Japanese-American relations (Dec. 1941)

21

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Singapore
December 2, 1941
Purple
Circular #2450 (5 parts complete.)

Re my Circular #2409 [a].

We have drawn up the following table for the particular needs of your localities to supplement for the already given list.

  Code Word                                Meaning
 
KIKUTI                   Shipments on the road whereby CHIANG
                         receives assistance (the Burma road ?) are now
                         very lively.
KAGEYAMA                 Shipments along the road whereby
                         CHIANG receives assistance (the Burma
                         road?) have now virtually stopped.
(DE?)GUTI                ... (blank)  ... (blank)  has been
                         forced backward at . . . (blank) . . .
AYAOKA                   The Burmese Independence movement is
                         gradually gaining momentum. The officers
                         are endeavoring to quell this with every 
                         resource, however, the movement is gradually
                         growing more fierce.
ITAGISI                  On the . . . the Burma . . . (blank) . . . was
                         attacked by the Independents wing with
                         pistols (or dynamite).
FUKUNISI                 On the . . . th in the . . . (blank) . . . area
                         rioting broke out.
MIYAMOTO                 I will continue the action I described to you
                         until advised by you to do otherwise, then I
                         will end it immediately.
KITAMURA                 Recently . . . (blank) . . . American military
                         planes arrived at . . . (blank) . . .
MUTO                     . . . (blank) . . . and pilots numbering. . .
                         (blank) . . . arrived at . . . (blank) . . .
NAGAOKA                  . . . (blank) . . . divisions of . . . (blank)
                         . . . troops arrived at . . . (blank) . . . and
                         left for . . . (blank) . . . on the . . . th.
INABA                    . . . (blank) . . . divisions of . . . (blank)
                         . . . troops are reportedly concentrated on the
                         . . . (blank) . . . border.
YASIROEN                 The Independents movement at . . . (blank)
                         . . . and negotiations thwarting England are
                         now progressing smoothly.
TUMURA                   At present there is a total of . . . (blank)
                         . . . enemy merchant men docked at . . .
                         (blank)
HINO                     Merchant ships now docked at . . . (blank)
                         . . . are as follows: American . . . (blank)
                         . . .; British . . . (blank) . . .; Netherlands
                         . . . (blank) . . .
NAGAI                    . . . . . an merchant ships left for . . .
                         (blank) . . . loaded with arms.
HIGUTI                   Our means of communication with Burma
                         and the South Seas is disrupted and we can-
                         not receive.
SEGAWA                   Our resident Nationals have been camped.
YASUI                    It is reported that riots are breaking out.
NARUSE                   Progressing with preparations to bomb oil
                         fields.
KUBOTA                   Oil fields bombed.
NIBA                     The residents of _ _ _ _ _ area re pre-
                         paring to flee.
MOORI                    Orders issued to residents of . . . (blank)
                         . . . area to flee.
SEKYA                    Morale wavering.
TUKAMOTO                 Netherlanders.
OCHIAI                   Japanese Nitta Natives.
KURIBARA                 Japanese.
NISIYAMA                 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
YAMANOUTI                Premier.
NOSE                     Specialists' Commission.
KURODA                   High tide (?)
HIRAI                    Some officers and private citizens _ _ _ _ _ _.
INOYAMA                  Telegraphy.
ENDOO                    The Yamashita Agency.
ATUKAI                   The Nakamura Company.
KOIZUMI                  India.
ABE                      Java.
EDOGUTI                  Sumatra.
HIROSE                   Celebes.
HUKUI                    Borneo.
INOUYE                   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
FUKA _ _ _               British India.
KASAURA                  Ceylon.
IKAWA                    _ _ _ _ _ _ _
HUJIMURA                 Hainan Island.
IIJIMA                   The Spratleys.
ARIASA                   Singapore.
HURUYA                   Pinan.
NIWA                     Bangkok.
KAMIYA                   Chien mad* _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Singora.
ISIDA                    Saigon.
NINOMIYA                 _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
HOSOKAWA                 _ _ _ _ _ _ _    
NEZU                     Tonkin.
YOKOTA                   Cambodia.
NUMATA                   _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
WATANZAKA                Manila.
NOZAKI                   _ _ _ _ _ _ _
KERI                     Batavia.
SEKINE                   Menado.
SERISAWA                 Makassar.
SONE                     _ _ _ _ _ _ _
ANDO                     Pankaran-Brandan*.
DOBASI                   Pankan Susu*.
FUKUSIMA                 Mandalay.
HAKAMATSU                Palembang.
ISTUMOTO                 Jambi.
NAKINO                   Tarakan.
MAKINO                   Pa _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Pan.
SAKURAI                  Sageirinda*.
TAKANO                   Sanga Sanga*.
UEDA                     Puura*.
YANAGIYA                 Banka*.
WATAGI                   Biriton*.
EGAWA                    Sunda*.
AIDA                     Malacca.
BANDO                    Sumaran*.
FUNABASI                 Timor.
IKEDA                    New Guinea.
KATAGIRI                 Lashio.
MIZOCUTI                 The Perurisu* region.
NUKADA                   The Geta* region.
SAWAKAWA                 The Kota Bharu Region.
TAKESITA                 East.
UTSUNOMIYA               West.
YAMANE                   South.
ARAMAKI                  North.
DOOKE                    Island.

Army 25943                                           Trans. 12/9/41 (NR)
 
[a] See S.I.S. #25609 in which Tokyo sends out a circular containing 
hidden-meaning words to be used as an emergency system for dispatches. 
[b] Kana spelling.
22

[Secret]

From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)
To: Santiago
2 December 1941
(J 19)
Circular #328
Tokyo to Rio de Janeiro as Circular #2431, 29th November

Re my Circular #2409.*

Additions to the list already sent; please use with others.

Code Word                                Meaning
 
KASIMA                   Have Japanese living there been interned?
KANO                     Japanese living here are all safe.
KIKUTI                   Japanese living here have all been interned.
KATUNO                   Some of Japanese living here have been
                         interned.
KAWASIMO                 The wave length of General Information
                         broadcast will be changed to . . kilocycles
                         from . . . (day) . . . (month) . . .
KAKAO                    Reception of General Information broad- 
(Kayso)                  cast bad, please change wave length.
TUJIKITA                 Please change wave length of General In-
                         formation broadcast to a shorter
                         than the present wave length.
TABUSE                   Please change wave length of General In-
(Tabuti)                 formation broadcast to a longer wave length.
SAITO                    The time of General Information broadcast
                         is to be changed starting on . . . (day) . . .
                         from . . . (time) . . . to . . . (time) . . .
HAYASAKI                 Please change time of General Information
                         broadcast, starting on . . . (day) . . . to,
                         from . . . (time) . . . to . . . (time) . . .
ISEZAKI                  100 (hyaku).
WANAMI                   1,000 (see)
YASUNO                   10,000 (man).
UNO                      100,000 (jyu man).
ITIOTA                   1,000,000 (hyaku man).
(perhaps ITIOKA)
(probably UTIOKA)

26144
JD-1:                                       (Y) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)
 
*JD-1: 6985. List of code words similar to above.
23

[Secret]

From: Rio de Janeiro (Ishii)
To: Santiago
2 December 1941
(J 19)
Circular #329 (In 3 parts, complete)
Tokyo to Rio as Circular #2432, on 29 Nov.

Re my Circular #2409*.

The following are added this date to my Circular #2409*, for special use in your area. Please use them together with the others, (after making them up in a table).

(Translator's note. Underlined values are doubtful due to garbles. Probable correct value added below in parenthesis.)

Code Word                                Meaning
 
ASHINA*                  From . . . (blank) . . . (date), Japanese
                         ships stopping here will not be allowed to take
                         on fuel.
DATE*                    Please telegraph probable amount of . . .
                         (blank) . . . that can be imported.
KAWAHARA                 I estimate we can probably import about
                         . . . (blank) . . . tons of . . . (blank) . . .
NIWAGUCHI                It is impossible to carry out . . . (blank)
(Kawaguchi)
NAKAMUTA                 Are in the process of arranging for im-
(Nakamura)               portation of . . . (blank) . . .
SATUNAKATA               Send communications via . . . (blank)
(Munakata)               . . . (country).
KAZAMA                   Communications will be through offices
                         stationed in . . . (blank) . . . (country).
TOKUSIMA                 Japanese ship should arrive in . . . (blank)
                         . . . (country) on . . . (blank) . . .(month)
                         . . . (blank) . . . (day).
TAKENOUTI                Is it possible for Japanese ships to come
                         to . . . (blank) . . . (country) ?
YA  GI                   It is not possible to send Japanese ships
(YANAGI)                 to . . . (blank) . . . (country).
TONEGI                   It is possible to send Japanese ship(s) to
                         . . . (blank) . . . (country).
TAKAGI                   Minerals
SAWAMURA                 Lead.
SUMI                     Mercury.
(Kasumi)
IWASAKI                  Petroleum.
HIROHATA                 Diamonds for industrial use.
ITAMI                    Platinum.
KADA                     Copper.
NAKAGAWA                 Carat.
MAEHATA                  Peru.
MASUKO                   Chile
SENEDA                   Colombia.
TAKENAKA                 Paraguay or Uruguay (?)
SIMAZU                   Paraguay or Uruguay. (?)
IMAZAWA                  Venezuela.
FUJIKAKE                 San QINY**
HASIMOTO                 Cuba.
SINDO                    Havana.
TIBA                     Rio de Janeiro.
TOZAWA                   Sao Paulo.
HASEGAWA                 Riberao Preto.
IRIFUNE                  Santos
ENOMOTO                  Bauru.
BEPPU                    Curityba.
TIKAMATU                 Belem.
SUETUGU                  Buenos Aires.
OKIZUMI                  Santiago.
YAMATO                   Lima.
UMEGAWA                  Bogota.
HARA                     Caracas.
ISONO                    Montevideo. (?)
FUKAMATI                 Asuncion.

Relay from Rio de Janeiro to TPT***, Lima, Sao Paulo. Mexico City relay to Washington, Panama, Havana, Caracas (?), Bogota.

25830
JD-1                                         (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)
 
*JD-1: 6985 (S.I.S. #25609). List of code names to be used in plainlanguage messages. with indicator S T O P at end.
**Code value is QINY, (probably Salvador or Domingo). 
***Probably "Buenos Aires and Santiago."
24

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941
Purple
#1232 (Part 1 of 2)
 
COMPLETED TRANSLATION

Re my #1231. [a]

Today, the 2nd, Ambassador KURUSU and I had an interview with Under-Secretary of State WELLES. At that time, prefacing his statement by saying that it was at the direct instruction of the President of the United States, he turned over to us the substance of my separate wire #1233. [a] Thereupon we said:

Since we haven’t been informed even to the slightest degree concerning the troops in French Indochina, we will transmit the gist of your representations directly to our Home Government. In all probability they never considered that such a thing as this could possibly be an upshot of their proposals of November 20th.

The Under-Secretary then said:

I want you to know that the stand the United States takes is that she opposes aggression in any and all parts of the world.

Thereupon we replied:

The United States and other countries have pyramided economic pressure upon economic pressure upon us Japanese. (I made the statement that economic warfare was even worse than forceful aggression.) We haven’t the time to argue the pros and cons of this question or the rights and wrongs. The people of Japan are faced with economic pressure, and I want you to know that we have but the choice between submission to this pressure or breaking the chains that it invokes. *We want you to realize this as well as the situation in which all Japanese find themselves as the result of the four-year incident in China; the President recently expressed cognizance of the latter situation.

Army 25659-B                                          Trans. 12/3/41 (7)
 
[a] Not available.
*Original translation incomplete from this point on.

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941
Purple
#1232 (Part 2 of 2)

Furthermore, I would have you know that in replying to the recent American proposals, the Imperial Government is giving the most profound consideration to this important question which has to do with our national destiny.

Under-Secretary of State WELLES said:

I am well aware of that.

I continued:

We cannot overemphasize the fact that, insofar as Japan is concerned, it is virtually impossible for her to accept the new American proposals as they now stand. Our proposals proffered on the 21st of June and the proposals of September 25th, representing our greatest conciliations based on the previous proposal, still stand. In spite of the fact that the agreement of both sides was in the offing, it has come to naught. At this late juncture to give thoughtful consideration to the new proposals certainly will not make for a smooth and speedy settlement of the negotiations. Recently, we promised to evacuate our troops from French Indochina in the event of a settlement of the Sino-Japanese incident and the establishment of a just peace in the Far East. In anticipating the settlement of fundamental questions, the question of the representations of this date would naturally dissolve.

The Under-Secretary assiduously heard us out and then said:

The American proposals of the 26th were brought about by the necessity to clarify the position of the United States because of the internal situation here.

Then he continued:

In regard to the opinions that you have expressed, I will make it a point immediately to confer with the Secretary.

I got the impression from the manner in which he spoke that he hoped Japan in her reply to the American proposals of the 26th would leave this much room.

Judging by my interview with Secretary of State HULL on the 1st and my conversations of today, it is clear that the United States, too is anxious to peacefully conclude the current difficult situation. I am convinced that they would like to bring about a speedy settlement. Therefore, please bear well in mind this fact in your considerations of our reply to the new American proposals and to my separate wire #1233 [a].

Army 25660                                            Trans. 12-3-41 (7)
 
[a] Not available.
25

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#1234
 
Strictly Secret.

Re your #862 [a].

I knew that to leave that error in the publication of this speech as it now stands would have a bad effect on negotiations, so on the morning of the 2nd prior to my interview with WELLES I sent TERAZAKI to visit BALLANTINE at the State Department to explain the substance of your #862. BALLANTINE said,

At this tense psychological moment in Japanese-American negotiations, the fact that such a strong statement as this has been circulated has given a severe shock to the American Government and people and it is very unfortunate and dangerous.

TERAZAKI replied,

Well, as it was the American newspapers that made such a clamor about it, I did not come to vindicate ourselves or make any explanation. I merely wished to state the facts.

He added,

At present the newspapers of both countries ought both to be cool and calm, so will you please advise them hereafter concerning this point.

Army 25730
JD: 7059                                              Trans. 12-4-41 (2)
 
[a] Not available.

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941
Purple
#1239

Re my #123.[a]

On the 2nd in a press interview the President stated that he had sent us an inquiry that day concerning our increasing troops in French Indochina. Expressing his own views for the first time, he briefly stated that the trend of Japanese-American negotiations for the past few days and our rumored increasing of troops in southern French Indochina had both thrown obstacles in the way of the progress of the negotiations (see special intelligence from Washington). This was the first interview since returning from Warm Springs, and particular attention is to be paid to the fact that he referred directly to negotiations.

Army 25690                                           Trans. 12/4/41 (NR)
 
[a] Not available.
26

[Secret]

From: Canton
To: Tokyo
December 2, 1941
J-19
#512 
Secret outside the department

If hostilities are to begin we here are all prepared. The army has completed all preparations to move immediately upon Thai. Should the British resist to the bitter end, it is understood that the army is prepared to go so far as to militarily occupy the country.

(Japanese)

Army 26103                                              Trans. 12/11/41

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#875 
Chief of Office routing

Re your #1232*.

Please explain the matter to the United States along the following lines:

There seem to be rumors to the effect that our military garrisons in French Indochina are being strengthened. The fact is that recently there has been an unusual amount of activity by the Chinese forces in the vicinity of the Sino-French Indochina border. In view of this, we have increased our forces in parts of northern French Indochina. There would naturally be some movement of troops in the southern part as a result of this. We presume that the source of the rumors is in the exaggerated reports of these movements. In doing so, we have in no way violated the limitations contained in the Japanese-French joint defense agreement.

25725
JD-1: 7057                                (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)
 
*JD-1: 7021 (S.I.S. #25659-60).
27 
From: Tokyo (Togo)
To: Honolulu
December 2 1941
J-19
#123

(Secret outside the department.)

In view of the present situation, the presence in port of warships, airplane carriers, and cruisers is of utmost importance. Hereafter, to the utmost of your ability, let me know day by day. Wire me in each case whether or not there are any observation balloons above Pearl Harbor or if there are any indications that they will be sent up. Also advice me whether or not the warships are provided with anti-mine nets.

ARMY 27065  JD 8007 (Japanese)                       Trans. 12/30/41 (5)
 
NOTE.-This message was received here on December 23.
28

U.S. Department of State (December 3, 1941)

793.94/17037: Telegram

The Consul at Tsingtao to the Secretary of State

Tsingtao, December 1, 1941 — 11 a.m.
[Received December 3 — 6:27 a.m.]

During the past 10 days an average of about three Japanese transports have left Tsingtao daily loaded with troops. These troops were in summer uniforms and are believed to have been withdrawn from areas in the Yangtze valley north of the river as Japanese troops in Shantung have been in winter uniforms for some time. Reliable information as to numbers and destination is not available here but it may be deduced from the above that they are southward bound.

Sent to Beiping. Repeated to the Department and Chungking.

MEYER

740.0011 Pacific War/671: Telegram

The Minister in Thailand to the Secretary of State

Bangkok, December 3, 1941 — 5 p.m.
[Received December 3 — 4 p.m.]

547.

  1. In a conversation I have had with the Minister for Foreign Affairs he referred to the seemingly mild attitude of the Japanese toward the Thai Government lately but said that the Thai Government thoroughly understood what Japan was plotting against this country and definitely would resist Japan. I said I would be glad to telegraph this to my Government. He referred appreciatively to the information received through the Minister in Washington that the United States would place Thailand in the same category as China in case of resistance to invasion.

  2. The Prime Minister was very disappointed at the meagerness of the assistance promised by the British Government in reply to his inquiry made about October 15. It is my opinion that the Government, however, as a whole and the Thai people are confidentially expecting that if the nation resists Japanese invasion it will receive immediate [aid?] from Great Britain and the United States.

The Thais are well aware that these two nations are opposing Japanese aggression even at the risk of war and naturally infer that their own efforts will receive British and American support. See the Legation’s telegram 534, November 26, 11 p.m., paragraph no. 3, quoting two popular radio commentators as saying that Thailand will have friends to come to her assistance.

  1. If Japan invades this country and no aid as described is provided there is bound to be popular resentment against our two nations and possibly our citizens. This will be fomented by the Japanese and some Thais. I earnestly suggest that the British and American Governments as soon as possible inform the Thai Government what immediate and long term assistance it can expect against invasion.

This will enable the government to plan for the future intelligently either for resistance to the last extremity in the hope of ultimate victory through supporting British and American action or for a truce while awaiting a later settlement. Preliminary advice will also do much to avert a revulsion of feeling if American and British aid is not speedily forthcoming. The Thai have confidence in Britain and the United States in spite of refusal to supply them with military equipment and I feel that it would be fair to inform them of our intentions with reference to their situation as soon as those intentions can be communicated.

My British colleague is telegraphing along the same general line.

PECK

29

Japanese Foreign Office (December 3, 1941)

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
3 December, 1941
(Purple)
#876

Re your 1227* (Washington to Tokyo).

As you are well aware, during the tenure of the previous cabinet, a meeting between the leaders of the two countries was suggested by us but the proposal failed to materialize. It is felt that it would be inappropriate for us to propose such a meeting again at this time. Please be advised of this decision.

25699
JD-1: 7018                                          Navy Trans. 12-3-41
30

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Washington
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#877

Re #1225* from Washington to Tokyo.

Your message #1225* of course refers to the U.S. proposal of June and our September proposal but it goes without saying that the one we are holding to now is our 20 November proposal, which now supercedes the September proposal.

25700
JD-1: 7019                                           Navy Trans. 12-3/41
 
*Not available.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo.
To: Washington. 
3 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#878 (In 2 parts, complete)

Re your #1225*.

Chief of Office routing.

  1. Apparently, the United States is making much of the statements issued by our governmental organs, the trend of the public opinion, as well as of our troop movements in the south. They have used these as an excuse to doubt our sincerity in wanting to bring about a successful settlement in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations.

We explained the truth behind the alleged Tojo statement in my message #866**. The English translation (this was done in the offices of the Domei News agency) of that statement was very different from the original, and that was responsible for the unexpected reactions.

With regard to guiding general public opinion, this Minister himself has made considerable effort.

The State Department should be in receipt of a report from the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo regarding this point. As a matter of fact, as your report in your message #1148*** Secretary Hull has expressed his satisfaction over the change for the better along these lines.

In spite of this, the tone of some of the U.S. newspapers seem to be unduly ominous. Moreover, the radio (particularly those which are aired via short wave from San Francisco very recently) has been daily broadcasting in considerable detail, the progress being made in the negotiations. It is quite evident that persons who have access to the records of the meetings are acting as liaison agents for those broadcasts, for otherwise it would be impossible to obtain some of the information that is being aired. We feel that it is very inappropriate for the United States to criticize us without looking after her own house.

  1. Recently, Britain, the United States, and others have been making military preparations against Japan at an every increasing tempo. At the same time, they have been acting in a more and more antagonistic. manner of late. For example, on the 20th of last month, a U.S. plane made a reconnaissance flight over Garanpi in the southern part of Formosa. (We filed a protest with the U.S. Ambassador on the 27th regarding this matter). Since then, however, the British and the United States have shown no indication of ending such activities. In view of the very critical times, we cannot help but hope that such incidents would cease.

  2. Our proposal which was submitted on 20 November was based on just principles. Will you please point out again that these principles undoubtedly offer the best chance of leading to an eventual settlement. (We assume that when the United States says in their counter proposal that our terms are not in sympathy with the existing principles, they refer to the contents of Article 4 in which it is stated that the peace between Japan and China shall not be disturbed. We are insisting that all aid to Chiang cease as soon as Japanese-Chinese negotiations, at the instigation of the President of the United States, are launched. Hence, our proposal in no way conflicts with the spirit of the so-called fundamental principles being proclaimed by the United States. Please bear that in mind.

25720
JD-1: (D) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

*JD-1: 7042 (S.I.S. #25715). 
**Available, dated 3 December. 
***JD-1: 6737 (S.I.S. #25174).
31

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: (Circular)
3 December 1941
(PA-K2)
Circular #2461

Please keep the code list (INGO HIKAE)* (including those in connection with broadcasts) until the last moment, and if by any chance you have already destroyed them they will have to be resent to you, so please notify us of this fact immediately.

This message is as a precaution.

25855
JD-1: 7123                                (Y) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (S-TT)
 
*"Hidden Word" code to be used in plain Japanese language messages.

[Secret]

From: Tokyo
To: Vancouver
3 December 1941
(PAK-2)
#92

Please retain the “hidden meaning” codes and the codes to be used in conjunction with radio broadcasts until the last moment. If you have already destroyed them, advise and we will retransmit them.

26787
JD-1: 7775                                  (D) Navy Trans. 12-24-41(CN)
32

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#1243

If we continue to increase our forces in French Indochina, it is expected that the United States will close up our Consulates, therefore consideration should be given to steps to be taken in connection with the evacuation of the Consuls.

25721
JD-1: 7050                                (F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#1244

Judging from all indications, we feel that some joint military action between Great Britain and the United States, with or without a declaration of war, is a definite certainty in the event of an occupation of Thailand.

25785
JD-1: 7098                                   (D) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (7)
33

[Secret]

From: Washington 
To: Tokyo 
3 December 1941 
(Purple) 
#1245

Terasaki now in the midst of — — — intelligence work at a most important time, would like to have him stay over a while and go by the sailing on the 19th. Takagi busy on Tatsuta Maru business. (Negotiating with State Department for securing space) - - — air plane.

(NOTE. — Many gaps in this message.)

25722
JD-1: 7051                                (F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)

[Secret]

From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
December 3, 1941
Purple (Urgent)
#1256.

Re your #875 [a].

I received your reply immediately. I presume, of course, that this reply was a result of consultations and profound consideration. The United States Government is attaching a great deal of importance on this reply. Especially since the President issued his statement yesterday, it is being rumored among the journalists that this reply is to be the key deciding whether there will be war or peace between Japan and the United States. There is no saying but what the United States Government will take a bold step depending upon how our reply is made. If it is really the intention of our government to arrive at a settlement, the explanation you give, I am afraid, would neither satisfy them nor prevent them taking the bold step referred to — even if your reply is made for the mere purpose of keeping the negotiations going. Therefore, in view of what has been elucidated in our proposal which I submitted to the President on November 10th, I would like to get a reply which gives a clearer impression of our peaceful intentions. Will you, therefore, reconsider this question with this is mind and wire me at once.

Army 25849                                           Trans. 12/7/41 (1)
JD: 7128 
 
[a] See S.I.S. #2572 — Explanation of Japan's increase of their forces in French Indochina.
34

[Secret]

From: Rome
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple—CA)
#985

Re your message #985* to Berlin.

On this day, at 11 o’clock in the morning, I, accompanied by Ando, called on Premier Mussolini, (Foreign Minister Ciano was also present). I described the developments in the Japanese-U.S. negotiations in accordance with the contents of your message #986** to Berlin.

Mussolini:

I have been carefully watching the progress of the Japanese-U.S. talks from the very beginning and therefore am not at all surprised to receive your report. As a matter of fact, in view of the utter bull-headedness of the United States and the meddlesome nature of President Roosevelt, I should say that the outcome was nothing but what should have been expected. One of the aims of the United States is to make the Far East her own, from an economic standpoint. I have felt from the beginning that if it was the intention of the United States to separate Japan from the Axis first and then intervene in Europe, the United States was doomed to fail because of Japan’s loyal and sincere nature.

As Your Excellency and Your Excellency’s predecessor know, I wholeheartedly endorse Japan’s policy of creating a New Order in East Asia. This has been true in the past, is true now and will be so in the future. I am one who is firmly convinced that Japan has every right to be the leader of the Great East Asia area.

I continued by relating to him the contents of your message referred to in the heading, (with regard to paragraph 3 of that message, said that I had been advised that some arrangements were being made between our Ambassador in Berlin and Ribbentrop).

With regard to paragraph 2, Mussolini said that should war break out, Italy would give every military aid she had at her disposal, i.e., that she would make every effort to keep the British navy checked in the Mediterranean.

Mussolini:

Recently, the formation of an Italian-German air force bloc was discussed so as to afford closer cooperation between the two to apply further pressure on the British in the Mediterranean. The negotiations on this proposal have progressed to a point where it may be signed any day now.

Regarding paragraph 2 again, should Japan declare war on the United States and Great Britain, I asked, would Italy do likewise immediately? Mussolini replied:

Of course. She is obligated to do so under the terms of the Tripartite Pact. Since Germany would also be obliged to follow suit, we would like to confer with Germany on this point.

With reference to paragraph 3, I submitted the French text of your message #987***, as one proposal, and asked him whether he preferred it to be separately or jointly. He replied that as long as it was done simultaneously with Germany it did not make much difference to him, but if it were done jointly he thought it would give the impression of more strength. He said he would confer with Ambassador MAKKENZEN.

Mussolini failed to bring up the subject of Soviet Russia, so the matter was not brought up at all.

In the first part of this message, please correct “N-NEEN WA” to “KINKENSHA WA”.

25833
JD-1:                                     (D) Navy Trans. 12-6-41 (W-TT)
 
*JD-1: 6943 (S.I.S. #25552-53). 
**JD-1: 6944 (S.I.S. #25554-55).
***Not available.
35

[Secret]

From: Bangkok
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(Purple)
#892

In order to meet an emergency situation it is most important that we have our currency arrangements for Thailand in readiness. Therefore please have the Finance Minister appoint a suitable person as a member of the Embassy Staff, and send him out as soon as possible.

25724
JD-1: 7053                                (F) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (S-TT)
36

[Secret]

From: Peking
To: Net
3 December 1941
(Purple)
Circular #616 (In 3 parts, complete)
Peking to Tokyo #763 (Most secret outside the Ministry).
      Kitazawa, Commander Army of North China.
      Arisue, Vice Chief of Staff.
      Nishimura, 4th Section, Staff Headquarters.
      Kazayama, Chief of Staff.
      Shiozawa, Liaison Officer, Chinese Development Board.

At a meeting on December 1st and 2nd, of the above five, the following conclusions and decisions were reached:

If this war does start, this will be a war which will decide the rise or fall of the Japanese Empire. For this reason it goes without saying, do not have small, or local, insignificant matters, occupy you. Instead quiet such things immediately and settle in a most advantageous way to us. In addition, all administrative control of these districts should be carefully planned anew with the above in view. For example, the fact that this war is one which is unavoidable for the existence of Japan and the maintenance of peace in East Asia’ should be made very clear to all foreign nations and thus internally strengthen the unity of the people while guiding the world’s public opinion in a direction beneficial to Japan. Thus both during the period of war and at the end of the war during the peace negotiations the greatest benefit will accrue to Japan.

Especially on the minds of the southern native peoples we must make an impression so as to draw them towards us and against the United States and Britain. For this purpose, when this war starts all district and regional authorities must as much as possible adhere to existing international laws, etc. and under no condition should any action which would look like ‘stealing while the house burns’ to foreign countries be taken which might result in the loss of the main issue for a small immediate local profit.

In order to end this affair in a profitable note for Japan, one need but remember that in the Russo-Japan war it was necessary to have President Roosevelt act as peace mediator, to appreciate that for the expected coming war the only one who can be imagined as an intermediary is the Pope. This fact should be kept in mind in any step which is taken in the occupied territory. And for this reason too the enemy’s position should be considered, and the handling of enemy churches etc. in China should be carefully studied.

It is evident that Japan will have to put everything that they have in the coming war, and for this reason it is only natural that our burden in China be made as light as possible, so that our strength must be saved. For this reason matters other than political or economic, that can be handled by China should as much as possible be left to China to manage and thereby get credit for this from the Chinese, too.

It can be imagined that the next war is to be a longer one than the China incident, so that in this region the main issue should be the obtaining of materials. For this reason the question of closed trade and methods of gathering material should again be thoroughly studied.

The military will of course try to handle matters as much as possible according to the International code. They will increase even more their close cooperation with the Legations, especially regarding protection of churches. In this regard they have already planned a complete education of the soldier groups stationed in the occupied territories.

Arisue mentioned that he was on close terms with the Vatican here _ _ _ _ _ (2 lines garbled) _ _ _ _ _ .

(Arisue mentioned that he had always approved of allowing the Chinese to handle their own affairs and as a matter of fact he had been acting with that in mind. However, he was only worried that by handing over the management of things to the Chinese, that they might get the mistaken idea that the Japanese had become weakened. This point should be kept in mind and any action of this kind should be done in such a way as to not let them get such a mistaken idea.)

It is of course important to obtain materials, but regarding easing the ban on free trade in enemy territory, this subject should be studied from various angles.

Shiozawa expressed his agreement with most items mentioned and declared that very close touch has been kept with military forces and different methods of leading North China politically were being studied.

26881
JD-1: 7848                               (Y) Navy Trans. 12-26-41 (C-NR)
37 
From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo 
3 December 1941
(PA-K2)
#247

Ship report:

2nd. Military transport (name unknown) sailed out toward mainland.
3rd. RARIN came into port from San Francisco.

26065
 
JD-1: 7309                                  (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)
38 
From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(PA-K2)
#245 (In 2 parts, complete)
(Military secret.)

From Ichiro Fuji to the Chief of #3 Section of Military Staff Headquarters.

  1. I wish to change my method of communicating by signals to the following:

I. Arrange the eight signals in three columns as follows:

          Meaning                                              Signal
Battleship divisions including  Preparing to sortie.                1
 scouts and screen units
A number of carriers            Preparing to sortie.                2
Battleship divisions            All departed between 1st and 3rd.   3
Carriers                        Several departed between 1st and    4
                                  3rd
Carriers                        All departed between 1st and 3rd.   5
Battleship divisions            All departed between 4th and 6th    6
Carriers                        Several departed between 4th and    7
                                  6th
Carriers                        All departed between 4th and 6th    8
26145
  1. Signals

I. Lanikai* Beach. House will show lights during the night as follows:

                                                                  Signal
One light between 8 and 9 p. m.  ................................    1
 "   "     "      9 and 10 p. m. ................................    2
 "   "     "     10 and 11 p. m. ................................    3
 "   "     "     11 and 12 p. m. ................................    4
 
II. 
 
Two lights "     12 and 1 a. m.  ................................    5
 "   "     "      1 and 2 a. m.  ................................    6
 "   "     "      2 and 3 a. m.  ................................    7
 "   "     "      3 and 4 a. m.  ................................    8

III. Lanikai* Bay, during daylight
If there is a “star” on the head of the sail of the Star Boat it indicates signals 1, 2, 3, or 4.
If there is a “star” and a Roman numeral III it indicates signal 5, 6, 7, or 8.
Lights in the attic window of Kalama House** will indicate the following:

Times                        Signal|Times                         Signal
1900-2000 ...................... 3 | 2200-2300 ....................... 6
2000-2100 ...................... 4 | 2300-2400 ....................... 7
2100-2200 ...................... 5 | 0000-0100 ....................... 8
V.K.G.M.G.*** Want Ads.

A. Chinese rug etc. for sale, apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 3 or 6.

B. CHIC. CO farm etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 4 or 7.

C. Beauty operator wanted etc. apply P.O. box 1476 indicates signal 5 or 8.
  1. If the above listed signals and wireless messages cannot be made from Oahu, then on Maui Island, 6 miles to the northward of Kula Sanatorium * * * * at a point halfway be- [24] tween Lower Kula Road and Haleakala Road (latitude 20°40’N, longitude 156°19’W, visible from seaward to the southeast and southwest of Maui Island) the following signal bonfire will be made daily until your EXEX signal is received:
Times Signal
From 7-8 3 or 6
From 8-9 4 or 7
From 9-10 5 or 8 
JD-1:7370                                   (M) Navy Trans. 12-11-41 (7)
 
*Between Waimanalo and Kailua Beaches on east coast of Oahu.
**A beach village on east coast of Oahu, 1 mile northwest of Lanikai.
***A radio broadcast station in Honolulu.
****At latitude 20-42-45 N., longitude 156-20-20 W.
39 
From: Honolulu (Kita)
To: Tokyo
3 December 1941
(PA-K2)
#248

Ship report.

December 3rd. Wyoming and 2 seaplane tenders left port. No other movements.

JD-1:7310                                  (Y) Navy Trans. 12-10-41 (2)
40

U.S. Department of State (December 4, 1941)

711.94/2513: Telegram

The Consul General at Batavia to the Secretary of State

Batavia, December 4, 1941 — 10 a.m.
[Received December 4 — 9:19 a.m.]

220.

War Department at Bandoeng claims intercepted and decoded following from Ministry Foreign Affairs, Tokyo:

When crisis leading to worst arises following will be broadcast at end weather reports: (1) east wind rain war with United States, (2) north wind cloudy war with Russia, (3) west wind clear war with Britain including attack on Thailand or Malaya and Dutch Indies. If spoken twice, burn codes and secret papers.

Same re following from Japanese Ambassador, Bangkok, to Consul General, Batavia:

When threat of crises exists, following will be used five times in texts of general reports and radio broadcasts: (1) Higashi east America, (2) Kita North Russia, (3) Nishi west Britain with advance into Thailand and attack on Malaya and Dutch Indies.

Thorpe and Slawson cabled the above to War Department. I attach little or no importance to it and view it with some suspicion. Such have been common since 1936.

FOOTE