Guadalcanal part 2 – the perfect battle for US

I can see the Japanese Idea of an airbase on Guadalcanal as an unsinkable carrier in the outer defense of the new Japanese Empire. But with easy access for air attacks over open waters from all directions it would not be sustainable in the long run.
Because of the offensive threat to the sealanes to Australia the airbase would immediately put the island on top of the list “Americas most wanted”. And the Japanese should be able to see that.

And that’s why I think this battle turned into the perfect battle for US, holding all the strategic advantages

Logistic
The Japanese lured themselves into a fight at the extension of what should have their logistical limit. US could put huge resources into building up the supply chain, because the chain was the logistical foundation for the whole SW strategy. The Japanese turned the battle into “the decisive battle” because of a matter of principles, honor, and the reluctance to accept the fact on defeat in time and retreat. Thus they sent fully combat loaded cargo ships into the slot to be attacked in broad daylight. Or they ferried small volumes in on fast going destroyers. All just burned up fuel the Japanese could ill spare

Training
The US had to learn to fight the hard way, both at seas, on land and in the air. But it was better to do so in a limited battle, instead of a later large scale disaster. They could, rather easily, disengage and come back stronger another day. Yes, the battle of Savo Island was a disaster, but who could have believed that a heavy cruiser was ill suited for those waters. All heavy cruisers in action at Guadalcanal was either sunk or damaged.

On the land the concept of the Marines proved itself. Tough guys, eager for battle, and confident that the Japanese soldier was also mortal – and the fighting spirit of the marines was hugely underestimated by the japs and must have been quite a shock for them. They got experience, confidence and fame, that would catapult them through the Pacific. In the air, the Cactus air force quickly learned that at Wildcat can not dogfight a zero, and the tactics to fight the Japanese air force could be developed.

Attrision
The Pacific war was from day one to become a battle of attrision, but at Guadalcanal I think the greatest blunder from the Japanese was wearing down their navy fighter pilots. Japan only trained about 30 or so new carrier pilots each year, and that was way to little. And there where no fuel to train new pilots to the prewar expert level. Also the long flight from Rabaul would mean that both combat loss and loss due to technical problems would mean a total loss of both plane and crew.

US home front
The US got the brand they needed for the press at home. Now we are doing something - the Japs are getting beaten.

If any have any comments on this I will be glad to discuss

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I think you are spot on here. The US didn’t need Guadalcanal to win the war but it was a perfect learning mechanism for all their forces while Japan just wore out.

And it was done on such a shoestring. Amazing that in just a few more months all that would change when the Essex carriers, Hellcats and Corsairs would arrive.

We suffered high casualties but a lot of that was the learning curve. Japan suffered high casualties but most of them died without a chance to teach what they were learning.

Also don’t discount the fighting on New Guinea. The Japanese attempt to take Port Moresby was pretty much their last offensive against the US and ANZAC forces.

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