The Evening Star (April 9, 1946)
Eliot: Our armed forces
By George Fielding Eliot
This is the first of a series of articles dealing with the armed forces of the United States – their strength, organization, missions and their relation to national and world security.
The present period of transition from victorious war to established peace is one of special trial and difficulty for the armed forces of the United States.
They are beset on every hand by elements of novelty and of uncertainty. They face tasks which are altogether new. Never before has the United States been compelled to assumed the tremendous responsibilities of world leadership, of being at one and the same time the most powerful military nation in the world and the principal pillar of a world-wide organization for the maintenance of world peace and security.
Yet at the very moment that these responsibilities must be shouldered, the armed forces must also face the task of recasting their whole organization, their plans and their thinking, to meet the exigencies imposed upon them by the new weapons which the war has brought into existence, weapons which drastically affect the making of war in the future and the maintenance of security against war.
These responsibilities are heavy. They cannot be borne by the armed forces alone. They must be shared by all of us. There are certain fundamental principles which every citizen should understand. if we are ever to have the secure, peaceful world for which we fought this war and made so many sacrifices.
First, we should forget the word “defense.” There is no longer any such thing as national defense. The only defense, as Gen. Marshall has said, is in the power of attack. For the present, at least, the basic contribution which military power can make to our security and to the security of the world is offensive power so great that no one will dare to challenge it.
Second, the primary element in that offensive power must be air power. It can hit first, it can reach farther and it can strike heavier blows than any other form of power. Time, reach and destructive potential are of vital importance – not only in the winning of a future war which we hope will never be fought, but in the consideration of others who may at some future time weigh the chances of peace or war.
Third, for the present the maintenance of an unchallengeable air power requires (1) the command of the sea, in order to have access to outlying bases and strategic mobility to move our air power wherever we may need to send it; (2) sufficient ground forces to protect the bases and communications of our air power from any form of land attack.
These principles are generally accepted. There are differences of view as to the strength, type and equipment of the forces necessary to implement them, but these differences really lie within comparatively narrow areas, and relate to immediate needs rather than to future objectives.
Many of these differences arise from the extremely difficult conditions of the postwar period, in which the armed forces are carrying out a tremendous demobilization program, including not only the return of millions of young Americans to their homes, but the disposal of billions of dollars’ worth of surplus property, at the same time that they are trying to establish the firm foundations of the permanent military establishments of the future.
It should be clear that they must, for the present, be allowed a considerable degree of latitude in this respect. In the fighting of a war, the objective is clear. You know what you are trying to do. You can form a reasonable estimate of what you need to accomplish your objective. But in facing the problems of maintaining peace in a chaotic, uncertain world, with new weapons and new political conditions, there can be far less certainty.
But, put it this way. If we now spend more on our armed forces than future events prove that we need have spent, we shall have wasted money. But if we do not spend enough, we may bring about the collapse of the world’s hopes for peace by not being strong enough to support those hopes, and we may in the end bring about the destruction or enslavement of this nation.
Our armed forces must continue to be the servants of our people. No man in high place within them has any other desire. But military advice and military considerations must be given a far more prominent and assured place in the formulation of national policies than ever before.
The penalty for failure or carelessness in this respect has heretofore been heavy, but we have been able to pay because we have always had time to rectify our errors. This will never be the case again. Our next mistake in this field may well be our last.
During this period of political, military and scientific uncertainty our first military consideration must be to have enough power. Later on, as the outlines of the future become more sharply defined, and as the confusions of the postwar period subside, we can make suitable reductions and rearrangements. But unless we are to throw away this victory as we threw away the last one, we dare not mortgage the future now – either in the name of a false economy or a bad guess.