America at war! (1941--) -- Part 2

971

Roosevelt-de Gaulle conversation, 10:20 p.m.

Present
United States France
President Roosevelt General de Gaulle

McCrea Notes

Washington, 4 February 1943.

Secret

The President met General de Gaulle with much cordiality and, after the exchange of pleasantries, proceeded to tell General de Gaulle the reason for his, the President’s and the Prime Minister’s visit to North Africa. The President stated that after the occupation of Morocco had become an accomplished fact, it seemed most necessary to him, late in 1942, that plans be made for the calendar year 1943. The President stated that it had originally been intended that Mr. Stalin attend the conference, but that due to the urgency of the Russian Campaign and the fact that Mr. Stalin occupied the position of Commander-in-Chief of the Russian forces, he had been compelled to decline the invitation to be present. In brief, the President remarked that the whole purpose of his meeting with Mr. Churchill was “to get on with the war,” and supply an answer to the question:

Where do we go from here?

The President proceeded to discuss the political situation in North Africa, stating that he recognized that there existed many points of view, almost as many as there were people involved, and that accordingly, there were some conflicting thoughts. The President added, however, that so far as he was able to determine, there were no substantial differences which could not be readily reconciled.

The President stated that he supposed that the collaboration on the part of General Eisenhower with Admiral Darlan had been the source of some wonderment to General de Gaulle. Continuing, the President stated that he had felt from the outset that the problem of North Africa should be regarded as a military one and that the political situation should be entirely incident to the military situation. General Eisenhower had found that Admiral Darlan was very willing to collaborate with the end in view of bringing as much pressure as possible to bear on the enemy at the earliest possible moment. To this end General Eisenhower expressed his willingness to collaborate to the utmost with Admiral Darlan. The President stated that he thoroughly approved of General Eisenhower’s decision in this matter and that real progress was being made when the Admiral met his untimely death.

At this point General de Gaulle evidently made some remark to the President with reference to the sovereignty of French Morocco. The President continued, stating that the sovereignty of the occupied territory was not under consideration, that none of the contenders for power in North Africa had the right to say that he, and only he, represented the sovereignty of France. The President pointed out that the sovereignty of France, as in our country, rested with the people, but that unfortunately the people of France were not now in a position to exercise that sovereignty. It was, therefore, necessary for the military commander in the area to accept the political situation as he found it and to collaborate with those in authority in the country at the time that the occupation took place so long as those in authority chose to be of assistance to the military commander. The President stated that any other course of action would have been indefensive [indefensible].

The President again alluded to the lack of power on the part of the French people at this time to assert their sovereignty. The President pointed out that it was, therefore, necessary to resort to the legal analogy of “trusteeship” and that it was his view that the Allied Nations fighting in French territory at the moment were fighting for the liberation of France and that they should hold the political situation in “trusteeship” for the French people. In other words, the President stated that France is in the position of a little child unable to look out and fend for itself and that in such a case, a court would appoint a trustee to do the necessary. The President stated that he had been twice in consultation with General Giraud and that General Giraud was very definite on the one point that mattered; namely, “to get on with the war.” The President further remarked that General Giraud recognized fully the conflicting political situation, but stated that he would, under no circumstances, let it divert him from the immediate and urgent task of freeing French territory of the enemy.

The President stated that following the Civil War in our home country, there was conflict of political thought and that while many mistakes were made, nevertheless, the people realized that personal pride and personal prejudices must often be subordinated for the good of the country as a whole, and the contending French leaders could well follow such a program. The only course of action that would save France, said the President, was for all of her loyal sons to unite to defeat the enemy, and that when the war was ended, victorious France could once again assert the political sovereignty which was hers over her homeland and her empire. At such a time all political considerations would be laid before the sovereign people themselves and that by the use of the democratic processes inherent throughout France and its empire, political differences would be resolved.

After about 20 minutes of conversation, General de Gaulle, with some show of cordiality withdrew.

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U.S. Navy

972

Roosevelt-Churchill conversation, 11:15 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins Mr. Macmillan
Mr. Murphy Mr. Mack
Mr. Welles
973 
Friday, 22 January

Mr. Hopkins was in conference with the Prime Minister from 9:45 until 11:55 a.m., returning just before noon in order to be present when the President and the Prime Minister were photographed with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Several photographs were taken on the terrace of the President’s villa, and then the President bestowed the Congressional Medal of Honor on Brigadier General William H. Wilbur, U.S. Army, for conspicuous gallantry and intrepidity in action during the landing at Fedala on November 8, 1942. Under heavy fire, General Wilbur had succeeded in passing through the French lines in order to deliver certain important letters to French generals some 16 miles to the rear, and later, while returning to his own troops, had personally led a group of tanks which destroyed a French artillery unit observed to be effectively shelling our positions. The President made the presentation in the presence of the Prime Minister, General Marshall, and General Patton, and upon the conclusion of the ceremony extended his personal congratulations to General Wilbur, as did the Prime Minister and Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten.

The President and General Marshall lunched together at the President’s villa, no others being present. General Marshall departed at 2:30 p.m.

During the late afternoon, Mr. Harriman and Mr. Murphy conferred with the President, and Mr. Hopkins, separately and jointly.

The Sultan of Morocco had taken great pleasure in accepting the President’s dinner invitation which Captain McCrea had delivered at Rabat the day before. He arrived at the President’s villa at 7:40 together with his early ’teen age son, the Heir Apparent, the Grand Vizier, and his Chief of Protocol.

The Sultan and his entourage were magnificently attired in white silk robes and came bearing several presents – a gold-mounted dagger for the President in a beautiful inlaid teakwood case, and two golden bracelets and a high golden tiara for Mrs. Roosevelt. The President presented the Sultan with a personally-inscribed photograph of himself, in a beautiful heavy silver frame, engraved at the top with the seal of the President of the United States.

No alcoholic beverages were served before, during, or after the dinner, and care had been taken that no pork or pork products were served since these items are forbidden to true Mohammedans.

The dinner list was composed of the following list:

  • The President
  • The Sultan of Morocco (on the President’s right)
  • The Prime Minister of Great Britain (to his left)
  • General Charles A. Noguès, Resident General
  • The Grand Vizier to the Sultan
  • Major General Patton
  • Mr. Robert Murphy
  • The Crown Prince of Morocco
  • The Chief of Protocol
  • Mr. Hopkins
  • Captain McCrea
  • Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt

The Sultan and his party left at 10:10 p.m. and were followed shortly thereafter by the Prime Minister, General Noguès, and General Patton.

General Charles de Gaulle had arrived in Casablanca from London at noon today, had lunched with General Giraud, and at 6:30 p.m. had kept an appointment with Prime Minister Churchill. These two conferred until the latter had to depart for dinner with the President and the Sultan of Morocco. General de Gaulle talked with the President from 10:20 until 10:55 p.m. Information as to the substance of the conversation between the President and General de Gaulle is contained in notes recorded separately by Captain McCrea.

Following the departure of General de Gaulle at 10:55, the Prime Minister and Mr. Macmillan, plus the latter’s secretary, Mr. Mack, called on the President at 11:15 and conferred with him, Mr. Murphy, and Mr. Hopkins until 12:30 a.m.

The President retired a half hour after the Prime Minister, Mr. Murphy, Mr. Macmillan, and Mr. Mack departed.

974

U.S. State Department (January 23, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
General Marshall General Brooke
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Lieutenant General Arnold Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Dill
Rear Admiral Cooke Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Lieutenant General Ismay
Commander Libby Major General Kennedy
Air Vice Marshal Slessor
Air Vice Marshal Inglis
Secretariat
Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 23, 1943, 10 a.m.

Secret
  1. Bolero Buildup
    (C.C.S. 172)

General Somervell said that his paper had been prepared in collaboration with Lord Leathers, and the figures of U.S. troops to arrive in the United Kingdom in 1943 were dependent on certain assistance being provided by the British. A figure of 50,000 men per division had been taken as a basis of calculation, but this was very high owing to the inclusion of a large overhead in the first half year. The figures would be reduced to about 40,000 in the latter part of the year. In this event, the total number of divisions might rise from fifteen to nineteen by the end of the year. Every means would be used of increasing the number of troops shipped by additional loadings in personnel ships during the summer months and the fitting of more cargo ships for troop carrying.

The Committee:
Took note of paper C.C.S. 172.

  1. Continental Operations in 1943
    (C.C.S. 167)

(Previous reference C.C.S. 67th Meeting, Item 3)

General Marshall said that the proposals in the paper by the British Joint Planning Staff were acceptable to the U.S. Chiefs of Staff subject to the following comments:

It appeared that the availability of the British airborne division referred to in paragraph 4 was now doubtful in view of the demands of Husky. The dispatch of an American airborne division to the United Kingdom, possibly in June, was, therefore, being considered by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff. The first airborne division which would be ready for overseas would be required for Husky. The chief difficulty lay in the provision of the necessary air transports, but these could be moved across to the U.K. more quickly than the personnel, who would have to go by sea.

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff considered it most desirable that any operation of the type mentioned in paragraph 2 (a) of the paper, e.g., against the Channel Islands, should be coordinated in time with Husky.

As regards the larger operation against the Cotentin Peninsula, for which the target date given in paragraph 19 (b) was August 1st, it must be made clear that the plan was only to be based on the U.S. resources available at that time in the United Kingdom. First priority was given to Husky, and the U.S. did not wish to accept any additional commitment for operation Hadrian beyond what was at present envisaged. It was highly improbable that any U.S. landing craft crews would be available for operations from the United Kingdom this summer.

Sir Alan Brooke said that, as a result of the decision on Husky, paragraph 4 was not now correct. There would only be 11 British divisions and a part of one British airborne division available.

The Committee:
Approved the proposals contained in C.C.S. 167 subject to the reservations of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff recorded above.

  1. Report to the President and Prime Minister
    (C.C.S. 170)

The Committee:
a) Approved the draft submitted by the Secretaries, subject to minor amendments agreed in the discussion, and the inclusion of a paragraph on the Bolero build-up based on C.C.S. 172.

b) Instructed the Secretaries to prepare and submit a final draft forthwith.

  1. Operation Husky – Directive to General Eisenhower
    (C.C.S. 171)

General Marshall proposed certain amendments to the text of the draft directive, which were accepted.

The Committee:
Approved the directive as amended and instructed the Secretaries to transmit it to General Eisenhower.

  1. Landing Craft

Lord Louis Mountbatten said that the Admiralty had been asked to complete another 160 LCA during the next four months to provide American requirements for Husky and training. He might have to send British LCA from Force J (the Channel Assault Force) for the U.S. share of Husky, but it was essential that these should be replaced in time to enable cross-channel operations to be undertaken this summer. All LCA engines come from America; and he would, therefore, require 400 Scripps-Ford conversion engines at the rate of 100 a month for the next four months. Each craft had two engines, and 25 percent spares were required. It was of great importance that the Channel Assault Force should be kept in being, even though temporarily short of LCA to make up U.S. requirements. Otherwise, there would be no force available for cross-channel operations. Once broken up, this force would be very difficult to reform again.

Admiral King said that no firm promise could be given that this large number of engines would be provided from the U.S. where production resources were already strained. He undertook to see what could be done.

The Committee:
a) Agreed that it was most desirable for the Channel Assault Force to be kept in being for cross-channel operations this summer.

b) Took note that the U.S. would endeavor to provide the necessary engines for any LCA hulls produced in Great Britain during the coming months.

975

Murphy-Giraud conversation

Present
United States France
Mr. Murphy General Giraud

Memorandum by the President’s Personal Representative to the Presidents Special Assistant 

Casablanca, January 22 [23], 1943.

Mr. Hopkins:

Dear Harry: Giraud had a long talk with Catroux this morning after which he told me that he had found Catroux’ attitude helpful and understanding. In essence Giraud told Catroux for the information of de Gaulle that what Giraud proposed is that Giraud remain Commander in Chief of all French armed forces as a member and titular head of a French War Committee. The Committee would include de Gaulle as a High Commissioner or Commission[er] who would have the direction of the affairs of the territories which he brings into the combination. The Committee would include a third person, possibly General George, as High Commissioner or Commissioner having supervision of North and West Africa. Catroux would be the Committee’s Director of Foreign Affairs, and General Valin – who is also with de Gaulle, would be in charge of Propaganda. Other de Gaulle people would be included one way or another in the setup. Giraud, de Gaulle and George would make their headquarters at Algiers. The military character of the organization would be emphasized – its primary purpose waging the war against the Axis – stressing political calm now during the military operation, and the fact that the French people must be left the decision of the eventual form of French Government.

Under the War Committee would be the Directory or Committee of Governors of the several territories. Under that eventually a consultative body of representative civilians from those territories to be called for example the Federal Council.

Giraud says that he looks at this matter as a matter of plain common sense – there cannot be two bosses in this area if we are to get on with the war. On the other hand, he wants to play ball with de Gaulle and to respect his sensibilities. When de Gaulle assumes to talk for France and of conditions in France, Giraud points out that he has lived there much more recently than de Gaulle where Giraud was in touch with the underground organizations. He feels that possibly de Gaulle may confuse his idea of his own popularity with the French people and the latter’s hatred of the Germans.

General George is still in France and will probably be smuggled out.

Giraud is lunching with de Gaulle and will have a long tete-a-tete after lunch.

BOB

976

Hopkins-el Mokhri conversation

Present
United States Morocco
Mr. Hopkins Grand Vizier el Mokhri
Brigadier General Wilbur Si Mammeri

Wilbur Notes 

January 23, 1943

The Grand Vizier made it clear that the matters to be discussed must be made known only to the President and that no power other than the U.S. should know of the interview. Unless the above could be agreed upon it were better not to discuss anything.

Mr. Hopkins assured the G.V. that his desires would be completely respected and that matters to be discussed would be for the President’s ear only.

The G.V. stated that there were four questions to be presented to the President for his consideration.

1st Question
His Majesty the Sultan has heard of the conference between Gen. Giraud and Gen. de Gaulle now taking place. France itself is insecure and has turned first this way then that. Since Nov. 8 relations with the French have been troubled due to the existence of many factions. The Sultan has no complaint to make against Gen. Nogues. He is an able administrator and his relations with the Sultan, with the Sultan’s government and with the people have been excellent. But since Nov. 8, when Gen. Noguès has proposed some line of action, almost immediately some de Gaullist or Vichy group has opposed it.

Due to all of the above the Sultan is worried. He has welcomed the arrival of U.S. troops with joy; but will the joy continue? What are the intentions of the U.S. in regard to Morocco? What relations are to be established with the U.S.? In order to determine his future policy the Sultan would like to know the permanent policy of the U.S. in regard to Morocco.

2nd Question
The Jews have never been the predominant people in Morocco. In numbers and in influence they have always been definitely second. They have been well treated by the Moslems. When the German Armistice Commission arrived in Morocco they at first insisted that the Jews in Morocco should be treated the same as they are in Germany. This the Sultan steadfastly refused to do.

The existing situation has been the result of centuries of living together. The Moslems need the Jews and the Jews need the Moslems.

There is no Jewish question in Morocco and will be none if matters are left as they are now. Some Jews thought that the arrival of U.S. troops would mean the placing of Jews in positions of authority over the Moslems. This must not be.

3rd Question
Morocco is greatly in need of supplies of certain foods, clothing, machines, etc. The prestige of the U.S. has been drawn into this question somewhat as there have been statements to the effect that needed goods would arrive. It is hoped that the very evident needs of Morocco can be supplied at an early date.

4th Question
The Sultan is certain that the war will end in a victory for the U.S. This victory will be followed by a treaty of peace. When the time arrives to discuss the conditions of the peace it is the Sultan’s intention to throw himself in the arms of Mr. Roosevelt. Provided Mr. Roosevelt will accept him and his country.

If Mr. Roosevelt accepts the Sultan proposes to hold a plebiscite of his people. The Sultan is certain that all his people both in French and Spanish Morocco will be in agreement and wish to place their future in Mr. Roosevelt’s hands.

The Grand Vizier stated that this last subject was one concerning which he requested that absolute secrecy be maintained, that he desired that it be presented only to Mr. Roosevelt. Mr. Hopkins stated that it would be for Mr. Roosevelt’s ears alone.

Mr. Hopkins stated that he could make a general reply now as he is thoroughly familiar with Mr. Roosevelt’s views.

General Reply
Mr. Roosevelt believes that this war is a life and death struggle. For the present all efforts must be devoted to beating Germany, Italy, and Japan.

We believe that we will succeed and that complete victory will be gained.

Indicated by plane production.

Gave figures.

The war will be pursued until Germany Italy and Japan agree to unconditional surrender.

The President is aware of the difficulties now confronting Morocco. He realizes the situation the Sultan was in when the German Armistice Commission attempted to force him to comply with their demands. The Sultan proved himself to be a man of character and force and the President honors him for it and knows him to be a great man.

In the past armies have come into countries and after peace was restored have remained under one pretext or another. The American army will not remain in Morocco.

Powerful countries have exploited smaller countries; wealth and resources have been siphoned out for the benefit of the powerful country. Mr. Hopkins wished the G.V. to assure the Sultan that it is not the intention of the U.S. to exploit Morocco. It is hoped that closer economic relations can be established as airplanes and improved sea transport will bring the two countries closer together.

The President feels that many peoples of the world have not had their rightful share of the good things of the world. He feels that they can and will have them after the victory has been gained.

The President feels that there is no reason to change the present government of Morocco and has no intention of forcing other changes on any people.

Casablanca was selected for the conference somewhat by chance. It should prove beneficial to Morocco for it has enabled the President to see Morocco and meet the Sultan. The President has been profoundly impressed, and his visit will be of great benefit for he has become a warm friend of the Sultan and his country.

Mr. Hopkins stated that he could not give a final answer to all the questions; that with reference to supplies for the civilian population, they will be sent but military needs must come first.

The President knows that the people of Morocco are concerned. They should not be unduly so. The final outcome can be awaited with certainty.

Mr. Hopkins thanked the Grand Vizier for his frankness and stated that he would give the President a full and exact report of the discussion.

W. H. WILBUR
Brig. Gen.

977

Murphy-de Gaulle conversation, afternoon

Present
United States France
Mr. Murphy General de Gaulle

This meeting was concerned with the effort to resolve the conflict between de Gaulle and Giraud. De Gaulle says that he informed Murphy that it had not been possible to reach an agreement with Giraud regarding the unity of French liberation forces. De Gaulle also states that Murphy informed him at this time that Roosevelt and Giraud “had just signed an agreement” providing for deliveries of weapons and supplies to Giraud’s forces in North Africa and the recognition of Giraud as military and civil commander in Africa.

978

Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
Mr. Hopkins
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

According to Elliott Roosevelt, it was in the course of this luncheon that the phrase “unconditional surrender” was “born”. Elliott Roosevelt recalls that it was the President, rather than the Prime Minister, who first used the term. It was strongly approved by Hopkins and accepted by the Prime Minister. The President appeared to be especially impressed with the beneficial effect the phrase would have on the Russians. It is probable that the original “unconditional surrender” discussion between the President and the Prime Minister which Elliott Roosevelt recalls as occurring on January 23 actually had taken place some days earlier. On January 18 the Prime Minister had already suggested the preparation of a statement to the press using the phrase “unconditional surrender.”

979

U.S. Navy Department (January 23, 1943)

Communiqué No. 259

Atlantic.
The U.S. Coast Guard cutter NATSEK (WYP-170) has been overdue in the North Atlantic for several weeks and must be presumed to be lost. The next of kin of personnel in the NATSEK have been notified.

South Pacific.
U.S. forces on Guadalcanal Island continue mopping up and patrol operations.

UNITED STATES COAST GUARD CUTTER NATSEK (WYP-170)

The U.S. Coast Guard cutter NATSEK was built by the Snow Shipbuilding Corporation, Rockland, Maine, in 1941 and was placed in commission in June 1942. The cutter, which bore the Eskimo name for Fjord Seal, was 116.9 feet in length with a beam of 23.16 feet, and a draft of 11.8 feet. Her gross tonnage was 225 tons, and her net tonnage was 134.

980

Brooklyn Eagle (January 23, 1943)

U.S. blasts road of retreat

Yanks, French halt Germans’ Tunisian drive

…

Surviving Japs hunted down in Papua cleanup

Only handful of hungry, tattered foes left of original 15,000

…

981

La Guardia testifies on Flynn today

To be last witness – charge well-founded, Herlands declares

…

982

Westchester’s citizens expendable, WPB hints

…

983

BRITISH SEIZE TRIPOLI
Battle remnants of Axis army

Encircled men get out of trap, Nazis report

London, England (UP) –
The British Eighth Army marched into Tripoli and hoisted the Union Jack at 5 a.m. today and then sent striking forces racing west of Benito Mussolini’s last African capital in an attempt to encircle and annihilate Axis forces straggling into Tunisia.

A lively battle was said to be developing between the advanced units of the British and the Afrika Korps, presumably west of Tripoli. The German-controlled Radio Paris admitted that the battle had started and that Axis forces had been encircled in the early stages but said that attempts of the British to throw a firm ring around the Germans and Italians had been “frustrated.”

An Italian High Command communiqué admitted the fall of Tripoli, but attempted to convey the impression that Axis forces had retired from the city voluntarily.

The smashing blow to Mussolini’s dreams of African empire was hailed here by War Minister Sir James Grigg as having been an action that firmly turned the tide of war for the British and Russian armies. He paid tribute to the remarkable offensive conducted by Sir Bernard L. Montgomery, Eighth Army commander, who in three months moved almost 1,400 miles across the desert, fighting most of the way.

Officials try to escape

The Axis offered a brief, sharp rearguard defense of Tripoli, but the British pushed through to the city that has been under heavy Allied air attack for two weeks. They found that Italian and German civilian officials had fled from the city to the port of Zaura, 70 miles to the west, and were attempting to escape in small boats. Allied planes attacked the boats and damaged some of them.

Medium bombers and fighter bombers from the 9th U.S. Air Force in Cairo played an important part in the capture of Tripoli and the subsequent drive on west. A communiqué said the American pilots operating west of Tripoli started numerous fires among retreating Axis vehicles. At one point incendiary bombs caused a large explosion and fire on the road leading to Tunisia. All U.S. planes returned safely, the communiqué said.

French move up

Brig. Gen. Jacques Leclerc’s Fighting French forces from the Lake Chad region were reported to have turned toward Tunisia and the Mareth Line, along the border, where Marshal Erwin Rommel was believed to be hoping to hole up for a while and give his Afrika Korps a breathing spell.

A dispatch from a United Press staff correspondent in southern Tunisia had hinted that U.S. paratroops and infantry, along with French forces, might soon stab to the coast, cutting the Afrika Korps off in a narrow, desolate corridor.

Three months to a day from the start of his smashing offensive at El Alamein, more than 1,300 miles to the east, Lt. Gen. Bernard L. Montgomery’s desert-hardened Empire troops were swinging down the narrow, twisted streets of Tripoli, and under the marble triumphal arch that the Caesars built.

A column that had bypassed Tripoli moved ahead on Zaura, 70 miles west of Tripoli, along a road that was a graveyard of Axis tanks, trucks and troops.

Italian Empire gone

Beyond the border lay the old French Mareth Line of forts, Ben Gardane, 20 miles inside Tunisia; Medenine, 48 miles west of Ben Gardane, and Gabes, 45 miles north of Medenine, the first big enemy base and anchor point of the corridor to the north.

The Italians’ once-pretentious African empire was for practical purposes gone.

Only 300 miles by land separated the forces of Montgomery and the U.S. Fifth Army, the British First Army and strong French forces in Tunisia. Only 200 miles separated them by air, and U.S. and British planes from Africa and Tripolitania overlapped in an eternal pounding of the fleeing Afrika Korps.

Rommel’s ultimate plan was presumably to flee to northern Tunisia and join forces with Col. Gen. Hans Arnim in holding a small bridgehead encompassing Tunis and Bizerte. If he could get there, the two Axis forces might total 150,000 men. The Allies were believed to have two or three times that many.

To fight delaying action

At best, it was believed, the Axis planned to fight only a delaying action in northern Tunisia, to give the Germans time to prepare their European defenses before the Allies swarm on to the continent.

Tripoli, besides being a great symbolic victory, was of great potential benefit to the Allies. It has a magnificent harbor, presently clogged with wrecked ships sunk by U.S. and British bombers. Great Castel Benito Airdrome, 10 miles south of Tripoli, will give the Allies a nearby base for operating against the Axis in Tunisia.

Radio Morocco said the Axis retreat was now a complete rout.

984

WAAC wins annulment because mate refused a Catholic ceremony

Mineola, New York –
Supreme Court Justice Cortland A. Johnson here today had granted an annulment of marriage to Gloria Genevieve Munroe of 163 Clement Ave., Elmont, a member of the WAACs, from Donald Robert Munroe, now of Bellmore. They were married July 14, 1940.

Mrs. Munroe testified that when she was married, her husband agreed he would later go through a Catholic marriage ceremony. She said that after marriage, she reminded him of his promise and he refused, saying that he thought It was a “silly notion.” She left him on Jan. 1, 1941.

Mrs. Munroe was inducted into the WAACs two weeks ago and she expects to be called for active duty soon.

985

Errol Flynn takes stand next week

…

Treasury officials defend currency

…

986

U.S. plans reforms to retard rise in price of milk

Milk order is first step in move to force economy, says Wickard

…

987

Hunt 25 Navy men missing on 2 planes

…

988

Movie crews tour barren Aleutians for camp shows

…

989

Seagoing Broncs end Marine unit’s Bahama paradise

One kisses the earth after wild ride on fast Navy vessel
By Sgt. Maurice E. Moran, USMC combat correspondent

…

990

Editorial: Faith in U.S.-led Filipinos alone in East to fight Japs

That the Philippines should have been the only country in the Orient where the natives fought on the side of the foreign power controlling it against the Japanese, in spite of all the Japanese propaganda to the effect that they came as liberators, not as conquerors, is a fact of the highest importance.

In the countries controlled by the British, the French and the Dutch, the only fighting against the Japanese done by the natives was by the very few enrolled in small specialized military and police forces, under officers drawn from their foreign masters. But in the Philippines, not only was the great bulk of the fighting forces actually enrolled against the Japanese drawn from the Philippine people, including their officers, but there the great masses of the people fought against the Japanese on their own account, and were, almost universally, immune to Japanese propaganda and produced no Quislings of any consequence.

But in French Indochina, British Burma and Malay and the Dutch East Indies, generally speaking, the masses of the people were either hostile or indifferent. Either they actively aided the Japanese, or at least preferred Japanese rule, even if harsh, to European rule, because outside control by people of an Oriental race was less humiliating than rule by white men whose whole policy seemed to be built upon the dogma of the inferior status of the native races.

As the tide of war now turns against Japan, as in Europe it turns against Hitler, not only is the lesson furnished by the Philippine exception to the general rule in the Orient important as a factor in prosecuting the war to a victorious issue for the United Nations, it is even more important as a factor in the problems that must face us after the victory.

The explanation of the Philippine situation, as provided by men having the best possible right to testify such men as President Manuel Quezon of the Philippine Republic and his aide, Col. Carlos P. Romulo not only should be a source of legitimate pride both to the Filipinos and the people of the United States but it also provides the fundamental policy to guide the world when not merely their statesmen, but their enlightened peoples, turn from the tasks of war to the even more essential tasks of world reconstruction.

President Quezon’s recent speech in Baltimore before a meeting of the Bar Association and Col. Romulo’s book, I Saw the Fall of the Philippines, both agree that it was because the United States alone among all the great nations controlling Oriental peoples succeeded in convincing the people under its flag, by deeds and not merely by words, that it truly intended to liberate them and uplift them rather than to exploit them commercially that the Philippine people fought for the Stars and Stripes and what that banner symbolizes as if it were their own.

President Quezon said:

When we fought for your flag, we were fighting for our own freedom. You did by us what no other colonizing power has done by the people who had fallen under its sway. For you have been our liberators and our benefactors, and the presence of your flag in the Philippines was the symbol of our freedom. It was there only to allow you to finish the work you had started to do to help set up an independent Philippine republic.

Not all the myriad races of the swarming Orient, it is true, possess that solid core of centuries-old Christianity enjoyed by the bulk of the Filipino people, who have been further instructed in the spirit and practice of democratic processes by decades of such extensive public education as we have provided, but all of them, as President Quezon points out, possess natural self-respect, and that instinctive belief that they:

…like any other nation, possess the right to determine their own destiny as part of the interlocking society that is the human race.

What the United States has achieved in the Philippines, therefore, points the way to the future peace and security of the world even as it throws bright light upon the otherwise somber tragedy of the Filipinos’ struggle, at the side of our American warriors, against the temporary triumph of the Japanese hordes.