THE PURSUIT TO AGHEILA
THE PURSUIT proper began on the 5th November with 10th Corps (Lumsden) in the van. I left 30th Corps (Leese) to reorganise to the west of the break-out area. 13th Corps (Horrocks) had the task of cleaning up the battle area of Alamein and of salving all the war material of the enemy and of our own forces. It also had to collect all the Italian prisoners; there were many of them and they surrendered in droves, headed by the generals carrying their suit-cases. My ultimate objective was Tripoli; this had always been considered the objective of the Eighth Army. But unfortunately the operations to get there had become known as the âBenghazi Handicapâ. As one officer expressed it to me: âwe used to go up to Benghazi for Christmas and return to Egypt early in the New Year.â
I was determined to have done with that sort of thing. Egypt must be made secure for the duration of the war. I had long considered the problem, and when the pursuit began I was clear that the way to achieve this task was as follows:
(a) to capture the Agheila position, and hold securely the approaches to it from the west.
(b) to locate a corps strong in armour in the Jebel about Mekili, trained to operate southwards against any enemy force that managed to break through the Agheila position and make towards Egypt.
(c) to get the A.O.C. to establish the Desert Air Force on the Martuba group of airfields, and also to the south of Benghazi.
The establishment of aircraft on the Martuba group was not just a long-term proposal; it was an immediate requirement since a convoy for Malta was due to leave Alexandria on the 16th November. That island was in dire straits with great shortage of food and fuel; it was vital the convoy should get through and it might fail to do so unless the Desert Air Force could provide fighter cover as it passed in daylight through the narrow area between Crete and Cyrenaica.
By the 15th November the air forces were established in the Martuba airfields, in time to see the convoy safely on its way.
For the development of these operations I agreed the following detailed plan with the A.O.C. Desert Air Force (Coningham). We would use the air arm as the long-range hitting weapon, working in close co-operation with armoured car regiments; fighter squadrons would operate from advanced landing grounds soon after the armoured cars had reported them clear, and well ahead of the main bodies. These tactics would lead to the enemy being shot up and harassed in his withdrawal, while good fighter cover was given to our own forces.
I did not think we would have any serious fighting till we reached Agheila. Rommel would undoubtedly withdraw to that position and would endeavour to stop us there; his supply route would then be shortened while ours would be long, thus reversing the supply situation which had existed at Alamein.
I therefore planned to leave 10th Corps to lead the pursuit as far as the Jebel, and to halt it there with orders to push light forces forward towards Benghazi and Agedabia. I considered Lumsden would handle these operations satisfactorily. I would then pass 30th Corps through to tackle the Agheila position and the movement to Tripoli. I also decided that as soon as 10th Corps was established in the Jebel I would bring Horrocks up to command it and would send Lumsden back to England. I had reached the conclusion that command of a corps in a major battle was above Lumsdenâs ceiling. On the other hand, he was a good trainer and as such he would be valuable back in England. I decided to ask for Dempsey to be sent out from England to take over 13th Corps from Horrocks. I would then have three reliable Corps Commanders in Leese, Horrocks and Dempsey; they had all served under me before, and Leese and Dempsey had been students under me at the Staff College. All these moves were agreed by Alexander.
The sketch map will serve to illustrate the development of my plans up to the Agheila position.
I gave precise instructions to Lumsden about the development of operations for the pursuit to Agheila, and kept a firm hand on the battle in order to ensure the master plan was not âmucked aboutâ by subordinate commanders having ideas inconsistent with it. I knew well that, in the past, corps and divisional generals had had their own ideas about operations in the desert, and had not liked a firm grip from above; this was one reason why we had nearly lost Egypt. I made it very clear to Lumsden that this time all would carry out my orders; I had promised the soldiers complete success and I was determined to see they got it.
Soon after the pursuit began I was in danger of capture. A reconnaissance party was sent forward to select a site for my headquarters in the Mersa Matruh area; two members of this party were Hugh Mainwaring and my stepson Dick Carver. On approaching Mersa Matruh the party took a road leading down to a place on the shore called Smugglers Cove, just to the east of the town. The enemy were still there; they should all have been rounded up by that time but, as will be seen later on, our forces moving across the desert were halted by heavy rain. The reconnaissance party was captured. I myself with a small escort was moving well forward in rear of the leading elements of the army and was about to take the road leading to Smugglers Cove. But at that moment I ran into a sharp engagement which was going on a few hundred yards in front; we had bumped into an enemy rearguard which was trying to hold us off while they cleared Mersa Matruh. If I had gone down the road to Smugglers Cove, it is possible I would have run into the enemy; if so, Iâm pretty clear that I wouldnât be writing this book today.
The otherâand more importantâoperations developed successfully. Twice Rommelâs forces were saved from complete disaster by heavy rain. The first occasion was on the 6th and 7th November when we had three divisions âboggedâ in the desert, unable to move, and it was not possible even to get petrol to them; this setback saved Rommelâs forces from complete encirclement at Mersa Matruh. The second occasion was when very heavy rain on the 15th, 16th and 17th November held up our forces moving across the desert towards Agedabia to cut off the enemy before he could reach the Agheila position. However, I âdroveâ the Eighth Army hard and the following figures will show how fast we moved:
5th November Pursuit began from Alamein.
11th November Reached Sollum (270 miles).
12th November Reached Tobruk (360 miles).
17th November Reached Msus (560 miles).
It was good going to do 560 miles in 13 days; but the administrative situation quickly began to cause me anxiety. To get full value from having established the air forces in the Cyrenaica bulge about Martuba, they must be able to operate at full blast against Rommelâs supply routes by sea across the Mediterranean, the port of Tripoli, and the enemy communications between Tripoli and Agheila. The air force daily requirements for these tasks were given to me as follows:
By 28th November 400 tons.
By 2nd December 800 tons.
By 9th December 1050 tons.
By 16th December 1400 tons (1000 at Tobruk and 400 at Benghazi).
These were big tonnages for the air forces alone. But if Rommel intended to stand and fight at Agheila, we should also have to build up army resources of supplies, petrol, and ammunition before we could attack. However, from the larger angle, it was clear that the air forces had to have all they wanted; they were the long-hitting weapon and their operations if successful would indirectly make the army task much easier.
On the 12th November, when we had driven the enemy forces out of Egypt, I issued the following message to the Eighth Army:
â1. When we began the Battle of Egypt on 23rd October I said that together we would hit the Germans and Italians for six right out of North Africa. We have made a very good start and today, 12th November, there are no German and Italian soldiers on Egyptian territory except prisoners. In three weeks we have completely smashed the German and Italian Army, and pushed the fleeing remnants out of Egypt, having advanced ourselves nearly 300 miles up to and beyond the frontier.
- The following enemy formations have ceased to exist as effective fighting formations:
Panzer Army 20th Italian Corps 15th Panzer Div. Ariete Arm. Div. 21st Panzer Div. Littorio Arm. Div. 90th Light Div. Trieste Div. 164th Light Div. 10th Italian Corps 21st Italian Corps Brescia Div. Trento Div. Pavia Div. Bologna Div. Folgore Div. The prisoners captured number 30,000, including nine Generals. The amount of tanks, artillery, anti-tank guns, transport, aircraft, etc., destroyed or captured is so great that the enemy is completely crippled.
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This is a very fine performance and I want, first, to thank you all for the way you responded to my call and rallied to the task. I feel that our great victory was brought about by the good fighting qualities of the soldiers of the Empire rather than by anything I may have been able to do myself.
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Secondly, I know you will all realise how greatly we were helped in our task by the R.A.F. We could not have done it without their splendid help and co-operation. I have thanked the R.A.F. warmly on your behalf.
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Our task is not finished yet; the Germans are out of Egypt but there are still some left in North Africa. There is some good hunting to be had farther to the West, in Libya; and our leading troops are now in Libya ready to begin. And this time, having reached Benghazi and beyond, we shall not come back.
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On with the task, and good hunting to you all. As in all pursuits some have to remain behind to start with; but we shall all be in it before the finish.
B. L. Montgomery, General, G.O.C.-in-C, Eighth Armyâ