The Pittsburgh Press (October 17, 1940)
THE WASHINGTON MERRY-GO-ROUND
By Drew Pearson and Robert S. Allen
The United States and Great Britain planned to cut of Japan’s scrap iron, oil, cotton and copper during the first invasion of China in 1937, and thus paralyze the Japanese military machine.
This plane was revived again during the Panay incident in 1937, but each time there were differences of opinion inside the Administration and the plan fell flat.
Today, almost exactly the same problem faces the Administration, and again there are basic differences of opinion.
The group inside the Cabinet which favors a complete stoppage of Japan’s raw materials of war, especially her oil, includes Secretary of War Stimson, Secretary of the Navy Knox, Secretary of the Interior Ickes, and Secretary of the Treasury Morgenthau – also certain admirals. Perhaps it is significant that the strongest advocates of complete embargoes against Japan are the three Republican members of the Cabinet – Stimson, Knox and Ickes.
On the other hand, the State Department plus some of the admirals favor a go-slow policy toward Japan. They believe in applying the embargoes gradually, or as Mr. Ickes describes it, “cutting off the dog’s tail by inches.”
Japan Might Attack
The State Department concurs that cutting off Japan’s oil would paralyze her fleet after her present two and a half months’ supply was exhausted. But they also believe it would force Japan to move into the Dutch East Indies immediately in order to get more oil.
However, the embargo-now group within the Cabinet contends that the Dutch East Indies are fortified sufficiently to withstand four months’ seize and that with the U.S. fleet on guard in that general area, Japan could not risk an attack on these islands.
What makes the intra-Cabinet debate doubly vital is knowledge that as long as the British fleet keeps the Italian and Nazi fleets bottled up in Europe, the U.S. fleet can operate as a one-ocean navy, thereby keeping most of its vessels on guard against Japan. But once Britain’s naval defense weakens, then the United States will have the navies of the European dictators to contend with in the Atlantic, plus the Japanese in the Pacific.
And a two-ocean drive on South America by both the dictators and Japan is more than the Navy likes to contemplate. That is the chief argument behind the 'total-embargo now" group.
Limited Embargo on Oil
The Cabinet difference first came to a head more than a month ago when the action-now group placed on the President’s desk an executive order embargoing the sale of oil. They argued that with the military clique they could not continue to give the Japanese Navy this vital fuel. The President concurred and signed the order. Then it went over to the State Department to be carried out. And the State Department revised the order so that it applied only to high-test gasoline.
The embargo-now group also advocated an immediate stoppage of all scrap iron shipments to Japan. But the State Department again intervened so that scrap shipments continued on everything except “No. 1 scrap,” and even No. 1 scrap could be shipped on license. It was only the other day that the sale of all scrap iron, after much urging by the National Defense Commission, was finally embargoed.
The question of cutting off oil to Japan still is a moot question inside the Cabinet, and is being discussed with the British government.
Navy v. State Department
Last week one argument over this point and over general naval policy in the Far East developed into a hot debate between the Navy, on one side, and Hull and Welles on the other. It took place in front of the President, who did most of the listening.
Hull and Welles contended that if we stopped Japan’s oil supply she would certainly attack the Dutch East Indies, and that the United States could not possibly afford to have ships in that area because they might be needed in Atlantic eaters. Welles pointed out that Germans might seize the Azores or the French naval base at Dakar, West Africa, which would menace South America.
To this, Admiral Leahy, now Governor of Puerto Rico and one of Roosevelt’s closest naval advisers, replied:
Gentlemen, we don’t have to worry about Dakar and the Azores now. The British fleet can still prevent Germany from taking them. But a few months from now it may be different. By next spring, or even this winter, the war may have gone against the British in the Mediterranean, and then we’ll have two oceans to defend. Now we have only one.
Secretary Knox supported Leahy emphatically. Further conferences are being held, and a final decision on shutting off all Japan’s war supplies probably will depend on developments in both the Far East and Europe.