The Pittsburgh Press (February 21, 1946)
Hearings end, Pearl probers to take rest
They face review of 3 months’ testimony
WASHINGTON (UP) – The Pearl Harbor Committee today planned a short rest before sitting down to study three months of testimony and fix responsibility for the nation’s worst naval disaster.
Public hearings recessed formally at 5:19 p.m. yesterday after almost continuous sessions since November 15. Chairman Alben W. Barkley, D-Kentucky, said it might be necessary to reopen them if any “gaps” show up in subsequent evaluation of the recorded testimony. Such meetings, he said, would only last two or three days.
To urge unification
Mr. Barkley refused to guess when the committee would be ready to report its findings. But he hoped the six Democrats and four Republicans would agree unanimously not only on responsibility for the December 7, 1941, disaster but on recommendations to prevent a future repetition.
They may not agree on responsibility if Republicans insist on putting the blame on the late President Roosevelt. There is every prospect the committee will be unanimous, however, in recommending:
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Unification of military intelligence even if Army-Navy merger legislation never is passed.
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Unity of command at outlying posts to replace the separate Army and Navy commands which existed at Pearl Harbor.
Hear millions of words
The committee took millions of words of testimony in its quest for all the facts that contributed to the Pearl Harbor disaster. Members reviewed U.S. foreign policy in the period which preceded the attack.
All in all, the committee heard 39 witnesses. Here are the principal highlights of their testimony:
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The late President Roosevelt ordered the fleet based at Pearl Harbor early in 1940 as a deterrent to Jap aggression. The State Department urged the action and prevailed over the opposition of Adm. J. O. Richardson, then commander-in-chief of the fleet.
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There were conversations between the United States, Great Britain and the Dutch toward setting up a bloc against Jap aggression.
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Witnesses disagreed on whether the United States intercepted prior to December 7 a “winds” message revealing Japan’s decision for war.
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Lt. Gen. Walter C. Short and Adm. Husband E. Kimmel, deposed commanders of Hawaiian defenses, accused the High Command in Washington of withholding information which would have enabled them to avert the surprise attack. They referred to highly-secret interception and decoding of Jap diplomatic messages.
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Gen. George C. Marshall, former Army chief of staff, and Adm. Harold R. Stark, former chief of Naval Operations, and their principal aides insisted that Gen. Short and Adm. Kimmel had “adequate” warnings to put them on guard against a surprise move by Japan.
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Gen. Marshall and Lt. Gen. Leonard T. Gerow, his chief of war plans, accepted their share of responsibility for failing to notice and correct the fact that Gen. Short alerted the Army in Hawaii only against sabotage in response to the November 27 message.
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The warnings to Adm. Kimmel and Gen. Short pointed to possible Jap aggression in the South China Sea area. They did not mention Pearl Harbor as a possible target. Gen. Marshall and Adm. Stark said they were surprised that Japan risked such a thrust.