Casablanca Conference

Hopkins-el Mokhri conversation

Present
United States Morocco
Mr. Hopkins Grand Vizier el Mokhri
Brigadier General Wilbur Si Mammeri

Wilbur Notes

January 23, 1943

The Grand Vizier made it clear that the matters to be discussed must be made known only to the President and that no power other than the U.S. should know of the interview. Unless the above could be agreed upon it were better not to discuss anything.

Mr. Hopkins assured the G.V. that his desires would be completely respected and that matters to be discussed would be for the President’s ear only.

The G.V. stated that there were four questions to be presented to the President for his consideration.

1st Question
His Majesty the Sultan has heard of the conference between Gen. Giraud and Gen. de Gaulle now taking place. France itself is insecure and has turned first this way then that. Since Nov. 8 relations with the French have been troubled due to the existence of many factions. The Sultan has no complaint to make against Gen. Nogues. He is an able administrator and his relations with the Sultan, with the Sultan’s government and with the people have been excellent. But since Nov. 8, when Gen. Noguès has proposed some line of action, almost immediately some de Gaullist or Vichy group has opposed it.

Due to all of the above the Sultan is worried. He has welcomed the arrival of U.S. troops with joy; but will the joy continue? What are the intentions of the U.S. in regard to Morocco? What relations are to be established with the U.S.? In order to determine his future policy the Sultan would like to know the permanent policy of the U.S. in regard to Morocco.

2nd Question
The Jews have never been the predominant people in Morocco. In numbers and in influence they have always been definitely second. They have been well treated by the Moslems. When the German Armistice Commission arrived in Morocco they at first insisted that the Jews in Morocco should be treated the same as they are in Germany. This the Sultan steadfastly refused to do.

The existing situation has been the result of centuries of living together. The Moslems need the Jews and the Jews need the Moslems.

There is no Jewish question in Morocco and will be none if matters are left as they are now. Some Jews thought that the arrival of U.S. troops would mean the placing of Jews in positions of authority over the Moslems. This must not be.

3rd Question
Morocco is greatly in need of supplies of certain foods, clothing, machines, etc. The prestige of the U.S. has been drawn into this question somewhat as there have been statements to the effect that needed goods would arrive. It is hoped that the very evident needs of Morocco can be supplied at an early date.

4th Question
The Sultan is certain that the war will end in a victory for the U.S. This victory will be followed by a treaty of peace. When the time arrives to discuss the conditions of the peace it is the Sultan’s intention to throw himself in the arms of Mr. Roosevelt. Provided Mr. Roosevelt will accept him and his country.

If Mr. Roosevelt accepts the Sultan proposes to hold a plebiscite of his people. The Sultan is certain that all his people both in French and Spanish Morocco will be in agreement and wish to place their future in Mr. Roosevelt’s hands.

The Grand Vizier stated that this last subject was one concerning which he requested that absolute secrecy be maintained, that he desired that it be presented only to Mr. Roosevelt. Mr. Hopkins stated that it would be for Mr. Roosevelt’s ears alone.

Mr. Hopkins stated that he could make a general reply now as he is thoroughly familiar with Mr. Roosevelt’s views.

General Reply
Mr. Roosevelt believes that this war is a life and death struggle. For the present all efforts must be devoted to beating Germany, Italy, and Japan.

We believe that we will succeed and that complete victory will be gained.

Indicated by plane production.

Gave figures.

The war will be pursued until Germany Italy and Japan agree to unconditional surrender.

The President is aware of the difficulties now confronting Morocco. He realizes the situation the Sultan was in when the German Armistice Commission attempted to force him to comply with their demands. The Sultan proved himself to be a man of character and force and the President honors him for it and knows him to be a great man.

In the past armies have come into countries and after peace was restored have remained under one pretext or another. The American army will not remain in Morocco.

Powerful countries have exploited smaller countries; wealth and resources have been siphoned out for the benefit of the powerful country. Mr. Hopkins wished the G.V. to assure the Sultan that it is not the intention of the U.S. to exploit Morocco. It is hoped that closer economic relations can be established as airplanes and improved sea transport will bring the two countries closer together.

The President feels that many peoples of the world have not had their rightful share of the good things of the world. He feels that they can and will have them after the victory has been gained.

The President feels that there is no reason to change the present government of Morocco and has no intention of forcing other changes on any people.

Casablanca was selected for the conference somewhat by chance. It should prove beneficial to Morocco for it has enabled the President to see Morocco and meet the Sultan. The President has been profoundly impressed, and his visit will be of great benefit for he has become a warm friend of the Sultan and his country.

Mr. Hopkins stated that he could not give a final answer to all the questions; that with reference to supplies for the civilian population, they will be sent but military needs must come first.

The President knows that the people of Morocco are concerned. They should not be unduly so. The final outcome can be awaited with certainty.

Mr. Hopkins thanked the Grand Vizier for his frankness and stated that he would give the President a full and exact report of the discussion.

W. H. WILBUR
Brig. Gen.

Murphy-de Gaulle conversation, afternoon

Present
United States France
Mr. Murphy General de Gaulle

This meeting was concerned with the effort to resolve the conflict between de Gaulle and Giraud. De Gaulle says that he informed Murphy that it had not been possible to reach an agreement with Giraud regarding the unity of French liberation forces. De Gaulle also states that Murphy informed him at this time that Roosevelt and Giraud “had just signed an agreement” providing for deliveries of weapons and supplies to Giraud’s forces in North Africa and the recognition of Giraud as military and civil commander in Africa.

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

According to Elliott Roosevelt, it was in the course of this luncheon that the phrase “unconditional surrender” was “born”. Elliott Roosevelt recalls that it was the President, rather than the Prime Minister, who first used the term. It was strongly approved by Hopkins and accepted by the Prime Minister. The President appeared to be especially impressed with the beneficial effect the phrase would have on the Russians. It is probable that the original “unconditional surrender” discussion between the President and the Prime Minister which Elliott Roosevelt recalls as occurring on January 23 actually had taken place some days earlier. On January 18 the Prime Minister had already suggested the preparation of a statement to the press using the phrase “unconditional surrender.”

Informal American-British conversations, 3:50-5:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Mr. Macmillan
Mr. Murphy

Wilbur-de Gaulle conversation, 4 p.m.

Present
United States France
Brigadier General Wilbur General de Gaulle

Wilbur Notes

Casablanca, 23 January 1943.

Secret

I called on General de Gaulle at his villa this afternoon at four o’clock. As we were both in the same class at the École Supérieure de Guerre, we started on a friendly basis. He seemed inclined to unburden himself to me, and told me the entire situation.

He told me that before our arrival in Morocco, his forces were the only French Forces that had been fighting for the liberty of France; that they were the only elements that represented the true France; that without question the whole of the France that is willing to fight for its rights rested with people who were for him. He said that there had grown up the mystery of the Marshal and the mystery of La France Combattante, that these had become almost two religions. He said that the real Marshal Pétain had died in 1925, and that the present Marshal was weak, was vain, and had the spirit and attitude of a grandfather.

He said that when Darlan came into power he represented the collaborationists. De Gaulle and his people could have no traffic with him. Darlan in his opinion had remained too long.

General Giraud did not in his present position, and could not in his present position represent the government of France because he held a position by virtue of the vote of Noguès, Boisson, and Chatel, all of whom were representatives of the Vichy Government.

He said that he had offered General Giraud the command of the troops, but that General Giraud in his present position could not represent the true France. His thesis was that General Giraud should join the France Combattante, rather than that the Gaullists should join the present government.

He said that it was perfectly possible that the United States might make the decision that he should be deprived of supplies and equipment and that under such circumstances England and the others would have to agree to the United States’ decision and that he, de Gaulle, would have to fold up.

He said that even if General Giraud succeeded in reaching France at the present time, he would find that the people would rise against him and that communism would result. I told him that as a friend of France I deplored the present situation, that it was of great importance that the French compose their differences now before the invasion of the continent took place; that they must compose their differences before the peacetable was reached or that the French would find themselves in a very weak and poor position. I told him that I personally, and many Americans, were extremely sorry for the French that we felt that the French people must be under-going a very severe winter, that it was only by unity that we would reach them at the earliest possible date.

I stated that it seemed to me that General de Gaulle, who I knew had the real interest of France at heart, must be willing to withdraw from any position if no other way could be found to accomplish the union of those who wished to fight to liberate France. We discussed the situation of his adherents in Morocco. He is very anxious to have those individuals who wish to serve with his forces be permitted to join them. He asked for my address so that he could communicate with me further. I told him that many Gaullists had come to me with their stories. He asked me if any others came to see me, if I would tell them that I had seen him, that he had seen General Giraud, that they had not been able to compose their differences, but that he was sending a liaison officer to join Giraud.

I emphasized the necessity for calm and order in Morocco – and suggested that his adherents not only should not cause trouble but should also do everything they could to help the American effort. He agreed to do that.

W. H. WILBUR
Brig. Gen.

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, 5:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Admiral of the Fleet Pound
General Marshall Field Marshal Dill
Admiral King General Brooke
Lieutenant General Arnold Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Somervell Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Commander Libby Lieutenant General Ismay
Secretariat
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 23, 1943, 5:30 p.m.

Secret

The President suggested discussing the report submitted to him and the Prime Minister in C.C.S. 170/1, paragraph by paragraph.

Both the President and the Prime Minister, before starting the discussion, said that they wished to congratulate the Chiefs of Staff on the character of the work which had been done during the conferences. The Prime Minister said it was the first instance he knew of when military leaders had remained together so long, free from political considerations, and had devoted their full thought to the strategic aspects of the war.

The President agreed to this and recalled an incident in the last war when Marshal Foch, Field Marshal Haig and General Pershing had had a similar conference which lasted but 5 hours.

  1. Security of Sea Communications

In discussing the security of sea communications, the Prime Minister indicated that he wished German submarines to be referred to as “U-Boats” rather than dignifying them by calling them “submarines.”

  1. Assistance to Russia

A discussion regarding assistance to Russia in relation to other commitments then followed.

The President said that in March we will be faced with the necessity of arranging to extend the Russian Protocol. He thought the last sentence in paragraph 2 of C.C.S. 170/1 which provides that “supply to Russia will not be continued at prohibitive cost to the United Nations’ efforts” should stand and asked Mr. Hopkins for his view on the subject.

Mr. Hopkins said that the present Protocol has such a clause but that, of course, it cannot be exercised without raising violent objections from Premier Stalin.

The Prime Minister said that aid to Russia must be pushed, and no investment could pay a better military dividend. The United Nations cannot let Russia down. He said that the Chiefs of Staff had been considering whether or not 16 destroyers could be made available from the United States in order to reduce the length of the convoy turnaround from 40 to 27 days.

Admiral King said that the destroyers simply were not available. The escort vessel situation is so tight as to make it necessary to eliminate the Russian convoys starting about June 14th in order to take care of the needs of Operation Husky. He pointed out that there is already a shortage of 65 escorts to protect the convoys in the Atlantic service and that the Husky operation will make this shortage more acute.

Mr. Hopkins suggested the possibility of stopping the convoys entirely if we could give Russia something that she had not previously expected and suggested that this be airplanes.

The President asked what new escort construction would be available by June of 1943.

Admiral King replied that there would be 100 escort vessels completed but that, if the present loss rates continued, this number would represent only a small net gain.

Sir Dudley Pound said there is no substitute for destroyers in protecting convoys. At the present time we are utilizing 16 destroyers and 8 ships of other types with the convoys running on a 40-day cycle. If this were to be reduced to 27 days, it would be necessary to double this force in order to have two convoys in operation.

Mr. Hopkins asked whether the destroyers and escort vessels that are now with these convoys could not be released for use elsewhere if the convoys were eliminated entirely.

Sir Dudley Pound said the escort vessels would be released, except for the Home Fleet destroyers which must be kept available to watch for a break-out into the Atlantic of the German fleet.

Mr. Hopkins repeated that some consideration should be given by the Chiefs of Staff regarding the entire elimination of the Russian convoys via the northern route. He said that it might be possible to increase the delivery of munitions to Russia over the Persian route and via Alaska although the Russians object to handling some types of munitions over these routes. At the same time, we could increase the Protocol in certain types of munitions such as aircraft. If this were done, there would be a saving in the use of the 500,000 tons of shipping from the Russian convoys. The considerable losses of shipping connected with the northern convoys would be eliminated, as well as the cargoes which are lost when ships are sunk. He felt that the Chiefs of Staff have been inclined to consider aid to Russia as a political expedient and that actually the question should be viewed from the standpoint of military necessity.

The Prime Minister said it would be a great thing if we could continue the Russian convoys throughout the Husky Operation. He thought it better to continue them on a 40-day cycle rather than attempt the 27-day cycle prior to Husky and then stop the convoys while Husky was being undertaken. He said we have never made any promises that we would take supplies to Russia. We have merely committed ourselves to making munitions available to them at our ports.

General Somervell said that by July 1st we will be able to send 30 ships a month to the Persian Gulf ports, and this would offer good prospects for increasing the supply to Russia.

The President said that supplying Russia is a paying investment. Stopping the convoys in July and August would occur just at the time when the Russians would be engaged in their most severe fighting. He pointed out that it is difficult to say now just what the situation regarding shipping losses will be in July or August, or what the conditions will be along the route of the northern convoys. He said, for example, at the time of the last conference in June 1942, the United States was suffering great shipping losses along her eastern coast. This area has now been almost cleared of submarines, and the greatest losses are now occurring off the coast of South America.

Admiral King said that we are definitely committed to mounting Operation Husky and that everything must be done to insure its success, including the elimination of the Russian convoys if that be necessary.

General Marshall , in referring to Mr. Hopkins’ opinion of the Chiefs of Staff’s attitude towards aid to Russia, said that in the current conferences, it had been decided that the first charge against the United Nations was the defeat of the submarine menace and aid to Russia had to come next. He said that if we had to take the losses which had been suffered in the Murmansk convoys, they would hurt Russia as much as the U.S. and U.K. Such losses make it impossible for us to attack on other fronts and thus eliminate the possibility of forcing the Germans to withdraw ground and air troops from the Russian front. He said these losses last year came just at the time that we were laboring to build up Bolero. It must be made certain that we do not hazard the success of Operation Husky.

The Prime Minister agreed that if passage of convoys on the northern route were prohibitive in cost, they must be stopped. He thought it would be right to have in our minds the possibility of continuing convoys through the Husky period, but to make no promises to Stalin.

Sir Dudley Pound said this must be the case because if we were committed to continuing these convoys, the Royal Navy could not play its part in Operation Husky.

The Prime Minister said that the discussion should rest on the point that the discontinuance of these convoys will depend upon the losses that are suffered. He said we must tell Mr. Stalin the facts, that he must rely on a 40-day schedule. Also that we cannot promise the continuance of the convoys while Operation Husky is being undertaken. He said it should also be made clear to Mr. Stalin that the U.S. and U.K. are under no obligation to continue the convoys.

The President said that the draft message to Mr. Stalin would require some revision. It must be remembered that the Russian General Staff are making plans on the assumption that the munitions called for in the Protocol will be available. In justice to them, they should know just what is intended. He asked how a 2.4% per month loss rate would relate to the 700,000 tons loss of shipping per year.

Admiral King said he thought the loss rate of 2.4% would reduce the losses in shipping to less than 700,000 tons. He recalled the Prime Minister’s having said before the House of Commons that if our losses could be reduced below 500,000 tons per year, the shipping situation would be satisfactory.

The President said that the shipping situation is bound to improve during the coming year as a result of nearly doubling the construction program and by reason of the more effective antisubmarine measures which are to be taken.

Admiral King agreed with this and said that the great losses on the eastern coast of the United States were possible in large measure because of a lack of effective means to combat the submarines. He said that great improvement has been made in this respect.

The Prime Minister suggested that it should be decided that if the shipping situation is better than we expect, we shall continue the 40-day convoy throughout Operation Husky, but that we should not commit ourselves either way. He said that, while it might be possible to continue the convoys, they must be stopped if the losses are too great.

Admiral King suggested that before deciding on discontinuing the convoys, the situation should be reviewed as of the first of May.

  1. Operations in the Mediterranean

The discussion then turned to Operation Husky.

The Prime Minister said he wished to set the target date as the period of the favorable June moon rather than that of July.

General Marshall said that the matter of training must be considered as well as other features in connection with the preparations for Operation Husky. He said that all training and preparations must be scheduled, and that if an impossible or improbable target date was set and then later changed to one that was practicable, all of the schedules would be out of adjustment. This might result in compromising ourselves with regard to every aspect of the operation. The subject of the target date had been quite exhaustively studied, and it is going to be difficult to mount Operation Husky with properly trained forces even in July.

The President asked if the fixing of the target date in July was made on the assumption that the Axis forces would be driven from Tunisia by the end of April. He asked what the effect would be if they were to be eliminated from Africa by the end of March.

General Marshall replied that success in Tunisia at the end of March would improve the situation somewhat but was not the limiting factor. The limiting factor was on the naval side with respect to organizing crews and assembling landing craft. After this has been accomplished, the naval crews and landing craft must be made available for the training of the troops. He said that the situation in Tunisia might result in delaying Operation Husky but that an earlier success there would not help in moving the target date forward.

Admiral King said it was a question as to whether the assault on Sicily should be made by partially or fully trained forces.

The President suggested that the operation might be easier than Operation Torch in view of the better weather found in the Mediterranean.

Lord Mountbatten said that the difficulty of the Husky Operation was not in the weather but the excellence that might be expected in the enemy’s defenses.

General Marshall pointed out some of the errors that had been made in the Torch operation through lack of adequate training. Some of the landing boats went to the wrong place. One Ranger unit had the mission of taking a shore battery and clearing a certain area. It actually landed 18 miles away from its objective.

The President said he thought this might have been the result of poor navigation rather than a lack of adequate training.

General Marshall replied that while we do have divisions with amphibious training, we do not have the landing craft or crews. The craft must be built and the crews must be trained.

The Prime Minister agreed that General Marshall’s point that the target date for Husky did not depend on the Tunisian operations but rather on the necessity of training was a good one.

He said, however, that the British are to send their overseas assault force which has a capacity of 7 brigade groups to participate in Operation Husky. He had been told that this could not leave England until March 14th and then must undergo some training in the eastern Mediterranean. He said he felt sure that the force could be sent earlier. In this connection, Lord Louis Mountbatten said that he had been informed that it could be sent by the end of February.

The Prime Minister said that this would be done. He then discussed the question of navigation. When operations of the importance of Husky are to be undertaken, no effort should be spared to obtain capable navigators. He suggested the possibility of combing the navy, particularly the “R” class battleships, with the purpose of setting up a special group of navigators.

Sir Dudley Pound said that skilled navigators could not be taken from the navy without serious effects and, in any event, they would have to be supplemented by inexperienced men and the training period could not therefore be shortened.

The Prime Minister said that he feared the gap of perhaps four months during the summer when no U.S. or British troops would be in contact with the Germans.

The President agreed and said that this gap might have a serious effect all over the world.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had examined the timing of the operation most carefully. September was the first date that had been put forward and this they had rejected. Further study had brought the date back to the end of August. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had then put on the same kind of pressure that the President and the Prime Minister were now applying, with the result that July had been tentatively fixed, though August remained a more likely date. He was in agreement with General Marshall that to try and fix too early a date would prejudice the preparations. It was impossible to shorten the loading period, and thus the only process off which time might be lopped was training. If this were curtailed, the result might be disastrous.

The Prime Minister thought that by intense efforts the loading might be accelerated. Similarly if landing craft now employed in maintaining the 8th Army could be recovered forthwith, training might start earlier. All these points must be rigorously examined before the July date could be accepted.

General Marshall pointed out that if the date were to be made earlier, it would have to be by a complete four weeks unless the added risks of moonlight were acceptable.

The President said that the present proposals were based on a large number of factors which might well prove correct, but which were estimates. Another estimate which must be taken into account was the state of morale in Italy, which recent reports showed to be deteriorating. If this process continued, the Germans might be faced with an Italy in revolt, and it would then be essential for us to have our preparations far enough advanced to be able to act, not necessarily in Sicily but perhaps in Sardinia, or even in Italy. For this reason, he would like to set the date of the operation in June, it being understood that it might have to be carried out in July if the enemy’s strength remained as at present.

General Marshall pointed out that to bring back the date at the expense of adequate preparation would not make it any easier to stage an improvised operation during the intervening months. The troops would have been moved into place quite early in the preparatory period, so that they would be standing ready if required.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed and pointed out that we should probably get some advance indication of an Italian collapse which would enable us to speed up the launching of a smaller force. It would be quite wrong to risk a costly failure by unduly curtailing the period of preparation.

The Prime Minister said that General Marshall was pleading for the integrity of the operation, and the arguments which he had employed were most convincing. Nevertheless, he was not himself yet convinced that the integrity of the operation could not be maintained with a June date. Some quicker methods might be found of moving troops into place.

General Marshall said that this also had been examined. He pointed out that the period after the fall of Tunis would not be one of inactivity, as a growing air bombardment of Italy would be launched. We ought to place ourselves in a position to do the hard operation against Sicily while being ready to improvise if the enemy weakened. The initial landing in Sicily was on a larger scale than had been envisaged for Operation Roundup.

The President inquired whether any easement could be secured if the Spanish situation cleared still further during the Spring.

General Marshall said that in any case the troops standing ready to move into Spanish Morocco would be simultaneously training for Sicily.

Admiral King said that one of the innumerable items which had to be considered in this operation was the provision of armored landing craft, which he and Lord Louis Mountbatten agreed were essential. None of these was at present available for the U.S. forces. He agreed that the ideal method of launching the operation would be to follow in on the heels of the Germans fleeing from Tunis. He was convinced, however, that the closest we could come to this ideal was July. He would have liked June, but felt it impossible to promise such a date.

The President said that the important point was to retain a flexible mind in the matter so that advantage could be taken of every opportunity.

General Marshall said that he had felt embarrassed over the date of this operation remembering as he did the incentive which had existed for hastening Torch in view of the U.S. elections. In spite of that, it had not proved possible to advance the date.

The Prime Minister said there had been much admiration in England of the fact that the election had not been allowed to influence in the slightest the course of military events.

After some further discussion, it was agreed that:

a) Operations for the Capture of Sicily:

The July date should stand subject to an instruction that in the next three weeks, without prejudice to the July date, there should be an intense effort made to try and achieve the favorable June moon as the date of the operation. If at the end of this three weeks, the June date could be fixed, General Eisenhower’s instructions could be modified to conform.

b) Cover Plans:

The Prime Minister suggested that Norway should again play a part in the cover plans.

Sir Alan Brooke pointed out that it might be awkward for the Russian convoys if we gave the Germans cause for reinforcing Norway. He thought that much the best cover would be given by the active preparations going on all over the North African shore. These would not only disguise the objective, but would cause dispersion of enemy forces.

The President thought that the creation of General Giraud’s French army might also play a part in making the enemy think that the southern coast of France was our objective.

c) Command of the Mediterranean Theater:

The Prime Minister said that he thought the United States had been very generous and broad-minded in the command arrangements. He thought that the most natural method of procedure would be at the appropriate moment to announce that the 8th Army, on entering Tunisia, had passed under the command of General Eisenhower, and that General Alexander had been appointed as his deputy.

d) The Bomber Offensive from North Africa:

The Prime Minister thought that it would be advisable to maintain the threat of bombardment against Rome, but that it should not actually be carried out without further consultation.

The President agreed.

  1. Operations in and From the United Kingdom

b) Bolero:

The Prime Minister thought that it was very disappointing that there would only be 4 U.S. divisions equipped in the U.K. by August 15th. He inquired whether by using the Queens, the number for September could not be achieved in August.

General Somervell said that the limiting factor in the first half of the year was cargo ships, and in the second half of the year it was personnel ships. To move more men over in the first half would only result in their arriving in England with no equipment, and thus their training would be interrupted. The Queens were all fully employed in various parts of the world.

General Marshall pointed out that the figures in the table were a minimum, and the 4 divisions shown for August 15th would probably be 19 rather than 15. Allowance had to be made in the early build-up for the Air Corps personnel.

The Prime Minister inquired whether the initial equipment of 8 tons per man, and the maintenance of 1.3 tons per man per month, could not be reduced; similarly, could not savings be made on reserves and on vehicles. For the type of operations which would be undertaken in France in 1943, a big advance was not likely. Fighting men for the beaches were the prime essential.

General Somervell said that the calculation of the rate of buildup had been made on the basis of one ton per man per month. The other factors mentioned by the Prime Minister had also been taken into account, and everything would be done to reduce any unnecessary volume to be transported. He pointed out that there was a 45-day interval between the arrival of a division and its availability for operations; thus, the divisions which were shown as being available on August 15th would have sailed by July 1st. If the British could lend additional cargo shipping in the early part of the year, the flow of troops could be increased.

The Prime Minister said that it was in the early part of the year that the British shipping shortage would be most acute. He suggested that it should be recorded that the figures shown in the report were a minimum and that every effort would be made to increase them.

c) Amphibious Operations in 1943 from the U.K.

The Prime Minister suggested that the word “vigorously” should be inserted before the word “exploiting” in subparagraph (2) of this section of the report. This was agreed to.

The President inquired whether an operation against the Brest Peninsula could not be staged instead of against Cherbourg. The advantages of the former were very much greater. He also inquired about the date proposed for the operations.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that the date for the Channel Island operations had been chosen so as to fit in with Operation Husky. A difficulty had arisen in that the armored craft required by the Americans for Husky would have to come from the British Channel Assault Force. A telegram had been sent to the Admiralty asking that the output of these craft should be doubled so as to produce 160 more in the next four months. This might be done provided 400 additional Scripps Ford conversion engines were allocated to the U.K. from the U.S.A. He understood this point was under investigation.

The President inquired whether some Ford tank engines could not be produced and taken by air transport from the U.S.A. to the U.K. He understood that the engine was much the same.

General Somervell said that there was a difference in the engines, though the same facilities were required to produce both. He could not at present state the production possibilities.

The Prime Minister suggested that some reduction of tank engine output could be accepted if necessary.

Sir Alan Brooke agreed.

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that the landing craft resources would only permit of an initial assault by 2 brigade groups with an immediate follow-up of one brigade group and some armor. This could only be increased with U.S. help.

Admiral King said that all available U.S. resources would be devoted to Operation Husky.

On the question of command the President inquired whether sufficient drive would be applied if only a Chief of Staff were appointed. He hoped there would not be a long delay before a Supreme Commander was selected.

General Marshall said he understood it was a question of the availability of the right man.

Sir Alan Brooke thought that the Chief of Staff, if a man with the right qualities were chosen, could do what was necessary in the early stages.

The Prime Minister suggested that in any case an American Deputy to the Supreme Commander should be appointed.

Sir Alan Brooke and General Marshall agreed.

The President suggested that the last sentence of this section should be omitted. This was agreed to.

  1. Pacific and Far East Theater

The President said that he was disturbed to find that this section contained no reference to operations in or from China. Operations in Burma, though desirable, would not have the direct effect upon the Chinese which was necessary to sustain and increase their war effort. Similarly, an island-to-island advance across the Pacific would take too long to reduce the Japanese power. Some other method of striking at Japan must be found. The opportunity was presented by Japan’s shipping situation. She began the war with 6,000,000 tons. In the first year of the war 1,000,000 tons net had been sunk, leaving her with 5,000,000. When this was reduced to 4,000,000, Japan would be hard pressed to maintain her garrison in the chain of islands stretching all the way from Burma to New Guinea and would have to start pulling in her lines. The most effective weapon against shipping was the submarine, and the U.S. submarines were achieving notable results. There was another method of striking at the Japanese shipping, and that was by attacking the routes running close to the Asiatic shore from Korea down to Siam. This could be done by aircraft operating from China. He thought that 200 aircraft should be operating in China by April. They could spend most of their time in attacks on shipping, but occasionally they could make a special raid on Japan. There seemed to be two methods of achieving this object: either the planes could be based and maintained in China or else they could be based in India, moving to China each time for a mission, returning to their bases in India on completion. An indication of the shortage of Japanese shipping was the fact that they were buying up junks to replace coastal steamers, so that they could employ these on their maintenance routes.

General Arnold said that he was fully aware of the need for reinforcing the U.S. Air Force in China. One group of aircraft was just preparing to leave the U.S.A.; and he would examine, when he got to India, the best method of operating the aircraft. He hoped that effective operations would start before April. It should be remembered, however, that there were large demands for transport aircraft in other theaters, and these could not be neglected. Nevertheless, he hoped to have 135-150 transport planes operating on the India-China route by the end of the Fall.

General Marshall said that the provision of transport planes for India competed with urgent requirements for Husky, and for cross-channel operations. Nevertheless, he felt it was vital to step up the effort in China, and this would be done.

The Prime Minister expressed his agreement with the President’s proposals. He suggested that the document should now be reconsidered by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, and amendments arising out of the present discussion should be incorporated in a final edition. The document would then fittingly embody the results of a remarkable period of sustained work.

The President agreed with this proposal, and expressed his congratulations to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the results which they had achieved.

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 9:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
General Marshall General Brooke
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Lieutenant General Arnold Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Dill
Rear Admiral Cooke Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Brigadier General Hull Lieutenant General Ismay
Brigadier General Wedemeyer
Colonel Smart
Commander Libby
Secretariat
Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 23, 1943, 9:30 p.m.

Secret
  1. Report to the President and Prime Minister
    (C.C.S. 170/1)

The Committee:
a) Agreed, after discussion, to a number of amendments to C.C.S. 170/1.

b) Instructed the Secretaries to incorporate these amendments in a final report to be submitted to the President and Prime Minister.

  1. Operation Husky – Directive to General Eisenhower
    (C.C.S. 171/1/D)

The Committee:
a) Agreed to an amendment to the directive to General Eisenhower (C.C.S. 171/1/D) consequent upon the amendments agreed to in C.C.S. 170/2.

b) Directed the Secretaries to transmit the amended directive to General Eisenhower.

  1. Assault Shipping

Sir Alan Brooke read a note by Lord Leathers expressing concern at the use of large passenger ships as assault shipping. (A copy of this note is attached as an Annex to these Minutes.)

Admiral King said that it was this consideration which had moved him to suggest that the assault in Operation Husky should be carried out as far as possible in the larger type of landing craft and not in assault shipping.

The Committee:
Took note:
a) Of the note by Lord Leathers.

b) That the British Chiefs of Staff would submit proposals for reducing to the minimum the use of large passenger ships as assault ships.

  1. Conclusion of the Conference

General Marshall, at the conclusion of the conference at Casablanca, expressed his appreciation of the readiness of the British Chiefs of Staff to understand the U.S. point of view and of the fine spirit of cooperation which they had shown during the discussions. He felt sure that the Combined Chiefs of Staff would greatly profit by their contacts with their colleagues and the mutual understanding of each other’s problems which had been insured. He paid a tribute to the work of the British 8th Army and expressed his admiration of their energetic prosecution of the operations in Tripolitania. He went on to thank Sir John Dill for accompanying the U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the conference and for paying a visit to India to continue his valuable work as a link between the U.S. and British Staffs.

Sir Alan Brooke thanked General Marshall for his words and said that he reciprocated most whole-heartedly General Marshall’s expression of the great benefit which had accrued from the conference. Mutual appreciation of each other’s problems was only possible through personal contacts. Sir John Dill was performing a great service as a link between the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff. A great step forward had been taken in agreeing upon a basic strategy for the future prosecution of the war.

Sir Charles Portal said he was sure he was speaking on behalf of all the British Chiefs of Staff in expressing his appreciation of the great hospitality which had been given by the U.S. Forces and of the excellent arrangements for the conference which had been made by General Patton and the troops under his command.

Sir John Dill thanked the Combined Chiefs of Staff and emphasized the great value of the frank discussions which had been held.

Admiral King said he fully agreed with Sir Alan Brooke as to the great value of the basic strategic plan which had been worked out at the conference. In his view this was the biggest step forward to the winning of the war. Much has already been done to fill the details of this plan and more would be done in the future, but the discussions which had been held had enabled a true meeting of minds to take place between the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff.

General Arnold said that he fully associated himself with these views.

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Mr. Macmillan
Mr. Murphy Mr. Mack
Captain Churchill
Saturday, 23 January

Mr. Hopkins had a number of callers during the morning, conferring at various times with Lt. General Arnold, Mr. Harriman, and Major General Patton.

The Prime Minister lunched with the President, Mr. Hopkins, and Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt at 1: 30 p.m. He departed at 2:45 p.m.

Mr. Murphy and Mr. Macmillan called during the afternoon at 3:50 and departed at 4:10, again calling at 4:30 and leaving at 5:15.

The Prime Minister arrived at the President’s villa at 4:45 to talk with the President prior to a final meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff scheduled for 5:30. The American and British military, naval, and air chiefs conferred with the President and the Prime Minister, in the dining room of the President’s villa from 5:30 until 7:50 p.m. This was the last large-scale meeting of the ten-day conference period fast drawing to a close.

There were no guests at dinner tonight. The President and Mr. Hopkins dined with their sons, Lt. Col. Elliott Roosevelt and Sergeant Robert Hopkins.

After dinner, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Mack called to see Mr. Hopkins, and at 10:30 the President sent for Chief Ship’s Clerk Terry to dictate some “background material” which the President planned to give to the correspondents who were to attend the press conference scheduled for 11:00 a.m. the following day.

When Mr. Terry returned shortly after midnight with the transcription of the President’s dictation, he found the Prime Minister and his son, Randolph, in conference with the President and Mr. Hopkins.

In the next two hours, the final draft of a cable to Mr. Stalin, reporting the highlights of the meeting, was agreed upon as was also the text of the joint communiqué to be issued next day to the press representatives for actual release to the press of the world the following Wednesday.

Mr. Murphy, Mr. Macmillan, and Mr. Mack left the President’s villa at 2:10 a.m., and the Prime Minister and his son took their departure at 2:30. The President retired a few minutes later.

U.S. State Department (January 24, 1943)

Murphy-Giraud conversation, morning

Present
United States France
Mr. Murphy General Giraud

Giraud expressed willingness to co-operate with de Gaulle but not to work under him.

Hopkins-Macmillan conversation, morning

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Hopkins Mr. Macmillan
Mr. Murphy

Macmillan brought news that de Gaulle insisted on the dominant role in the French movement. After conferring with Roosevelt, Hopkins informed Macmillan that it was up to Churchill to bring de Gaulle to a meeting with Giraud.

Roosevelt-Giraud conversation, 11:05 a.m.

Present
United States France
President Roosevelt General Giraud

The conversation appears to have been given over in large measure to a discussion of two memoranda concerned with the political relationship between Giraud and the Anglo-American authorities and with the rearmament of French military forces in North Africa.

Roosevelt-de Gaulle conversation, 11:40 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom France
President Roosevelt Mr. Macmillan General de Gaulle
Mr. Hopkins
Mr. Murphy
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

Roosevelt sought unsuccessfully to persuade de Gaulle to accept the text of a draft joint statement or communiqué regarding his meetings with Giraud.

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting with de Gaulle and Giraud, about noon

Present
United States United Kingdom France
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill General de Gaulle
Mr. Hopkins Mr. Macmillan General Giraud
Mr. Murphy
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

The principal subject of discussion was the joint statement to the press to be made by de Gaulle and Giraud. It appears to have been agreed that the two French leaders would prepare such a statement after Roosevelt and Churchill had left Casablanca.

Roosevelt-Churchill press conference, 12:15 p.m.

A parenthetical statement on the source text reads as follows:

This Press Conference was held jointly by the President and Prime Minister Winston Churchill of Great Britain, on the lawn at the rear of the President’s villa, which adjoined the Anfa Hotel, and which was part of the general term “Anfa Camp,” comprising the Hotel surrounded by 15 villas, which in turn was surrounded by barbed wire and troops.

The newspapermen – about 50 in number – sat cross-legged in front of the President and the Prime Minister, who were seated in chairs.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill

Transcript of Press Conference

Casablanca, January 24, 1943.

Confidential

The President: This meeting goes back to the successful landing operations last November, which as you all know were initiated as far back as a year ago, and put into definite shape shortly after the Prime Minister’s visit to Washington in June.

After the operations of last November, it became perfectly clear, with the successes, that the time had come for another review of the situation, and a planning for the next steps, especially steps to be taken in 1943. That is why we came here, and our respective staffs came with us, to discuss the practical steps to be taken by the United Nations for prosecution of the war. We have been here about a week.

I might add, too, that we began talking about this after the first of December, and at that time we invited Mr. (Josef) Stalin to join us at a convenient meeting place. Mr. Stalin very greatly desired to come, but he was precluded from leaving Russia because he was conducting the new Russian offensive against the Germans along the whole line. We must remember that he is Commander in Chief, and that he is responsible for the very wonderful detailed plan which has been brought to such a successful conclusion since the beginning of the offensive.

In spite of the fact that Mr. Stalin was unable to come, the results of the staff meeting have been communicated to him, so that we will continue to keep in very close touch with each other.

I think it can be said that the studies during the past week or ten days are unprecedented in history. Both the Prime Minister and I think back to the days of the First World War when conferences between the French and British and ourselves very rarely lasted more than a few hours or a couple of days. The Chiefs of Staffs have been in intimate touch; they have lived in the same hotel. Each man has become a definite personal friend of his opposite number on the other side.

Furthermore, these conferences have discussed, I think for the first time in history, the whole global picture. It isn’t just one front, just one ocean, or one continent – it is literally the whole world; and that is why the Prime Minister and I feel that the conference is unique in the fact that it has this global aspect.

The Combined Staffs, in these conferences and studies during the past week or ten days, have proceeded on the principle of pooling all of the resources of the United Nations. And I think the second point is that they have re-affirmed the determination to maintain the initiative against the Axis Powers in every part of the world.

These plans covering the initiative and maintenance of the initiative during 1943 cover certain things, such as united operations conducted in different areas of the world. Secondly, the sending of all possible material aid to the Russian offensive, with the double object of cutting down the manpower of Germany and her satellites, and continuing the very great attrition of German munitions and materials of all kinds which are being destroyed every day in such large quantities by the Russian armies.

And, at the same time, the Staffs have agreed on giving all possible aid to the heroic struggle of China – remembering that China is in her sixth year of the war – with the objective, not only in China but in the whole of the Pacific area, of ending any Japanese attempt in the future to dominate the Far East.

Another point, I think we have all had it in our hearts and heads before, but I don’t think that it has ever been put down on paper by the Prime Minister and myself, and that is the determination that peace can come to the world only by the total elimination of German and Japanese warpower.

Some of you Britishers know the old story – we had a General called U. S. Grant. His name was Ulysses Simpson Grant, but in my, and the Prime Minister’s, early days he was called “Unconditional Surrender” Grant. The elimination of German, Japanese and Italian warpower means the unconditional surrender by Germany, Italy, and Japan. That means a reasonable assurance of future world peace. It does not mean the destruction of the population of Germany, Italy, or Japan, but it does mean the destruction of the philosophies in those countries which are based on conquest and the subjugation of other people.

(this meeting is called the “unconditional surrender” meeting)

While we have not had a meeting of all of the United Nations, I think that there is no question – in fact we both have great confidence that the same purposes and objectives are in the minds of all of the other United Nations – Russia, China, and all the others.

And so the actual meeting – the main work of the Committee – has been ended, except for a certain amount of resultant paper work – has come to a successful conclusion. I call it a meeting of the minds in regard to all military operations, and, thereafter, that the war is going to proceed against the Axis Powers according to schedule, with every indication that 1943 is going to be an even better year for the United Nations than 1942.

The Prime Minister: I agree with everything that the President has said, and I think it was a very happy decision to bring you gentlemen here to Casablanca to this agreeable spot, Anfa Camp, which has been the center – the scene – of much the most important and successful war conference which I have ever attended or witnessed. Nothing like it has occurred in my experience, which is a long while – the continuous work, hours and hours every day from morning until often after midnight, carried on by the Staffs of both sides, by all the principal officers of the two nations who are engaged in the direction of the war.

This work has proceeded with an intensity, and thoroughness, and comprehensiveness, the like of which I have never seen, and I firmly believe that you will find that results will come from this as this year unfolds. You will find results will come from it which will give our troops, and soldiers, and fliers the best possible chance to gather new victories from the enemy. Fortune turned a more or less somber face upon us at the close of last year, and we meet here today at this place – we have been meeting here – which in a way is the active center of the war direction. We wish indeed it was possible to have Premier Stalin and the Generalissimo (Chiang Kai-shek), and others of the United Nations here, but geography is a stubborn thing; and the difficulties and the pre-occupations of the men engaged in fighting the enemy in other countries are also very clear obstacles to their free movement and therefore we have had to meet here together.

Well, one thing I should like to say, and that is – I think I can say it with full confidence – nothing that may occur in this war will ever come between me and the President. He and I are in this as friends and partners, and we work together. We know that our easy, free conversation is one of the sinews of war – of the Allied Powers. It makes many things easy that would otherwise be difficult, and solutions can be reached when an agreement has stopped, which would otherwise be impossible, even with the utmost goodwill, of the vast war machinery which the English-speaking people are operating.

I think that the Press here have had rather a hard, provoking time, because it isn’t possible to have everything organized at once when you throw yourselves on a shore. Some of our earliest and brightest hopes have not yet been fulfilled, and you gentlemen have no doubt felt baffled in the work you want to do, and therefore a trial is imposed upon you. I beg you to rise to the level of that; namely, not to allow the minor annoyances of censoring, et cetera, make you exaggerate these details. To keep your sense of proportion is a patriotic duty.

Tremendous events have happened. This enterprise which the President has organized – and he knows I have been his active Lieutenant since the start – has altered the whole strategic aspect of the war. It has forced the Germans to fight under the very greatest difficulties. And I think that it gives us in a very marked way the initiative. Once we have got that precious treasure into our hands, we must labor hard to keep it. Hitler said you never could tell what would happen, because he wasn’t dealing with competent military experts but with military idiots and drunkards. He said he didn’t know where he was, and that was a preliminary forecast of the explanation which he will no doubt offer to the Nazi Party for the complete manner in which he has been hoodwinked, fooled, and out-maneuvered by the great enterprise which was launched on these shores.

We are still in full battle, and heavy action will impend. Our forces grow. The Eighth Army has taken Tripoli, and we are following (Field Marshal Erwin) Rommel – the fugitive of Egypt and Libya – now wishing, no doubt, to represent himself as the deliverer of Tunisia. The Eighth Army have followed him a long way – 15 hundred miles – from Alamein where I last saw them, now to Tripoli. And Rommel is still flying before them. But I can give you this assurance – everywhere that Mary went the lamb is sure to go.

I hope you gentlemen will find this talk to be of assistance to you in your work, and will be able to build up a good and encouraging story to our people all over the world. Give them the picture of unity, thoroughness, and integrity of the political chiefs. Give them that picture, and make them feel that there is some reason behind all that is being done. Even when there is some delay there is design and purposes, and as the President has said, the unconquerable will to pursue this quality, until we have procured the unconditional surrender of the criminal forces who plunged the world into storm and ruin.

The President: I think – the Prime Minister having spoken of the Eighth Army – that you should know that we have had a long talk with General (Harold R. L. G.) Alexander, Admiral (Sir Andrew) Cunningham, (Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur) Tedder. (Lieutenant) General (Dwight D.) Eisenhower has been here, as has (Major) General (Carl) Spaatz – (Lieutenant) General (Mark W.) Clark too. We have had a pretty good picture of the whole south shore of the Mediterranean, at first hand.

This afternoon there will be given to each of you a communiqué from the Prime Minister and myself, which is really the formal document stating the history of this conference, and the names of all the people who have taken part; nothing very much in it in addition to what we have talked about as background for you all.

You will want to know about the presence of General (Henri Honoré) Giraud, and General (Charles) de Gaulle. I think that all that should be said at this time is that the Prime Minister and I felt that here we were in French North Africa and it would be an opportune time for those two gentlemen to meet together – one Frenchman with another Frenchman. They have been in conference now for a couple of days, and we have emphasized one common purpose, and that is the liberation of France. They are at work on that. They are in accord on that, and we hope very much that as a result of getting to know each other better under these modern, new conditions, we will have French armies, and French navies, and French airmen who will take part with us in the ultimate liberation of France itself.

I haven’t got anything else that relates to the United Staffs conference, but – it is purely personal – but I might as well give it to you as background. I have had the opportunity, during these days, of visiting a very large number of American troops – went up the line the other day and saw combat teams and the bulk of several divisions. I talked with the officers, and with the men. I lunched with them in the field, and it was a darn good lunch. We had to move the band, because it was a very windy day, from leeward to windward, so we could hear the music.

From these reviews we went over to a fort – I don’t know whether you can use the name or not – that is up to (Brigadier) General (Robert A.) McClure. Actually, it was at the mouth of Port Lyautey where the very heavy fighting occurred and where a large number of Americans and Frenchmen were killed. Their bodies, most of them, lie in a joint cemetery – French and American. I placed a wreath where the American graves are, and another wreath where the French graves are.

I saw the equipment of these troops that are ready to go into action at any time; and I wish the people back home could see it, because those troops are equipped with the most modern weapons that we can turn out. They are adequately equipped in every way. And I found them not only in excellent health and high spirits, but also a very great efficiency on the part of officers and men, all the way from top to bottom. I am sure they are eager to fight again, and I think they will.

I’d like to say just a word about the bravery and the fine spirit of the French whom we fought – many of whom were killed. They fought with very heavy losses, as you know, but the moment the peace came and fighting stopped, the French Army and Navy, and the French and Moroccan civil population have given to us Americans wholehearted assistance in carrying out the common objective that brings us to these parts – to improve the conditions of living in these parts, which you know better than I do have been seriously hurt by the fact that during the last two years so much of the output, especially the food output of French North Africa, has been sent to the support of the German Army. That time is ended, and we are going to do all we can for the population of these parts, to keep them going until they can bring in their own harvests during this coming summer.

Also, I had one very delightful party. I gave a dinner party for the Sultan of Morocco (Sidi Mohammed) and his son. We got on extremely well. He is greatly interested in the welfare of his people, and he and the Moroccan population are giving to us the same kind of support that the French population is.

So, I just want to repeat that on this trip I saw with my own eyes the actual conditions of our men who are in this part of North Africa. I think their families back home will be glad to know that we are doing all we can, not only in full support of them, but in keeping up the splendid morale with which they are working at the present time. I want to say to their families, through you people, that I am mighty proud of them.

This is not like a Press Conference in Washington. We have 200 to 250 that crowd into one rather small room, and it is almost impossible there to meet everyone personally. You are an elite group, and because it is not too big a group, the Prime Minister and I want to meet all of you.

One thing, before we stop talking – on the release date of this thing – sometimes I also am under orders. I have got to let General McClure decide the release date. There are certain reasons why it can’t be for a few days, but as I understand it, one of your problems is the bottleneck at Gibraltar. I think you have enough background to write your stories and put them on the cables, and General McClure will decide what the actual release date will be. I told him that it should be just as soon as he possibly could.

The Communiqué

Casablanca, 24 January 1943.

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain have been in conference near Casablanca since January 14. They were accompanied by the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the two countries, namely, for the United States:

  • General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army
  • Admiral E. J. King, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Navy
  • Lieut. General H. H. Arnold, Commanding U.S. Army Air Forces

and for Great Britain:

  • Admiral of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound, First Sea Lord,
  • General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief of the Imperial General Staff,
  • Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff.

These were assisted by:

  • Lieut. General B. B. Somervell, Commanding General, Services of Supply, U.S. Army,
  • Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington,
  • Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, Chief of Combined Operations,
  • Lieut. General Sir Hastings Ismay, Chief Staff Officer to the Minister of Defence,

together with a number of Staff Officers from both countries.

They have received visits from Mr. Murphy and Mr. Macmillan; from General Eisenhower, the Commander-in-Chief Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa; from Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew Cunningham, Naval Commander Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa; from General Spaatz, Air Commander Allied Expeditionary Force in North Africa; from General Clark, U.S. Army and from Middle East Headquarters, from General Sir Harold Alexander, Air Chief Marshal Sir Arthur Tedder and Lieut-General F. M. Andrews, U.S. Army.

The President was accompanied by Mr. Harry Hopkins and was joined by Mr. Averell Harriman. With the Prime Minister was Lord Leathers, the British Minister of War Transport.

For ten days the Combined Staffs have been in constant session meeting two or three times a day, and recording progress at intervals to the President and the Prime Minister. The entire field of the war was surveyed theatre by theatre throughout the world and all resources were marshalled for the more intense prosecution of the war by sea, land and air. Nothing like this prolonged discussion between two Allies has ever taken place before. Complete agreement was reached between the leaders of the two countries and their respective Staffs upon the war plans and enterprises to be undertaken during the campaign of 1943 against Germany, Italy and Japan with a view to drawing the utmost advantage from the markedly favourable turn of events at the close of 1942.

Premier Stalin was cordially invited to meet the President and the Prime Minister, in which case the meeting would have been held very much farther to the East. He was, however, unable to leave Russia at this time on account of the great offensive which he himself, as Commander-in-Chief is directing.

The President and the Prime Minister realized to the full the enormous weight of the war which Russia is successfully bearing along her whole land front, and their prime object has been to draw as much of the weight as possible off the Russian armies by engaging the enemy as heavily as possible at the best selected points.

Premier Stalin has been fully informed of the military proposals.

The President and the Prime Minister have been in communication with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. They have apprised him of the measures which they are undertaking to assist him in China’s magnificent and unrelaxing struggle for the common cause.

The occasion of the meeting between the President and the Prime Minister made it opportune to invite General Giraud to confer with the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to arrange for a meeting between him and General de Gaulle. The two Generals have been in close consultation.

The President and the Prime Minister and the Combined Staffs having completed their plans for the offensive campaigns of 1943, have now separated in order to put them into active and concerted execution.

24. 1. 43

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Roosevelt-Churchill dinner, 8 p.m. (Marrakech)

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Sir Charles Wilson
Mr. Harriman Commander Thompson
Rear Admiral McIntire Mr. Martin
Captain McCrea Mr. Rowan
Colonel Beasley Captain Churchill
Vice Consul Pendar
Sergeant Hopkins

The conversation ranged over a number of topics including Morocco, the Arab problem, the de Gaulle-Giraud controversy, and the rebuilding of France.

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, about midnight (Marrakech)

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Mr. Martin
Mr. Harriman Mr. Rowan

The meeting was given over to the final revision of the joint messages from Roosevelt and Churchill to Stalin and Chiang.

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Sunday, 24 January

General Henri Giraud called at 11:05 and had an audience with the President until 11:40. Major General Charles de Gaulle had arrived while General Giraud was in conference with the President, and following General Giraud’s departure, went in to talk to the President, Mr. Hopkins, Mr. Murphy, and Mr. Macmillan.

While General de Gaulle was with the President, General Giraud returned, and a few minutes later the Prime Minister appeared.

These four, the President, the Prime Minister, General Giraud, and General de Gaulle then repaired to the lawn in the rear of the President’s villa where they posed for moving and still pictures. While the cameras “turned over”, the two generals shook hands.

Then Generals Giraud and de Gaulle bade farewell to the President and the Prime Minister and withdrew.

A few minutes after twelve, the President, with the Prime Minister seated at his left, invited the assembled newspapermen to sit down on the lawn and make themselves comfortable for the discussion which was to follow. It was a beautiful day, brilliant with sunshine, and with these two great men seated before them, the assembled correspondents heard a complete description of the purpose of bringing the British and American Chiefs of Staff together here in North Africa, together with the heads of their respective governments, and a general description of what had been accomplished.

Both the President and the Prime Minister reaffirmed the decision that no effort would be spared until the unconditional surrender of the Axis powers had been accomplished (The notes of this press conference have been recorded separately). When the discussion ended, the Prime Minister and the President asked the newspapermen to come up to shake hands, the President remarking that they should consider themselves an “elite group”, inasmuch as the great number of correspondents habitually attending routine press conferences in Washington precludes any thought of shaking hands.

Following the press conference, the President received General Charles A. Noguès, Resident General at Rabat, who had hurried down to Casablanca to say “au revoir” to the President upon being informed by telephone at 10:30 that the President’s departure was imminent.

At this time, the President also received Vice Admiral Michelier, the Commander-in-Chief of the French North African Fleet, who had called to pay his respects.

Heavy baggage, collected the night before, had been stowed in the planes and flown to Marrakech. The motorcade was waiting when the President departed from his villa at a few minutes past one o’clock in the afternoon, and at 1:25, the party was on its way to Marrakech, 150 miles almost due south of Casablanca, but well inland.

Besides his own immediate group, the President was accompanied by the Prime Minister, his son, Captain Randolph Churchill, Sir Charles Wilson, the Prime Minister’s aide, Commander Thompson, and his two private secretaries, Mr. Rowan and Mr. Martin.

At three o’clock, the cars were halted at the roadside for a basket lunch packed by the British consisting of several kinds of sandwiches, hard boiled eggs, and mincemeat tarts.

At 5:45, the party arrived at Marrakech, a very old Berber and Arab town, going directly to a large villa now occupied by the U.S. Vice Consul at Marrakech, Mr. Kenneth Pendar. This villa was placed at his disposal by the wife of the American millionaire, Moses Taylor. It was most beautiful, set in the midst of an olive grove. Its courtyards were filled with orange trees, flowers, and shrubs. There was a fountain or pool and inlaid marble floors all furnished in splendor befitting a Sultan.

The President and the Prime Minister, together with Admiral McIntire, Captain McCrea, and several others, ascended to the top of a 60-foot tower which crowned the villa, to view the sunset and the towering Atlas Mountains, many miles away, as the bells tolled from Mosque towers summoning the faithful to evening prayer.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The President and the Prime Minister were dinner guests of Mr. Pendar this evening, as were the following:

  • Sir Charles Wilson
  • Mr. Averell Harriman
  • Mr. Harry Hopkins
  • Admiral McIntire
  • Captain McCrea
  • Mr. Martin
  • Mr. Rowan
  • Commander Thompson
  • Colonel Beasley
  • Captain Randolph Churchill
  • Sergeant Robert Hopkins
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U.S. State Department (January 25, 1943)

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Premier Stalin

Marrakech, January 25, 1943.

Most secret

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Premier Stalin

1. We have been in conference with our military advisers and have decided the operations which are to be undertaken by American and British forces in the first nine months of 1943. We wish to inform you of our intentions at once. We believe these operations, together with your powerful offensive, may well bring Germany to her knees in 1943. Every effort must be made to accomplish this purpose.

2. We are in no doubt that our correct strategy is to concentrate on the defeat of Germany, with a view to achieving early and decisive victory in the European theatre. At the same time, we must maintain sufficient pressure on Japan to retain the initiative in the Pacific and Far East, sustain China, and prevent the Japanese from extending their aggression to other theatres such as your Maritime Provinces.

3. Our main desire has been to divert strong German land and air forces from the Russian front and to send to Russia the maximum flow of supplies. We shall spare no exertion to send you material assistance by every available route.

4. Our immediate intention is to clear the Axis out of North Africa and set up the naval and air installations to open:
a) An effective passage through the Mediterranean for military traffic; and
b) An intensive bombardment of important Axis targets in Southern Europe.

5. We have made the decision to launch large-scale amphibious operations in the Mediterranean at the earliest possible moment. The preparation for these operations is now under way and will involve a considerable concentration of forces, including landing craft and shipping in Egyptian and North African ports. In addition we shall concentrate hi the United Kingdom a strong American land and air force. These, combined with the British forces in the United Kingdom, will prepare themselves to re-enter the Continent of Europe as soon as practicable. These concentrations will certainly be known to our enemies, but they will not know where or when, or on what scale we propose to strike. They will therefore be compelled to divert both land and air forces to all the shores of France, the Low Countries, Corsica, Sardinia, Sicily, the heel of Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Crete and the Dodecanese.

6. In Europe we shall increase the Allied Bomber offensive from the U.K. against Germany at a rapid rate and, by midsummer, it should be more than double its present strength. Our experiences to date have shown that the day bombing attacks result in destruction and damage to large numbers of German Fighter Aircraft. We believe that an increased tempo and weight of daylight and night attacks will lead to greatly increased material and morale damage in Germany and rapidly deplete German fighter strength. As you are aware, we are already containing more than half the German Air Force in Western Europe and the Mediterranean. We have no doubt that our intensified and diversified bombing offensive, together with the other operations which we are undertaking, will compel further withdrawals of German air and other forces from the Russian front.

7. In the Pacific it is our intention to eject the Japanese from Rabaul within the next few months and thereafter to exploit success in the general direction of Japan. We also intend to increase the scale of our operations in Burma in order to reopen our channel of supply to China. We intend to increase our air force in China at once. We shall not, however, allow our operations against Japan to jeopardize our capacity to take advantage of every opportunity that may present itself for the decisive defeat of Germany in 1943.

8. Our ruling purpose is to bring to bear upon Germany and Italy the maximum forces by land, sea and air which can be physically applied.

25. 1. 43

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