Cairo Conferences (SEXTANT)

Have you genuinely not heard of the FLQ?

Their deadly antics got our current Prime Minister’s father to invoke the War Measures Act and impose martial law in Quebec. Junior did the same thing in Ottawa to break up the “Bouncy Castle Insurrection”, proving that Karl Marx’s The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Napoleon still has validity:

Hegel remarks somewhere that all the events and personalities of great importance in world history occur, as it were, twice. He forgot to add: the first time as tragedy, the second as farce.


No I had not, thank you.

U.S. State Department (December 18, 1943)

President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin

Cairo, December 3 [18], 1943

Dear Marshal Stalin, The weather conditions were ideal for crossing the mountains the day of our departure from Teheran so that we had an easy and comfortable flight to Cairo. I hasten to send you my personal thanks for your thoughtfulness and hospitality in providing living quarters for me in your Embassy at Teheran. I was not only extremely comfortable there but I am very conscious of how much more we were able to accomplish in a brief period of time because we were such close neighbors throughout our stay.

I view those momentous days of our meeting with the greatest satisfaction as being an important milestone in the progress of human affairs. I thank you and the members of your staff and household for the many kindnesses to me and to the members of my staff.

I am just starting home and will visit my troops in Italy on the way.

Cordially yours,

President Roosevelt to the British Minister of Information

Washington, December 18, 1943

Dear Brendan: Since my return to Washington, I have received a more complete report of the confusions over publicity which arose at Cairo and Teheran.

Whatever the causes, I am greatly disturbed at the results. Not only did the newspapers, news services, and broadcasters of the United States suffer a heavy penalty because they kept confidence and observed the designated release dates, but non-observance elsewhere has engendered bitter reproaches and many charges of bad faith. Such a condition is distinctly damaging to that unity of purpose and action which the conferences at Cairo and Teheran were designed to promote.

I am resolved that we will not risk a repetition. Consequently, I have decided that hereafter no news having a security value will be issued by the Government for future release, but that all such news will be given out instead at the earliest moment consistent with safety, for immediate publication and broadcast. I have issued instructions to that effect to the various departments and agencies.

Very sincerely yours,

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U.S. State Department (December 20, 1943)

Marshal Stalin to President Roosevelt

December 20, 1943

Personal and Secret Message to President Roosevelt from Premier Stalin

I thank you for Your letter which Your Ambassador has extended to me on December 18.

I am glad that fate has given me an opportunity to render you a service in Tehran. I also attach important significance to our meeting and to the conversations taken place there which concerned such substantial questions of accelerating of our common victory and establishment of future lasting peace between the peoples.


The President’s special assistant to the Secretary of State

Washington, December 20, 1943

Dear Cordell: Here is a memo which Eden handed me in confidence in Cairo, which apparently was prepared for Eden by some of his associates prior to his talk with the King of Greece.

Mr. Eden told me that he followed this line of argument with the King and I gather he made it pretty strong.

Cordially yours,


The British Embassy accredited to the Greek Government-in-Exile in Egypt to the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs

Cairo, November 25, 1943

Main talking points with the King of the Hellenes

  1. Refer again to your previous conversation when you told the King that the strategical situation had changed and that it was most [un]likely that any but quite inconsiderable British forces would be sent to Greece when the Germans evacuate.

  2. Point out that at the time when we thought a considerable British army would go to Greece to drive the Germans out, we strongly supported your desire to enter Greece with the British and Greek forces. Under the changed conditions such British forces as might go to Greece would be mainly concerned in ensuring law and order and in assisting in the distribution of relief supplies.

  3. It would be essential for the Greek Government to function at the earliest possible date in close association with the British and in an atmosphere as far removed as possible from political controversy. This Government would have to be mainly composed of leading personalities who have lived in Greece during the period of the occupation.

  4. During the whole period of the German occupation acute controversy has continued and grown increasingly strong on the subject of the King’s return before the will of the people has been expressed. The immediate return of the King in the teeth of this opposition would inevitably raise this controversy to fever point, and it would be impossible for the King himself to remain outside political dissension. He would find himself confronted with a situation even more acute than that which led to the Metaxas Dictatorship, and would therefore start under every disadvantage, which would make it impossible for him to return in the role which he and we desire for him – that of a constitutional monarch.

  5. The immediate confusion that will result from the difficult social and economic conditions caused by the occupation will make it essential for the Government [to] be in the hands of a leading personality, who has made his mark through his bold resistance to the Germans within the country. He will have to form an emergency Committee prepared to act firmly and to put down disorder. The first administration to be formed will be of a temporary character to tide over the period until normal conditions can be established and elections held. It would be an undesirable situation for the King, when he first returned to Greece, to be associated directly with an administration bound to become unpopular and unable to accord all those freedoms associated with a constitutional monarchy.

  6. In these circumstances, the King should consider the choice of the most suitable personality to head a Regency Committee in Athens the moment the Germans evacuate. Archbishop Damaskinos is prepared to undertake this responsibility, but must know in advance that he can announce to the Greek people, as soon as the Germans quit Athens, that he has the legal authority of the King for so doing.

  7. There is therefore every advantage for the King, in his own interests as well as those of his country, to make it clear now to his people that he does not intend to return to Greece until such conditions have been established as will allow him to function as a constitutional monarch. He has no desire to return to Greece unless he can so function, but he also has no desire to return unless he is convinced by a clear expression of the people’s will that the system of constitutional monarchy is desired by them.

  8. An immediate declaration to this effect would rally moderate opinion against any attempt made by a small section, who seek to impose their will by force as soon as the Germans leave Athens. This section have made capital out of the failure of the King so far to make such a declaration.

  9. There is reason to believe that if Zervas knew that such a declaration would be made by the King, he would immediately ask that his irregular forces should be incorporated in the Greek regular Army. If this were immediately granted by the King it would act as a magnet to draw large numbers of the officers and men in the ELAS forces to break away from purely sectional political control and make a similar request for incorporation on the same terms as those accorded to Zervas. This would bring the Greek Government in Cairo into close association with the resistance movements inside Greece, and would thereby enormously enhance the authority and prestige of the King and his Government, which would then be reformed to include personalities from Greece and would consequently provide a Government of which Archbishop Damaskinos could avail himself when he set up his Regency Committee in Athens.

British Embassy to Greece, Cairo
25 November, 1943

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U.S. State Department (December 22, 1943)

841d.01/228: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State

London, December 22, 1943 — 4 p.m.

Personal and secret to the Secretary.

Your 8004, December 18, Department’s 7184, November 13, was held by the Embassy until my return and because of the absence of both Eden and the Prime Minister. I explained the British position on this issue to the President in Cairo, having taken the matter up at great length with the Prime Minister on my journey out there with him. I understood the President would talk with the Prime Minister on this subject but do not know the results of their discussion.

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The Diplomatic Agent in Lebanon to the Secretary of State

Beirut, December 22, 1943

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I should, I believe, add the following report regarding my brief conversation in Cairo with the President:

Summoned by telephone message from Mr. Kirk, I arrived in Cairo the evening of December 2 and was received by the President the following afternoon. In reply to questions, I gave a brief review of the Lebanese crisis; then presented President Khouri’s letter.

I explained that I had brought the letter personally in the thought that, should it be thought appropriate that personal reply be made from Cairo, an expression of satisfaction at the outcome of the crisis might be added to the usual formal acknowledgment and good wishes.

The President appeared to welcome this suggestion and asked that a reply in the suggested sense be drafted for his signature. He asked that it include mention of the fact that, had time and duties permitted, he would have desired personally to visit Lebanon. I was, too, to convey to President Khouri, but not to include in the letter, Mr. Roosevelt’s keen personal interest in reforestation, a subject which possesses particular historical as well as current interest to Lebanon.

The latter message has been delivered. It was received with evidently sincere interest and appreciation.

The aspect of the Lebanese crisis in which President Roosevelt seemed to take special interest was as to whether General de Gaulle was personally responsible for the dictatorial action taken by Monsieur Helleu in suspending the Lebanese Constitution, proroguing Parliament and imprisoning President and ministers.

I could only answer that rumour and report in Beirut, which I tended to credit, had it that Helleu had acted under de Gaulle’s general instructions and that de Gaulle had later approved Helleu’s action in the matter. General Catroux, I added, had been categorical in insisting that, in his opinion, Helleu had misinterpreted and exceeded them.

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Madame Chiang to President Roosevelt

Chungking, December 5 [22], 1943

My Dear Mr. President: The Generalissimo and I arrived in Chungking on the morning of December 1. …

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Immediately upon our return the Generalissimo consulted with Dr. Kung regarding the feasibility of the plan which you suggested in our conference regarding the alleviation of China’s urgent economic situation. Dr. Kung has studied its possibilities with great care and he wishes me to tell you that, in his opinion, your suggestion is both generous and kind and he thinks some feasible procedure could be worked out with the aid of Secretary Morgenthau. He appreciates the interest and concern you have shown in helping us to fight aggression not only with the military machine, but with economic weapons as well. He is impressed with the fact that you see with such clear foresight and vision that, in order to continue resistance, methods and means must be evolved to hold intact China’s economic security, a fact which you doubtless will remember that the Generalissimo emphasized was even more critical than the military.

The Generalissimo is now thinking of asking Dr. Kung or his appointee, empowered with full credentials, to go to Washington to discuss the details with the American Government and would like to know whether this is satisfactory to you. It would, of course, be best if Dr. Kung could go himself, but, failing that, he will send one of his trusted men to go in his stead.

I need not tell you how grateful we feel that you have promised to speak to the Treasury about the two hundred million gold bar arrangement.

The Generalissimo wishes me to thank you again for your promise to help stabilize the fapi.

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Völkischer Beobachter (December 23, 1943)

Churchills Kairoer Nachkonferenz

w. v. d. Ankara, 22. Dezember –
Churchill ist nicht gleichzeitig mit Roosevelt von Kairo aufgebrochen, weil er, wie die offizielle Begründung lautet, seine seit der Erkrankung vom vergangenen Frühjahr immer noch angegriffene Lunge in dem günstigen ägyptischen Winterklima kräftigen wollte. Daneben aber hatte er auch die Absicht, sich vor seiner Rückreise nach London noch bestimmten Arbeiten an nahöstlichen Problemen zu widmen, die im besonderen Interesse Englands liegen. Ein Steckenpferd Churchills ist seit jeher die Herstellung einer panarabischen Union unter englischer Oberleitung gewesen. Schon in der Zeit nach dem ersten Weltkrieg hatte er dieses Ziel im Auge. Damals ließ sich das Projekt einer arabischen Einigung indessen nicht verwirklichen, weil Frankreich darauf bestand, die Vormacht roll? im syrischen Raum zu erhalten. Da sich nach dem französischen Zusammenbruch im gegenwärtigen Krieg der englischen Politik die Möglichkeit bot, zu dem alten Plan zurückzukehren, so wurde er von ihr vor eineinhalb Jahren wieder aufgegriffen und seine Ausführung dem ägyptischen Premierminister Nahas Pascha übertragen Aber alle Bemühungen des Ägypters in der ihm gewiesenen Richtung sind bisher kläglich fehlgeschlagen. In der Tat hat Nahas Pascha mittlerweile die Hoffnung, eine Union der arabischen Staaten ins Leben rufen zu können, aufgegeben. Kleinlaut spricht er nur noch von panarabischer- Zusammenarbeit Eine solche aber genügt dem britischen Premierminister nicht. Churchill will, daß ein festgefügter Block entstehe, der sich geschlossen dem Willen Englands unterordnete und der durch seine Geschlossenheit Einmischungen anderer Großmächte in irgendwelchen arabischen Gebieten erschwert.

Berichte aus Kairo besagen, daß neuerdings weitere Umstände hinzugekommen sind, die Nahas Pascha die Freude an dem ihm erteilten Auftrag nehmen. Ägypten ist in den letzten Wochen zweimal, der Iran einmal Gastgeber internationaler Konferenzen gewesen. Der Iran erhielt dafür, gleichsam als Belohnung, ein amerikanisch-englisch-sowjetisches Kommuniqué, das ihm für die Zeit nach dem Kriege Wiederherstellung seiner Rechte und Freiheit verspricht. Ägypten aber ist selbst ohne diesen Trostpreis geblieben. Gewiß, die dem Iran gegebenen Versprechungen werden. sich zu gegebener Zeit als recht wertlos erweisen. Doch sollte der iranische Premierminister Suheili durch sie immerhin in den Stand versetzt werden, sich vor der Öffentlichkeit seines Landes brüsten zu können, daß er etwas „erreicht“ habe. Nahas Pascha aber ist nicht in die gleiche Lage gebracht worden. Sein Volk weiß sehr genau, daß er entsprechend dem Programm des von ihm geleiteten Wafd mancherlei Wünsche hat: er möchte – nachdem er eine solche allerdings nur bedingte Zusage von England bereits im Herbst 1942 erhielt – nun auch von den Vereinigten Staaten und der Sowjetunion die Zusicherung erlangen, daß Ägypten auf der zukünftigen Friedenskonferenz als gleichberechtigter Staat zugelassen werde. Ferner strebt er eine Änderung des ägyptisch-britischen Bündnisvertrages an, unter dem sein Land weiter in einem Vasallenverhältnis zu England geblieben ist. Und er will schließlich, daß der Sudan Ägypten einverleibt werde. Bei dem letzten Programmpunkt handelt es sich ebenfalls um eine nationale Aspiration von nicht geringer Bedeutung, nennt sich doch der ägyptische König in seinem offiziellen Titel schon jetzt auch „Herr des Sudans.“ Die ägyptische Öffentlichkeit hatte von ihrem Premierminister erwartet, daß es ihm gelingen werde, den zweimaligen Aufenthalt Roosevelts und Churchills in Kairo für die Durchsetzung dieser ägyptischen Forderungen auszunutzen. Nahas Pascha hat das jedoch nicht vermocht. Es trifft ihn infolgedessen allgemeiner Tadel, worunter sein Eifer bei der Zusammenarbeit mit Churchill leidet.

Im Zusammenhang mit dem panarabischen Problem gibt es noch manche andere Schwierigkeiten, die Churchill Sorge bereiten. Ihn Saud, der von einer Union der arabischen Staaten nichts wissen will, weil er nicht geneigt ist, sein Land einer ägyptischen Leitung zu unterstellen, hat jüngst in bündigster Form erklärt, auch eine panarabische Zusammenarbeit planmäßiger Art könne nicht in Frage kommen, solange das palästinensische Problem nicht eine gerechte Lösung gefunden habe. Wiederholte Aussagen des irakischen „Premierministers“ Nuri el Said, der sich trotz seiner Englandhörigkeit in der Frage Palästinas des Öfteren nicht ohne Nachdruck der arabischen Interessen angenommen hat, bekunden die gleiche Auffassung. Die Haltung des Irakers wird auch durch das Bedürfnis seines Landes nach dem Bau einer Eisenbahn von Bagdad nach Haifa bestimmt, die den Irak fester mit Palästina verbinden und ihm den ersehnten Ausgang zum Mittelmeer geben soll.

In Palästina selber stehen die Dinge ebenfalls schlecht. Nachdem sich bereits saudi-arabische, irakische und syrische Abordnungen zur Erörterung der panarabischen Angelegenheit in Kairo eingefunden haben, ist Nahas Pascha seit Monaten bestrebt, zu den Beratungen auch eine palästinensische Araberdelegation hinzuzuziehen. Die Araber Palästinas wollen die gleiche Delegation entsenden wie seinerzeit (Frühjahr 1939) zu der fehlgeschlagenen Londoner „Konferenz am runden Tisch.“ Delegationsführer war damals Dschemal Husseini, der sich gegenwärtig in Uganda in Verbannung befindet. Die Engländer wären an sich bereit’, ihn frei zu lassen. Dschemal Husseini, der sich stets nur als der Beauftragte seines Vetters, des Großmufti von Jerusalem, gefühlt hat, aber erklärt, er könne sich nicht ohne Zustimmung seines Oberhauptes für den Delegationszweck zur Verfügung stellen. Im übrigen zeigt auch in den inneren Verwaltungsangelegenheiten Palästinas die englische Oberbehörde nach wie vor wenig Bereitwilligkeit zur Herbeiführung einer gerechten Lösung des arabisch-jüdischen Problems. So ist von ihr im November ein beratender Wirtschaftsausschuß unter der Leitung von drei Engländern eingesetzt worden, zu dem vier Juden und vier Araber gehören, während es doch im Lande doppelt so viel Araber als Juden gibt. Die Araber innerhalb und außerhalb Palästinas sehen darin einen weiteren Beweis der antiarabischen Einstellung Englands.

Eine englische Meldung hat ausgesprochen, daß sich Churchill während seines verlängerten Kairoer Aufenthalts auch mit der libanesisch-syrischen Frage befassen wolle. Diese hat gewiß insofern Fortschritte gemacht, als es in beiden Ländern gelungen ist, den gaullistischen Einfluß auszuschalten. Die Regierungen der beiden Staaten verhandeln zur Zeit über die Herstellung einer gemeinsamen Zoll- und Verkehrsverwaltung, die bisher unter gaullistischer Leitung stand und die Haupteinnahmequelle der dem Libanon und Syrien aufgezwungenen gaullistischen Beamtenschaft bildete. Die Gaullisten werden somit, weil sie sich ihre Gehälter nicht mehr auszahlen können, wahrscheinlich demnächst das Feld räumen müssen. So weit ist also das von England angezettelte Spiel gelungen. Doch zeigt sich jetzt, daß sich die englische Politik in ihren eigenen Netzen gefangen hat. Es lag ihr daran, Frankreich aus dem syrischen Raum zu verdrängen. Um dies zu erreichen, war sie darauf aus, den französischen Mandatsapparat zu stürzen. Dem englischen Anschlag haben sich die Libanesen und Syrer neuerlich freudigst geliehen. Doch gingen die Regierungen der beiden Staaten nun noch den einen, durchaus logischen Schritt weiter, daß sie das französische Mandat nicht nur in der Praxis, sondern auch als Prinzip aufheben wollen. Das aber glaubt England nicht zulassen zu dürfen, weil es befürchtet, sein Mandatsverhältnis in Palästina könnte dadurch tangiert werden. Riad el Sulh, der libanesische Premierminister, und Saadalah Dschabri, sein syrischer Kollege, die erprobte Kampfkameraden (und miteinander verschwägert) sind, haben sehr wohl erkannt, daß die Beibehaltung des Mandatsprinzips, auch ein leeres, für ihre Länder gefährlich wäre, weil dadurch die Hintertüren für eine Wiedereinführung der eigentlichen Mandatspolitik durch die Großmächte offenbliebe. Die Freiheitsbewegung um Libanon und in Syrien wird sich also hienach unter Umständen gegen England richten.

U.S. State Department (December 23, 1943)

Generalissimo Chiang to President Roosevelt

Chungking, 23 December 1943


I have received your telegram of December 21. Since our meeting at Cairo, I have been even more keenly aware of your friendly assistance to and deep concern for China, and have therefore accepted your suggestion of delaying our all-out offensive in Burma until we can have a large-scale amphibious operation as outlined in your telegram of December 7. As regards the general strategy decided by the British-American council of Chiefs of Staff to use all available resources to defeat Germany first, I was not present during the deliberations and was therefore not in position to express my views. I place the greatest confidence in the soundness of your judgment. I must however say quite frankly that judging by the latest military dispositions and activities the Allied strategy of relegating the China War Theater to the background has given rise to serious misgivings on all sides. The success or failure of the Burma campaign is a matter of life and death for China. You will recall that while at Cairo I emphasized the fact that to dispatch our Yunnan troops to begin operations in south Burma to outflank the enemy is to court disaster – a plan of campaign to which I am unable to agree. …

U.S. State Department (December 24, 1943)

740.0011 EW 1939/12–2443

The Ambassador in Turkey to the Chief, Division of Near Eastern Affairs

Ankara, December 24, 1943
Most secret

Dear Paul: The minutes of the various Anglo-American-Turkish meetings in Cairo having now been approved by the British, I enclose a set for your information and for the records of the Department. In so doing, I should make it clear that these minutes have not been shown to the Turks or the Russians and accordingly are in no sense binding on either of them. They merely reflect the composite belief of the British and ourselves as to what was said. They are, in my opinion, full and complete, subject always to the misunderstandings – great or small – that inevitably arise when the conversations are carried on in three languages, English, French and Turkish, with only two or three individuals present who speak all three languages fluently.

Subject to the foregoing qualification, but taken as a whole, I think they clearly reflect in detail the views expressed at the Conference. One point will puzzle you which George has probably already cleared up. That is the status of the Russians at the Conference. Vinogradov’s instructions were delayed in transmission and he had not received them at the time we left Ankara. Hugessen and I persuaded him to go along “as President Inönü’s guest.” On his arrival in Cairo his instructions to go to Cairo caught up with him but they failed to authorize him to participate in the Conference specifically stating that Vishinsky would represent the Russian Government. As George has doubtless explained to you, Vishinsky’s arrival in Cairo was delayed until some hours after the Conference had closed and about twelve hours after President Roosevelt and Hopkins had departed. Vishinsky telephoned me at midnight an hour or two after his arrival in Cairo and in the course of our ensuing talk convinced me – beyond a doubt – that his delay had been in no sense intentional but had resulted from his instructions arriving in Algiers a few hours after he had left there for Naples and when they finally caught up with him he left immediately for Cairo but the delay of two days prevented him from arriving there in time.

After I outlined to him what had taken place at the Conference, he seemed quite satisfied with the outcome – and what impressed me more than anything else – clearly indicated that he had not expected any commitment by the Turks to enter the war by December 31 and would not be surprised at their unwillingness to commit themselves irrevocably on February 15. I gained the impression after my talk with him that the Russians will be satisfied if the Turks enter the war at such time in the spring as may fit in with the overall Allied plans.

As you know, we returned to Ankara the next morning. I understand that Vishinsky had a long talk with Eden after our departure in the course of which Eden outlined the position to him. I have no knowledge as to the outcome of the talk between Vishinsky and Eden after my departure from Cairo but Vinogradov tells me that he has received no instructions to make any representations to the Turkish Government and so I am inclined to the view that the Russians are permitting the British to take the lead in dealing with the Turks from now on subject only to the political discussions concerning the Balkans in general and the position to be taken by Russia vis-à-vis Bulgaria should the latter declare war on Turkey, aid the Germans or permit the passage of German troops through Bulgaria.

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The enclosed minutes are copy No. 8. By agreement with the British only ten copies exist of which they hold six and we hold four, each of us to assume responsibility for the utmost secrecy in respect of the copies in our possession.

With every good wish [etc.]

U.S. State Department (December 27, 1943)


Memorandum prepared in the Department of State

Washington, December 27, 1943

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The indications are that the Chinese Government has applied to this Government for a loan of $1,000,000,000, and this memorandum will be posited on an assumption that such is the fact.

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There are indications that the subject of this loan was broached by Chiang at the Cairo Conference. There have been heard rumors to the effect that Chiang was given encouragement to believe that the requests by China for such a loan would meet with favorable response. There are indications, also, that Chiang strongly urged that a campaign for the reopening of the Burma Road be embarked upon at once; and rumors have been heard and have been seen in print to the effect that Chiang was told that this could not be done. Whatever the facts may be so far as the Cairo Conference is concerned, China’s desire for a loan has apparently been formally expressed and operations for the reopening of the Burma Road have not been embarked upon.

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U.S. State Department (January 3, 1944)


Memorandum by the Secretary of State

Washington, January 3, 1944

Memorandum of Conversation


Participants: Secretary of State Hull and the British Ambassador, Lord Halifax

The British Ambassador called at his request and remarked that information had come to him from his Foreign Office that in a conversation with the Turks, Egyptians, and perhaps others, during his recent trip to the Near East, the President spoke rather definitely about what purported to be his views to the effect that Indochina should be taken away from the French and put under an international trusteeship, et cetera.…


U.S. State Department (January 5, 1944)


The Second Secretary of Embassy in China to the Ambassador in China

Chengtu, January 5, 1944

No. 12

Sir: I have the honor to report that on January 4, 1944 I called by appointment on General Chang Chun, Chairman of the Szechwan Provincial Government, who received me at his private residence south of the West China University campus.…

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… I inquired whether the Chinese Government had any plans for sending Japanese-trained administrators to Japan to assist in restoring order. He assured me that this question had been fully discussed and settled at the Cairo Conference and that the Generalissimo had informed him recently that the conferees had agreed that as soon as Japan’s military power had been broken the Japanese in Japan proper would be permitted to work out their own destiny without outside direction.…

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What’s fapi? Is it how the chinese refered to the japs?

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U.S. State Department (January 14, 1944)

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the President

London, 14 January 1944

For the President from Ambassador Winant.

I have just received the following confidential communication dated January 13 from Mr. Eden regarding a matter which you discussed with him at your recent meeting in Egypt:

13 January, 1944

My dear Ambassador,

Before I left Egypt the President mentioned to me that Father Hughes, an English priest who is at present in charge of the Apostolic Delegation in Cairo, had complained to him of the treatment by the authorities concerned of Italian priests and nuns who had been arrested or interned. I told the President at the time that I was sure that there was another side to this question, and informed Lord Killearn of the conversation. I have now in front of me several reports from Lord Killearn which show that I was right, and that Father Hughes, in making these complaints, had, to say the least, allowed his heart to rule his head.

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U.S. State Department (January 19, 1944)

870.01 AMG/21

The Secretary of State to the President

Washington, January 19, 1944

Memorandum for the President

On September 25 you authorized the Department to propose to the British participation of American political (Lincoln MacVeagh) and economic (James Landis) representatives on the ATB (Administration of Territories – Balkans) Committee in Cairo in order to meet the increasingly urgent need for a direct method of Anglo-American collaboration as regards the Balkans, and with a view to full American participation in the execution of agreed political and economic policies in that area. The ATB was then a British military-civilian committee, after having started out as a purely military body.

Although Ambassador Winant has subsequently pursued this matter, under instructions, he has been unable to get any concrete response from the British. Finally, in December, the British said this question had been “discussed at the highest level in North Africa” and promised a definite reply as soon as they knew the results of these discussions.

So far nothing has been received. Before instructing Winant to take the matter up again, I should appreciate being informed whether this question was in fact covered in your recent discussions; and, if so, what decisions were reached.


U.S. State Department (February 3, 1944)

Generalissimo Chiang to President Roosevelt

Chungking, 3 February 1944

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I appreciate your desire to open the Ledo Road, a desire which is also my great concern since it is only thru the opening of this land route that China may quickly obtain the heavy equipment much needed by her Army. You doubtless recall that at Cairo I reiterated and emphasized the fact that I am ready to send the Yunnan troops into Burma at any moment that large scale amphibious landing operations can be effected at strategic points.

I stand ready to adhere to this decision, and hope that we can carry out operations even before November of this year, which date you mentioned as possible and probable for the diverting of the amphibious equipment to Burma.

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