Why Axis didn’t done on a strategic level? I know that Rommel’s cases at the tactical level in north Africa. but why didn’t the German high command applied to the strategic level? Because of the German high command, or mainly because of Hitler’s lack of chronic strategic senses? or lack of flexibility? they were definitely flexible on the tactical level on whole warfare…mostly though.
Or the reason will be whole thing though. German Wehrmacht high command and the Heer high command didn’t have lack of strategic senses, and Hitler who is pinpointing and maneuvering this war, didn’t have much better senses too. On the combat level, sure the Army had capable flexibility of tactical thinking, but on the strategic level?
but I am curious about Indy and the Timeghost team would derive the different result too. or is there a another reason to think about? 
Truely Wehramacht had no match on tactical level at that time but on strategic terms it was absolute fiasco the way they waged war after campaign in France.
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indeed. I know that that results was the best option for those who thought about that situation. but… these terms still gives me curiosity that why allies did and axis did not.
Well, Hitler´s main strategic objective of war was to conquer east, but first Red Army must be destroyed. When it never happened he simply had no other options…
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Sort of like…
Hitler: I have nothing to think more about this war. Anymore of it…(In a emaciate Hitler in the film Der Untergang)
I think what you mean is often called “grand strategy”, a description of movements and force application above even the army group level.
In “strategy”, the movements of German Army groups in Russia each have their own strategic goals, in “grand strategy”, the forces allocated to each Army Group are defined, and the general objectives (“Leningrad/Moscow/Kiev”). Grand Strategy is generally decided by political, rather than military leaders. For the US, grand strategy decided “Germany first, land in France as soon as profitable, the Philippines must be liberated”, like that.
Hitler believed that he could not leave things to the generals, because they didn’t analyze things like he did.
For instance, Hitler obsessed about grain from the Ukraine, and turned AGC south for no really good reason – large-scale grain imports from Ukraine could not begin until the war was won – and denying them to the Russians wasn’t important either, they didn’t have transport to move anything out of Ukraine anyway. That’s a strategic decision masquerading as grand strategy (and terrible one, at that.). Hitler’s obsessions led him to, at Stalingrad, to order battalions.
So, Grand Strategy puts Rommel in Africa (to keep it ‘in play’, at least.). Strategy is Rommel attacking the 8th Army, ‘operational’ is sending the 90th Light on a flanking maneuver, led by sending 150th Regiment to a crossroads, and low-level tactics is down to the platoon level.
Hope that helps, a little.
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So what you meant is, There were no room for Hitler to do such a thing as deception is it?
Early on, Hitler had plenty of room for deceptions - right up until the invasion of Russia.
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Deception in Sudetenland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia – by overawing pretty much everybody, he had deceived the West into leaving him alone.
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Poland - He was clever enough to bring the Soviets on-side. The deception was, in that case, that the German were attacking Poland solo. When the Russians joined in, it threw the West into confusion; they had been plotting to find a way to get Russia to join an anti-German alliance in 1939, and that went by the way.
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Norway/Denmark - came pretty much as a bolt from the blue to the allies. They bought the deception that Hitler, now at war with France and England, couldn’t do more than glower at them. The English had been trying to work a way to use Norway as a platform to choke off imports from Sweden, and use a strategy from the Napoleonic era to crack the German homeland. (It didn’t work against Napoleon, either.)
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France - he allowed his military to make their invasion look like a repeat of WWI, and use the armored units (which Hitler was instrumental in making as numerous as they were) to surprise the Allies and isolate their main forces in Belgium and northern France. The Western Allies had reacted to an expected WWI-style attack by bringing Belgium on-side, moving much of their best divisions into Belgium, believing the Maginot line protected their right flank, and they could mask the Ardennes with light forces (mostly cavalry.) When the panzer divisions started to roll past Sedan, the show was basically over.
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North Africa - The deception was that the Germans would have to let the Italians lose North Africa without helping them. Very nearly ran the Brits out of Egypt, and caused them to send extra forces to Greece, where they were…
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Yugoslavia/Greece - when Italy got hung up from Albania, it looked like the Germans were stuck letting the Greeks and the British already in Greece would beat them, and begin Churchill’s “soft underbelly” campaign that he cherished so much.
The Germans took the simple expedient of driving right through Yugoslavia into Greece. They tried to finesse Crete, and got a bloody nose doing it. But the German drive took pretty much everybody by surprise.
- Russia. Hitler’s attack took Stalin completely by surprise (despite many warnings); to the extent that he forbid any “provocative” defensive preparations beforehand. Hitler’s deception that he was bogged down everywhere let Stalin believe that his continued providing of food and raw materials to the Germans would keep them from even thinking of attacking.
But there the surprises stopped; Hitler had run out of easy (for some definition of easy) targets, and could only hope that grand-strategic surprise of Russia would win out. Once that didn’t happen, he was presented with three enemies that were not willing to be lulled into taking Hitler’s bait.
The “V” weapons, Hitler thought, would regain the initiative by deceiving the Allies that they had taken away any German strategic bombing, when a hail of V1’s and V2’s would bring ruin to the British (at least).
If the Brits could be taken out of the picture, the Americans would be stuck for options, and the Wehrmacht could turn to Russia and at least force a stalemate. But that deception had no teeth, and so Hitler had no options. But he held onto the illusion well into 1945.
Once Britain could not be cowed, and the Germans attacked Russia, they lost all flexibility, and so chances for deception. (The u-boat campaign was a carbon-copy of the u-boat campaign of WWI, which didn’t surprise anybody.)
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