The Evening Star (January 5, 1946)
Editorial: The Korean problem
As far as the future of Korea is concerned, Gen. MacArthur’s first formal report on nonmilitary affairs in that country and Japan – a report covering September and October – lends considerable support to the agreement worked out at the recent Anglo-Russian-American Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Moscow. Despite Korean rioting over failure of the conference to grant immediate independence, the report makes clear that the Moscow formula – envisioning a possible five-year trusteeship and prompt coordination of Soviet occupation policies with our own – constitutes a sound approach to the problem.
Although the restoration of Korean independence and sovereignty was formally pledged by the Allies as one of their war aims, genuine post-war reconstruction has hitherto been prevented by the armistice terms which arbitrarily divided the country into an American and a Russian occupation zone that drastically truncated its economy, the American agricultural south being sundered from the industrial north in Russian hands. The dividing line, as the MacArthur report emphasizes, has proved in practice to be an impassable barrier.
This impossible situation is now to be remedied. Within a fortnight the local commanders are directed to confer “for the elaboration of measures establishing permanent coordination in administrative economic matters,” and in their deliberations they are to be guided by the overall directive looking to “the reestablishment of Korea as an independent state, the conditions for developing the country on democratic principles and the earliest possible liquidation of the disastrous results of the protracted Japanese domination in Korea.”
This preliminary conference of the American and Russian occupational authorities is to be succeeded by a regular joint commission, while concurrently a “provisional democratic government” of the Korean people will be set up, broadly based on all important “parties and social organizations.” Subsequently, the recommendations of the Russo-American joint commission and the Korean provisional government will be considered by the governments of the United States, Soviet Union, Britain and China “for the working out of an agreement concerning a four-power trusteeship of Korea for a period up to five years.”
While this deferment of Korean independence is not to the liking of Korean political leaders, it certainly seems to fit in with Gen. MacArthur’s views. In fact, according to his September-October report, his personal inclination is against setting up even a provisional government because of the “almost complete lack of qualified Korean administrators untainted by Japanese collaboration and the absence of any political party truly representative of the people.” The country has no fewer than fifty-four political factions, he says, and although all have in common a hatred for the Japanese and a desire for self-rule, they differ widely in other respects, with many having only the vaguest idea of their aims.
This condition is understandable, of course, and the MacArthur report, which was drawn up before the Moscow meeting, makes a point of explaining it. For thirty-five years Korea has been subjected to a ruthless Japanese regime, with the result that present-day Koreans lack experience in self-government and are suffering a natural confusion in politics. A brief period of international trusteeship, if honorable and enlightened, should go far toward fitting them for complete freedom and autonomy. To this extent at least, Gen. MacArthur seems to be in full accord with the Moscow agreement.