihre Konferenz im Schwarzen Meer begonnen haben, aber was man bisher davon gehört hat, War spärlich und ziemlich nichtssagend. Das will nicht heißen, dass wir etwa ungeduldig auf das „Ergebnis“ dieser Besprechungen warten würden, im Gegenteil, denn wir halten uns nur an die nackten Tatsachen. In dieser Hinsicht ist aber zweierlei Interessantes festzustellen.

Erstens ist bemerkenswert, dass diese Konferenz an sich scheinbar dringendst notwendig war, denn so leicht ist der schwerbewegliche Mann des Weißen Hauses nicht zu einer so weiten Reise zu veranlassen. Was Churchill betrifft, so sind genug Meldungen bekannt und veröffentlicht worden, die erkennen ließen, wie sehr er sich um das Zustandekommen der Konferenz bemüht hat, wie dienstbeflissen er Stalin sagen ließ, dass er „an jedem Ort und zu jeder Zeit bereit“ stünde. Das ist ein vielsagendes, ja untrügliches Zeichen dafür, dass es England sehr eilig und sehr nötig hat, irgendwie politisch mit erfolgversprechenden Ereignissen aufwarten zu können.

Die Zustände in Belgien und Frankreich, vor allem aber in Griechenland sprechen für die Welt eine zu deutliche Sprache von dem Tiefstand der politischen Ebene, auf die das englische Weltreich herabgesunken ist, seitdem Churchill das Steuer führt. So dumm und verblendet sind auch die Briten nicht, dass sie das Verhängnisvolle dieser Entwicklung nicht begriffen hätten. Die weihnachtliche „Siegesfeier“ ist eine Churchillsche Illusion geblieben und das ununterbrochene deutsche Vergeltungsfeuer auf London und Südengland trägt kaum dazu bei, solchen Illusionen für einen absehbaren späteren Zeitpunkt neuen Auftrieb zu geben. Im Gegenteil, wir wissen aus den Nachrichten, die von der Feindseite selbst verbreitet werden, dass das ehemals so stolze England schon mit sehr viel Wasser kochen muss…

Zweitens lässt sich aus der Tatsache, dass zum „Konferenzort“ die Wasser des Schwarzen Meeres gewählt wurden, von jedem Schuljungen die logische Folgerung ableiten, dass hier Stalins Wunsch der Befehl war, dem Roosevelt und Churchill Folge leisten mussten. Der Massenansturm der Bolschewisten gegen den deutschen Osten hat. Stalins bisher schon bestandenes politisches Übergewicht über seine beiden Komplicen derart verstärkt, dass sie einfach nur mehr Befehlsempfänger geworden sind. Was aber die Bolschewisten mit ihren Panzerarmeen erreichen wollen, nämlich die Niederringung des deutschen Widerstandes und die Brechung der deutschen Kampfkraft und Kampfmoral, das wollen Roosevelt und Churchill mit dem alten Betrug von 1918 Wilsonscher Prägung erreichen und so das Ihrige zum erhofften „Siege“ beitragen, um damit bei der Teilung der Beute noch halbwegs gut abzuschneiden.

Das deutsche Volk aber ist gewarnt, ja geradezu immun gegen das Gift scheinheiliger Versprechungen. Wir wissen, was uns blühen würde, wenn wir schwach würden, wenn wir die Waffen aus der Hand legten, ehe nicht Leben und Freiheit uns in unserem Sinne gesichert sind. Wir sahen, und sehen an dem Beispiel der Wehrlosen, die im Westen dem amerikanischen „Eroberer“ und im Osten den Bolschewisten in die Hände fielen, was das Schicksal ist, das sie uns im Falle ihres Sieges zu bereiten gedenken. Was sie uns angekündigt hatten, haben sie in beiden Fällen voll und ganz wahr gemacht. Wenn sie jetzt in lockenden Tönen vom „Weltfrieden“ reden wollten, kann uns das keinen Eindruck mehr machen, denn wir hatten uns, wie gesagt, nur an die nackten Tatsachen. Und die sind von vornherein der klarste Beweis für die lügenhaften Verkündungen, die man auf den Wellen des Schwarzen Meeres zusammenbraute. Schon in Teheran gedachte man sich mit einer „Botschaft“ an das deutsche Volk zu wenden und hat dann doch in letzter Minute davon Abstand genommen, weil die Sache zu aussichtslos erschien.

Noch leben ja zu viele Zeugen der Folgen des Novembers 1918. Die Deutschen in den Donau- und Alpengauen haben sich die Erinnerung an die Auswirkungen des Vertrages von St. Germain gut bewahrt. Sie war wohl etwas verblasst in den Jahren des harten täglichen Lebenskampfes, die nachher kamen und von den meisten als eine Art Naturnotwendigkeit hingenommen wurden. Als aber das Großdeutsche Reich geschmiedet war, da ist uns allen erst so richtig aufgegangen, was es heißt, Angehörige und Mitbestimmende eines großen Volksstaates zu sein, eines Staates, der wahrhaft für das Volk selbst und nicht für das Alleinwohl von Geldsäcken oder Gottesgnadenmenschen geschaffen ist.

Viel zu kurz nur war die Zeit, die gerade diesen Gauen gegönnt, war, um den neuen Aufschwung voll zu leben; denn das Komplott der Feinde war schon geschmiedet, die Schlinge, die das Reich erwürgen sollte, von den Juden in der ganzen Welt schon geknüpft. Aber gerade weil wir wissen, wie die wahre Freiheit eines tüchtigen und arbeitsamen Volkes beschaffen ist, was sie dem einzelnen bietet und gibt, gerade darum gewinnen wir auch aus uns selbst die Kraft, jedem feindlichen Ansturm zu widerstehen, in Zähigkeit und Beharrlichkeit auszuhalten, bis wir unsere Freiheit wiedergewonnen haben, ungeachtet der Opfer, die der Kampf uns noch auf erlogen macht.

Darum wird auch jener neue Feldzug unserer Feinde, der jetzt von dieser Dreierkonferenz ausgeht, weder mit den militärischen noch mit den agitatorischen Waffen zu dem vom Feind erstrebten Ziele führen, weil es lediglich an uns liegt, ihn abzuwehren mit jener unwiderstehlichen Kraft und Stärke, die in der deutschen Einheit und Einigkeit liegt. Ganz abgesehen von jenen militärischen Mitteln, die für uns noch im Schoss der nächsten Zukunft liegen…

A. E. T.

8448

Sowjetblatt bestätigt Vernichtungspläne

Stockholm, 9. Februar – Die sowjetische Iswestija nimmt in einem Kommentar zu der Dreierkonferenz Stellung und legt dabei eine Offenherzigkeit an den Tag, die alle Zweifel aus der Welt schafft.

Die Iswestija fasst in einem Satz das Endziel der bolschewistischen Politik gegenüber Deutschland zusammen und legt mit brutaler Ehrlichkeit den Plan vor, den der Kreml zu verwirklichen erstrebt, falls es gelänge, Deutschland in die Knie zu zwingen.

„In der Endphase des Krieges wird die Todesstrafe, die von der gesamten freiheitsliebenden Menschheit über Deutschland verhängt wurde, durchgeführt werden,“ so schreibt Iswestija.

An diesem Satz gibt es kein Deuteln: Moskaus Ziel ist die Ausrottung des deutschen Volkes, das wird hier noch einmal klar und unmissverständlich von dem führenden bolschewistischen Blatt bestätigt.

Es ist kennzeichnend, dass das englische Reuters-Büro von dem Iswestija-Kommentar gerade diesen einen Satz in die Welt verbreitet. Das bedeutet, dass England das bolschewistische Kriegsziel gutheißt und mit allen Mitteln unterstützt. Diese Erkenntnis ist für uns Deutsche nicht neu, aber jede Bestätigung gibt uns immer wieder die Gewissheit, dass wir mit einer geschlossenen Feindfront zu rechnen haben, wenn es sich darum handelt, Deutschland zu vernichten, das deutsche Volk zu dezimieren und seine Männer als Arbeitssklaven zu deportieren.

Unsere Antwort auf diesen Knechtungs- und Ausrottungsplan haben wir dem Gegner tausendmal ins Gesicht geschleudert. Was auch immer Stalin und seine plutokratischen Komplicen Roosevelt und Churchill bei ihrem Dreiertreffen aushandeln mögen oder mochten, es wird nichts an den Feindplänen ändern und wir werden dem nur noch eine fanatischere Entschlossenheit entgegenstellen. Dass wir um unser Leben kämpfen, ist uns gerade in den letzten Wochen, wo die bolschewistische Flut gegen das Deutsche Reich anbrandet, klarer denn je geworden, dass wir aber diesen Kampf bis zur letzten Entscheidung durchstehen, darüber dürfte es im Feindlager keinen Zweifel geben.

8449

Führer HQ (February 10, 1945)

Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht

Die Verteidiger von Budapest setzen in der Burg and in der Zitadelle Ihren heldenhaften Kampf fort. Östlich des Plattensees wurden feindliche Angriffe bis auf einen inzwischen abgeriegelten Einbruch vor unseren Stellungen zerschlagen.

Nördlich der Westbeskiden wird bei Saybusch und Zielitz in Angriff und Abwehr heftig gekämpft. Im Brückenkopf von Brieg blieben alle Angriffe des Gegners erfolglos. Im Kampfraum von Breslau–Liegnitz–Glogau warfen die Sowjets starke Kräfte in die Schlacht und konnten trotz zäher Gegenwehr unserer Truppen nach Westen Raum gewinnen. Zwischen Fürstenberg und Küstrin wurde der Feind aus seinen Brückenköpfen weiter auf die Oder zurückgeworfen.

Im Südteil von Pommern hielt der feindliche Druck bei Amswalde und Deutsch-Krone an, während in den übrigen Frontabschnitten unsere Abwehrerfolge ein Abflauen der feindlichen Angriffe bewirkten. Im südlichen Westpreußen nahmen die Bolschewisten nach starker Feuervorbereitung mit mehreren Schützendivisionen ihre Angriffe nordwestlich Schwetz und südwestlich Graudenz wieder auf. Sie wurden in harten Kämpfen aufgefangen. Von Osten gegen Graudenz geführte Angriffe scheiterten. Die Besatzu en von Schneidemühl und Elbing erfüllen in schweren Kämpfen und vorbildlicher Tapferkeit die ihnen übertragenen Aufgaben.

Eine aus dem Panzerschiff Admiral Scheer und drei Torpedobooten bestehende Kampfgruppe der Kriegsmarine griff wirkungsvoll in die Kämpfe um Elbing und Frauenburg ein.

In Ostpreußen versuchten die Bolschewisten mit starken Infanterie- und Panzerkräften bei Landsberg und Kreuzburg unsere Front zu durchbrechen. Nach anfänglichem Geländegewinn wurde die Wucht der Angriffe durch den hartnäckigen Widerstand und die Gegenangriffe unserer Divisionen gebrochen. In erbitterten Kämpfen wurden über 100 sowjetische Panzer vernichtet, davon 80 im Bereich des Fallschirmpanzerkorps „Hermann Göring.“ Auch im Samland scheiterten heftige Angriffe der Bolschewisten.

Jagd- und Schlachtfliegerverbände griffen auch gestern in den Schwerpunkten in die Erdkämpfe ein und vernichteten außer Hunderten von Fahrzeugen 37 Panzer und 28 Geschütze. Oberst Rudel schoss in den letzten Tagen elf sowjetische Panzer ab und erhöhte damit seine Abschusserfolge auf 516 Panzer.

Aus einem durch Jäger geschützten britischen Kampffliegerverband schossen deutsche Jäger an der norwegischen Westküste elf Torpedoflugzeuge und drei Jäger ab. Leichte deutsche- Seestreitkräfte und Sicherungsfahrzeuge der Kriegsmarine brachten weitere neun der erfolglos angreifenden britischen Bomber zum Absturz.

Im Westen sind zwischen dem Niederrhein östlich Nimwegen und der Maas bei Gennep heftige Abwehrkämpfe im Gange. Im Verlaufe starker Angriffe konnte der Feind im Reichswald Boden gewinnen.

An der Rur scheiterten zahlreiche Aufklärungsvorstöße und Übersetzversuche des Gegners. Am Oberlauf des Flusses riegelten Panzergrenadiere in heftigen Kämpfen den angreifenden Gegner ab, bevor er das Ostufer gewinnen konnte. Südwestlich Schleiden warf ein Gegenstoß die Amerikaner aus einer Einbruchsstelle. In der Schnee-Eifel blieben die angreifenden Verbände der 3. amerikanischen Armee im zusammengefassten Feuer aller Waffen vor oder in unserem Hauptkampffeld liegen. An der oberen Oure wurden feindliche Bereitstellungen durch unsere Artillerie zerschlagen.

Heftige Kämpfe sind um Brückenköpfe an der unteren Sauer entbrannt, die der Feind nach Zuführung von neuen Kräften auszuweiten versuchte. Mehrere Angriffe der Amerikaner südöstlich Vianden brachen unter hohen blutigen Verlusten für den Gegner schon vor unseren Stellungen zusammen. Südöstlich Remich an der Mosel warfen unsere Panzer den angreifenden Feind wieder auf seine Ausgangsstellungen zurück.

Im Unterelsass blieben feindliche Aufklärungsvorstöße vor unseren Gefechtsvorposten liegen oder scheiterten in unserem Artilleriefeuer.

Nach schweren Kämpfen gegen die bei Tag und Nacht angreifenden De-Gaulle-Truppen wurden unsere noch auf dem Westufer des Oberrheins stehenden Kräfte mit allen Waffen und Versorgungsgutem auf das Ostufer übergeführt und vor dem nachdrängenden Feind die Brücken bei Neuenburg gesprengt. Die einundzwanzigtägige Schlacht um den Brückenkopf im oberen Elsass, in der unsere Truppen tapfer kämpfend eine oft zehnfache feindliche Übermacht abwehrten, ist damit abgeschlossen. Im Verlaufe dieser Kämpfe vernichteten unsere Truppen 200 Panzer sowie zahlreiche Panzerspähwagen und Kraftfahrzeuge des Feindes.

An der ligurischen Küste in Mittelitalien dauert die örtliche Kampftätigkeit an. Feindliche Aufklärungsvorstöße auf den Höhen östlich des Serchio scheiterten.

In dem Gebiet westlich Mostar in der Herzegowina dauern die feindlichen Angriffe an. An der unteren Drina haben unsere Truppen den Fluss nach Osten überschritten und dem zäh kämpfenden Feind die Uferhöhen nordwestlich Zvornik, entrissen. Südlich der Drau stießen deutsche Truppen und Kosakenverbände lm Zusammenwirken mit kroatischen Kampfgruppen konzentrisch von Osten und Westen vor und nahmen die Stadt Virovitica im Sturm.

Nordamerikanische Terrorverbände warfen am gestrigen Tage Bomben auf Magdeburg sowie auf Orte in Thüringen und Westfalen. Dabei entstanden Gebäudeschäden und Personenverluste, vor allem in Weimar und Jena. Weitere Angriffe richteten sich gegen Städte lm südostdeutschen Raum. Tiefflieger terrorisierten im westlichen und südwestlichen Reichsgebiet durch Bordwaffenangriffe die Zivilbevölkerung.

Das Feuer unserer Vergeltungswaffen auf London dauert an.

Der mit dem Ritterkreuz zum Eisernen Kreuz ausgezeichnete Hauptmann Rath schoss in der Nacht zum 8. Februar sechs feindliche Flugzeuge ab.

8450

Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (February 10, 1945)

FROM
(A) SHAEF MAIN

ORIGINATOR
PRD, Communique Section

DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
101100A February

TO FOR ACTION
(1) AGWAR
(2) NAVY DEPARTMENT

TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)
(3) TAC HQ 12 ARMY GP
(4) MAIN 12 ARMY GP
(5) AIR STAFF
(6) ANCXF
(7) EXFOR MAIN
(8) EXFOR REAR
(9) DEFENSOR, OTTAWA
(10) CANADIAN C/S, OTTAWA
(11) WAR OFFICE
(12) ADMIRALTY
(13) AIR MINISTRY
(14) UNITED KINGDOM BASE
(15) SACSEA
(16) CMHQ (Pass to RCAF & RCN)
(17) COM ZONE
(18) SHAEF REAR
(19) AFHQ for PRO, ROME
(20) HQ SIXTH ARMY GP

(REF NO.)
NONE

(CLASSIFICATION)
IN THE CLEAR

Communiqué No. 308

The Allied offensive in the area southeast of Nijmegen continues to make good progress.

In spite of stiff enemy resistance from his prepared positions, difficult terrain, numerous minefields and anti-tank obstacles our units have captured Zyfflich, Neil, Kranenberg, Frasselt and Bredeweg and are fighting in the western fringe of the Reichswald Forest.

Southeast of the battle area, enemy troops and equipment just east of the Reichswald Forest and at Goch, Geldern and Rheinberg were attacked by medium, light and fighter-bombers. East of Wesel, a road bridge spanning the railway line was destroyed by rocket-firing fighters which also hit Rhine River traffic in the area.

Our forces have cleared the towns of Harscheidt and Schmidt in the area northeast of Monschau, against stiff resistance and have advanced to Hasenfeld, two miles southeast of Schmidt.

Farther south, in the area north of Prüm, our infantry captured Olzheim and entered the town of Neuendorf. Other elements have captured the towns of Gondenbrett, Hermespand and Niedermehlen. West of Prüm, our forces are three-fourths of a mile from the town.

Across the Our River in the area five and one-half miles northeast of Clervaux, our units have gained one-half miles. Other elements farther southeast have pushed 1,000 yards in the area and one-half miles southeast of Wallendorf. North of the Our River, one and one-half miles northeast of Wallendorf, two infantry counterattacks were repulsed.

The Bannholz Forest, one-half mile northeast of Sinz, has been cleared by our troops. A counterattack by tanks and infantry in this area was repulsed.

Enemy artillery activity was increased along the sector east of the Hardt Mountains.

East of Haguenau, in the Rhine Valley, Oberhöfen was cleared except for a few houses in the northwestern section of the town.

Patrols in the Drusenheim region farther east drew strong hostile reactions.

In southern Alsace, all organized enemy resistance on the west bank of the Rhine has ceased.

Allied forces in the west captured 1,049 prisoners on 7 February.

The communications center of Kempen, and railway yards at Viersen, Rheydt, and Grevenbroich were struck at by medium and light bombers. Fighter-bombers attacked railway yards at Euskirchen, Koblenz, Trier Kaiserslautern and Würzburg, and a rail junction at Wengerohr, northeast of Trier. Rail bridges at Sinzig and Neuwied, northwest of Koblenz, were attacked by small formations of medium and light bombers.

Rail traffic over a wide area ranging from Mannheim south to the German-Swiss frontier, rail bridges at Rastatt, Hornberg and Offenburg, enemy barracks at Donaueschingen and road traffic near Oberkirch were targets for medium and fighter-bombers.

Escorted heavy bombers in very great strength attacked the synthetic oil plant at Lützen, south of Halle; an ordnance and motor transport factory at Weimar; oil installations and railroad marshalling yards at Magdeburg and other communications targets in Germany. Escorting fighters shot down 23 enemy aircraft, destroyed 41 others on the ground and strafed rail transport.

From all operations, according to reports so far received, 19 heavy bombers and five fighters are missing.

Last night, bombers attacked road and rail movement in Holland and western Germany.

COORDINATED WITH: G-2, G-3 to C/S

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS
/s/

Precedence
“OP” - AGWAR
“P” - Others

ORIGINATING DIVISION
PRD, Communique Section

NAME AND RANK TYPED. TEL. NO.
D. R. JORDAN, Lt Col FA2409

AUTHENTICATING SIGNATURE
/s/
8451

U.S. State Department (February 10, 1945)

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon

Vorontsov Villa, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar
Mr. Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan Molotov
Mr. Matthews Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Vvshinskv
Mr. Hiss Mr. Jebb Mr. Maisky
Mr. Page Mr. Dixon Mr. Gusev
Major Theakstone Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

Page Minutes

Alupka, February 10, 1945, noon
Top secret

Subjects:

  1. THE POLISH FORMULA
  2. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE
  3. YUGOSLAVIA
  4. REPARATIONS
  5. COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE
  6. WORLD ORGANIZATION
  7. AUSTRO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER
  8. YUGOSLAV-ITALIAN FRONTIER
  9. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS
  10. IRAN

Mr. Eden, who presided, opened the meeting.

The Polish Formula

Mr. Stettinius stated that the American experts as well as the President had given serious study to the Polish formula and that the American Delegation was prepared to withdraw the last sentence, which Mr. Molotov had objected to, on the understanding that the President would be free to make any statement he felt necessary on Poland relative to his receiving information from his Ambassador on the question.

Later in the conversation Mr. Eden stated that he did not wish to indicate during the conversation on the Polish formula that he agreed with the American proposal to drop this last sentence.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he, of course, preferred the document as it existed. The President, however, was so anxious to reach agreement that he was willing to make this concession.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had several amendments to the formula. He proposed that “as soon as practicable” be changed to “as soon as possible.” He also proposed that the last part of the last paragraph be drafted to read: “the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Government as has been done by the Soviet Union.”

Mr. Stettinius stated that he could not agree with this second change.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that a special situation existed in Poland. The Soviet Government had accorded the Polish Government recognition, whereas, the United States and Great Britain had not.

Mr. Eden said that the Government referred to in the formula was a new government and that it was most necessary that the three Allies move together in recognizing it.

Mr. Stettinius supported Mr. Eden and added that it was vital for public opinion in the United States to adhere to the principle of a new Polish Government.

Mr. Molotov stated that the present situation was a different one and that the document would reflect this difference. He referred to the inadvisability of prejudicing the present situation or raising difficulties in the rear of the Red Army. He suggested that the matter be given consideration and be subsequently discussed. Mr. Molotov later suggested that Mr. Eden make a full report on last night’s and today’s discussion on the Polish situation for submission to the plenary session.

Declaration on Liberated Europe

Mr. Stettinius stated that he had consulted with his experts and with the President on the Declaration on Liberated Areas and that he was obliged to say that the American Government found it impossible to accept the amendment proposed by Mr. Molotov at the Plenary Session of February 9. To do so would cause untold difficulties in United States domestic affairs. The text of this Declaration, with Mr. Molotov’s amendment is attached hereto.

Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to submit a second amendment. He suggested that in the fifth paragraph the words “they will immediately establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration,” be replaced by the words “they will immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultation.”

Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden agreed to this formula.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to the status of Mr. Molotov’s amendment of February 9.

Mr. Molotov agreed that it should be dropped, though he remarked that he thought it very useful in that it might prevent recurrences similar to those in Greece.

Mr. Eden inquired whether the British proposals regarding French association were acceptable.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had not had sufficient time to give full consideration to this proposal. He suggested that it be discussed at the four o’clock meeting.

Mr. Stettinius observed that he approved highly the British proposal and recommended that it be included in the Declaration.

Yugoslavia

Mr. Eden stated that he had been informed that Subasic was due to leave today or tomorrow for Belgrade. The principal question under dispute, as he understood it, has been about the names of the Regents. However, in the British view, there was no reason why this should hold up the execution of the agreement. If Mr. Molotov so desired, Mr. Eden stated that Marshal Stalin’s proposal might be accepted to the effect that a telegram be sent setting forth the views of the Foreign Ministers on the Yugoslav situation.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether any mention should be made of Yugoslavia in the Crimea Conference Communiqué.

Mr. Eden suggested that both courses might be advisable.

Mr. Molotov recalled that Marshal Stalin had suggested that a telegram be sent to Tito and Subasic suggesting that they expedite the coming into force of the agreement.

Mr. Eden stated that he would submit such a draft telegram to the Foreign Ministers for consideration.

Reparations

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to reserve the position of the British Government with respect to pre-war debts and claims. He was in favor of setting up the Reparations Commission as soon as possible.

Mr. Maisky interjected that unless the British agreed to the American draft submitted February 9, the Commission would have no basis, no directives for its work.

Mr. Eden stated that he agreed on the principles involved in the American proposals concerning the immediate withdrawal of property from Germany and the annual contributions. However, he wished to submit a redraft of the proposals.

Mr. Eden stated that reparations should be considered in connection with the dismemberment of Germany. There seemed to be two Russian objectives which were difficult to reconcile – the depletion of German manufacturing capacity and the insuring of German ability to make large payments at a later date. The British were most anxious to avoid conditions in which it would be necessary for them to finance and feed Germany at a later date as a result of reparations. Furthermore, the British would like France on the Moscow Commission from the start. The British Government also felt that the question of labor should be considered by the Moscow Commission and that it would be inadvisable to name any figure for deliveries until the Moscow Commission had started its work. In addition, reparations arrangements should be made without prejudices to the restitution of looted property.

Mr. Molotov agreed to this last statement.

Mr. Maisky stated that Mr. Eden’s reply was very disappointing. Its whole spirit was to take from Germany as little as possible.

Mr. Eden interjected that this was not the case; however, he could say that the Prime Minister did not believe that the Russians would receive anywhere near as much as they hoped for.

Mr. Maisky stated that naturally when the dismemberment of Germany had been decided in a practical form the reparations plan must be adjusted. This problem was considered from its initiation. There was no contradiction. The amount of annual payments were quite possible after the contemplated removals. If Mr. Eden had any doubts the easiest way out was to accept the formula agreed upon by the Americans and Russians yesterday as the basis for discussion and to raise the British proposals in Moscow on this basis. He stated that the question of labor would certainly come up for discussion of the plan during the Commission studies of Germany. He pointed out that the formula did not commit the Allies to the exact figure. Taking into account all considerations advanced by Mr. Eden, Mr. Maisky maintained that the British could easily agree to the formula.

Mr. Eden maintained that the British wished a period shorter than ten years for the reparations payments. They preferred five years.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the ten-year period was merely mentioned as a basis for discussion. It might result that all the capital movements could be effected in seven years. He added that the Soviet Government was not committing itself to ten years or twenty billion dollars.

Mr. Eden inquired why this time limit should then be put in the formula.

Mr. Maisky replied that it was desired as a basis for discussion.

Mr. Eden stated that he would submit an alternative draft and that he hoped that the subject might be discussed at the 4:00 o’clock meeting.

Communiqué on the Crimean Conference

Mr. Molotov inquired whether any thought had been given to the communiqué on the Conference.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the American Delegation was drafting something for the consideration of the Foreign Ministers. He suggested that the first item on the afternoon’s agenda be the question of a communiqué and that the drafting of a communiqué be assigned to the Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden agreed to this suggestion.

World Organization

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to submit a report of the subcommittee.

Mr. Molotov stated that he agreed to both points contained in the report, i.e., regarding the method of consulting France and China and the text of the invitation to the Conference.

Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius also agreed.

Austro-Yugoslav Frontier

Mr. Eden stated that this problem would surely arise and that he did not wish a repetition of “Athens.” He wished to submit a small paper on the question.

Mr. Molotov stated that he would wish to study this paper before discussing it.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he felt that paragraph (b) on page two went beyond the period of occupation and that it might be improved by redrafting.

Yugoslav-Italian Frontier

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to submit a paper on this question. He added that he did not expect to discuss it at the present meeting. A copy of this document is attached.

Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations

In accordance with Mr. Eden’s suggestion, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty of alliance. The British Embassy in Moscow had transmitted to the Narkomindel a note on the Balkan Federation in which it was stressed that such a Federation might include Turkey. This was not an urgent matter at the present time; however there were conversations in progress between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on a treaty of friendship and alliance. The Soviet Government entertained favorable views on this treaty and had informed the British accordingly. The Bulgarians and Yugoslavs were collaborating militarily against the Germans in Yugoslavia. There should, consequently, be no objections to such a treaty.

Mr. Eden stated that this treaty raised the important question of principle. The British held the view that former enemy states should be debarred from entering into treaty relations with other states when they were under an occupational regime and certainly not without the permission of the Allies. Apart from this principle, the British were somewhat anxious concerning the effect of the treaty on reparations which Greece should obtain from Bulgaria. He wished to submit a separate memorandum on this matter.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Foreign Office had received a note from the British to the effect that former enemies under an armistice regime should not have treaty relations with other enemy states. But now it was a question of an ex-enemy and a friendly state. He maintained that the British had stated that they had no objections to treaties between ex-enemy and friendly states.

Mr. Eden questioned this.

Mr. Molotov continued that this principle was also implied in the British proposal concerning a Balkan Federation in which former enemy and friendly states would enter.

Mr. Eden maintained that he did not believe that states under an armistice regime should be permitted to make peace treaties without the permission of the Allies. Furthermore, the British never had in mind a Balkan Federation until the armistice period had terminated.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he was completely in accord with Mr. Eden’s views.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it would not be preferable for the states in question to wait.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had no power to speak for them.

Mr. Eden reminded him that Bulgaria had signed an armistice and was not free to do what it wished.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that this question be discussed by the Ambassadors and Mr. Molotov in Moscow promptly.

Mr. Molotov stated that it might be preferable to postpone discussion of this matter until tomorrow and then to seek agreement.

Iran

Mr. Eden inquired whether Mr. Molotov had considered the British document on Iran.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had nothing to add to what he had said several days ago on the subject.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it would not be advisable to issue a communiqué on Iran.

Mr. Molotov stated that this would be inadvisable.

Mr. Stettinius urged that some reference be made that Iranian problems had been discussed and clarified during the Crimean Conference.

Mr. Molotov stated that he opposed this idea.

Mr. Eden suggested that it be stated that the declaration on Iran had been reaffirmed and reexamined during the present meeting.

Mr. Molotov opposed this suggestion.

8452

Hiss Notes

Alupka, February 10, 1945, noon

Ed. chmn
2/10
For Mins
12.10 p m

ERS asked make statement

We are prepared to withdraw our insistence on the final sentence in the Polish memo, which Mr. Mol. objected to with the understanding that the Pres would be perfectly free to make any statement to the Am. people he might think he had to relative to receiving inform. from his Amb.

Mol. Would like to make a small amend. to yesterday’s text: one cond: as soon as possible

of U.S. & Gt Brit will est. dip. reis, with it as has been done by the Soviet Un

Ed. Objected – It’s to be a new govt

Mol we can leave out “as has been done by the Soviet Un” Ed. But we would all have to recognize it.

Mol. our sit. is diff. from that of U.S. We have already given recog. to present govt

Ed: Yes but this will be a new gov’t

ERS: Advisable that we all move together

Mol: Present sit. being different the doc. must reflect this diff. We quite agree on the future. Let us think about it.

ERS Decl, on Lib. Areas Have discussed Mr. Mol’s proposal Impossible for us to consider amend. Would create untold diffs. for us with respect to our dom, situation

Mol: Then I will propose another amend:

2nd ¶ from the end “they would immed. take measures for carrying out mutual consultation”

Suggests one or other amend.

Ed: An improvement

ERS I’m very favorably impressed

Mol. As to the former amend. Thinks it would be very useless because we don’t wish shots which have occurred in Athens to take place elsewhere

ERS. Sorry, I’m not authorized to consider this amend. any further.

New amend. agreed to

—>Mol Withdraws his former amend.

Ed: One other point. About Fr. sit. Proposed addition of a last ¶

Mol Hasn’t had time to study it, perhaps at 4.00

ERS As stated yesterday, thinks it most desirable

Ed. Little further inform. Re Yug. Sub. due leave today or tomorrow for Bel. Argument, as I as [sic] understand, has been about names of regents. But in our view no reason this should hold up coming into force of agt. We can send tel. setting forth our views as Mar. St. suggested

Mol. and communique?

Ed Can do that, too

Mol. Tel. telling them to hurry up That the agt. come into force immed.

Ed. Will show other 2 delegs. draft of tel.

Ed. Re Pol. – I didn’t mean to indicate agt. with Am. proposal to drop last sentence

ERS We would of course still prefer doc. as it exists but Pres so anxious reach agt, he is willing to make this concession

Mol. Thanks him Mr. Stett. very much

Reparations
Ed:

  1. 1st reps should be considered in connection with dismemberment

  2. Two R objects – depletion Ger. mfg. capacity & ensuring ability make large payments later – are difficult to reconcile We are very anxious to avoid conditions making it nec. finance or feed Ger later as result reparations

  3. Would like Fr. on Mos. Commission from start

  4. Labor should be considered too

  5. Can’t name any figure for deliveries until Commission has studied matter

Mol: Any points Mr Ed. agrees on?

Ed. Add: These arrangements are without prejudice to restitution of looted property Mol. Of course

Ed. reserve position re pre-war claims We are in favor of Com. being set up in Mos as soon as possible

Mol: No basis for work of Com. We don’t give it any directives or principles on which to work.

Ed. We agree on principles: immediate withdrawal of machinery, etc – quicker the better – & annual payments Has a redraft

Maisky: Mr. Ed’s reply is very disappointing – Whole spirit of reply Spirit apparently is to take from Ger little as poss.

Ed: Never said anything of kind but can say my P.M. doesn’t think you’ll get anything like as much as you think.

Re Ed’s points

  1. Naturally when dismemberment decided in practical form, plan be adjusted

  2. Problem was considered from beginning. No contradiction. Ain’t of annual payments quite possible after contemplated removals. If you have doubts, shortest cut to accept our formula of yesterday – to take our proposals as basis for discussion & then bring up your points Never expected support Ger.

Nothing on 3

  1. Labor certainly will come in in elaboration of whole plan, but as Com. studies q.

  2. Our formula doesn’t commit you to the figures. Taking into account all your points, you can easily agree to formula agreed on by Sov & Am. delegs

Ed. We consider $20 billion equals 500,000,000£ a yr.

Maisky No in ten yrs

Ed: We wanted a shorter period

Mol. Let us write down 10 yrs

Ed: We prefer 5 yrs

ERS Its all a basis of discussion Might end up all these capital movements possible in 7 yrs Sov. Gov’t isn’t committing itself to 10 yrs or $20 billion

Maisky Certainly. In end might be 5 or 6

Ed Then why put in 10 yrs

Maisky: As basis for discussion

Ed. Let each put in its own plan Will give alternate draft & discuss at 4.00 p m Agreed

Mol. re communique

ERS We are hard at work drafting something for your consid.

Mol: You take initiative?

ERS There will be a draft, we would be glad to take initiative I would suggest 1st order bus. this afternoon that drafting of commun. be assigned to For Mins

Mol. Good

Ed. all right

World Org. report of subcommittee

Mol. I agree to both points – consultation of Ch & Fr. & the invitation

Ed We all agree then

Austria-Yug. frontiers

Ed: presented proposal

Mol. Translate & study

ERS: we feel (b) on p 2 should be pretty carefully considered. We feel that as phrased this goes beyond period of occupation

Ed: That is all that is meant Drafting may need to be made clearer

Yug-It frontier

Ed: proposal to be studied

Yug-Bul. relations

Mol. Mentioned treaty of alliance between Yug & Bul.

  1. Recently For. Commissariat rec’d a note re federation, stressing federation might include Turkey. This is not an urgent q.

  2. There are conversations between Yug & Bul about a treaty of friendship & alliance Sov. Govt holds a favorable view. They are collaborating militarily ag. Gers in Yug. There should be no objections to it.

Ed: Glad to hear treaty is not actual (?) Anxious about effect of this treaty on reparations we are anxious & all agreed Gr. should receive from Bul. Has separate memo on this.

Mol All obligs. of Bul. have been enforced. No one can change them without consent of 3 powers Bul & Rum. cannot have a treaty between them Now is q. of treaty between 1 friendly country & an ex-enemy There was a direct agt by Brit Govt to it. Q by Eden?

Mol. There were objections to treaty between 2 former enemies but not friendly & enemy

Ed. We do not think a country under armistice terms can make a treaty without consent of 3 powers. I never had it in mind a country under armistice would come into a federation until armistice over

ERS I’m completely in accord with Ed’s views

Ed: Can’t they wait?

Mol: Has no power to speak for them.

Ed. Bul. has signed armistice. Isn’t free to do as she wants. Although has threatened to shoot our planes coming here.

Mol. Our planes have been shot at in Yug but was mistake & our troops shot at by Am planes

Ed. I don’t know why Bul. can shoot at any planes Can we ask this wait awhile

Mol Can go on with discussions

ERS Suggest our Ambs discuss with Mol. in Mos. promptly Mol. Would wait until tomorrow

Iran
Mol. Has nothing to add

Ed: Would Mol like to put out communique

Mol: Undesirable. Can discuss this later

ERS I would urge some reference that Iranian problems have been discussed & clarified. Very troublesome q.

Mol Against that

Ed: Say re-examined & reaffirmed Teheran Decl.

Mol Against that

ERS status of Pol. Agreed Ed. to report on yesterday’s & today’s progress.

Reparations:
Mol.: mention in document just 2 figures as basis for discussion

8453

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Items Still Before the Foreign Ministers

Poland
There is probably no reason to discuss this until the plenary meeting.

Declaration of Liberated Europe
Same status as Number 1.

Iran
The British may propose adoption of their paper – Mr. Matthews has a copy of it.

Reparations
The British have not yet agreed to Soviet-American paper. The British or Russians may want to bring this up.

Mr. Eden Wants
(a) To have the provisions relating to the Hungarian Control Commission apply also in Bulgaria;
(b) To get an agreement for Bulgarian reparations to Greece;
(c) To express opposition to Russian proposal favoring an alliance between Tito and Bulgaria.

U.S. Delegation Memorandum On The Polish Government

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Text of Formula on Poland So Far Agreed by the Three Foreign Ministers

A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a provisional Polish government more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The provisional government now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad. This new government will then be called the “Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.” Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This “Polish Provisional Government of National Unity” would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties would have the right to take part and to put forth candidates.

When a “Polish Provisional Government of National Unity” has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition.

In lieu of the following sentence: “When a ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’ has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition.” Mr. Molotov suggests the following rewording:

When a “Polish Provisional Government of National Unity” has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with it as has been done by the Soviet Union.

This sentence was not accepted by Mr. Stettinius or Mr. Eden.

He said he would bring it up again at the four o’clock meeting this afternoon.

The British still advocate inclusion of the following sentence:

The ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.

U.S. Delegation Memorandum on the Soviet Proposal for the Final Paragraph of the Formula on Poland

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Mr. Molotov’s latest draft proposal for the end of the last sentence of the Polish formula:

… the Government of the USSR, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland and the Governments of Great Britain and the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. and will exchange Ambas. by whose reports the respect. Govts. will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

8454

British Amendment to the Draft Declaration on Liberated Europe

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

British Draft of Last Paragraph of Declaration on Liberated Europe

In issuing this Declaration the three Powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of the French Republic may be associated with them in the action and the procedure suggested.

British Proposal on Reparations

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

Basic Principles of Exaction of Reparation from Germany

  1. The proportions in reparation allotted to the claimant countries shall be determined according to their respective contributions to the winning of the war and the degree of the material loss which they have suffered. Account shall be taken of deliveries made to the claimant countries by other enemy countries.

  2. Reparation is to be exacted from Germany in the three following forms:

    (a) Removals within two years from the surrender of Germany or the cessation of organized resistance from the national wealth of Germany located on the territory of Germany herself as well as outside her territory. These removals to be carried out chiefly for purpose of destroying the war potential of Germany. Subject to the fulfilment of these aims Germany’s industrial capacity will not be reduced to a point which would endanger the economic existence of Germany and the execution of such obligations as may be imposed on her.

    (b) Annual deliveries from current production for a period to be considered.

    (c) Use of German labor and lorry service.

  3. In fixing the amount of reparation to be exacted under paragraph two above account shall be taken of any arrangements made for the dismemberment of Germany, the requirements of the occupying forces, and Germany’s need to acquire from time to time sufficient foreign currency from her exports to pay for her current imports and the pre-war claims of the United Nations on Germany.

8455

Report to the Foreign Ministers by the Subcommittee on Arrangements for the United Nations Conference

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

Report to the Foreign Ministers

We were instructed on February 8 to prepare a report to the Foreign Ministers on the following subjects:

  • a) The method of consultation with France and China in regard to the decisions taken at the present conference concerning the proposed world organization.

  • b) The text of the invitation which should be issued to all the nations which will take part in the United Nations Conference.

With regard to (a) we consider that the United States on behalf of the three powers should consult the Government of China and the Provisional French Government.

With regard to (b) we attach for the approval of the Ministers a draft invitation to all the nations which will take part in the conference.

[Attachment]

Invitation

The Government of the United States of America, on behalf of itself and the Governments of the United Kingdom, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China and of the Provisional Government of the French Republic, invites the Government of __________ to send representatives to a Conference of the United Nations to be held on April 25, 1945, or soon thereafter, at ______ in the United States of America to prepare a Charter for a General International Organization for the maintenance of international peace and security.

The above-named governments suggest that the Conference consider as affording a basis for such a Charter the Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization, which were made public last October as a result of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and which have now been supplemented by the following provisions for Section C of Chapter VI:

C. Voting

  1. Each member of the Security Council should have one vote.

  2. Decisions of the Security Council on procedural matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members.

  3. Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters should be made by an affirmative vote of seven members including the concurring votes of the permanent members; provided that, in decisions under Chapter VIII, Section A and under the second sentence of paragraph 1 of Chapter VIII, Section C, a party to a dispute should abstain from voting.

Further information as to arrangements will be transmitted subsequently.

In the event that the Government of _______ desires in advance of the Conference to present views or comments concerning the proposals, the Government of the United States of America will be pleased to transmit such views and comments to the other participating Governments.

8456

British Proposal Regarding the Austrian-Yugoslav Frontier

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

British Statement on Austro-Yugoslav Frontier

If the British proposals for the allocation of zones of occupation in Austria are approved, the whole length of the Austro-Yugoslav frontier will be a British responsibility. This may involve us in difficulties with Yugoslavia because though the Yugoslav Government have not so far asked for any alteration of the Styrian portion of this frontier they have advanced claims to Klagenfurt and those parts of Carinthia which they failed to obtain under the plebiscite held in 1919. Action may be required to resist Yugoslav efforts to assert these claims and to secure the withdrawal of Yugoslav partisans who in the course of operations may well advance into Carinthia and establish control over it. It would be invidious for HMG to be solely responsible for such action and after our experiences in Greece we must try to prevent British troops from becoming involved in fighting with Allied partisans. We hope, therefore that an agreement might be reached between the three powers for the maintenance of the 1937 Austro-Yugoslav frontier pending the final territorial settlement and for joint measures to ensure its maintenance and observance by Yugoslavia.

It is therefore suggested we should agree at the present conference:

  • (a) that pending the final peace settlement the 1937 frontier between Austria and Yugoslavia shall be restored.

  • (b) that the integrity of this frontier is the joint interest of the three powers, and that the USSR and the USA will support any action which HMG may see fit to take to preserve its integrity.

  • (c) that the three powers should jointly inform the Yugoslav Government of decisions (a) and (b) above and request the Yugoslav Government to give an undertaking to preserve this frontier.

British Proposal Regarding Venezia Giulia

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

Notes for the Secretaries of State in Regard to Venezia Giulia

I should like to draw the attention of my colleagues to the fact that the province of Venezia Giulia in the northeast of Italy is a potential powder magazine. It is therefore likely that there will, as the war draws to a close, be clashes in this area between the Yugoslavs and the Italians, and we must prevent these outbursts to the best of our ability.

We had originally intended to set up Allied Military Government over the whole province up to the 1937 frontier but we now have doubts whether this would be a very satisfactory course for the following reasons. Tito has not yet put his views in writing but he has made it pretty clear that he will not agree to such a proposal. He certainly intends to administer himself the considerable areas which he claims for Yugoslavia and part of which are already controlled by his Partisans. Even if under extreme pressure he was forced to accept Allied (British) Military Government his Partisans would remain in arms throughout the district and it would be a miracle if sooner or later they did not obstruct our Military administration. We should then have to take forceful measures to assert our authority and fighting might begin. Alternatively, there might be clashes between the Yugoslav Partisans and the Italian Partisans, both trying to hold as much territory as they could. In that case also we should have to intervene to keep the peace by force. I would therefore ask my colleagues to agree to establish some body for the purpose of working out a provisional line of demarcation in the Venezia Giulia between the area to be controlled by Tito and the area over which we should establish Allied Military Government. We have made an attempt ourselves to draw up such a line based for the most part of ethnic considerations. But obviously we cannot jointly agree on a line now, all we can do is agree to the principle that there should be such a line and that some body of technicians should be established for the purpose of determining it. After that it would no doubt be for His Majesty’s Government to obtain Tito’s acceptance of it. But if they do this His Majesty’s Government would like to be able to say that both their Allies agree with the proposal.

Finally, I would point out that in any case, even if the area west of my suggested provisional line is allotted to Tito, it will be necessary, in the early stages at any rate, for our Supreme Commander to make use of the communications from Trieste northwards in which case he would have to take suitable measures to that end. It might later be possible for him to arrange for his communications to Austria to pass further to the west.

British Proposal Regarding the Allied Control Commission in Bulgaria

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

Allied (Soviet) Control Commission in Bulgaria

His Majesty’s Government regard it as essential (a) that their representatives in Bulgaria should enjoy reasonable freedom of movement and communication, and (b) that decisions about which they have not been consulted should not be taken in their name. In the case of Hungary, (a) has been satisfactorily dealt with in the “Statutes of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary,” and His Majesty’s Government suggest that identical Statutes should be adopted for the Control Commission in Bulgaria in order to meet the points made in the message from Mr. Eden which was delivered to M. Molotov on or about December 11, 1944.

His Majesty’s Government also consider that during the first period there should be prior consultation with the British and American representatives and that, should the Soviet Government feel obliged to take any unilateral action on military grounds not covered in the Armistice, it should be taken on their sole responsibility and in the name of the Soviet Government only.

During the second period, i.e. after the conclusion of hostilities with Germany, His Majesty’s Government wish to ensure that

  • (a) The British and American representatives should take their places in the Control Commissions as full members and should have the right to attend all their meetings and to participate fully in the consideration of all questions before the Commissions. They should also have the right of direct access to the Bulgarian authorities.

  • (b) Decisions of the Allied Control Commission should be unanimous and its name and authority should be used only where the representatives of all three powers are in agreement. If the Soviet High Command, being in de facto control of Bulgaria through the presence of Soviet troops, insist upon issuing directives to the local Government or taking action which has not been approved by both the British and American representatives they should act unilaterally in their own name.

  • (c) The extent to which the British and Americans will share in the actual executive and administrative work of the Control Commission will be a matter to be settled on the spot. But they must certainly have the right to membership of any subcommittee or executive organ dealing with matters concerning British and American rights and property.

  • (d) The detailed implications of these proposals should be worked out between the Soviet chairman and the British and American representatives on the Control Commission on the spot.

British Proposal on Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations

His Majesty’s Government recently communicated to the Soviet Government an expression of their views regarding a possible Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation. In replying to this communication, the Soviet Government informed His Majesty’s Government that they were aware that negotiations between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria for the conclusion of a pact of alliance and mutual assistance were proceeding and added that their attitude towards this was favourable. The Soviet Government, however, considered that the question of a Balkan federation, and in particular of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation, was not at present actual and was of no practical importance.

While His Majesty’s Government are glad to learn that the Soviet Government do not consider the question of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian federation to be actual at present and that they regard the matter as of no practical importance, they are disturbed to learn that a pact of alliance and mutual assistance between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria is under negotiation and that the attitude of the Soviet Government towards these negotiations is favourable.

His Majesty’s Government cannot but regard the pact now under negotiation as open to the same objections which they felt in regard to a possible federation. In their view an enemy state whose status is still regulated by an armistice regime must be debarred from entering into special treaty relations with another state, more particularly with another state with which she is still technically in a state of war except with the explicit permission of all the victorious Powers with whom the armistice was concluded.

Quite apart from the important question of principle involved, His Majesty’s Government are also anxious regarding the effect of the pact now under negotiation between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria upon the interests of Greece which has hitherto not received from Bulgaria the full reparation to which she is entitled under the terms of the armistice. This aspect of the matter is treated in greater detail in a separate aide-mémoire.

His Majesty’s Government accordingly consider that a communication should be made to the Bulgarian Government by all the victorious Powers with whom she recently concluded an armistice, stating that they cannot agree to her entering into special treaty relations with Yugoslavia at this stage and that full reparation must be made to Greece before there can be any question of such negotiations being resumed. His Majesty’s Government consider that Marshal Tito should simultaneously be informed of the objections seen by the victorious Powers to the conclusion of a Yugoslav-Bulgarian pact. His Majesty’s Government would be glad to learn the views of the Soviet Government upon this matter as soon as possible.

British Proposal Regarding Greek Claims on Bulgaria

Yalta, February 10, 1945
Top secret

Greek Claims Upon Bulgaria, More Particularly in Regard to Reparations

His Majesty’s Government are concerned regarding the position in regard to Greek claims against Bulgaria. On the occasion of the signature of the Armistice with Hungary, the Soviet Government informed the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments that they might send representatives to be accredited to the Hungarian Control Commission for the purpose of dealing with all questions affecting their particular government.

On January 23, the Greek Government, with the support of His Majesty’s Embassy in Moscow, approached the Soviet Government with a request for facilities in Bulgaria similar to those granted to the Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments in Hungary. No reply has, however, yet been vouchsafed to this request by the Soviet Government.

The Greek people have suffered very seriously from Bulgarian depredations and are in the view of His Majesty’s Government entitled to early satisfaction and to immediate reparation deliveries of which Greece stands in urgent need. The Greek Government have already presented to the Bulgarian Control Commission a list of commodities necessary to the Greek economy and due to them in virtue of the Bulgarian Armistice Agreement, the delivery of which to Greece in the immediate future is essential to the maintenance of Greek economy. Deliveries which are more urgently required comprise, inter alia, food stuffs, locomotives, agricultural implements and livestock. Furthermore, in view of the decision incorporated in the Hungarian armistice terms allotting to Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia fixed sums payable in commodities as reparations over a period of six years, it is in the view of His Majesty’s Government equitable that similar arrangements should be made to fix a lump sum due to Greece by Bulgaria to be paid similarly in commodities over a period of six years. In the view of His Majesty’s Government a corresponding sum should be allocated to Yugoslavia which has also suffered from Bulgarian occupation. In this connection his Majesty’s Government desire to make it clear that, while they are in general opposed to the fixing of lump sums for reparations to be exacted from enemy countries, they consider it only equitable, in view of the fact that lump sums have been allocated to the Soviet, Czechoslovak and Yugoslav Governments under the Rumanian, Finnish and Hungarian Armistices, that a similar lump sum should now be allocated to Greece and Yugoslavia under the Bulgarian Armistice.

His Majesty’s Government accordingly trust that the Soviet Government will accede to the proposals put to them on January 23 with the support of His Majesty’s Government concerning Greek representation on the Control Commission in Bulgaria. They further trust that the Soviet Government will agree to give explicit instructions to the head of the Control Commission in Bulgaria that immediate deliveries must be made to Greece in accordance with the terms of the armistice and that the list already presented by the Greek Government to the Soviet Government is to be taken as the basis for determining the nature and amounts of commodities to be delivered. Finally, His Majesty’s Government are of the opinion that immediate consideration should be given to the question of fixing the total Bulgarian reparation liability to Greece and Yugoslavia, if necessary in terms of money.

8457

British Memorandum on Oil Equipment in Romania

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Oil Equipment in Roumania

His Majesty’s Government have been glad to note that the Soviet authorities have now agreed to stop removing equipment from the oil fields in Roumania in which British interests are involved and have also agreed that the Ruat plant should remain in situ. But if the large quantities of equipment which have already been removed are not to be returned, His Majesty’s Government considers that they must be regarded as deliveries on account of reparations, and arrangements made for compensating the oil companies. Similarly, the Ruat plant should be restored to its previous condition and brought into production as soon as possible. As the Soviet Government have made no attempt to refute the argument advanced by His Majesty’s Government that any equipment which may be removed should be regarded as reparation and not as war booty, His Majesty’s Government can only refer the Soviet Government to the statement of the case which has already been made. It should also be pointed out that these difficulties would never have arisen if the Soviet representatives in Roumania had discussed problems affecting the Roumanian oil industry with their British and American colleagues on the Control Commission instead of taking unilateral action.

8458

Harriman Memorandum of Conversations

Leningrad, February 10, 1945, 2:00 p.m. to 4:30 p.m.
Top secret
1st Conversation
Present: Mr. Harriman Date: February 10, 1945
Mr. Molotov Time: 2:00 PM
Mr. Pavlov Place: Koreis
2nd Conversation
Present: The President Date: February 10, 1945
Mr. Harriman Time: [blank]
Place: Livadia Palace
3rd Conversation
Present: The President Date: February 10, 1945
Mr. Harriman Time: 4:30 PM
Marshal Stalin Place: Livadia Palace

Subject: THE FAR EAST – POLITICAL

At Mr. Molotov’s request I called on him at Koreis at 2:00 p.m. He handed me in English translation the draft of Marshal Stalin’s political conditions for Russia’s entry in the war against Japan as discussed with the President on February 8.

I explained to Molotov that there were three amendments I believed the President would wish to make before accepting:

  1. b) should indicate Stalin’s readiness to accept the President’s proposal that Port Arthur and Dairen should be free ports and 2. c) should cover the alternative of the railways being operated by a Chinese-Soviet Commission, both of which Marshal Stalin had agreed to. In addition, I said I felt sure that the President would not wish to dispose finally of these two matters in which China was interested without the concurrence of the Generalissimo.

Mr. Molotov indicated that Marshal Stalin had agreed to the first two points but it took me some time to explain to Molotov the reasons for the last. I agreed to submit to Molotov the President’s suggested revisions.

On my return to Livadia I showed the President the proposed draft (copy attached) with the amendments covering the points mentioned (copy of amendments attached): The President approved and authorized me to resubmit them to Mr. Molotov, which I did.

After the formal Conference meeting in the afternoon between the President, the Prime Minister, Marshal Stalin and their associates, Marshal Stalin came to me to explain the further changes he had in mind for the Agreement. He said that he was entirely willing to have Dairen a free port under international control, but that Port Arthur was different, it was to be a Russian naval base and therefore Russia required a lease.

I suggested to Marshal Stalin that he take the opportunity to discuss this matter at once with the President, which he thereupon did.

The President agreed to Marshal Stalin’s revised proposal regarding the ports as above.

Marshal Stalin then explained that he agreed it would be more appropriate for the Manchurian Railroads to be operated by a Chinese-Soviet Commission. He further agreed in the need for concurrence of the Generalissimo on these matters but stated that the Generalissimo should also give his concurrence to status quo in Outer Mongolia.

The President asked Marshal Stalin whether he (Stalin) wished to take these matters up with T. V. Soong when he came to Moscow or whether Stalin wished the President to take them up with the Generalissimo.

Marshal Stalin replied that as he was an interested party he would prefer to have the President do it.

The President then asked when the subject should be discussed with the Generalissimo having in mind the question of secrecy.

Marshal Stalin said he would let the President know when he was prepared to have this done.

The President said that he would send an army officer from Washington through Moscow to Chungking with a letter of instructions to Ambassador Hurley in order to insure secrecy.

At that moment the Prime Minister interrupted the discussion. I had an opportunity later, however, to ask Marshal Stalin whether he would undertake to draft the further revisions, to which he replied in the affirmative.

W. A. HARRIMAN

  1. Attachments
[Attachment 1 — TRANSLATION]

Draft of Marshal Stalin’s Political Conditions for Russia’s Entry in the War Against Japan

The leaders of the three Great Powers – the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has ended the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

  1. Status quo in the Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian People’s Republic) should be preserved;
  2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 should be restored viz:

  • a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to this part of Sakhalin should be returned to the Soviet Union,

  • b) possession of Port Arthur and Dairen on lease should be restored.

  • c) the rights possessed by Russia before the Russo-Japanese war to the operation of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian railroad providing an outlet to Dairen should be restored on the understanding that China should continue to possess full sovereignty in Manchuria;

  1. The Kurile islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union. The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union should be unquestionably satisfied after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its willingness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

[Attachment 2]

Mr. Harriman’s Suggested Changes in Marshal Stalin’s Draft of Russia’s Political Conditions for Russia’s Entry in the War Against Japan

Item 2 b)

possession lease of the port areas of Port Arthur and Dairen en lease should be restored, or these areas should become free ports under international control.

Item 2 c)

Add the following after the word “Manchuria;” at the end of the paragraph “or these railroads should be placed under the operational control of a Chinese-Soviet Commission.”

Item 3

Add final paragraph:

It is understood that the agreement concerning the ports and railways referred to above requires the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

NOTE: Portions crossed out are deletions and portions underlined are additions to original document.

8459

Seventh plenary meeting, 4:00 p.m.

Livadia Palace, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill Marshal Stalin
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy Sir Archibald Clark Kerr
Mr. Hopkins Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Harriman Sir Edward Bridges Mr. Maisky
Mr. Matthews Mr. Jebb Mr. Gusev
Mr. Hiss Mr. Wilson Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Dixon Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Foote Major Birse
Mr. Early Mr. Roberts
Mr. Allen

Bohlen Minutes

Leningrad, February 10, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

Subjects:

  • POLAND
  • FRENCH PARTICIPATION IN CONTROL COMMISSION FOR GERMANY
  • YUGOSLAVIA
  • WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION
  • REPARATIONS FROM GERMANY
  • THE DARDANELLES

The President said that he thought that Mr. Eden had a report to make on the progress achieved at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning.

Mr. Eden said that he had to report agreement on the future Government of Poland, that there had been two questions involved which he would refer to later but in the meantime he would read the new formula. He read the new formula with one correction which he admitted to have been made by Mr. Molotov. The new formula was as follows:

A new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional Government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of Western Poland. The Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. This new Government should then be called the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.

Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present Provisional Government and with other Polish democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad, with a view to the re-organisation of the present Government along the above lines. This Polish Provisional Government of National Unity shall be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties shall have the right to take part and to put forward candidates.

When a Polish Provisional Government of National Unity has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Government of the USSR, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland, and the Government of the United Kingdom and the Government of the USA will establish diplomatic relations with the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity, and will exchange Ambassadors by whose reports the respective Governments will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.

The Prime Minister said that the document made no mention of frontiers. He said we are all agreed on the Eastern frontier of Poland and he agreed that Poland should receive compensation in the West, up to the line of the Oder if the Poles so desired. He said that the British Government was very doubtful about going any further or mentioning any such possibility at this stage, since he did not believe that the War Cabinet would accept the line of the Western Neisse. He said he felt, however, that some mention should be made of the territorial settlement otherwise the whole world would wonder what had been decided on this question. There would be some criticism, but nevertheless, it would be better than no mention at all.

The President said that the Polish Government should be consulted before any statement was made in regard to the Western frontier.

Marshal Stalin remarked that he thought that there should be some statement on the Eastern frontier on which all present had agreed.

The Prime Minister concurred with this statement of Marshal Stalin and repeated the people would wish to know what we had decided on this question.

Mr. Molotov remarked that it would be a good thing if something definite could be said about the Eastern frontier, since it would clarify and quiet the whole situation insofar as the Poles were concerned. He said that it was certain that there would be criticisms, but he felt it would in general be beneficial. He suggested that the matter be referred to the three Foreign Ministers to draft some statement on this point. He added that it was perhaps not necessary to be as specific in regard to the Western frontier as in regard to the Eastern frontier.

The Prime Minister said that he had already gone on record to the effect that Poland would receive a good slice of territory in the North and in the West but that the opinion of the New Polish Government of National Unity would be sought.

The President said he had no objection in principle to such a statement but he thought the Prime Minister should draft it.

Mr. Molotov suggested that it should form a last sentence of the Polish statement.

Mr. Eden, continuing his report, said that in regard to his [the] declaration on liberated Europe the Soviet Delegation had proposed an amendment in regard to the last sentence of the fifth paragraph to the effect that the three Governments should immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultations. Mr. Eden said that he proposed a draft that the three Governments should immediately consult together upon the measures to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.

After some discussion as to what had been agreed upon at the meeting of the Foreign Ministers this morning, Marshal Stalin said he accepted the British suggestion.

Mr. Eden then said there was a note which he wished to attach to this declaration, namely, that the French should be invited to associate themselves with the declaration and that his note would merely state that in issuing this declaration the three heads of Governments expressed the hope that the Provisional Government of France would associate themselves in the actions and procedures envisaged therein.

The President then said that he had changed his mind in regard to the question of the French participation in the Control Commission. He now agreed with the views of the Prime Minister that it would be impossible to give France an area to administer in Germany unless they were members of the Control Commission. He said he thought it would be easier to deal with the French if they were on the Commission than if they were not.

Marshal Stalin said he had no objections and that he agreed to this.

The Prime Minister suggested that there should be a joint telegram sent to De Gaulle informing him of these decisions to which there was general agreement.

Mr. Eden said the next subject was that of Yugoslavia and read the text of a telegram to be sent to Marshal Tito and Subasic suggesting that the agreement which they had reached be immediately put into effect as the basis for the formation of a unified Government of Yugoslavia.

The President said he was not sure whether he would be able to join in the statement on Yugoslavia but when it had been read to him, he agreed that it was satisfactory and that he could associate himself with it.

After some discussion Marshal Stalin suggested that the telegram to Marshal Tito and Subasic should say that the heads of the three Governments have agreed that the agreement between Tito and Subasic should be put immediately into effect and that as soon as a new Government was formed the two amendments proposed by the British should be put into effect. He said he thought it was inconsistent to put more in the communiqué than there was in the telegram.

The Prime Minister said he hoped that both of the two amendments proposed by the British could be in the communiqué.

Mr. Molotov said he thought it would be better to confine the telegram and reference in the communiqué to the entry into force of the Tito-Subasic agreement.

The Prime Minister said he thought the British people would be more reconciled to the Government and it would have a better reception if the two amendments were included.

After some discussion with the Prime Minister and Mr. Eden, Marshal Stalin said he thought that three points could be included in the telegram: (1) that the Tito-Subasic agreement should go immediately into force, (2) that the members of the Skupschina who had not collaborated with the Germans could be included into the Vetch, and (3) that the actions of the anti-fascist Vetch would be subject to the confirmation by the Constituent Assembly. He added that he thought these three points could go into the communiqué.

Mr. Eden said that the sub-committee in regard to Dumbarton Oaks had reported on the matter of informing the French and Chinese Governments and on the form of the invitations, but he did not feel that it was necessary to bother the Conference with these small matters. He went on to say that in regard to reparations the British Government still had reservations in regard to the Soviet proposals.

The Prime Minister said he had received instructions from the War Cabinet not to mention figures and that that should be left to the reparations committee to determine.

The President said that he was afraid that if reparations and especially if any figures were mentioned that the American people would believe that it involved money.

Marshal Stalin explained that the sum mentioned was only the expression of the value of the reparations in kind.

The Prime Minister added that nothing would be published, as he understood it, in regard to reparations but that he could not agree to the inclusion of a definite sum.

Marshal Stalin said he wished to discuss the circumstances of the matter. He did not understand why there should be any confusion in regard to payment in money since the Soviet Union had concluded three treaties with Finland, Rumania and Hungary in which the value of reparations in kind were definitely stated and that there had been no confusion as far as he knew on this subject. He said that if the British felt that the Russians should receive no reparations at all, it would be better to say so frankly. He said he had heard a great deal of talk at the Conference that the Russians would receive reparations in kind in the form of factories and plants but that no decision had been reached. He said he thought that two decisions might be taken by the Conference: (1) that it was agreed in principle that Germany should pay reparations and (2) that the Reparations Commission to sit in Moscow should fix the amount and should take into consideration the American-Soviet proposal that there should be twenty billion dollars of reparations, with fifty per cent to the Soviet Union.

The President said he feared the word “reparations” somewhat since he thought the people in America would think it meant reparations in cash.

Someone replied that this could be easily avoided by using the term “compensation for damages caused by Germany during the war” instead of “reparations.”

Mr. Molotov said that the Moscow commission would have the duty of finding out the total of reparations to be paid, taking as a basis of discussion the American-Soviet formula.

The Prime Minister replied that the British Government could not commit itself to any figure.

Marshal Stalin replied that there was no commitment involved but it might be said that the Commission might take as material for discussion the American-Soviet formula.

The Prime Minister then read a telegram from the War Cabinet which said that they considered it inadmissible to state any figure until an investigation had been completed on the spot and that at any rate the figure of twenty billion dollars was too great. It was equal to Germany’s export trade in times of peace and it was beyond the capacity of Germany to pay. It was true that some of these reparations would come from Germany’s capital assets but that in turn would make it more difficult for Germany to pay her bills. The payments would more than cover German imports and if these imports were not given a priority ahead of reparations it would mean that the other countries would be paying for German reparations to those countries receiving them.

Marshal Stalin said he did not want to go into the circumstances of the telegram the Prime Minister had just read. The experts may be right, but that all they were preparing was a figure to be used as a basis for discussions – it could be reduced or increased by the Commission in Moscow.

The President then suggested that the whole matter be left to the Commission in Moscow.

Marshal Stalin said that he felt in principle that Germany should pay reparations which would be stated by the three Governments here.

Mr. Molotov said that yesterday Mr. Stettinius had analyzed the results of the meeting and had reported full agreement on the first two points of the Soviet proposal. Now the question was what countries should receive reparations and the type of reparations and differences only appeared between the United States and the Soviet Delegation on the one hand and the British on the other in regard to the naming of a sum.

Mr. Eden said that rightly or wrongly, the British Government felt that even the naming of a sum as the basis of discussions would commit them. He said he proposed that the Moscow Commission be instructed to examine the report of Mr. Maisky, made at the Crimean Conference.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Maisky both replied that to refer a question put by the Crimean Conference to a lesser body would be utterly illogical.

The Prime Minister said that no agreement had been reached as to the mention of a sum.

Mr. Eden added that the first two points referred to by Mr. Molotov were agreed upon but not the last which related to the sum.

Marshal Stalin repeated that he was willing to propose the following formula: (1) that the heads of the Governments had agreed that Germany must pay compensation for the damages caused to the Allied nations as a result of the war, and (2) that the Moscow Commission be instructed to consider the amount of reparations. This was agreed to by the Conference.

There was then a short intermission.

The President inquired whether they could discuss the British text of the paragraph on frontiers to be added to the Polish statement.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had not yet received the Russian translation.

Marshal Stalin then said that he would like to say a few words about the Montreux Convention regarding the Dardanelles. He said the treaty was now outmoded. As he recalled, the Japanese Emperor played a big part in the treaty, even greater than that of the Soviet Union. The treaty was linked with the League which does not exist just as the Japanese Emperor was not present at this Conference. Under the Montreux Convention the Turks have the right to close the Straits not only in time of war but if they feel that there is a threat of war. He said that the treaty was made at a time when the relations between Great Britain and the Soviet Union were not perfect, but he did not think now that Great Britain would wish to strangle Russia with the help of the Japanese. The treaty needed revision. He thought that there would be no objection to a consideration of the revision of that treaty. He said in what manner the treaty should be revised he did not know and he did not wish to prejudge any decisions, but he felt that the interests of Russia should be considered. He said that it was impossible to accept a situation in which Turkey had a hand on Russia’s throat. He added, however, that it should be done in such a manner as not to harm the legitimate interests of Turkey. This was a question which an appropriate organization could consider and he thought that the three Foreign Ministers who were to meet periodically – every two or three months – might well consider this matter at their first meeting and report to their respective cabinets.

The President said he had one general observation to make and that was that in the United States we had a frontier of over 3,000 miles with Canada and there was no fort and no armed forces. This situation had existed over a hundred years and it was his hope that other frontiers in the World would eventually be without forts or armed forces on any part of their national boundaries.

The Prime Minister said that Marshal Stalin had reminded them of the question of the Straits when they were in Moscow last autumn. They had said then that they were in sympathy with the revision of the treaty and had suggested to the Soviet Government that a note be sent on the subject but none has as yet been received. He said that he thought that the method proposed by Marshal Stalin was a wise one. The British certainly felt that the present position of Russia with their great interests in the Black Sea should not be dependent on the narrow exit. He said if the matter is brought up at the meeting with the Foreign Ministers he hoped the Russians would make their proposals known. In the meantime, it might be well to inform the Turks that the matter of revision of the Montreux Convention would be under consideration. This was particularly true if the Allies desired them to come into the war on their side. Mr. Eden reminded him that he had mentioned the matter several times to the Turkish Ambassador in London. He said it might be advisable to give the Turks at the same time some assurance that their independence and integrity will be guaranteed.

Marshal Stalin replied it was impossible to keep anything secret from the Turks and that such assurance should be expressed.

The President agreed to this.

Marshal Stalin said the Foreign Ministers could meet at the United Nations Conference and discuss the question of the Straits.

The Prime Minister said that he thought that this matter affected the position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean more than it did that of the United States and that he felt that if the Foreign Ministers had a meeting in London that that would be the proper place to discuss this question. He went on to say that some years ago he had tried very hard to get through the Dardanelles and then the Russian Government had made available an armed force to help but it did not succeed.

Marshal Stalin said that the Prime Minister had been in too much of a hurry in withdrawing his troops since the Germans and Turks were on the verge of surrender.

The Prime Minister replied that by that time he was out of the government because of the Dardanelles campaign and had had nothing to do with that decision.

Marshal Stalin then inquired who was taking down decisions reached at this conference.

Mr. Eden replied there would be an agreed upon communiqué as well as a list of the decisions taken.

The President then said he wished to propose some small amendments in the paragraph regarding frontiers in the Polish statement. He said these amendments were necessary for American Constitutional reasons. He suggested that instead of the first words “The three powers” he would like to substitute “The three heads of government” and that in the second sentence the words “three powers” be eliminated, and in the last sentence the word “feel” instead of “agree” should be used.

These amendments were accepted by the conference, and the following text approved:

The three Heads of Government consider that the Eastern frontier of Poland should follow the Curzon Line with digressions from it in some regions of five to eight kilometres in favour of Poland. It is recognized that Poland must receive substantial accessions of territory in the North and West. They feel that the opinion of the new Polish Provisional Government of National Unity should be sought in due course on the extent of these accessions and that the final delimitation of the Western frontier of Poland should thereafter await the Peace Conference.

Mr. Molotov said he had one suggestion and that was to add to the second sentence “with the return to Poland of her ancient frontiers in East Prussia and on the Oder.”

The President inquired how long ago these lands had been Polish.

Mr. Molotov said very long ago, but they had in fact been Polish.

The President said this might lead the British to ask for the return of the United States to Great Britain.

Marshal Stalin replied that the ocean prevented this. He added that at the present the draft said nothing specific about frontiers, which he thought was very important for the Poles.

The Prime Minister said he would prefer not to mention the frontier in the west since he shared the same difficulties the President had spoken of.

Mr. Eden said that they had always said that they would accept any line up to the Oder that the Poles desired.

The Prime Minister said that there was no stopping place between what we proposed to do and the line of the Oder, and if the question is asked about ancient territories there would be no answer. He said that he was not against the line of the Oder in principle if the Poles so desired.

Mr. Molotov said he thought it might be worthwhile considering this wording.

Marshal Stalin said he would withdraw the Soviet amendment and leave the British draft as it had been.

The draft of the last paragraph regarding Polish frontiers was accepted.

The President then remarked he would have to leave Yalta tomorrow at three o’clock in the afternoon.

The Prime Minister remarked that he doubted if it would be possible to get all the work done by then, particularly the communiqué and the final text of the documents.

There followed a discussion between the President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden concerning the possibility of preparing the communiqué before the time set for the President’s departure.

Marshal Stalin remarked that there was very little time and he felt it was impossible to complete the work in view of the dinner. He suggested that the dinner might be cancelled.

After some discussion it was decided that a drafting committee for the communiqué should come to the Villa and report at ten o’clock to the Foreign Ministers and heads of government.

The meeting then adjourned.

8460

Matthews Minutes

Leningrad, February 10, 1945, 4 p.m.
Top secret

The President opened the meeting (which was delayed owing to an earlier discussion between Mr. Churchill and Marshal Stalin) by asking Mr. Eden to render a report on the foreign secretaries’ meetings of last night and this morning.

Eden: I should like to report that with the exception of two points outstanding we have reached a decision on the Polish question. I believe that we have since worked out an agreement with regard to these two points. (He reads the Polish formula, which after some discussion as to wording was finally agreed to.)

Prime Minister: There is no reference in this formula to the frontier question. The world at large will ask about that. We are all agreed I believe about the eastern frontier. We are all agreed in principle about the western frontier. The only question is where the line is to be drawn and how much to say about it in our communiqué. We are doubtful about going further in mentioning frontiers at this stage. I have received a telegram from the War Cabinet deprecating any frontier going as far west as the Neisse. They feel that the population problem is too large to handle.

President: My position is that I would rather hear from the new government of national unity what they think about it. Therefore, I think we had better leave out all references to frontiers.

Prime Minister: On the west?

Stalin: It is important to say something.

Prime Minister: I agree. People will immediately ask what is the settlement on the question of the frontiers. We think that the eastern frontier is settled. On the west the wishes of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity must be consulted.

President: I do not believe we should say anything in the communiqué. I have no right to make an agreement on boundaries at this time. That must be done by the Senate later. Let the Prime Minister make some public statement when he returns if that is necessary.

Molotov: I think it would be very good if something could be said about full agreement of the three heads of government on the eastern frontier. We could say that the Curzon line is generally representative of the opinion of all present. It is possible that there might be criticism of this for some time but that would be better in the long run. We should either agree or leave to the three foreign ministers to find a formula. I agree that we need say nothing about the western frontier.

Prime Minister: I agree we must say something.

Molotov: Yes, but less specific if you wish.

Prime Minister: We must say that Poland is to get compensation in the west; also that there is to be left for discussion with the Polish government before the line is drawn.

Molotov: Very good.

Prime Minister: We must go out now with the rest of our communiqué on Poland. (Matter is referred to the three foreign ministers.)

Stalin: That could be done during our intermission.

Eden: I shall next report on the declaration on liberated areas. Mr. Molotov kindly withdrew his amendment of last night with regard to the third from last paragraph but has proposed the following wording at the end of the penultimate paragraph. (There followed considerable discussion as to the exact wording that was agreed upon and finally Marshal Stalin accepted the following: “… shall consult together on the measures to discharge the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration.” In this form it was approved.)

I should like to add a sentence with regard to the French which we proposed last evening to clear up the ambiguous situation in regard to France. (The following was approved: “In issuing this declaration the three powers express the hope that the Provisional Government of France will associate itself with them.”)

President: I should like to say that I have changed my mind with regard to the position of the French on the Control Council for Germany. The more I think of it the more I think that the Prime Minister is right and that a nation with a zone of occupation must sit in on the control machinery. I think it would be easier if France is on the commission to get de Gaulle to agree to join the liberated areas declaration and many other things.

Stalin: I have no objection. (It is agreed upon.)

Prime Minister: Of course France may say that she will have no part in the declaration and reserve all rights for the future. (laughing) We must face that.

Molotov: We must be ready to receive a rough answer.

Eden: Next is the question of Yugoslavia. We prepared a draft on this which is still under discussion. (After some discussion between the British and Russians a draft telegram to Yugoslavia is agreed upon. Copy attached.) Molotov insisted that the telegram should be short and should be sent today. The Prime Minister wanted the joint telegram to contain not only the exhortation that the Tito-Subasic agreement be put into effect immediately and the new united government formed but also the additional points which the new government would be asked to accept (Subasic recommendations). First that the Avnoj be extended to include members of the last Yugoslav Skupstina who have not compromised themselves, thus forming a body to be called a temporary parliament, and, two, that legislative acts passed by the Avnoj would be subject to ratification by a constituent assembly. The British also wanted a third provision to the effect that the government is only temporary pending the free expression of the will of the people but dropped this at the Russian request as offensive to Yugoslav sensibilities. On that basis the telegram was agreed upon by all three after considerable discussion by the Prime Minister and Stalin, the latter wanting originally to confine the telegram to the question of the execution of the Tito-Subasic agreement and await till the government was formed before taking up the other point.

There followed a lengthy and at times somewhat heated discussion between Marshal Stalin and Churchill on the question of reparations. This was the only time during the conference that Stalin showed some annoyance. He obviously felt suspicious of the British opposing Russian reparations as part of a program to build up a strong Germany. At one stage in the discussion, he asked point blank if the British did not want the Russians to receive reparations they should say so frankly. This of course Mr. Churchill emphatically denied. Stalin proposed that the three governments accept the principle of reparations in goods. (The President made it clear that what he feared was a system of reparations paid in money.) And second that the Moscow commission should be asked to find out the total or total possible reparations and report to the respective governments. He also asked that the three governments agree that Germany must pay in kind for losses suffered in the course of the war.

Molotov: We must give the Moscow commission on reparations the task of finding out the total of reparations to be paid, taking as a basis of discussion the American-Soviet formula. The commission need only take that as the basis.

Prime Minister: We have had a very important communication from our government on this question. We cannot accept any specific figures in any formula.

Stalin: I propose first that the three heads of government agree that Germany must pay compensation in kind for losses caused during the war. Two, the heads of the three governments agree that Germany must pay for losses to the allied nations. Three, the Moscow reparations commission is given the task to consider the amount to be paid. We bring our figures before the commission and you bring yours, (to Churchill)

(This was followed by an intermission during which the formula to be used on Polish frontiers for inclusion in the communiqué was largely worked out.)

President: Marshal Stalin said that he wanted to talk a little on some question after our intermission and I now invite him to do so.

Stalin: I should like to say a few words on the Montreux Convention. We believe that it is now out of date. The Japanese Emperor was one of the parties to it. In fact, he plays a greater role in it than the Soviet Union. The treaty was made at a time when relations between Britain and Russia were not very good. Now that is all changed. I do not think that Great Britain would with the help of the Japanese want to strangle Russia. Now the convention should be seriously modified. I do not wish to pre-judge future decisions. The interests of Russia should be taken into account and observed. The legitimate interests of Turkey must not be infringed. The question is how to do it. We can of course ask a certain organism to discuss this question. We have agreed that the three foreign ministers should meet from time to time. Perhaps they could discuss this question at their first meeting and report to the three governments. This would be a preparatory step to settling the question.

President: I only want to say that we have three thousand miles of natural boundary with Canada. There is no fort and no armed ship on this entire distance. If other parts of the world would do the same it would be a wonderful thing.

Prime Minister: Marshal Stalin mentioned this question to me and to Eden in Moscow. We viewed it with sympathy. We agreed with the Soviets that the Montreux Convention should be revised or reconstructed. We asked the Soviet Government for a note with their ideas. This has not yet been received. The suggestion of Marshal Stalin is a wise one. I certainly feel that the present position of Russia – her Black Sea dependent on the narrow exit – is not satisfactory. I hope our Russian allies will make their proposal. Meanwhile, if Turkey wanted to declare war we should tell her beforehand that this matter is to be brought under consideration. They should know that fact before going into the war. I believe we are obligated to tell them. (After conferring with Mr. Eden) Eden tells me that he did mention that matter to the Turkish ambassador in London in general terms following our Moscow visit, so we have kept our engagement. It is worth considering whether when changes are made some assurances should be given Turkey that her independence will not be affected.

Stalin: Certainly we should give such assurance. When the foreign ministers meet in April in the United States at the end of the conference could they not discuss the question of the straits?

Prime Minister: Well, I think this question affects Britain with her Mediterranean interests more than the United States. Therefore, I believe that the meeting should be in London.

I tried some time ago to get through the Dardanelles (smiling) and the former Russian government had two army corps ready to help me at the other end. However, we did not succeed in joining hands. I consequently have some feeling on this question.

Stalin: You were in too much of a hurry to take away your troops. Perhaps in another week you would have won as the Germans and Turks were getting ready to withdraw.

Prime Minister: I had nothing to do with that decision. I was already out of the government. (It was decided that the question would be discussed by the three foreign ministers in London.)

President: The only thing left now is the amended text on the frontiers of Poland. (The text is then read for consideration by the Russians who had received the Russian text.)

Stalin: I should like to suggest an amendment in the phraseology to indicate that Poland should receive the return of her ancient frontier of East Prussia and the Oder.

President: (Laughing to Prime Minister) Perhaps you would want us back?

Prime Minister: Well you might be as indigestible for us as it might be for the Poles if they took too much German territory.

Molotov: This change would give great encouragement to the Poles.

Prime Minister: I prefer to leave it as it is.

Molotov: But there is no mention of frontiers in the west. What about the Oder? No exchange was mentioned.

Prime Minister: Well, between what we propose and the question of specifying ancient territories up to the Oder there seems to be no stopping place.

Stalin: I withdraw my suggestion and agree to leave it as drawn. The President suggested changes (change “agreed” to “consider” in the first sentence and change “the three powers” to “the three heads of government” in the third sentence) are accepted. This I believe is our last point of decision.

President: There only remains the question of the communiqué I must leave tomorrow at 3 p.m. I hope we can get the communiqué done and I suggest that if we meet at eleven tomorrow we can finish it by lunch. (This suggestion is vigorously opposed by Churchill and to a lesser degree by Stalin, both of whom insist that the communiqué is most important and should not be drawn too hastily. The matter was left indefinite with the representatives of the three governments assigned the task of concluding their drafts – an American and British draft had already been prepared – for submission to the Big Three.)

The meeting then adjourned.

8461

Hiss Notes

Leningrad, February 10, 1945, 4 p.m.

Plenary 2/10 4.55

Ed. reported on meeting For Mins

We reached agt re Pol – there were two outstanding q’s Perhaps I may come to that in a moment. Read draft as it now stands (included some changes app. agreed to by Church & St. in their private meeting before plenary session) included Mol. amend of noon. and new amend: “and will exchange Ambs. by whose reports the respective govts will be kept informed about the situation in Poland”

Church: We have made no reference to frontiers but of course people will ask at once about frontiers, what we have agreed. We are all agreed about the E. frontier, we are all agreed in prin. about W. frontier. The only q is where it is to be exactly drawn & how much we should say about it. We all agreed that the Poles are to have E. Pr. & be free to go to the line of the Oder if they so desire. We are very doubtful indeed about going further or mentioning at this stage – we have had a tel. from our War Cab. strongly deprecating frontier going as far as W. Neisse because they think the problem is larger than we could manage

Pres. We should rather hear from the Pol. Govt of Nat. Unity we had better leave out all references to boundaries

Church: on West?

Maisky on East we should say something Church. agreed.

Church people will immediately say what is the position about the frontier. We think E. frontier is settled. We think on W. frontier wishes of Pol Govt Nat Un be first consulted & matter finally settled at peace settlements

Pres: I cannot agree on Pol boundaries at this time. It must be done by the Sen later

Mol It would be very good if something could be said about full agt of 3 heads about E. frontier. Would clarify that important q. It would be good to say gen. opin of all sides represented. Prob. would provoke criticism for a time but in end would be good. Proposes leave it to 3 Mins. to find nec. formula. Not nec. to say anything about W frontier

Church: Something

Mol Yes, much less def.

Church: Say recog. by 3 powers Pol should receive substantial accession of terr both to the N. & to the W… Thereafter final line be determined

St: That would be very good That would correspond to wish of public opin. all around

Pres: 3 For Secs

Church: Along lines we have suggested

Maisk St.: As a last ¶

Ed Decl, on Lib Areas (continuing his report)

Read & Church amended the Mol. amend. to include “responsibilities” etc.

Mol: Wants his amend. to stand

Pres read it as agreed this morning

Church how can you carry out measure.

St. accepted Church. Formula

Agreed To be put in language

Document approved

Ed sug. amend. re Fr.

“In issuing this decl. the 3 powers express the hope that the French Prov. Govt will be associated with them in the action & procedures contemplated”

Pres: I have rather changed my opin. I was opposed to Fr. sitting in on the Com. of 3, Control Machinery The more I think of it the more I think the PM’s contention that a country which has an area to control can not do so without sitting in on the Con. Com. I think it would be easier if Fr. is on that Con Com to get DeG to agree to this Decl. & other things. Like St. think about it

Pres agreed to add also Ed. addition

St agreed

Ed. Yug.

Agreed For Mins. prepare first draft final communique

Pres Should communique contain Yug statement Will leave to Ed in Conf. with For Mins whether we join in on that or not.

Church These are very respectable issues

Pres I’m not trying to protect my purity

Mol What is agreed re Yug.

Ed We’ve agreed to send a message & we’ve agreed to draft a communique

Read d

Message for 3 Govts to Tito & Sub

agreed to recommend Tito-Sub be immed. formed & put into effect plus Brit amends.

Pres: All right

Mol: Tel was to be very short & without last 2 ¶s

Ed Yes then later then the amends second part.

Church. Hope commun. can mention both parts

Mol. We just had com. when agreed only 1st part be in tel.; 2nd part to be put off until United govt formed

Church But world will give more attention to immed. enforcement of agt if other part were mentioned, too. Would have effect of getting better reception for what we say.

St. It would be inconvenient if tel. & communique different & we agreed a second tel. will be sent

Church We have complex pub. opin. Want favorable reception of agt Believes it would help (include in commun)

Ed Might say: It was further agreed that when the agt is put into force, 3 govts would recommend to new govt to make a decl, of the 3 points

St. Without 3rd point, which is very objectionable

Ed. & Church: all right leave it out.

Church Besides it’s understood in Tito-Sub agt.

St. In any case change Tel – 3 parts 1st Put agt in force immed 2nd members Vojnoj be later included 3rd all acts be confirmed later Church Very good & very helpful

St & all 3 also be in communique

Ed World Org. Report of subcom re consultation Fr & China & Invitation was accepted by For Mins & need not be discussed in plenary session.

→Pres OK’d invitation

Reparations
Church We were practically instructed by our gov’t not to men tion figures. Let Com. do that

Pres goes along my idea not to mention money, not make reps an am’t of money Let Com. do Talk about the equiv.

St. That’s only a monetary expression of what the goods cost. It is not money

Pres so many people at home will think of it in terms of $ & cents

Church I don’t understand what is to be published

Pres Nothing

Church not even subject

St. There is objection to mention dollars because someone will think will take reparations in money But we have already 3 treaties on reps, where reps in kind are expressed in dollars. Why in this case should there be a misunderstanding?

Church. I was going to suggest Mos. Com. be auth. to issue an interim report & not have to issue whole report before authorization is given to taking reps. For ex. factories would be taken at once by Sov Govt

St. I think we can be quite frank How compare goods we should take from Ger. with our losses If we accept them we should say we accept as reparation. E could take factories & lands but better have a dec. I propose simple prin.: 1. Ger must pay reps. for losses caused to Allies. 2. To ask Rep. Com to find out am’t of reps. which would be nec. to take & to report to govts Am. side agreed with us to take as basis $20 million [sic] dollars. Does it mean Am side withdraws its agt

Pres: No I am completely in agt. Only one word. Reparations mean to so many people money. Add parenthesis (in kind)

St. We won’t publish

Pres U S entirely prepared discuss sum & principles. Only q I raise is use of word reps

St. We can use another word. Compensation of losses Church “Compensation in kind for losses”

St: 3 govts agree Ger. must pay in kind losses caused by her to Allies in course of war. To give to Mos Com the task to find out the figures of the reps. to be paid taking as basis To give Com to for discussion the Am-Sov formula

Church We cannot commit ourselves to fig. of $20 billion or any other figures until Com has studied

St. No commitment

Ed What is value of the figure

St. Com. could change figures & modify them in any way.

Church You could propose that when the Com. meets Read excerpt from “communication from our govt” £500,000,000 a yr.= Ger’s pre-war exports This could not be paid by Ger. True some of it capital but that make it harder for Ger. to supply rest. Attach importance to some statement re paying for Ger imports. Unless priority at least equal to reps. we shall pay by exports (?) for reps.

St: Suppose experts say figure is wrong Then can fix new one. Our fig. not sacrosanct. We propose to discuss. It is nec. that things move forward.

Pres. suggest whole thing be left to Com at Mos.

Mol: Only yesterday ERS announced results of 3 For Mins consids. Text of Read ERS report

Ed. We think putting fig. in report might commit us to the figures. If desired would be willing say:

Mos Rep Com will be instructed: 1st To take into exam the report presented by Mr M. to the Crimean Conf

Mol. The 3 Mins considered this q. Eden’s proposal ignores fact this q has been discussed at Crimean Conf

Ed. we didn’t want say how many yrs

St. 1. The heads of 3 govts agree Ger must pay cocompensation in Kind for losses caused to Allied Govts

 2. & agree Ger must pay in Kind

  1. To the Mos. Rep Com has been given task to consider the am’t of reps, to be paid

  2. In the Com. we will bring in our fig & you will bring yours Church: I agree

Intermission
St. Montreux Agt

I think this treaty is now out of date. In this treaty Jap. Emperor plays a very important role as one of the parties He plays perhaps more impor. role than S.U. The whole treaty is framed in such a way as to be linked up with Leag of Ns But Leag doesn’t exist any more, just as Jap Emperor is not in our ranks. According to this Treaty T. has rt to close Straits not only in case of war but also if T considers sit. dangerous. This also is difficult from modern point of view

The treaty was made when our rels with Gt Brit were not very tight but now G Bt wouldn’t want strangle R… I think this treaty should be very seriously modified. Now nearly indecent to say we observe the treaty of Montreux. I think there could be no objection to consideration of a revision of the treaty. In what sense I won’t go on to prejudge future decs. But I should like ints. of R to be taken account of. It is impossible to put up with a sit. where a small country will keep her hand at the throat of R. Ints of R must be taken into acct without infringing legit. ints of T. How to do it must be considered. I now propose the organ to study it. Is agreed 3 Mins will meet every few months Perhaps would be possible at 1st meeting to discuss so mins could report to their govts. That would be the preparatory stage for settlement of q. of the Straits

Pres. We have over 3,000 miles of natural boundary bet. US & Can No fort or armed ship on that boundary, Has existed for over 100 yrs. If we could get other govts do that would be wonderful thing

Church. Marshall mentioned this to Mr Ed & me when we were last in Mos. We viewed with sympathy the Sov. proposal that the treaty be revised We suggested that Sov Govt give us a note of what their ideas were on the Convention but this has not yet been done. We think proposal of Mar. is a wise one. We certainly feel present position of R with its great Black Sea being dependent upon this narrow exit is not satisfactory If the matter is brought up at the next For Secs meeting we hope the Rs will make their proposal Meanwhile I think it would be nec if T became minded to declare war on Ger for any reason, it would bee, to tell T the matter would be brought under consid. Shouldn’t like her to come in to war with out knowing of it. Indeed I think we have some promise to T that before anything is decided affecting her she would be informed Mr Ed reminds me that after we came back from Mos he mentioned the matter to the T. Amb. in general terms, so we have Kept our engagements It is worth considering whether at the time changes are made to meet the wishes & needs of R in the Straits whether some undertaking might be made to T that her indep. would in no way be affected That would make it easy for her.

St. We can hide nothing from T & we should give her some assurances

Church Then we are agreed

St. So For Mins will meet at the end of the Conf in US

Church I think it affects Brit position in the Med. more than U.S. so conference might be in Lon. I tried hard some time ago to get thru the Dardanelles. The R. Govt of that day sent 2 army corps to help from the other end. However we did not succeed

St. They were in a hurry to take away the troops. If had waited another wk. Gers & Ts all ready to capitulate Mr. Pres you would not object to conf. in Eur.

Pres No

St. No secretary of the Conf. Who is taking notes of the decs.

Ed. Will put before you a commun & a note of decisions taken Church In addition to commun.

Pres re Amended statement on Pol line For const. reasons I have made a few changes Only 2 changes. Orig text was “The 3 Powers are agreed” etc Const. q of whether I have a rt to say the 3 powers can change a boundary . . the new lang: “The 3 heads of gov’t consider” omit “3 powers” & change “agree” to “feel”

Mol Add Return her ancient terrs in E. Pr. & westerly

Pres Depends how long back you go

Mol Quite a long time ago It is of great importance to Poles from a national point of view.

Church I feel it would be better not to draw the frontiers in the W. at the present time & not to mention localities

Mol There is no mention of the frontiers & with regard to the line of the Oder there was no objection

Church Never in pub.

Mol But at the Conf

Ed On contrary, we have always said as far toward Oder as Poles want to go.

Church: If you talk of restoring the ancient terrs. I shall be asked what they are & there will be no satis. answer We’re not ag. it

St Withdrew his suggestions & “your suggestion Mr Pres (to Pres) is accepted”

That will be the last point of paper on Pol

Pres we have only commun

Church: D.O. (i. e. terr. trusteeships) [Then his advisers talked him out of it Prob. told him of revised copy of ERS report. He said “I haven’t seen it” but then matter was app. settled OK]

Pres suggested draft commun. be given to heads of govt tonight & then have 11.00 a.m. meeting tomorrow

Church Then said something about multiple membership in communique

8462

Amended Draft of the Declaration on Liberated Europe

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Declaration on Liberated Europe

The Premier of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the President of the United States of America have considted with each other in the common interests of the peoples of their countries and those of liberated Europe. They jointly declare their mutual agreement to concert during the temporary period of instability in liberated Europe the policies of their three governments in assisting the peoples liberated from the domination of Nazi Germany and the peoples of the former Axis satellite states of Europe to solve by democratic means their pressing political and economic problems.

The establishment of order in Europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of Nazism and Fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. This is a principle of the Atlantic Charter – the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live – the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived of them by the aggressor nations.

To foster the conditions in which the liberated peoples may exercise these rights, the three governments will jointly assist the people in any European liberated state or former Axis satellite state in Europe where in their judgment conditions require, (a) to establish conditions of internal peace; (b) to carry out emergency measures for the relief of distressed peoples; (c) to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and (d) to facilitate where necessary the holding of such elections.

The three governments will consult the other United Nations and provisional authorities or other governments in Europe when matters of direct interest to them are under consideration.

When, in the opinion of the three governments, conditions in any European liberated state or any former Axis satellite state in Europe make such action necessary, they will immediately (establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration) take measures for carrying out mutual consultation.

By this declaration we reaffirm our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter, our pledge in the Declaration by the United Nations, and our determination to build in cooperation with other peace-loving nations a world order under law, dedicated to peace, security, freedom and general well-being of all mankind.