The Evening Star (May 6, 1946)
ON THE RECORD —
Stalemate in Paris
By Dorothy Thompson
The Paris Conference is confronted by an all but insuperable clash of policy between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. The United States and Great Britain want peace in Europe; that is to say, they want a settled regulation of affairs. A settlement is to their interests. The United States, in particular, wants to lessen its military commitments, and Britain, from every consideration of economic recovery and security, wants European rehabilitation and a continent friendly or at least not hostile to Britain.
But it is increasingly clear that the Soviet Union prefers a fluid condition of affairs – a condition which is neither peace nor war, the “troubled waters” in which Soviet fishing is most likely to yield a catch.
Russia is hostile to Europe, historically and revolutionarily. There are reasons enough. In the 19th century Russia was invaded by the French. In the 20th century she has fought the Germans twice on her own soil. After the war of 1914 and against the advice of cooler-headed and more intelligent Germans, notably the foreign minister, Richard von Keuhlmann, who could not win over Ludendorff, the Bolshevik leaders were compelled, in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk, to sign one of the most Carthaginian treaties of history – and despite the fact that it was Ludendorff, and he alone, who had arranged to get Lenin and the Bolshevik emigres to Russia.
Lenin was under no illusion as to Ludendorff’s motives. “It is only to strengthen the anti-war movement in Russia,” he said. But Lenin, who was determined to have peace at practically any price, thought he could counter Ludendorff with another weapon. “The hour is near when, at the summons of our comrade, Karl Liebknecht, the German people will turn their weapons against their capitalist exploiters.”
Actually, the Bolshevization of Germany almost happened, following the collapse of the German armies in the west. The Communist Spartacus movement was suppressed in Berlin by the majority Socialists Frederick Ebert and Gustav Noske, and its leaders, Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxembourg, were murdered. (The latter had already repudiated Communism, but this was not known.)
The short Soviet Republic of Bavaria was ended by the assassination of Kurt Eisner, and the Soviet-sponsored Bela Kun regime in Hungary gave way to Nicholas Horthy.
That a victorious Russia, under Stalin, should abandon what a defeated Russia under Lenin almost accomplished is unlikely. To succeed where Lenin failed is a Stalin ambition. But Stalin is less an internationalist than Lenin or Trotsky. The revolutionizing of Europe is, for him, probably less for the sake of revolution than for the sake of Soviet power. While Lenin could hope that what Russia lost by the previous war she could regain by revolution. Stalin must see a chance, in victory, to Sovietize all Europe and so, in effect, end Europe – that perennial source of danger to tsars and Commissars.
The condition for this, now, as in 1918, is continued political and economic instability and weakness. The Russians know this – they do not forget history. The moment the last peace settlement, bad as it was, gave the European nations a chance to organize their lives, the opportunity for Bolshevism was over, even in the defeated countries.
Any stabilization now will militate against the Soviet plan, for Europe is not Communist, and will become Communist only through continued chaos, hunger, and demoralization offering opportunities to agitators trained in the technique of the coup d’etat. The economic recovery of the Rhine-Ruhr under any conditions would greatly contribute to the recovery of Europe. Why, then, from a revolutionary viewpoint, should it be hastened?
Furthermore, the Russians would hardly agree to diminish the numbers of their troops in Austria and elsewhere, for if the garrisons were weakened, the Soviets would probably lose what they have already gained. They may remember from the last war that the German general staff, who had hoped to release millions of troops for the west when Russia left the war, had to retain the bulk of them in the east to enforce Ludendorff’s annexations. Today no Eastern European country, except Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and possibly Czechoslovakia, can be trusted by the Soviets to retain the present status quo, except under force.
The Soviet program therefore calls for continued force, and continued force demands the existence of a threat. Occupation forces of millions of men and continued militarism can only be justified to the Russian people on the ground that they are menaced. Hence Stalin’s May Day speech charging that “international reaction” is “hatching plans for a new war.” The fact is that Europe is incapable of war against anyone: that the United States has largely disarmed, and that the real alarm is felt in the west, which did not fight Hitler’s Eurasian aims in order to have them realized by another.
There is fear and danger of another war only because conditions have been created in Europe which prevent a self-sustaining peace – which is the only real peace at any time.