Youngstown Vindicator (July 12, 1945)
Lippmann: Favors continuing Japanese emperor’s reign
By Walter Lippmann
As a result of the Potsdam conference, it will be possible, we may hope, to define the terms on which the Japanese war can be brought to an end. The United States alone cannot do that even though we shall have played the principal part in defeating Japan.
We are committed by the Cairo declaration to insist that Manchuria, as well as Formosa and other territories be restored to the Republic of China. But while we alone might be able to force the Tokyo government to order the evacuation of Manchuria, this in itself would not necessarily restore it to the Republic of China.
Between Manchuria and that China that is governed from Chungking lies that part of China which is ruled from Yenan. Therefore, the Chinese civil conflict must be resolved if Manchuria is to be “restored.” It is, moreover, unlikely that China can be reunited, even in the form of a loose federal union, unless there is a clear understanding between China and the Soviet Union, which the United States can approve.
The settlement in East Asia, as well as the grand strategy of the final campaigns of the war, require an understanding about what authority will prevail when Japanese authority is overthrown. This applies equally to Korea.
Time is ripe
The Stalin-Soong discussions, which have been taking place in Moscow, will, if they are successful, prepare the ground for a political and strategic agreement at Potsdam. The time is ripe for it, in that the schedule of the redeployment is such that the campaign which should mark the beginning of the end is now clearly in sight.
We may suppose that as between Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister T. V. Soong, a satisfactory agreement is possible. The chief doubt which exists about it is how effective is the authority of Soong and of the Chungking government over the vast territory of China, and whether the United States is equipped to play a useful part in making a general agreement work.
But assuming that a Chinese-Soviet-American-British agreement about Eastern Asia is arrived at, then we may consider that the territorial terms of settlement, as laid down at Cairo, are definite on what Japan must surrender. The situation is radically different than it was with Germany, where no territorial terms were fixed while the war was being fought.
What else?
The question which has still to be answered is what besides her conquests Japan must surrender. There will be general agreement that she must surrender her armed forces, her facilities for manufacturing weapons, and that she must accept control over her capacity to recreate her military power.
The question which is not settled, which is in fact the subject of serious debate in Washington and other Allied capitals, is whether it is necessary to demand the liquidation of the Japanese social order, with its peculiar dynastic and religious domination. There is substantial reason for thinking that all Japanese interpret “unconditional surrender” as meaning just that, and that this is the sticking point when they consider whether they should sue for peace.
This is an exceedingly difficult question, and it is one on which experts on the Far East are very much divided. Certainly, we could not afford to make a settlement which cut off the branches and left intact the roots from which aggression grows. Those who insist that the dynastic religious system must be extirpated are convinced that it is the root of the evil.
The opposing view
On the other hand, there are others who argue that when Japan has lost her empire and is reduced to her home islands, her power to do evil will have been removed as long as the Allies are united and agreed not to invite her back onto the Asiatic mainland. They contend also that the loss of her whole overseas empire is in itself a social and political catastrophe which is almost certain to revolutionize the Japanese social order, even if the dynasty and the religious institutions remain.
Not same as Germany
My own view is that in determining war aims – that is to say, conditions for which we deem it necessary to fight – we should – if there is a choice – choose the minimum terms which are certainly necessary rather than maximum terms which may be desirable but are not clearly necessary. The burden of proof, in other words, is on those who wish to go beyond the Cairo terms, and to identify unconditional surrender with a forced internal revolution.
In examining the argument, we are bound to ask ourselves whether the Japanese problem is the same as the German. It was certain that Hitler had to be destroyed, and since he had usurped all the power of the German state, he could not have any legitimate successor.
But the Japanese emperor is not a usurper, and more often than not in Japanese history the emperor has reigned but has not ruled. It is quite conceivable then that he might continue to reign, but that the country would be ruled by men who had surrendered the conquests and military power of Japan and had given guaranties.
If this is the right course, and provided the Allies have reached a strategical and political agreement, it would be no sign of weakness to let it be known in Tokyo.