The Pittsburgh Press (October 20, 1940)
How Short of War? —
AMERICA IS NOW AN ALLY OF BRITAIN IN ALL EXCEPT FIGHTING
…
Neutrality Has Been Scrapped for Non-Belligerency, And Danger of Actual Military Involvement Looms as We Increase Our Aid
…
This country is no longer neutral. It is “non-belligerent.”
It is engaged in certain enterprises which are called “short of war.”
But how short is this “short of war?” Does it mean we are a little way off, or that we’re on the brink?
Nobody knows. Congressmen can’t find out. When they ask how much of our war equipment is being sent abroad, the War Department refuses to tell.
Are we going to let England have some of our flying fortresses? No answer. Will the bomb sight be released? No answer.
We’re flying blind. And we may be flying hell-bent into the conflict.
Herewith is the first of a series of articles on the general question, “How short of War?” It attempts to survey the steps we have taken and those which may be contemplated in relation to the war.
By Ludwell Denny, Scripps-Howard Staff Writer
Washington, Oct. 19 –
How short is “short of war?” That limit, which President Roosevelt once placed on our help top Britain, is beginning to disappear.
Not that Washington wants war. But the Administration is moving rapidly toward the policy of “all necessary help to Britain,” regardless of the cost – war if necessary.
Despite the Neutrality Act, months ago we ceased to be neutral in fact and became a non-belligerent ally of Britain. As such we can give more effective help than as a direct military participant. For she is absolutely dependent on our supplies and equipment, and does not need lour men. Not yet, at least.
But she does need our Navy in the Pacific. And that is where it is being kept.
Maximum U.S. Aid
For the moment, therefore, Britain is receiving maximum United States aid. At this period in the conflict any change in American status would injure Britain by reducing her supplies. Not only would American military involvement in Europe (utterly impracticable at the moment) weaken Britain, but even an American-British naval war with Japan would cut down American supplies for the all-important defense of England, Gibraltar and Suez.
But this situation is not permanent.
We may go to war.
Next year, the problem of adequate supplies for both Britain and the United States may be solved, allowing Britain to take the offensive on the continent (unless there is peace before). She would then need our Air Corps, part of our Navy, and probably our Army, in Europe as in 1917. Military experts do not think Britain alone could re-conquer Europe from Hitler. Thus the alternative might be either American military action in Europe or a negotiated peace.
Hitler May Decide
But the possibility of direct American military involvement on the continent is distant, many months at least.
The present danger and uncertainty restless with London-Washington policy than with decisions in Berlin and Tokyo. For the London-Washington policy is known, while Berlin and Tokyo have not made up their minds what they are going to do about it.
The London-Washington policy is to increase American material aid and eventual credit to England, and to hold as much as possible in the Far East. But for the same reason London and Washington do not want to fight in the Far East, Hitler would profit by an American-Japanese war.
Moreover, Hitler might gain by drawing us into a war status with Germany in our present unprepared state. In terms of the next 12 months we doubtless hurt Hitler more as a non-belligerent ally than we would as a belligerent arming ourselves instead of Britain.
Hitler at any time can cease treating us as a neutral because of our military alliance with Canada, and the transfer of part of our Navy to Britain. Doubtless he assumes we will be in the war anyway if it lasts. If eventually, why not now while we are unprepared – particularly if we can be made to fight where we are weakest, far from home, and where Japan rather than Germany would take us on?
Japan In Trouble
Fortunately for us, it is not so simple for Tokyo as for Hitler. True, Japan is now more than our naval equal in her own battle area, even if we dared forget our Atlantic defenses. But Japan still has a very big China war on her hands. And a traditional Russian enemy is on her flank.
So an American-Japanese war now would be not only madness for us and Britain, it probably would be suicide for Japan.
The danger is that the war-religion of the Japanese militarists may drive them to an insane “incident” involving the United States. That danger is multiplied because Hitler, who brought Japan into his new anti-American axis, would profit by engaging our ships and supplies by proxy far from the Battle of Britain.
As long as Britain fights, the United States – certainly under Mr. Roosevelt and probably under Wendell Willkie – will aid her increasingly at home and in the Pacific. If Hitler and Premier Konoye of Japan decide to interpret that as war, it will be war.
U.S. Not Bluffing
Mr. Roosevelt has bluffed many times. But there is no evidence he is bluffing now. Berlin and Tokyo should understand that.
They should not misinterpret the fact that many American Army and Navy officers, Congressmen, and public leaders would prefer to concentrate on our own preparedness and on hemisphere defense, and that they fear the Roosevelt policy of sending planes and ships to England and risking our main fleet in the Far Pacific. Regardless of such disagreement, Roosevelt policy rules.
The phrase “short of war” is dangerously misleading. The Kaiser would not have invaded Belgium in 1914 had he known that Britain would fight; Hitler marched on Poland believing that Neville Chamberlain would appease again.
Hitler and Konoye should know that Mr. Roosevelt will not retreat, that there will be war if they force it.
NEXT – Britain’s frontier is on our assembly line.