Brooklyn Eagle (July 8, 1943)
Editorial: Stimson’s warning is timely on optimism at small losses
Office of War Information reports that casualties of the Armed Forces since the outbreak of the war total 91,644 emphasize anew the less deadly character of the Second World War as compared with the First. Nevertheless, Secretary Stimson is wise in warning the American people against considering the losses up to the present time as an optimistic indication of the price which will eventually be paid for victory.
Up to now, the modern fluid warfare has been sparing of lives. Except on the Russian Front, where losses have been heavy, there has been nothing to compare with the slaughter of 1914-18, where the 16 nations which were active participants suffered total casualties of 37,500,000, including 8,500,000 dead. Fortunately, our own death list up to the present time numbers only 16,696, which is less than the loss in about three weeks of fighting in the Argonne. During the entire campaign of six months in Africa, 2,574 Americans were killed.
This war of armored divisions, of tanks and planes and swift movement, has been designed to produce decisions with a minimum expenditure of lives. There has been no fruitless slaughter, as on the Somme and at Passchendaele, where men died by the thousands without bringing the last war any closer to its end. But, as, Secretary Stimson has indicated, the war has not as yet entered upon its decisive phase and there is no means of knowing the price that will be paid for a successful invasion of Europe, which is essential to victory in the West, and for the destruction of Japanese power at its source – the islands of Japan.
In the growing size and scope of the air raids over Europe, however, there is basis for the belief that this price may not be as heavy as was at one time feared. Air strength of the United Nations has now reached such proportions that it is possible to drop 2,000 tons of bombs on a single objective and to repeat this performance on successive nights. This air attack has caused such extensive damage to Germany’s industrial machine that the results are certain to become evident on the battlefield, where supplies and equipment must arrive without interruption if defeat is to be averted.
While there is virtual agreement among military leaders that campaigns cannot be won by air attack alone, that ground must be occupied and held if victory is to be achieved, there is basis for the belief that the terrific air offensives, which obliterate great sections of cities and towns, will reduce the effectiveness of the Nazi military machine to such a degree that the losses in the land fighting will be cut.
Air superiority was a vital factor in Germany’s easy conquests in the early days of her swift triumphs. Its loss may easily be an equally important element in bringing about her defeat.