Count Bernadotte: Inside story of German surrender (1945)

1

Youngstown Vindicator (September 2, 1945)

Inside story of Nazi surrender –
Hitler kept Nazis in line to last

Himmler shrank before his rages, count who arranged pre-surrender meetings reports
By Count Folke Bernadotte

Count Folke Bernadotte of Wisborg, nephew of King Gustav of Sweden, who arranged for the meetings preliminary to Germany’s surrender, here begins a report of the hitherto secret history of negotiations leading to that surrender. This is the first of a series.

The chief of the security police, Obergruppenfuehrer Ernst Kaltenbrunner, was courteous enough as he offered me American cigarettes and French vermouth, but his look was cold and inquiring. Our meeting was at Kaltenbrunner’s luxurious home at Wannsee, on the day following my arrival in Berlin, on February 16, 1945.

My immediate object was to convince Kaltenbrunner, Heinrich Himmler’s second-in-command in the Gestapo, that it was essential for me to meet his chief. Only by seeing Himmler could I hope to have Danish and Norwegian political prisoners evacuated to Sweden from German concentration camps.

Not only had nature provided Kaltenbrunner with the necessary qualifications for his present job and earlier as Heydrich’s successor in Czechoslovakia, but in appearance he was all that one would expect a Gestapo chief to be. He suggested that I should explain my objects to him, for transmission to his chief I had to get him sufficiently interested to arrange a meeting with Himmler, without giving away the real object of my visit.

“As you are doubtless aware,” I told him, “relations between Sweden and Germany are extremely bad… Reichsminister Himmler occupies a position which would make it possible for him to adopt measures calculated to improve Swedish-German relations.”

Progress

I told him no, but added my views were shared generally and that Germany could not afford to make an enemy of Sweden. It took time, but when I left, I felt that I had made good progress.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, received me at the Foreign Office. Ribbentrop seemed to be in excellent form, and filled with the consciousness of his own importance and dignity. He invited me to be seated by the fire, and immediately began to talk. I surreptitiously started my stopwatch.

Only a few hours after my arrival in Berlin, the Foreign Office was reported to be greatly interested in my visit, and especially anxious to know my reasons for wishing to meet Himmler. It was no secret that relations between Von Ribbentrop and the head of the Gestapo were decidedly cool.

Ribbentrop talks only

I stopped my stopwatch. Ribbentrop had talked for one hour and seven minutes without my being given an opportunity to get in a word.

Commenting on his own personal achievements with simulated humanity, he explained that Hitler had succeeded in convincing the German workingman of the necessity for retaining the classes that make up society, though these had to be adapted to the Nazi ideology.

Bolshevism, on the other hand, taught that the privileged classes must be “liquidated.” This, in Ribbentrop’s opinion, was the fundamental difference between the two systems.

Everything had shown that war between Germany and Russia was inevitable, and reliable evidence had actually been received that it was Russia’s intention to attack Germany in August 1941.

Every bomb Churchill and Roosevelt dropped on Germany, he said, was helping Russia and was another nail in the coffins of the British Empire and the USA. He told me he was at that very moment making a last attempt, through special channels, to convince the governments of the Anglo-Saxon countries of the fate that awaited Europe if Germany were to collapse. Though he had very little hope of success, he was going to appeal to Churchill and Roosevelt to stop the offensive in the west and the aerial bombardments.

‘Humanitarian’ Hitler

Here he turned to address a question to me. Who, he asked, did I regard as the contemporary who had contributed most to humanity. Without giving me time to reply, he answered, “Adolf Hitler. Unquestionably, Adolf Hitler.”

Before I left, Ribbentrop asked me if I had any concrete proposals, I had no intention of letting him know my real objects. He approved of what I told him and said he was glad I was going to meet Himmler.

There was no doubt that he now realized the game was lost, but he believed that he had a solution. He would reverse his famous coup of 1939 when he made the pact with Russia.

Two days later, my request for an interview with Himmler was granted. At 5 p.m. that day, I was driven to Hohen-Luchen, a large hospital 75 miles north of Berlin. The man who came to accompany me was Brigadefuehrer Walther Schellenberg, a man of about 35, who struck me as being the antithesis of Kaltenbrunner. A lawyer by profession, in 1940 he was appointed head of the political section of the German intelligence service, and in 1944 head of the whole organization.

Tried to change policy

In this capacity, I gathered, he had worked hard to change the policy of the Third Reich, especially its foreign policy. He had, moreover, tried to oppose the bestialities of the Gestapo. He told me later that Kaltenbrunner hated him; had even, though without success, tried to make Himmler believe he was in the pay of the British secret service.

Now I was to meet Heinrich Himmler, supreme head of the SS, the Gestapo, and the whole German police system, Minister of the Interior and commander-in-chief of the home army, the man who by his terror system had stained politics with crime in a manner hitherto unknown, and who, by his very system, had up to now held the tottering Third Reich upright.

When I suddenly saw him before me in the green Waffen-SS uniform, without any decorations and wearing horn-brimmed spectacles, he looked a typical lower grade civil servant. To my great surprise, he was extremely affable. In our talks, I found him a vivacious personality, inclined to be sentimental. He was a deft conversationalist.

Hitler still in saddle

It was evident that at that period Himmler was still in close contact with Hitler. “I have sworn loyalty to Adolf Hitler,” he told me at one point. “I cannot do anything in opposition to the Fuehrer plans and wishes.”

It is equally certain that Hitler was in full power at that time. To some extent the actual leadership may have passed out of his hands, it was easy to see that many of those nearest to him continued to have great respect for him and did not dare oppose him.

Shortly before my arrival, Himmler had made a concession to Switzerland for reasons of policy, without exacting a return concession. Hitler was seized by one of his fits of rage on learning of this, would hear no argument, and forbade the concession. It was evident that this experience was still in Himmler’s mind as we talked.

Himmler not so powerful

We talked for 2½ hours of my scheme to evacuate Scandinavian prisoners to Sweden. Himmler sought concessions I could not demand. One felt the shadow of Hitler over us all along. It was evident that Himmler was not so powerful as many believed.

At length, I succeeded in persuading him to think over my proposals. Later, Schellenberg, who had been with us throughout, told me the matter was as good as settled.

When I said goodbye to Himmler, he turned to Schellenberg and asked him if he had chosen a good chauffeur for me. Schellenberg replied that he had the best man to be found on account of the many tank traps and barricades erected on the road to Berlin.

“Good,” said Himmler. “Otherwise, the Swedish papers might come out with big headlines: ‘War Criminal Himmler Murders Count Bernadotte’.”

2

The Evening Star (September 3, 1945)

Inside story of Nazi surrender –
Oath to Hitler kept Himmler from hastening Nazi surrender

By Count Folke Bernadotte

Count Bernadotte, nephew of King Gustav V and head of the Swedish Red Cross, conducted the preliminary negotiations for Germany’s surrender. Second of a series.

On March 12, we crossed the German frontier, from Denmark, with a road convoy, to evacuate the first batch of prisoners. Our route was planned via Flensburg, Kiel, Luebeck, to Castle Friedrichsruh, which was to be our headquarters.

There I received a telephone message from Berlin: Kaltenbrunner was on the warpath. Brigadefuehrer Walter Schellenberg, chief of German intelligence, reported that Kaltenbrunner was trying to wreck my arrangement with Himmler.

I replied sharply that I would not tolerate interference by a subordinate in my arrangements with Himmler. I said this well aware that our telephone conversation was being tapped and would soon reach Kaltenbrunner’s ears.

Now the Third Reich was not merely crumbling; it was about to collapse. In the west, the British and the Americans had already crossed the Rhine and were advancing on Osnabrueck. In the east, the Russians were pressing forward and were to enter the suburbs of Vienna a few days later, simultaneously with the sensational Allied advance toward Bremen. On April 10, Koenigsberg and Vienna were taken by the Russians. The goal was Berlin.

During this time, our humanitarian efforts had continued without too much trouble – anyway, without insurmountable difficulties. However, our people were not being allowed to work at Neuengamme camp. I had to see Himmler again.

The meeting was on April 2, as before at Hohen-Lychen sanatorium. During the four-hour conversation that ensued, my activities in Germany were to be given a new direction.

Himmler’s first words almost, after greeting me, were: “I am ready to do anything for the German nation, but the war must go on. I have given my oath to the Fuehrer, and that oath is a binding one.” He was nervy and yet grave.

‘‘Don’t you realize,” I asked, “that Germany has lost the war? You say that you are willing to do anything for the German nation. You ought to think more of them than of your loyalty to Hitler, if you consider his decision to continue the war a disaster for your country.”

Himmler did not answer.

A few moments later he was called to the telephone. Schellenberg, who was again present at our talk, turned to me and asked if I could not see Gen. Dwight Eisenhower, to discuss a capitulation on the Western Front.

I told him that this was quite impossible, that the initiative must come from Himmler, and that I was convinced that Eisenhower and the Western Allies would not be willing to negotiate an armistice.

Then Himmler returned and we began to discuss the camp at Neuengamme.

The subject was not long pursued before Himmler said gloomily: “It was a mistake not to have been more frank with England. As for me – well, of course, I am regarded as the cruelest and most sadistic man alive.”

Soon after that, the audience ended.

Schellenberg accompanied me back to Berlin. He told me that but for Hitler, Himmler would not have hesitated to ask me to go to Eisenhower.

However, he hinted, the situation might alter. Hitler’s position might weaken; it might happen any moment. Himmler had asked Schellenberg to tell me that if this should happen, he hoped I would immediately proceed to Allied headquarters.

He warned me that Kaltenbrunner, possessing great influence over Hitler, was furious about the concessions Himmler had granted me for my Red Cross work. Kaltenbrunner wanted no neutrals gaining access to concentration camps and, when crossed, he was a dangerous man.

During the days that followed, I had several more talks with Schellenberg. He had had further conferences with Himmler. He thought Himmler and other leading Nazi figures would soon leave for South Germany. I advised Schellenberg to remain in North Germany so that, if necessary, Scandinavian prisoners could be removed rapidly to Sweden.

Himmler, he told me, was still talking about my going to Eisenhower. I told Schellenberg that the Allies would never enter into negotiations with Himmler. He could only conceivably head the government during a short transition period.

I added that I was prepared to go to Eisenhower’s headquarters on the following conditions:

  • There must be an announcement from Himmler, that Hitler compelled by illness to give up his powers – had chosen him to be the leader of the German people.

  • Himmler must declare the National Socialist Party dissolved, and remove all party officials.

  • Himmler must order the activity of the so-called Werewolves to cease.

Accepting and carrying out these conditions meant a revolution in Germany. I did not imagine Himmler would accept these conditions, but Schellenberg did not hesitate. He told me he would try to induce his chief to accept them.

By April 19, Gen. Patton had penetrated into Czechoslovakia; Northern Holland was liberated; resistance in Hamburg had been crushed, and in Berlin the defense was staggering before the Russian assault. Hitler gave orders to “shoot any officer who orders a retreat.” When I was in Berlin on April 20, I could hear the thunder of the Russian guns.

At 3 a.m. on April 23, I was awakened by the chief of the Flensburg Gestapo, on the telephone. Brigadefuehrer Schellenberg wished to speak to me about a most urgent matter. I was to go to Flensburg in the day.

Schellenberg lost no time in letting off his bombshell: Hitler was finished; it was thought that he could not live more than a couple of days at the outside.

“Himmler has decided to bring about a meeting with Gen. Eisenhower to inform him that he is willing to give orders to the German forces in the west to capitulate. Would you be prepared to take this message to Gen. Eisenhower?”

I repeated the points I had made earlier and it was arranged that we should meet Himmler in Luebeck that night, April 23-24.

3

The Evening Star (September 4, 1945)

Inside story of Nazi surrender –
Premature publicity aided final peace negotiations

By Count Folke Bernadotte

Count Bernadotte, nephew of King Gustav V and head of the Swedish Red Cross, conducted the preliminary negotiations for Germany’s surrender. Third of a series.

I shall not easily forget the night of April 23-24, with its uncanny feeling of impending disaster. Himmler arrived at the Luebeck branch of the Swedish Legation about half an hour before midnight. Immediately after, the sirens sounded their warning.

During the hour we spent in the air-raid shelter, he struck me as being utterly exhausted and in a very nervous state.

When the “all clear” sounded, we went upstairs. It was now about half an hour after midnight, and as the electricity was not working, a couple of candles illuminated our “conference table.”

The head of the Gestapo began by saying that Hitler was probably already dead and that, if not, he would be within the next few days. The Fuehrer had gone to Berlin to die with the inhabitants of the capital. Berlin was surrounded, and it was only a question of a few days, Himmler said, before it would fall.

Admits Reich beaten

“I admit that Germany is beaten,” Himmler said. He then touched on the importance of creating a Hitler legend which, after the fall of the Third Reich, would play the same part as the “stab in the back” phrase after the peace of Versailles.

If the Allied nations had the intention of crushing the German people, Himmler said, then Hitler would come to be regarded as the greatest of their heroes.

All I personally have experienced and learned has firmly convinced me that the myth that Hitler died fighting on the barricades of his capital must be destroyed once and for all.

Adolph Hitler was in the spring of 1945 a psychologically and physically sick man. A heroic act was the last thing of which he was capable. His decision to stay in Berlin was almost certainly due to his knowledge that, whatever happened, only a short time remained for him to live.

The accounts of his last heroic fight are a pure myth. He died like a hunted man, and as a cowardly man; as cowardly as all his henchmen showed themselves in the days of the breakup.

The conference went on.

“I consider my hands free,” Himmler said. “In order to save as great a part of Germany as possible from a Russian invasion, I am willing to capitulate on the Western Front. But I am not prepared to capitulate on the Eastern Front.”

I told him: “You can take it for granted that England and America will not make any separate settlements with Germany.”

“All the same, I want to make the attempt,” Himmler said.

I asked Himmler what he proposed to do if he received a negative reply.

“In such a case I shall take over the command on the Eastern Front and be killed in battle.” But he did not carry out his intention.

Finally, I asked him to write a short letter to the Swedish Minister for Foreign Affairs, Christian Guenther, as evidence that Himmler really desired to make the necessary contact through me.

This, Himmler declared after he had done so, was the bitterest day in his life.

On my arrival in Stockholm on April 24, I immediately called at the Foreign Office. A meeting was held later that evening at which were present the British minister, Sir Victor Mallet; the American minister, Herschel Johnson; the permanent Under Secretary of State and myself.

Approval doubted

The two foreign diplomats pointed out that it was most unlikely that their governments would agree to Himmler’s proposal, and that they must necessarily confer with the Moscow government.

Two days passed. During the evening of April 26, the American reply, signed by President Truman, arrived. I went at once to the American Legation.

“A German offer of surrender will only be accepted on condition that it is complete on all fronts as regards Great Britain, the Soviet Union as well as the United States of America…”

It was decided that I should leave without delay, meet Schellenberg and hand him the answer. On April 27, I flew to Odense, where I gave Schellenberg the western powers’ reply. At first it seemed to make him very depressed.

The following day, I heard my name mentioned on Radio Atlantic. Reports from London and New York said I had opened negotiations with Himmler for a German capitulation. My first thought was that this had spoiled everything.

I have since altered my views. The publicity which my negotiations received was to be decisive.

Himmler had from the beginning been chosen to be leader of the German Reich in the event of Hitler’s death. But with the publication of Himmler’s surrender bid. Grand Adm. Karl Doenitz was chosen to be the leader Instead. It is doubtful if the Allies could ever have negotiated with Himmler. With Doenitz, it was far easier.

Schellenberg returned to Odense. On April 29, after seeing Himmler at a place north of Bremen, Himmler was furious over the publicity given in England and America to our negotiations, he said. At one moment he had threatened to arrest Schellenberg as the one who, with me, had induced him to begin negotiations for surrender.

May 1 came, and with it, the news for which millions had for years been waiting and longing: Hitler was dead.

Doenitz announced: “The Fuehrer has appointed me to be his successor.”

For me, this meant that the points of departure of my negotiations had been shifted.

Doenitz in command

Himmler was no longer in a dominating position. And Doenitz urged Germany to fight on.

However, the situation changed rapidly. On May 4, I was told that Doenitz had decided to surrender.

At 10 o’clock on the morning of May 5, Schellenberg arrived in Stockholm by special plane and stated that the new German Minister for Foreign Affairs, Count Schwerin von Krosigk, had asked him to arrange a meeting with Gen. Eisenhower to discuss a German surrender.

Alone in the Doenitz cabinet, Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel violently opposed the surrender move.

Meanwhile, Gen. Franz Boehme, the German commander in Norway, refused to surrender his forces except on the direct, written order of Doenitz. He said his troops were intact and could hold out a couple of months longer.

Shortly after, Count von Krosigk telephoned that direct communications had been established with Gen. Eisenhower and that negotiations. which would include Norway, had begun.

At 10:15 a.m. on Monday, May 7, came the final telephone call from the German Foreign Minister; on the night of May 6-7, Germany’s complete capitulation had been decided.

4

The Evening Star (September 5, 1945)

Inside story of Nazi surrender –
Himmler only honest Nazi, negotiator told Bernadotte

By Count Folke Bernadotte

Count Bernadotte, nephew of King Gustav V and head of the Swedish Red Cross, conducted the preliminary negotiations for Germany’s surrender. Fourth of a series.

Shortly after the curtain had gone down on the drama of the European war. I had a long conversation with Walter Schellenberg, chief of German intelligence. His account of the final stage and what went on behind the scenes – for the accuracy of which he himself must be responsible – is of such interest in the light of history that its main points should be given publicity.

Schellenberg said:

In 1943, plans had been prepared and approved by Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Martin Bormann, the man closest to Hitler, for an attack on Switzerland. Allied landings in Italy seemed to make this necessary. I opposed these plans tooth and nail. I even tried to contact friends in Switzerland. Finally the idea was abandoned, mainly because of economic considerations. This was only one of the occasions when I attempted activity to oppose official German policy.

The upper strata of the Nazi regime was corrupt through and through. In my opinion, the one exception was the head of the SS, Heinrich Himmler.

Tries to approach Himmler

As I saw that the Hitler-Ribbentrop policy must lead to catastrophe, it became clear that some counterbalance had to be created. The only one who could do this, I felt, was Himmler.

I attempted to approach him and to obtain such influence over him as to use his power as I desired. It was my conviction that Germany had somehow to get out of the war with the western powers.

As the military and political situation grew more critical, I became the object of special notice by the Gestapo and the security police.

My most active and dangerous enemies were Bormann, and the head of the security police, Ernst Kaltenbrunner. Indeed, Kaltenbrunner, 18 months earlier, declared he had complete evidence that I was employed by the British secret service. He did ill in his power to trap me.

Such was the situation when, early in February 1945, the German minister in Stockholm reported that Count Bernadotte was leaving for Berlin to see Himmler. Twice that day Ribbentrop sent his personal secretary to see me in order to find out if I had arranged thus through personal connections in Sweden.

I told the man that I had no knowledge of the projected visit, and informed Himmler as well as Kaltenbrunner about these conversations. Himmler was interested but also annoyed that the arrangements for the journey should have gone through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This meant that he had to treat the count’s visit as official, and report it to Hitler.

Himmler instructed Kaltenbrunner to find a favorable opportunity to mention the matter to Hitler and to try to ascertain his feelings. “The Fuehrer was definitely opposed. Buffoonery of that kind won’t help us in this war,” was Hitler’s comment.

When Count Bernadotte arrived in Berlin, I at once telephoned Himmler and begged him not to ignore this gesture by Sweden. I said that he absolutely must receive the Red Cross delegate.

After a great many objections, Himmler agreed that Kaltenbrunner should try to arrange for Ribbentrop to see Count Bernadotte without Hitlers knowledge, and without letting Ribbentrop know that the Fuehrer had forbidden his reception. If Ribbentrop agreed, then Kaltenbrunner and I could also see the count, and Himmler would gain time to see how things developed.

Kaltenbrunner swallows bait

I saw in this visit my last opportunity to achieve what had always been at the back of my mind: Somehow to steer Germany out of the war.

I had to get around Kaltenbrunner. I complimented him on the way he had conducted his first conversation with Count Bernadotte, and told him that, in the present desperate situation. Ribbentrop must be removed, and he [Kaltenbrunner] appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in his place. Kaltenbrunner swallowed the bait with such enthusiasm that I found it difficult to control the situation!

When we telephoned Himmler, Kaltenbrunner insisted with burning conviction that Himmler had to meet the count, even though Hitler had expressly forbidden it.

But when the meeting took place, Kaltenbrunner was not asked to attend. This made him furious and he soon showed himself as hostile to me as ever. The intrigues began again.

Kaltenbrunner heaped reproaches on me because I had made Himmler altogether too well disposed toward Count Bernadotte and enlisted the services of Gruppenfuehrer Muller, acting chief of the Gestapo, who raised every kind of objection.

I visited Himmler at his headquarters and had it out with him. I told him that it was evident that Germany was about to collapse, and that he had to make the most of the count’s presence in Germany. I said that he had to act independently to steer the German ship into a peaceful haven before it capsized, and suggested that he should ask the count to fly to Gen. Eisenhower and present an offer of surrender.

Talk is emotional

The talk became more and more emotional as it went on. I said that Himmler’s place was in Berlin and not with an army group. This was the second time Hitler’s entourage had succeeded in getting Himmler away from the capital and he should return there immediately to prepare for peace, with or without using force.

At last Himmler gave way, and that night I received very wide powers to negotiate.

However, the next morning, he rang up and took back most of what he had said. He only authorized me to maintain contact with Count Bernadotte, and in certain circumstances to try to persuade him to see Eisenhower on his own initiative.

From that moment, early in March, there was a daily tug of war between Himmler and me. Although neither Kaltenbrunner nor any of the others around Hitler were aware of it.

5

The Evening Star (September 6, 1945)

Inside story of Axis surrender –
Himmler considered killing Hitler, Bernadotte is told

By Count Folke Bernadotte

Count Bernadotte, nephew of King Gustav V and head of the Swedish Red Cross, conducted the preliminary negotiations for Germany’s surrender. Fifth of a series.

Walter Schellenberg, chief of German intelligence, continues his account of what went on behind the scenes as the end of the war approached.

In long talks with Heinrich Himmler, I tried to show him that there was no longer any question of being true to his oath to Hitler, but that surrender was a matter of life and death for the German people. His reply was always: “Then what you want me to do is to eliminate the Fuehrer?”

There was a time when I couldn’t answer this in the affirmative, for if I had, I ran the risk of being “liquidated.” The influence of Fegelein, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Obersturmbannfuehrer Otto Skorzeny, the chief of the “Werewolves,” and others of their kind was still great; especially as they had the right to report personally to Hitler.

During these talks, Himmler often spoke to me about the state of Hitler’s health, which, according to him, was becoming worse from day to day. Himmler said, however, that Hitler’s energy was undiminished. His abnormal way of life, his habit of turning night into day and only sleeping two or three hours, his restless activity and continual outbursts of rage, completely exhausted those near him and made the whole atmosphere unbearable.

Hitler’s health failing

I suggested that the attempt of July 20 on his life may have seriously affected his health, particularly the injuries to his head. Himmler thought this possible, but he pointed out the significance of Hitler’s stooping more and more, of his slack appearance and the marked tremor in his left arm.

It was in connection with these reports – personally I had not seen Hitler for a long time – that early in April I spoke to a friend of mine, Prof. de Crinis, head of the psychiatric section of the Charite Hospital. He said he had observed from photographs in the illustrated papers that Hitler’s movements appeared almost paralyzed, and this he regarded as a symptom of Parkinson’s disease (paralysis agitans).

I arranged a meeting between Himmler and de Crinis, to which Himmler summoned the Minister of Health, Leonardo Conti.

A few days later – it was April 13 – Himmler summoned me to his headquarters in Wustrow and took me for a walk in the forest.

“Schellenberg,” he said, “I don’t think that we can let the Fuehrer go on any longer. Do you believe that de Crinis was right?”

Himmler asks advice

I answered, “Yes, it is true that it is two or three years since I met Hitler, but from what I can judge of his behavior in recent times, I am convinced that it is high time for you to act.”

Again and again he asked me what he could do. He said that after all he could not murder the Fuehrer, he could not give him poison, nor could he arrest him in the Reich’s chancellery, for in that case the whole military machine would come to a stop.

I replied that this would not matter. There was only one way out. He must present himself before Hitler, inform him of everything that had happened recently and force him to abdicate.

Himmler said that this was absolutely impossible. The Fuehrer would shoot him on the spot.

“You must take suitable precautions to prevent this,” I said. “After all you have a sufficient number of SS men capable of arranging an arrest of this kind. If there is no other way, we must get the doctors to help.”

No decision reached

Our walk went on for an hour and a half. Himmler could not come to a decision; said only that he would arrange a meeting between Prof. de Crinis, Prof. Morell, Hitler’s body physician; Dr. Stumpfegger, his other physician, and Martin Bormann.

A couple of days later, I asked Prof. de Crinis what conclusion he and his colleagues had reached. He answered rather disappointedly that he had discussed with Dr. Stumpfegger the supposed symptoms of Parkinson’s disease. Dr. Stumpfegger had not shared his opinion, although he had to accept some of his points. In the end, they had agreed on certain medicines.

I reported this to Himmler, who begged me insistently to keep this matter entirely to myself.

During the days which followed, events began to move in the direction I had long anticipated. During the first week in April, I got into touch with the Minister for Finance, Count Schwerin von Krosigk.

War’s end was aim

In several long talks, we agreed that the war must be brought to an end, to save as much of Germany as possible.

I arranged a meeting for April 19 between Himmler and von Krosigk. Relations between those two had been broken off for a long time. Before the meeting, Himmler was extremely worked up and at the last moment wanted to cancel it. However, it took place in the presence of Labor Minister Franz Seldte, who had at one time been the leader of the Stahlhelm party.

During the meeting, von Krosigk talked with Himmler while I conferred with Seldte. The latter was of the opinion that Himmler must take over and compel Hitler to read a proclamation to the German people on his birthday, in which he would announce that a plebiscite would be held, a new party formed and the people’s courts abolished.

After the conference, von Krosigk informed me that he had discussed with Himmler all the questions which we had gone over, and earnestly entreated him to act against the Fuehrer.

When we met to discuss this conference, Himmler began to speak about Allied propaganda against him in connection with the concentration camps. “The whole thing is senseless. It won’t in any case make any difference to me, but you must not believe in this propaganda; it isn’t true.”

6

The Evening Star (September 7, 1945)

Inside story of Axis surrender –
Hitler died from injection on April 27

By Count Folke Bernadotte

Count Bernadotte, nephew of King Gustav V and head of the Swedish Red Cross, conducted the preliminary negotiations for Germany’s surrender. Last of a series.

Walter Schellenberg, chief of German intelligence, continues his account of what went on behind the scenes as the end of the war approached:

I cannot describe the events of the following days in detail. Hitler’s birthday passed uneventfully. On April 21 Count Bernadotte had another meeting with Himmler. About this time Himmler complained that his health was not good, and I noticed how nervous and anxious he was.

“Schellenberg,” he said on one occasion, “I am filled with horror at the thought of what is now coming.”

Another time he told me what he would do when power was in his hands.

He requested me the same evening to propose a name for the new party which it had been suggested he should found. Himmler then took up the question of the “liquidation” of Hitler, but only in vague allusions.

Count sees Himmler

The night of April 23-24 there was another meeting between Count Bernadotte and Himmler in Luebeck, when he asked the count to present an offer of surrender to the western powers, to be transmitted through the Swedish government. He said then that it could only be “a question of one, two or at most three days before the Fuehrer ends his dynamic life in this dramatic struggle.”

According to my calculations, the Fuehrer died on April 27, and it is my definite belief that it was by an injection. However, I do not know who gave it to him.

Grand Adm. Karl Doenitz’s nomination as Hitler’s successor took place on the 29th. There are good grounds for believing that it was Reichsleiter Martin Bormann who made the nomination. It was the last move against Himmler. Himmler realized that capitulation was unavoidable and for this reason he was pushed aside.

When Himmler and I arrived at Doenitz’s headquarters at Plon on May 1, I found there a very tense atmosphere. It was soon apparent that Count Schwerin von Krosigk held the same views as Himmler and I, while Doenitz, with Gens. Keitel and Jodl, was not at that time prepared to give up Norway without a fight. They pointed out that the German commander in Norway, Col. Gen. Franz Boehme, was in a very strong strategic position.

Negotiations continued

The negotiations continued. Doenitz hesitated for a long time. In the end I was appointed envoy with instructions to negotiate in Stockholm the surrender of the troops in Norway.

Thus far Schellenberg.

In my travels in Germany in the spring of 1945, I received much information about the leading figures of the Third Reich from sources which must be regarded as reliable. These leaders were lacking in all moral concept, in all loftiness of mind.

In the last act, there they were, with their hideous pasts, desperately intriguing among themselves, while at the same time endeavoring to seek shelter behind each other’s backs, cowardly, undecided, irresolute. The last act of the Third Reich lacked all dignity or majesty.

Let us take first the Fuehrer. Already Adm. Doenitz has introduced the legend that the Fuehrer died the death of a hero, fighting for his people on the last barricades of the Occident against Bolshevism.

The Fuehrer did not die like a hero. It can be regarded as quite certain that he was murdered. It is true that he kept his leadership until the very last days of the Third Reich. But he had long before lost all capacity for taking any initiative. All he could do was to veto decisions made by his lieutenants.

Was figure of terror

To his entourage he had become a figure of terror in almost the same degree as he was to the world at large. If anyone displeased him, he immediately had an order for execution prepared.

At this final stage, Adolf Hitler was physically and psychologically a branded man, in all probability marked by that disease which alone can explain his insane acts and ideas. His hands shook, he could no longer walk, he could cross the room only with difficulty. He felt that the sands of his life were running out and was more than conscious of having failed completely, of his enemies being about to corner him, of the situation becoming more and more desperate.

Until the last day he would telephone to Himmler, roaring out his accusations in a desperate attempt to conjure up a change in the situation.

Closest to Hitler was Eva Braun, his mistress. Eva Braun, who came of a Munich family and is said to have been a very beautiful woman, had great influence over Hitler. It was, for example, she who paved the way for Obergruppenfuehrer Ernst Kaltenbrunner, one of the truly evil spirits in the little group of men and women who guided Germany’s destiny in those days.

Kaltenbrunner was an intimate friend of another member of the set, Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein, who married a sister of Eva Braun and was rapidly advanced from a humble riding master to the highest honors.

Hitler dominated

These four – the two sisters Braun, Kaltenbrunner and Fegelein – were among the most dangerous in the circle surrounding Hitler. Toward the end, Kaltenbrunner spent several hours every day with the Fuehrer and did all he could to work him up to continue the course on which he had embarked so long ago.

Among the principal performers in the last act of the Third Reich was Reichsleiter Martin Bormann, the successor to Rudolf Hess, a man who also had very great influence over Hitler. He specialized in intrigue, but he also had a talent for reducing complicated matters to their simplest forms in his reports to Hitler.

Goebbels, who drew strength from his own speeches, who was fascinated by them, even after almost everybody had ceased to believe what he said, and who from his safe shelter issued fiery orations exhorting the population of Berlin to fight to the last man: Goering, who from what one hears, could never after 1940 be shaken in his belief that Germany had definitely won the war and who, in this belief, allowed the Luftwaffe to deteriorate rapidly; Ribbentrop in his studied conceit and his narrow views – all these belonged to the inner circle of those about Hitler at the end.

And then there was Heinrich Himmler. In this connection one can only remark that he appears to have been just as terrified of Hitler as Hitler was of Himmler. That is perhaps the key to the Third Reich.