New Italian Chief of Staff General Vittorio Ambrosio who was appointed on January 1943 (replaced somewhat incompatent General Cavallero) made two situation reports in 17 February and 21 February 1943 in which both he and Italian military and diplomatic establishment saw what was coming in store for Axis in 1943. It is striking that upper echalons of Italian military had more foresight than Germans :
Abrosio’s first study of war situation is summarised in two minutes he relayed to Mussolini on 17th February :
Germans must shorten their front in East and and organise their lines during spring thaw. Defensive operations in this year on East would be more rewarding than offensive for lack of adequate forces. Nothing was to be gained by conquest of space. The occupation of Caucaus and industrial zones of Russia was problematical and not decisive. The Russians have established their industries amd oil wells well beyond Urals. If Grmans rest on defensive , this is the advantage to Mediterranean Front.
In Mediterranean too , the initiative of operations can not be wrestled from enemy. Tunisia should be held as long as possible. If Tunisia goes , the enemy will attempt landings coast of Europe. This can not happen before May or June so we have therefore two to three months for a build up in Tunisia.
The Germans must act during this period , decide to grant Italian requests to put the defence of the their coasts and those of Greece in order and faciliate as soon as possible the disengagement of Italian divisions in Croatia , permitting their retreat to a line in coast , enabling them to hold key points there. Those troops in Balkan peninsula then must be set up as a stratregic reserve. Mobile forces should be sent to Greece to give extra flexibility and also watch approaches to Salonika.
Finally Italian Air Forces in Mediterranean should be adequetely built up to resist enemy action and number of Axis submarines in Mediterranean should be increased. Above all at this moment Germans should realise that they should give up fighting a war of its own and to understand for its own salvation it is equally important to stand fast at Dniepr river as in Sicily or in Pelaponesse. In conclusion Germans must change thir operational objectives and must come to our aid otherwise we shall not be obliged to follow them in their erronous conduct of war.
Hitler and Mussolini , A Brutal Friendship by W. Deakin
Is last sentence a threat by Italian military to Mussolini that German-Italian partnership is about to break up ?