711.94/2579The British Ambassador to the Secretary of State
Washington, 29 November, 1941.Dear Mr. Hull:
When I got back to the Embassy this morning I found a telegram from Eden asking whether it would be possible to let him see the text of the document given to the Japanese.I have already told him of its general character as you described it to me, but I have no doubt, if you have no objection, he would be grateful for the opportunity of seeing the text.
Yours very sincerely,
(For the Ambassador)
R. I. CAMPBELL
740.0011 Pacific War/1301The Netherland Legation to the Department of State
Washington, November 29, 1941.The Netherlands Government requests the U. S. Government to be good enough to instruct the U.S. authorities in the Philippines to inform the Netherlands Consul General at Manila of any imminent Japanese danger in order that he may [be] enabled to inform the Netherlands Foreign Minister in London and the Governor General of the Netherlands Indies.
711.94/254023/35The Secretary of State to President Roosevelt
Washington, November 29, 1941.There is attached a draft of a proposed message to Congress, to which draft the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of War made material contributions, and the officers of the Department made further contributions, which together comprise the draft of the proposed message.
In order to get this to you today it has not been possible carefully to go over this draft a second time. In fact, I myself have not had time to read it at all critically, but expect to do so over the week-end and give you the benefit of any further comment or suggestions.
I also enclose a draft by the Far Eastern officials of a possible message from you to the Emperor of Japan. My personal view continues as on yesterday to be that its sending will be of doubtful efficacy, except for the purpose of making a record. It might even cause such complications as Col. Stimson and I referred to on yesterday.
If you should send this message to the Emperor it would be advisable to defer your message to Congress until we see whether the message to the Emperor effects any improvement in the situation. I think we agree that you will not send message to Congress until the last stage of our relations, relating to actual hostility, has been reached.
I think you will desire to have any message to the Emperor dispatched in code to Ambassador Grew for communication by him to the Emperor through appropriate channels.
CORDELL HULL
..............
[Annex 1]Draft message of President Roosevelt to Congress
I come before you to report to you on serious danger which is threatening this country and its interests in the Far East. Relations between the United States and the Japanese Empire have reached a stage where I consider it incumbent upon me to lay before you the essential facts of the situation and their extremely serious implications.
In the closing decades of the eighteenth century, American traders began the development of our direct contacts with eastern Asia. A little over a hundred years ago, in 1833, the United States entered into its first Far Eastern treaty, a treaty with Siam — in which treaty there was made provision for perpetual peace and for dependable relationships. By that time American missionaries were beginning to work in Eastern Asia. Ten years later Caleb Gushing began the negotiation of our first treaty with China, and in 1844 that treaty, containing provision for most-favored-nation treatment, was concluded. In 1853, Commodore Perry knocked on Japan’s doors, and in the next years those doors began to open. From the earliest days to this day, the United States has consistently urged in the Far East, as it has done in all parts of the world, the fundamental importance of fair and equal treatment among nations.
Throughout the period of our official relations with the Far Eastern area there has been a general recognition by responsible officials of this country and by our people that procedures conducive to respect for the sovereign rights of countries of the Far East coincide to a remarkable degree with the traditional liberal concepts of the people of this country and the legitimate and best interests of the United States. As a concomitant of this country’s espousal of the principle of equal treatment there has been its support of the principle of respect for the territorial and administrative integrity of the countries with which it has had relations. Throughout the period when there were indications that various nations were inclined to aggress against Japan, the United States always used its influence in opposition to every manifestation of such inclination on the part of no matter what country. Simultaneously and subsequently, the United States has done the same in regard to China.
Just before the end of the nineteenth century, the United States acquired a new position and, with that position, assumed important responsibilities in the western Pacific. Sovereignty over the Philippine Islands passed from Spain to this country. At that time there was going on what was known as the “scramble for concessions” in China and there was talk about a possible partitioning of China. It was then that the American Government took its stand on the principle of the “open door” and declared that it was its policy to:
…seek a solution which may bring about permanent peace to China… protect all rights guaranteed to friendly powers by treaty and international law, and safeguard for the world the principle of equal and impartial trade with all parts of the Chinese Empire.
Since 1898, the American Government has been conducting in the Philippines the unprecedented experiment of acquainting an Asiatic people with the methods of personal freedom and national self-government that are practiced by our own Republic. Our constant aim has been to develop the Filipino people into a self-governing and independent commonwealth. At the same time, this farsighted experiment has been and is of far-reaching importance to us and to other peoples. It is important to the material welfare of the United States that there should exist in the western Pacific a nation friendly to us by virtue of close association and profitable relations with us. Our presence in the Philippines has helped make known to the peoples of the Orient the name, the culture, the commerce and the good repute of the United States. It has helped to establish and to stabilize our relations in general with those regions of the Pacific from which there come materials which are indispensable to our economy not only in time of peace but even more in time of war and to which we sell in increasing amounts our manufactured products and some of our raw materials.
In 1908 the major principles of American Far Eastern policy were agreed to by Japan and the United States in an exchange of notes. In those notes, the two governments jointly declared not only that they were determined to support “by all pacific means at their disposal the independence and integrity of China and the principle of equal opportunity for commerce and industry of all nations in that Empire”, but that it was “the wish of the two governments to encourage the free and peaceful development of their commerce on the Pacific Ocean” and that “the policy of both governments” was “directed to the maintenance of the existing status quo” in that region.
In 1921 nine powers possessed of interests in the western Pacific — China, Japan and the United States among them — met in conference in Washington. The all-comprehensive objective of the conference was maintenance of peace. The methods envisaged were (1) reduction of armament and (2) regulation of competition in the Pacific and Far Eastern areas. Treaties and agreements interlocking in character and contingent upon one another were concluded. Especially important among these were the Nine Power Treaty which contained pledges to respect the sovereignty of China and the principle of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all nations throughout China; and the treaty (among the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy, and Japan) on limitation of naval armament.
In 1929 the nations of the world entered into a treaty — the Pact of Paris, or Kellogg Pact — wherein all agreed to resolve controversies among and between themselves by none but peaceful means.
In 1931, the Japanese army began its seizure of Manchuria. The Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations endeavored to induce Japan to revert to peaceful procedures, and the Government of the United States gave its support to that effort. While the occupation of Manchuria by Japanese armed forces was still in progress, the Government of the United States sent to the Japanese and Chinese Governments on January 7, 1932 identic notes declaring that the United States could not regard as legal and did not intend to recognize any situation, treaty or agreement which might be brought about by means contrary to the provisions of the Pact of Paris.
In 1934 the present administration welcomed an approach made by the Japanese Government in the form of a friendly note in which Japan’s Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he firmly believed that no question existed between the two governments that was fundamentally incapable of amicable solution and that Japan had:
…no intention whatever to provoke and make trouble with any other power.
Our Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, replied that he highly appreciated and reciprocated these cordial sentiments, that he fully concurred in the opinion that no question existed between the two countries which was fundamentally incapable of amicable solution, and that he received with special gratification the statement that Japan had no intention whatever to provoke and make trouble with any other power.
Almost immediately, however, there came indications of an attitude on the part of the Japanese Government inconsistent with these provisions in so far as concerned the rights and interests of other countries in China. Our Government felt compelled to make a statement in the course of which we said, through our Ambassador in Tokyo, that in this Government’s opinion treaties can lawfully be modified or be terminated only by processes prescribed or authorized or agreed upon by the parties to them and that in the opinion of the American people and the American Government no nation can, without the assent of the other nations concerned, rightfully endeavor to make conclusive its will in situations where are involved the rights, obligations and legitimate interests of other sovereign states.
In December 1934, the Japanese Government gave notice of its intention to terminate the naval treaty of February 6, 1922.
Japan, already engaged in expansion of her armed forces, thereafter intensified that expansion and in increasing measure engaged in activities obviously directed toward extension of her domination of neighboring areas and destructive of the lawful rights and interests in those areas of other countries, including the United States.
In July 1937 the armed forces of Japan embarked upon large-scale military operations against China. Soon her leaders were openly declaring that it was their determination to achieve and maintain for Japan a dominant position in the entire region of eastern Asia, the western Pacific and the southern Pacific. If they achieved this they would be masters of an area containing almost one-half of the population of the world and they would have arbitrary control of the sea lanes and the trade routes of an enormous area.
In the process of their military operations against and in China, Japan’s armed forces have taken American lives, wounded or otherwise physically abused American citizens (men, women and children), sunk American vessels — including a naval vessel — imperiled other American vessels, bombed American hospitals and churches and schools, destroyed a great deal of American property, ruined much American business, greatly interfered with American trade, and, in general, shown utter disregard for our rights — in law and under treaties: all this over and above and in addition to the incalculable damage that they have done to China and the suffering which they have caused to the Chinese people; to say nothing of the injuries which they have done to other nations and to civilization and to the cause of peace and good will among men.
During the past decade the enlightened policies of the American Government, as exemplified in our record in the Far East, have been endangered by a world-wide scheme of world-wide conquest developed by the so-called Axis powers. In Europe, Germany and Italy have without provocation or excuse attacked and conquered and reduced to economic and political slavery some sixteen other countries. In the Far East, the Government of Japan associated itself with Germany and Italy in 1936, and concluded with them in 1940 a treaty of alliance avowedly aimed at the United States. Those powers have been attempting to carry out a scheme of unlimited conquest. In flat defiance of its covenants Japan has invaded and sought to overthrow the Government of China. Step by step its armed forces, passing through the China Sea in the immediate proximity of the Philippine Islands, have invaded and taken possession of Indochina. Today they are openly threatening an extension of this conquest into the territory of Thailand. That step, if taken, would place them where they would directly menace, to the North, the Burma Road, China’s lifeline, and, to the South, the port and Straits of Singapore through which gateway runs the commerce of the world, including our own, between the Pacific and the Indian Ocean.
To the eastward of the Philippines, Japan has extended her threatening activities through the Caroline and Marshall Islands where, in violation of the mandate under which she received the custody of those islands, she has been secretly establishing naval and air bases and fortifications directly on the line between the United States and the Philippines.
By these steps Japan has enveloped with threatening forces the western, northern, and eastern approaches to the Philippines. Should this process go further, it will completely encircle and dangerously menace vital interests of the United States.
And while all this is going on, Japan, bound to Germany and Italy in a treaty wherein those three powers pledged one another that if any one of them is “attacked” by an outside power not already at war, the other allies will assist that one of their members by economic, political and military means; and Japan’s militant leaders declare that they will interpret their obligations under this commitment in whatever manner they may deem best suited to their own needs and purposes.
Simply stated, what we are confronted with in the Far East is a repetition of the tactics pursued by Hitler in Europe. The methods which Hitler has used with temporary success and which are being faithfully imitated by Japan, consist of a gradual expansion of power and control over neighboring peoples by a carefully planned and executed progressive infiltration, penetration and encirclement through which one nation after another is subdued and enslaved either by actual force or by threats of force.
After this fashion and pursuing this policy of conquest by force, Japan established herself in Korea; worked her way into and finally seized Manchuria; has sought for the past four and a half years to subjugate China; has, during the period of our negotiations with her, invaded Indochina; and now, threatens with imminent attack various neighboring areas including even the Philippines.
This situation, precipitated solely by Japanese aggression, holds unmistakable threats to our interests especially our interest in peace and in peaceful trade, and to our responsibility for the security of the Philippine Archipelago. The successful defense of the United States, in a military sense, is dependent upon supplies of vital materials which we import in large quantities from this region of the world. To permit Japanese domination and control of the major sources of world supplies of tin and rubber and tungsten would jeopardize our safety in a manner and to an extent that cannot be tolerated. Along with this would go practical Japanese control of the Pacific.
Unless the present course of events in the Far East is halted and considerations of justice, humanity and fair dealing are restored, we will witness in that region of the world precisely what has already transpired throughout the continental limits of Europe where Hitler seeks dominion by ruthless force.
A program on the part of any country for subjugation and exploitation of a huge population and a vast portion of the world is of incalculable concern to every other nation.
Throughout the period in which Japan has been making it clear that such is her program, the Government of the United States had endeavored to persuade the Government of Japan that Japan’s best interests lie in maintaining and cultivating friendly relations with the United States and with all other countries that believe in orderly and peaceful processes.
For the past eight months, conversations have been carried on between the Secretary of State and the President, on behalf of the United States, and the Foreign Minister and Premier of Japan, for the purpose of arriving, if possible, at some understanding agreeable to both Governments.
Throughout this entire period, the Government of the United States has been steadfast in its support of basic principles which should govern international relations. The principles for which we have stood in these discussions may be summarized as follows: The principle of inviolability of territorial integrity and sovereignty of each and all nations; the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; the principle of equality, including equality of commercial opportunity and treatment; and the principle of reliance upon international cooperation and conciliation for the prevention and pacific settlement of controversies and for improvement of international conditions by peaceful methods and processes. Basically these are the principles of peace, law and order and fair dealing among nations.
In our negotiations, we have kept in close contact with the Governments of Great Britain, Australia, the Netherlands Indies, and China. We have found those governments in complete agreement with our position. In every suggestion that we have made to Japan, the rights and vital interests of those and other nations have been faithfully represented. In the position which we have maintained we have had the moral support of these nations. We also have been given assurance of their material and military support if there comes resort to force.
We have made every effort of which we were capable toward reaching a fair and workable agreement. With the utmost of forbearance and patience, we have sought to bring Japan into commitments which would bring its practices into line with the principles which we advocate and in which the Japanese Government declares that it believes. These efforts have failed. Japan has refused to change her position or her practices, and relations between the two nations are threatened with rupture.
The supreme question presented to this country along with many other countries by the Hitler-dominated movement of world conquest is that of self-defense.
The fundamental issue between this country and Japan is not very different from the fundamental issue between this country and Nazi Germany. Concisely stated, it is an issue of autocracy versus self-determination, an issue of master and slave relationship among the peoples of the earth versus independence of nations and freedom of peoples.
The whole world is presented with the issue whether Germany, Italy and Japan are to conquer and rule the earth or are to be dissuaded or prevented, by whatever processes may be necessary, from pursuit of policies of conquest.
The question immediately presented in our Far Eastern affairs is whether the United States is or is not to stand by while Japan goes forward with a program of conquest by force — in disregard of law, in disregard of treaties, in disregard of others’ rights and interest, in disregard of any and all conventions or considerations of morality and of humanity — now in eastern Asia and the western Pacific, ultimately further afield.
In our own councils there are a variety and a composite of issues: There are issues between principles and opportunism; between confidence and fear; between reality and illusion; between clear understanding and confused misunderstanding; between wisdom and folly; between being farsighted and being shortsighted; between the concept of peace at any price and a concept of peace at a price commensurate with the value of peace; between accurate appraisal and inaccurate appraisal of our own strength; between full use and fractional use of our material and moral resources.
Japan’s policy of conquest and exploitation which is now being carried out in China has already utterly destroyed in the portions of China occupied by Japan the peaceful and profitable commercial relations which the United States had previously enjoyed there. It has devastated a nation which for many centuries by its devotion to the arts of peace and commerce was the most stabilizing influence on the western side of the Pacific Ocean. It threatens to transform a peaceful continent into one dominated by the military and leadership of Japan and devoted to the practice of war.
This Japanese procedure of conquest and exploitation is encircling the Philippine Islands. It threatens the commerce of those Islands and endangers their physical safety.
If it were to be successful, it would destroy the farsighted experiment which America has been conducting in those Islands and terminate the expectation of their independence. It would destroy the mutually profitable commerce which exists between those Islands and the United States, a commerce upon which the high standard of living of the Filipinos now depends. It would ruin the lifelong efforts and investments of thousands of American citizens who have transferred their homes and business activities to the Philippines on the faith that American principles of freedom and American methods of government would continue in those Islands. It would forever terminate the prestige and influence of the United States which the American experiment in the Philippine Islands has been establishing throughout the Orient.
If the Japanese should carry out their now threatened attacks upon and were to succeed in conquering the regions which they are menacing in the southwestern Pacific, our commerce with the Netherlands East Indies and Malaya would be at their mercy and probably be cut off. Our imports from those regions are of vital importance to us. We need those imports in time of peace. With the spirit of exploitation and destruction of commerce which prevails among the partners in the Axis Alliance, and with our needs what they are now in this period of emergency, an interruption of our trade with that area would be catastrophic.
We do not want war with Japan, and Japan does not want war with this country. If, however, war should come, the fault and the responsibility will be those of Japan. The primary cause will have been pursuit by Japan of a policy of aggression — in the course of which Japan’s militant militaristic leadership has disregarded law, violated treaties, impaired rights, destroyed property and lives of our nationals, inflicted horrible sufferings upon peoples who are our friends, interfered with our trade, ruined the legitimate business of many of our nationals, compelled us to make huge expenditures for defensive armament, made threats against us, put and kept many of our people in a constant state of anxiety, and, in general, made Japan a world nuisance and made of Japan a menace to our security and to the cause of peace, of freedom and of justice.
Our policy in relations with Japan should be and is influenced not by fear of what attacks Japan, acting unlawfully and with resort to force may make upon us but by determination on our part to give the utmost support of which we are reasonably capable to the fundamental principles of order and security and justice to which we have been and are committed, with confidence that it is within our capacity to withstand any attack which anyone may make upon us because of our pursuit of that course.
..............
[Annex 2]Draft Message From President Roosevelt to the Emperor of Japan
Washington, November 29, 1941.Almost a century ago the President of the United States addressed to the Emperor of Japan a message extending the offer of friendship of the people of the United States to the people of Japan. That offer was accepted, and in the long period of unbroken peace and friendship which has followed, our respective nations, through the virtues of their peoples, the sound character of their respective institutions and national structures, and the wisdom of their leaders and rulers — especially in Japan your illustrious grandfather the Emperor Meiji — have prospered and risen to a position of being able substantially to influence humanity.
Only in situations of extraordinary importance to our two countries need I address to Your Majesty messages on matters of state. I feel I should now so address you because of the deep and far-reaching emergency which appears to be in formation.
Developments are occurring in the Pacific area which threaten to deprive each of our nations and all humanity of the beneficial influence of the long peace between our two countries. Those developments contain tragic possibilities.
The history of both our countries affords brilliant examples in which your and my predecessors have, at other times of great crisis, by their enlightened decisions and acts, arrested trends and directed national policies along new and better courses — thereby bringing blessings to the peoples of both countries and to the peoples of other lands.
Feeling deeply concerned over the present trend of events, I address myself to Your Majesty at this moment in the fervent hope that Your Majesty may, as I am doing, give thought to ways of dispelling the dark clouds which loom over the relations between our two countries and of restoring and maintaining the traditional state of amity wherein both our peoples may contribute to lasting peace and security throughout the Pacific area.
711.94/254030/36The Secretary of the Navy to President Roosevelt
Washington, November 29, 1941.My Dear Mr. President: I am enclosing herewith a very rough draft of what I have sent over to the State Department as a means of helping in the drafting of a message. I hope it may be helpful.
I have had the assistance of both Admiral Stark and Admiral Turner in the summation of the military situation.
The news this morning indicates that the Japs are going to deliberately stall for two or three days, so unless this picture changes, I am extremely hopeful that you will get a two-or three-day respite down there and will come back feeling very fit.
Yours sincerely,
FRANK KNOX
740.0011 Pacific War/659: TelegramThe Ambassador in Japan to the Secretary of State
Tokyo, November 29, 1941 — 6 p.m. [Received November 29 — 3:11 p.m.]
1868.The Embassy has received Foreign Office note No. 129, American 1, dated November 27, which is translated as follows:
Excellency: I have the honor to state that according to a report from the Japanese naval authorities, an American airplane flew over Garanbi on the southernmost tip of Taiwan Island at 12:30 p.m. November 20, 1941, and after circling at an altitude of 2,000 meters flew away southward at 12:45 p.m. the same day.
It is believed that the Japanese Government cannot overlook such a violation of Japanese territory by an airplane and it is therefore requested that the matter be brought to the attention of the United States authorities concerned. Also I particularly bespeak Your Excellency’s solicitude particularly [as] the recurrence of such incidents at this time when the international situation is tense and the untoward events to which they might give rise are unpredictable.
I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration. Shigenori Togo, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Sent to the Department only.
GREW
711.94/2555The Navy Department to the Department of State
Manila, P. I., November 29, 1941.Information received from Headquarters, Philippine Constabulary is quoted:
According to several local Japanese who were conversing at the Tokyodo located at 341 R. Hidalgo, the personal opinion of the local Japanese Consul General Nihro is that war between America and Japan will begin within four months from now and if Kurusu and President Roosevelt will not come to an understanding, Japan will be forced to attack other nations without any declaration. The reason of the local Japanese Consul General Nihro is that in this way Japan can catch other nations unaware and besides Japan does not want to wait until America is well-prepared.
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
29 November 1941
(Purple)
#1216
In the Washington special intelligence dated the 28th concerning the White House interview, President Roosevelt is the person meant where reference is made to “authoritatively stated” and to an “administration spokesman”. We understand that Roosevelt particularly requested that the source be kept unclear.
(Please exercise caution in handling this).
25711
JD-1: 7038 (D) Navy Trans. 12-3-41 (1)[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Washington
29 November 1941
(Purple—CA)
#857
Re my #844*
We wish you would make one more attempt verbally along the following lines:
The United States government has (always?) taken a fair and judicial position and has formulated its policies after full consideration of the claims of both sides.
However, the Imperial Government is at a loss to understand why it has now taken the attitude that the new proposals we have made cannot be made the basis of discussion, but instead has made new proposals which ignore actual conditions in East Asia and would greatly injure the prestige of the Imperial Government.
With such a change of front in their attitude toward the China problem, what has become of the basic objectives that the U.S. government has made the basis of our negotiations during these seven months? On these points we would request careful self-reflection on the part of the United States government.
(In carrying out this instruction, please be careful that this does not lead to anything like a breaking off of negotiations.)
25496
JD-1: 6921 (F) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (S-TT)
*JD-1: 6898 (S.I.S. 25445) dated 28 Nov., in which Tokyo's first reaction to the new U.S. proposals castigates them as humiliating. When Japan sends a reply in 2 or 3 days giving its views on them the negotiations will be 'de facto' ruptured. However, do not give the impression that negotiations are broken off.From: Tokyo
To: Honolulu
29 November 1941
J-19
#122
We have been receiving reports from you on ship movements, but in future will you also report even when there are no movements.
JD-1: 7086 25823 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-5-41 (2)
From: Manila (Nibro)
To: Tokyo
29 November 1941
(Purple)
#805
Ships in port on the 29th.
1. Manila:
Submarine tender WOTOSU and HORAN*
Submarines 190 class 5
Submarines 170 class 5
Submarines 180 class 5
(When the 180 class entered port there were 8 but 3 departed,
destination unknown.)
Submarines 150 class 5
Submarines small size 4
Oilers, 2 (PISU* and TRINITY)
Destroyers, 2
Gunboats, 1 (BERU*)
2. Cavite:
TON*
PASU* (being repaired).
- It was announced on the 27th that for a time the lights at Sangley Point in Cavite, at Manila, Baguio, and on the buoys in the bay would be turned out.
JD-1: 7207 25935 (H) Navy Trans. 12-8-41 (6-AR)
*Probably HOLLAND, PECOS, ISABEL.From: Tokyo
To: San Francisco
29 November 1941
(J19)
Circular #2431
Make full report beginning December 1st on the following:
Ship’s nationality ship’s name, port from which it departed, (or at which it arrived), and port of destination, (or from where it started), date of departure, etc., in detail, of all foreign commercial and warships now in the Pacific, Indian Ocean, and South China Sea.
JD-1: 7037 25710 (Y) Navy Trans. 12-4-41 (2)Japanese Foreign Office (November 30, 1941)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941
Purple
#986 (Strictly Secret) (To be handled in Government Code)
(Part 1 of 2) (Secret outside the Department)
-
Japan-American negotiations were commenced the middle of April of this year. Over a period of half a year they have been continued. Within that period the Imperial Government adamantly stuck to the Tripartite Alliance as the cornerstone of its national policy regardless of the vicissitudes of the international situation. In the adjustment of diplomatic relations between Japan and the United States, she has based her hopes for a solution definitely within the scope of that alliance. With the intent of restraining the United States from participating in the war, she boldly assumed the attitude of carrying through these negotiations.
-
Therefore, the present cabinet, in line with your message, with the view of defending the Empire’s existence and integrity on a just and equitable basis, has continued the negotiations carried on in the past. However, their views and ours on the question of the evacuation of troops, upon which the negotiations rested (they demanded the evacuation of Imperial troops from China and French Indochina), were completely in opposition to each other.
Judging from the course of the negotiations that have been going on, we first came to loggerheads when the United States, in keeping with its traditional ideological tendency of managing international relations, re-emphasized her fundamental reliance upon this traditional policy in the conversations carried on between the United States and England in the Atlantic Ocean. The motive of the United States in all this was brought out by her desire to prevent the establishment of a new order by Japan, Germany, and Italy in Europe and in the Far East (that is to say, the aims of the Tripartite Alliance). As long as the Empire of Japan was in alliance with Germany and Italy, there could be no maintenance of friendly relations between Japan and the United States was the stand they took. From this point of view, they began to demonstrate a tendency to demand the divorce of the Imperial Government from the Tripartite Alliance. This was brought out at the last meeting. That is to say that it has only been in the negotiations of the last few days that it has become gradually more and more clear that the Imperial Government could no longer continue negotiations with the United States. It became clear, too, that a continuation of negotiations would inevitably be detrimental to our cause.
Army 25554 Trans. 12/1/41 (NR)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941
Purple
#986. (Part 2 of 2)
- The proposal presented by the United States on the 26th made this attitude of theirs clearer than ever. In it there is one insulting clause which says that no matter what treaty either party enters into with a third power it will not be interpreted as having any bearing upon the basic object of this treaty, namely the maintenance of peace in the Pacific. This means specifically the Three-Power Pact. It means that in case the United States enters the European war at any time the Japanese Empire will not be allowed to give assistance to Germany and Italy. It is clearly a trick. This clause alone, let alone others, makes it impossible to find any basis in the American proposal for negotiations. What is more, before the United States brought forth this plan, they conferred with England, Australia, the Netherlands, and China — they did so repeatedly. Therefore, it is clear that the United States is now in collusion with those nations end has decided to regard Japan, along with Germany and Italy, as an enemy.
Army 25555 Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941
Purple (CA)
#985. (Part 1 of 3)[a]
Re my Circular #2387. [b]
- The conversations begun between Tokyo and Washington last April during the administration of the former cabinet, in spite of the sincere efforts of the Imperial Government, now stand ruptured — broken. (I am sending you an outline of developments in separate message #986 [c].) In the face of this, our Empire faces a grave situation and must act with determination. Will Your Honor, therefore, immediately interview Chancellor HITLER and Foreign Minister RIBBENTROP and confidentially communicate to them a summary of the developments. Say to them that lately England and the United States have taken a provocative attitude, both of them. Say that they are planning to move military forces into various places in East Asia and that we will inevitably have to counter by also moving troops. Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams.
Army 25552
JD: 6943 Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)
[a] Part 2 not available. For Part 3 see S.I.S. #25553
[b] Not available.
[c] See S.I.S. #25554, 25555.
[Secret]
From: Tokyo
To: Berlin
November 30, 1941.
Purple (CA)
#985. (Part 3 of 3)
-
If, when you tell them this, the Germans and Italians question you about our attitude toward the Soviet, say that we have already clarified our attitude toward the Russians in our statement of last July. Say that by our present moves southward we do not mean to relax our pressure against the Soviet and that if Russia joins hands tighter with England and the United States and resists us with hostilities, we are ready to turn upon her with all our might; however, right now, it is to our advantage to stress the south and for the time being we would prefer to refrain from any direct moves in the north.
-
This message is important from a strategic point of view and must under all circumstances be held in the most absolute secrecy. This goes without saying. Therefore, will you please impress upon the Germans and Italians how important secrecy is.
-
As for Italy, after our Ambassador in Berlin has communicated this to the Germans, he will transmit a suitable translation to Premier MUSSOLINI and Foreign Minister CIANO. As soon as a date is set for a conference with the Germans and Italians, please let me know.
Will you please send this message also to Rome, together with the separate message.
Army 25553 Trans. 12-1-41 (NR)[Secret]
From: Washington
To: Tokyo
30 November 1941 (2230 to 2238 EST)
Telephone Code
Trans-Pacific Radio Telephone
(NOTE: Following is a preliminary, condensed version of conversation between Ambassador Kurusu and the Japanese Foreign Office American Division Chief Yamamoto on Sunday night.)
Kurusu.
It is all arranged for us to meet Hull tomorrow. We received a short one from you, didn’t we? Well, we will meet him in regard to that. There is a longer one coming isn’t there? In any case we are going to see him about the short one. (i.e. telegram. The longer one is probably Tokyo’s reply to Mr. Hull’s proposals.)
Yamamoto:
Yes. I see.
Kurusu:
The President is returning tomorrow. He is hurrying home.
Y:
Is there any special significance to this?
K:
The newspapers have made much of the Premier’s speech, and it is having strong repercussions here.
Y:
Is that so.
K.
Yes. It was a drastic statement he made. The newspapers carried large headlines over it; and the President seems to be returning because of it. There no doubt are other reasons, but this is the reason the newspapers are giving.
(Pause.)
Unless greater caution is exercised in speeches by the Premier and others, it puts us in a very difficult position. All of you over there must watch out about these ill-advised statements. Please tell Mr. Tani.
Y:
We are being careful.
K:
We here are doing our best, but these reports are seized upon by the correspondents and the worst features enlarged upon. Please caution the Premier, the Foreign Minister, and others. Tell the Foreign Minister that we had expected to hear something different, some good word, but instead we get this. (i.e. Premier’s speech)
(After a pause, Kurusu continues, using voice code.)
K:
What about the internal situation? (In Japan.)
Y:
No particular _ _ _ _ (one or two words faded out) _ _ _ _ .
K Are the Japanese-American negotiations to continue?
K:
You were very urgent about them before, weren’t you; but now you want them to stretch out. We will need your help. Both the Premier and the Foreign Minister will need to change the tone of their speeches!!! Do you understand? Please all use more discretion.
Y:
When will you see them. The 2nd?
K:
Let’s see — this is Sunday midnight here. Tomorrow morning at ten. That will be Monday morning here.
(Pause.)
Actually the real problem we are up against is the effects of happenings in the South. You understand don’t you?
Y:
Yes. Yes. How long will it be before the President gets back?
K:
I don’t know exactly. According to news reports he started at 4:00 this afternoon. He should be here tomorrow morning some time.
Y:
Well then — Goodbye.
25497
JD-1: 6922 (M) Navy trans. 30 Nov. 1941 (R-5)
[Secret]
From: Washington (Nomura)
To: Tokyo
November 30, 1941
Purple
#1222 (Secret)
Premier TOJO’s speech was published here on the 30th in the newspapers under conspicuous headlines. They printed especially noticeably the sentence:
The exploitation of the Asiatics by Americans must be purged with vengeance.
On the other hand, according to the newspapers, a White House secretary has issued an announcement to the effect that Secretary HULL had at once telephoned the President, resting at Warm Springs, concerning the Premier’s speech and, as a result, the President, changing his schedule, was leaving Warm Springs on the afternoon of the 30th and is expected to return to Washington on the morning of the first. Inasmuch as this speech will be used extensively for propaganda purposes by the Americans, will you please take suitable steps. Furthermore, will you please send me at once copies of the text (both Japanese and English)?
Army 25761 Trans. 12/5/41 (2)
[Secret]
From: Manila (Nihro)
To: Tokyo
November 30, 1941
Purple (Priority)
#809
Due to the straining of international relations, we have destroyed in readiness for emergency out of the codes kept at this office the Yokohama Special Bank code, the TU code, MATU Chinese Character List (it was, of course, reported in my #806 (?)) on the 29th.
As a result we find it impossible to decipher your message of the 29th (Yokohama Special Bank request telegram — - - - number of words 18.)
Will you please wire the same in the Foreign Office code.
25862 Trans. 12/7/41 (6)U.S. State Department (November 30, 1941)
711.94/2091: TelegramThe Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State
Chungking, November 30, 1941 — 3 [10] a.m. [Received November 30 — 5:45 a.m.]
465.Yesterday afternoon I took occasion to say to the Foreign Minister that the apprehension to which he gave expression on Thursday was not warranted by developments. He asked me [to] report his appreciation of the American position, explaining that his concern had not been due to any feeling on his part that China would be let down but had been due to fear that a modus vivendi such as reported by Hu Shih would have a disastrous effect on Chinese morale.
GAUSS
892.51/236: TelegramThe Minister in Thailand to the Secretary of State
Bangkok, November 30, 1941 — 5 p.m. [Received November 30 — 2:20 p.m.]
540.
On November 29 Doll, British Financial Adviser to the Thai Government, handed me for strictly confidential use a copy of a telegram sent by him to Waley and the Bank of England on November 28 through the British Legation which shows that the following arrangements were made between the Minister of Finance and Japanese Minister Futami on November 27:
Two credits of 10,000,000 ticals each opened on August 2 and November 2 will be repaid entirely in gold to be shipped from Japan to Bangkok and a third credit of the same amount may be opened if required on the same terms on February 2; these are transactions between Yokohama Specie Bank and Thai Banking Consortium.
All of the 25,000,000 ticals worth of gold sold by the Japanese Government to Thai Treasury last August will be shipped to Bangkok and a further sale in the same amount will be consummated, the ticals to be made available partly on the date of shipment and partly on delivery of the gold in Bangkok. The Minister of Finance demanded and Japan consented that Thai Government may freely dispose of all the gold acquired in these five transactions.
The telegram states that the Thai Government intends to ask the American Government for a credit of 8 million United States dollars to be equally divided for the use of the Government and market. It would be the intention of the Government, however, to sell at least 44 million ticals worth of the gold to the United States mint, thus repaying the total credit, and by gradually selling the dollar exchange to the Thai Treasury and the market to retire from circulation most of the Thai currency notes which the Currency Department will be obliged to issue in consequence of the gold purchases.
Hitherto the Japanese Government has insisted that gold purchased from it should not be resold and in regard to the present changed [arrangement?] whereby the Japanese Government consents to free use Mr. Doll offers the following comments: Because of the freezing orders Japan cannot use its native gold production of some one million fine ounces per annum; it is almost beyond doubt that Japan for military reasons wants to buy as much rice as possible; and Japan is using part of the new credits to acquire large quantities of Thai notes including the smallest denominations.
Doll handed me also copy of a memorandum dated November 28 to the Minister of Finance which describes the proposal to be made to the American Government. I was given to understand this memorandum was approved and will be the basis of a communication from the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Finally Doll handed me a letter from himself dated November 29 in which he stated inter alia that the Thai authorities were very happy to have $9,000,000 worth of gold safe in New York and wanted to send the bulk of the newly acquired gold out of the country as soon as possible. He said that if the United States Government were to grant the desired credits the cost of sending the gold cover to the United States would in present circumstances involve prohibitive cost in insurance and freight. They would prefer to deposit the gold in government banks in Singapore, Manila or Australia, especially in Singapore where shipment would entail no marine risk. The letter makes it clear that in this procedure immediate dollar credits are a comparatively minor consideration, the main objective being to enable the Thai Government to place realizable assets in [bank deposits?] for use during and after the present period of peril. For this reason the Thai Government would infinitely prefer to ship more gold out of the country to serve as security for credits rather than use that already in the United States. Doll asked me to ascertain by telegraph for information, whether the American authorities would be willing to purchase gold acquired and deposited as described above.
I agreed to telegraph the inquiry but I imagine the Department before returning a reply will prefer to await a formal proposal from the Thai Government. This may be expected in a day or two.
PECK
740.0011 Pacific War/674Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Washington, November 30, 1941.The British Ambassador called at his request and handed me the accompanying memorandum, which is self-explanatory. He was very desirous of ascertaining what the United States Government would do if the British should resist any Japanese undertaking to establish a base on the Kra Isthmus. I said that the President was returning tomorrow morning and that I would lay all phases of the situation before him on Monday noon. This I proceeded later to do and the President agreed to notify and see the Ambassador with respect to his inquiry. Previously the Ambassador had sent me a telegram (copy attached) received from his Foreign Office on this same matter.
The Ambassador continued his attitude of desiring more time for his Government to make preparations to resist in the Pacific area. He assured me that his Government would be in harmony with any steps we might pursue to this end.
CORDELL HULL
1 Like
711.94/2540Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State
Washington, November 30, 1941.The Australian Minister, who called at my apartment at his request, came to report the substance of a talk which he had had with Ambassador Kurusu. This amounted to very little and there was really nothing new in what he said except that Kurusu made it repeatedly clear that the Japanese were very desirous of continuing conversations with this Government.
The Minister then referred to his notes and said that the British Ambassador desired to urge along with him, the Australian Minister, that I do the best possible to continue our relations with Japan so as to avoid a military conflict at this time, the idea being that they needed more time for preparations to resist in the Pacific area. This view has been asserted constantly during recent weeks by the British Ambassador, the Australian Minister, and twice by the Netherlands Minister.
CORDELL HULL
1 Like