Japanese-American relations (Dec. 1941)

101

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Net
7 December 1941
(Purple)
Circular #2493 (In 2 parts, complete) Secret Separate message

Policies:
In regard to our handling of enemy subjects and enemy property in Japan, we will approach this matter in the magnanimity of a great nation, complying with international law as far as possible, and exercising care not to give the enemy nations or other third party nations any occasion for taking retaliatory measures, or for making unfavorable propaganda.

Main points:

  1. Diplomatic officials of enemy countries:
    a) Evacuation. The evacuation of enemy diplomatic officials will be carried out on the basis of exchanges for our diplomatic and consular officials resident in enemy countries.

b) Handling of the above until their evacuation. The inviolable rights pertaining to diplomatic officials of enemy countries, whose duties come to an end simultaneously with the beginning of war, will be respected as a general rule. However, telephones will be cut off, and the use of both code and plain language telegrams will be prohibited. Short wave radios and wireless transmitters will be seized. Members of the staffs of embassies and legations for the present, as a general rule will be allowed to live in the embassy or legation compounds, and no inconvenience will be caused in the matter of daily living.

  1. Consular officials:
    a) Evacuation. As far as possible consular officials will be handled under the same heading with diplomatic officials.

b) The handling of the same until the time of their evacuations: The offices will be closed and sealed. Shortwave radio and wireless equipment will be seized. Members of consulate staffs for the time being will be allowed to live at their present places of abode and as far as conditions warrant may use their official residences, with no restrictions upon their daily living.

  1. Enemy subjects residing in Japan:
    In addition to such police surveillance and protection as is necessary, individuals regarding whom there is ample ground for suspicion will be rounded up; and all military men, seamen, or aviation personnel as well as those qualified for these services, persons of special technical skill, persons suspected of being foreign spies, and all males between 18 and 45 will for the present be placed under arrest. However in view of the fact that we have a very large number of subjects residing in enemy territory, we will exercise caution so that there may be nothing of the nature of ill-treatment occasioned for them.

  2. Publicly owned enemy property:
    Such public property, aside from embassy, legation and consular buildings, which can be used either directly or indirectly for military purposes will, if necessary, be confiscated.

  3. Privately owned enemy property: Privately owned property will not be seized or confiscated except in the event of general requisitioning.

  4. While no special restrictions will be placed upon the diplomatic and consular officials of neutral countries resident in Japan, those of quasi enemy countries (such as Panama, Iran, Norway, Belgium, Egypt, Greece, etc.) will be denied the use of codes.

The evacuation of the enemy diplomatic and consular officials who are in Manchukuo and China will be handled in the same manner as the above.

25967
JD-1:                                     (F) Navy Trans. 12-9-41 (C-NR)
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102

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: (Circular telegram)
7 December 1941
(Plain Japanese language using code names)
Circular #2494

Relations between Japan and England are not in accordance with expectation.

25856
JD-1: 7148                        (M) Navy Trans. 7 December 1941 (S-TT)
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103

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: (Circular)
7 December 1941
(Purple)
Circular #2499 (Part 1 of 3) (Part 2 not available)

In the event of international crisis following upon our pursuance of our national policy regarding the China affair, which was decided on at the liaison-conference held on November 13th, the following steps will be taken in China:

  1. British concessions — upon issuance of orders, the present force will occupy and take over these areas. However, every effort will be made to accomplish this end through the instrumentality of existing set-ups.

  2. Shanghai International Settlement and the Peking Legation compounds: Upon issuance of orders, our troops will take over these grounds, however, without exceeding their present strength they will make every effort to maintain order and avoid causing confusion.

Also this will be accomplished by the aid of the existing set-ups and their staffs as well as that of various important Chinese agencies.

  1. Amoy settlement: The same procedure as the above will be employed.

(Part 2 not available)

JD-1: 7210                                (A) Navy Trans. 12-8-41 (6-AR)
25937

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: (Circular)
7 December 1941
(Purple)
Circular #2499 (Part 3 of 3) (Part 2 not available)

Upon declaration of war by Japan, the Nanking government will not be directed to participate in war but will be directed to maintain close relations and absolute cooperation with Japan.

  1. In maintaining close relations with our country the Nanking Government will be directed and guided in strengthening its morale and organization so that it may help alleviate Japan’s burden in participating in a protracted world war.

  2. Steps will be taken to propagate among the people through the cooperation of the Nanking Government, the true meaning of the present war, and to issue orders to maintain quiet and order among the general public.

  3. Regarding economic plans in China, with a view to retaining and increasing mutual economic self sufficiency, the emphasis will be placed on the utilization of productive powers, solicitation of local capital and investments, increased production of commodities. For this purpose efforts of every department will be made use of.

NOTE. — Those departments in the above category which are connected with the Nanking Government will continue to maintain even closer contact with that government.

25937
JD-1: 7210                                (A) Navy Trans. 12-8-41 (6-AR)
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104

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
7 December 1941
(Purple)
#1278

Re your #910.*

Your instructions and your #911** have been duly received and decoded, and as soon as we have composed and dispatched this telegram we will commence the demolition and destruction by fire.

Also we have destroyed the codes brought by Kosaka. (The HA code, O code, NE code, and the YO code).

Furthermore, the key of your #881***, first part, and your Circular #2400****, should have been burned but because the mails to Mexico are not safe it has not yet been sent.

Please be advised of the above.

26047
JD-1: 7299                               (H) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (S-TT)
 
*JD-1: 7147 S.I.S. 25854. Directs destruction of remaining cipher machine and machine codes. 
**JD-1: 7101 S.I.S. 25754. Instructions for disposing of codes. 
***JD-1: 7076 S.I.S. 25753. Re new keying method for cipher machine.
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105

[Secret]

From: Budapest
To: Tokyo
December 7, 1941
LA
#104

On the 6th, the American Minister presented to the Government of this country a British Government communiqué to the effect that a state of war would break out on the 7th.

Relayed to Berlin.

Army 25866
JD 7184                                               Trans. 12/7/41 (2)
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106

U.S. Department of State (December 8, 1941)

740.0011 Pacific War/710: Telegram

The Consul General at Singapore to the Secretary of State

Singapore, December 8, 1941 — 6 a.m.
[Received December 8 — 5:45 a.m.]

339.

Japanese raided Singapore 4 a.m. today and airfield Tengah nearby. They also landed troops at Kota Bharu, northern Kelantan and heavy fighting reported here. Damages light here, no casualties reported among Americans.

PATTON

107

740.0011 Pacific War/708: Telegram

The Minister in Thailand to the Secretary of State

Bangkok, December 7 [8?], 1941 — 8 a.m.
[Received December 8 — 4 a.m.]

555.

The correspondents have been officially informed that the Japanese attacked Thailand at various places on the land and sea frontiers at 2 a.m., December 8, and that Thai forces resisted. The Government ordered cease firing 7:30 a.m., and negotiations are taking place. Bangkok is quiet. American citizens will concentrate in the Legation in case of disorders.

PECK

108 
740.0011 Pacific War/704: Telegram

The Consul General at Hong Kong to the Secretary of State

Hong Kong, December 8, 1941 — 9 a.m.
[Received December 8 — 5:35 a.m.]

534.

About 15 Japanese bombers, said to be from Canton, bombed the Hong Kong airport at Kaitak this morning at about 7:50 and severely damaged it. British antiaircraft fire apparently not successful. Casualties apparently light and no Americans reported injured so far. Authorities are vague about number of Japanese troops on the frontier but attack from that source is anticipated. This office continuing business as usual although there is much restricted movements of persons and traffic throughout the colony.

Sent to the Department. Repeated to Chungking.

SOUTHARD

109

740.0011 Pacific War/1004

Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State

Washington, December 8, 1941.

The Minister of Thailand called at his request.

He said that he had not been able to hear from his Government during recent days and desired to get any information I had from our Minister in Thailand. I gave him the substance of two cables that had come in yesterday and today which showed that his Government’s forces had resisted Japanese attacks at various places on the land and sea frontiers on December eighth. I added that the Thai Government had ordered a cessation of firing five hours and thirty minutes after the attack and that negotiations were taking place, including terms of capitulation between Thai and Japanese representatives; and that the American Minister expects Japanese control of the Thai Government.

The Minister then proceeded to say that not many months ago his Government became satisfied of the dangerous character of the Japanese and that it has sought in every way to keep aloof from them; that the people of Thailand are inherently unfriendly toward the people of Japan and distrust them in most ways. The Minister said that what they have said and done in the way of contacts with Japan has been under duress and that, while there are some pro-Japanese in Thailand, and even in the Government of Thailand, the people are fundamentally sound in their opposition and in their conviction that they must always look to democratic governments like the United States for any freedom that they may be able to enjoy. The Minister said that we could count on this state of mind in his country no matter what may happen and that it would look to this country for aid at opportune times in the future to emancipate itself from Japanese military control. At the same time he said his people and he himself would watch every chance to be cooperative with us. I thanked him and reminded him that during recent months on account of our friendship for the people of Thailand and also our desire to safeguard that area against the establishment of a menace against the South Sea area by Japan, we have constantly warned Japan against occupying Thailand.

CORDELL HULL

110

740.0011 Pacific War/741: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State

London, December 8, 1941 — 4 a.m.
[Received December 7 — 10:40 p.m.]

5929.

Personal to the Secretary for the President.

It was great to talk to you. The Prime Minister is calling Parliament to meet at 3 o’clock this afternoon. Would it be best for him to ask for a declaration of war at that time or simply describe what had taken place and say that we would ask for a declaration of war within an hour after we had declared war which he has pledged to do?

I am thinking of the difference in time and that you might want to address the joint session prior to a British declaration of war.

The Prime Minister wanted you to know that he sent the following private and secret message to de Valera:

Now is your chance. Now or never! A nation once again! I am very ready to meet you at any time.

If you also would like to send de Valera a message you might want me to deliver it. We are old friends and I understand he gives me some credit for persuading the government here to abandon conscription in Northern Ireland.

I hope people at home will relate the tactic pursued and the action taken by Japan to German instigation and collaboration under the tripartite pact.

I am back at the Embassy.

WINANT

111

740.0011 P. W./741: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom

Washington, December 8, 1941 — 8 a.m.

5743.

From the President.

I think it best on account of psychology here that formal British declaration of war be withheld until after my speech at 12:30 Washington time. I am asking for declaration. Any time after that would be wholly satisfactory.

Delighted to know of message to de Valera.

ROOSEVELT

HULL

112

711.94/2600

The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State

No. 230

Chungking, December 3, 1941.
[Received January 19, 1942.]

Sir:
I have the honor to refer to my telegrams, no. 463 of November 28, 10 a.m., and no. 465 of November 30, 10 a.m., and to enclose copies of memoranda of my conversations on November 27 and 29, with Dr. Quo Tai-chi, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, on the subject of American-Japanese discussions at Washington on the problems of the Pacific.

When the Minister for Foreign Affairs requested me to call on November 27, I had received no information from the Department on the progress of the American-Japanese discussions later than that contained in the Department’s telegram No. 273 of November 22 [19], 3 p.m. Dr. Quo brought me up to date by translating from a telegram in Chinese received by him from Dr. Hu Shih, the Chinese Ambassador at Washington, a nine point draft of a proposed modus vivendi which he said had been submitted by the American Government for the information and consideration of the Chinese, British, Australian and Netherlands diplomatic representatives at Washington.

As detailed in the enclosed memorandum of my conversation, Dr. Quo then proceeded to stress the “apprehension; indeed resentment” which had been aroused by the proposed modus vivendi, emphasizing that it might have an “irreparable” effect on the Chinese public attitude and seriously threaten Chinese morale and the will to continue resistance. While asserting his confidence in the American Government and his own understanding of the situation which might suggest a delaying action for three months, Dr. Quo directed his attention principally to point seven of the proposed modus vivendi, which, he asserted, failed to conform the American position to the principles of the Nine Power Pact or the American declaration of principles of 1937. Apparently the Chinese Ambassador at Washington in reporting point seven used the Chinese characters which were translated as “desiring” but which I understand might be more accurately translated as “expecting”. Point seven was rendered in English substantially as follows:

With reference to the Sino-Japanese conflict, the United States only desires to see a settlement based on law, order, peace, and justice.

The Department’s telegram no. 277 of November 28, 7 p.m., outlining the draft of the proposed modus vivendi does not mention any such provision as that described to me by the Minister for Foreign Affairs as “point seven”.

The official Chinese reaction to the proposed modus vivendi between the United States and Japan is not surprising to the Embassy. The Chinese have wished for the complete failure of the Japanese-American conversations and the early entry of the United States into war with Japan. The Chinese believe that no lasting peace can be had in the Far East until Japan is first crushed by armed force. As I reported when Consul General at Shanghai, shortly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict at that port in 1937, Chinese resistance to Japanese aggression is largely based on the Chinese expectation that sooner or later Japan will clash with other powers having interests in the Far East and in the resulting armed conflict China will be saved from Japan.

That hope or expectation continues to inspire Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, who is the source and strength of the spirit of resistance in China — resistance against compromise as well as against the armed aggression of Japan.

I believe that I am not overstating in saying that the Chinese attitude is almost one of resentment that the American-Japanese conversations in Washington were opened and patiently continued. Dr. Quo Tai-chi in saying to me that the proposed modus vivendi had caused “apprehension; indeed resentment”, for the moment apparently did not bear in mind that information regarding the proposal had reached only the highest Chinese government circles. His statement in my opinion undoubtedly reflects the attitude of Generalissimo Chiang, and the latter’s wife whose unrestrainedly critical attitude toward the United States and our failure precipitately to plunge our country into war with Japan has undoubtedly influenced the Generalissimo. The alarm and apprehension felt by the Generalissimo is undoubtedly reflected in his action in seeking to influence official American opinion through other than the regular diplomatic channels.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs seems to me, from my conversations with him, to take a calmer and broader view, reflecting a more intelligent understanding of international affairs; but his official attitude is undoubtedly directed and controlled by the Generalissimo upon whom he has not yet come to exercise any outstanding influence.

Respectfully yours,
C. E. GAUSS