The hunting off Freetown , West Africa remained good.
• After refueling from Egerland, Heinrich Liebe in U-38 sank five ships for 29,400 tons, bringing his total to seven.
• Jost Metzler in U-69 bravely laid his TMB mines in the harbors of Takoradi on May 27, and Lagos on May 29. Later, Metzler lightheartedly described these extremely hazardous missions as “crazy exploits,” but they were successful. The British were forced to close both harbors. One mine damaged a 5,400-ton freighter in Takoradi; another sank a 2,900-ton freighter in Lagos.
• Viktor Schütze in U-103 sank four ships for 22,500 tons, including the 6,900-ton tanker British Grenadier, bringing his total to eleven.
• The Italian submarine Tazzoli sank the 8,800-ton Norwegian tanker Alfred Olsen.
• Homebound to Lorient, George Schewe in U-105 sank another ship, bringing his confirmed total to twelve for 70,500 tons.
• Jürgen Oesten in U-106, who had been sidetracked on escort missions for almost seven weeks, sank two ships for 13,200 tons, bringing his total to seven, plus the hit on the battleship Malaya.
• Günther Hessler in U-107 sank three more ships for 14,500 tons, bringing his total to eleven, including a second tanker, the 8,000-ton Dutch Marisa.
The aggregate sinkings of the boats in the South Atlantic in May were more than sufficiently impressive to justify the “diversion” of these boats from the North Atlantic. The sinkings served another purpose as well: They compelled the British to drastically curb the unescorted ship traffic in that area, to increase convoying from Freetown, and to draw a substantial number of surface escorts from the North Atlantic to the South Atlantic. Accordingly, Dönitz directed two more IXBs, U-66 and U-123, to sail to West Africa in June.
ROYAL NAVY ASW COUNTER MEASURES IN WEST AFRICAN SHORES AND SOUTH ATLANTIC (Let’s go after German Navy disguised supply ships !)
Thanks to the priceless intelligence haul from Lemp’s U-110, British codebreakers could read naval Enigma fluently and currently throughout the month of June. The torrent of information, which the British called Most Secret Ultra (shortened to Ultra), gave a select few in the Admiralty an astounding view of the Kriegsmarine’s innermost secrets, including everything about U-boat operations. Rodger Winn’s assistant in the U-boat Tracking Room, Patrick Beesly, remembered: “We rapidly learned the exact number of U-boats at sea, and not only the contents of their own signals but, even more important, the instructions constantly being pumped out to them by Dönitz from his headquarters in Lorient.”
The radio traffic between Dönitz and his skippers also revealed to the Admiralty day-by-day positions of nearly all the U-boats. Hence the Admiralty had an opportunity to organize task forces and “pounce” these boats by surface ship and aircraft and destroy them, putting an end to the U-boat menace in one simultaneous operation. But to attack twenty-odd U-boats in diverse locations simultaneously, the Admiralty believed, would tip off the Germans that Enigma had been broken and lead them to take corrective measures, such as changing the keys, or perhaps even introducing a new code machine.
Rather than attack the U-boats frontally, the Admiralty elected to impede their operations in indirect ways. These were principally two: by routing convoys away from the known U-boat positions and by thwarting the plan to use Bismarck’s supply ships for refueling U-boats at sea.
The refueling scheme was to be thwarted by directly confronting the supply ships and capturing or sinking them, as if the British had come upon them as a result of comprehensive and diligent blue-water patrolling. To be sure, there was a risk of arousing German suspicion, but less so in sinking big surface ships because the surface ships were easier to detect by radar than U-boats. The Admiralty knew, from breaking Enigma dispatches from Bismarck, that Lütjens had informed the OKM that British surface-ship radar was amazingly effective, capable of picking up a surface ship at a range of “at least 35,000 meters,” or about twenty miles.
Royal Navy assault on Bismarck’s supply ships began on June 3 in the North Atlantic. The cruisers HMS Aurora and HMS Kenya attacked the 10,000-ton German tanker Belchen, which was parked eighty miles southwest of Greenland. Belchen had refueled Kleinschmidt’s U-111 and Paulshen’s U-557, and when the cruisers struck, she was in the process of refueling Korth’s U-93. Belchen threw off the hoses and scuttled. Korth dived but he shied from attacking the cruisers while they destroyed Belchen with accurate gunfire.
Later that day, Korth surfaced and rescued all fifty survivors of Belchen. Dönitz instructed him to make for another Bismarck supply ship, Friedrich Breme, offload the survivors, refuel, and resume his patrol. But Korth demurred on the grounds that should that rendezvous fail, he did not have enough fuel to reach France. Halfway back to Lorient, on June 6, Korth spotted and reported a southbound convoy, but owing to his shortage of fuel and the presence on board of the fifty Belchen survivors, he did not attack or shadow it for the benefit of other boats. Although Korth had won his Ritterkreuz earlier on this patrol, when he arrived in Lorient, Dönitz upbraided him for not attacking and tracking the convoy, regardless of the presence of the Belchen survivors. Logging that Korth seemed to be losing his fighting edge, Dönitz decided to send him to West African waters on his next patrol.
The loss of Belchen was a stiff blow to Dönitz. She had been ideally situated to resupply the western patrol line, enabling those boats to double the time in the operating area. After Korth in After Korth in U-93, Walter Kell, age twenty-seven, commanding commanding the VIIC U-204 on his maiden patrol from Germany, had been next in line to refuel from Belchen. So that operation, and several others as well, had to be canceled.
In the two days following the destruction of Belchen, June 4 and 5, Royal Navy naval task forces struck at four other German supply ships in the North and South Atlantic simultenously thanks to intelligence guidence of ULTRA. Aircraft from HMS Victorious, the battleship HMS Nelson, and the cruiser HMS Neptune teamed up with the armed merchant ship Esperance Bay, forcing the 4,000-ton German supply ship Gonzenheim to scuttle. In the same area, the destroyer HMS Marsdale, trained for boarding, captured the 9,000-ton German tanker Gedania before she could scuttle. In southern waters, the light cruiser HMS London and the destroyer HMS Brilliant forced the 9,900-ton German tanker Esso Hamburg and the 9,800-ton German tanker Egerland to scuttle.
In the capture of Gedania, which was en route to relieve Egerland, the British Royal Marines who boarded her and Germans fought a pitched battle aboard tanker, during which several Gedania crewmen were killed. After the victory the British marines found numerous secret papers, including Enigma materials and the operational orders issued to Gedania. These orders contained a wealth of new information: instructions for conducting a rendezvous with a U-boat (coded meeting points, communications procedures, recognition signals), precise (coded) routes to be followed by supply ships and blockade runners when approaching French ports, and, not incidentally, the location of the North Atlantic weather-reporting trawler during June 1941.
Thanks to this information Submarine Tracking Room in OIC , Western Approaches Command and British Admiralty quickly went to work. First on 6th June 1941 , a 9.500 ton German blockade runner Elbe was intercepted by Swordfish and Fairey Blackburn aircraft from Royal Navy carrier HMS Eagle off Azores and forcing German blockade runner to scuttle when cornered.
Dönitz learned of the loss of Egerland from Heinrich Liebe in U-38, who was approaching her to replenish when she was scuttled and who then searched unsuccessfully for survivors. It was another blow. Her loss and the loss of her relief, Gedania, meant that the highly rewarding U-boat operations off the West African coast were to be interrupted until a substitute resupply ship could be stationed in those waters. Dönitz therefore directed the five boats remaining in the Freetown area to replenish, if necessary, from another Bismarck supply ship, the 10,700-ton tanker Lothringen, which had parked farther north.
Continuing their secret campaign, Royal Navy had five more successes. On June 12 the cruiser HMS Sheffield intercepted and forced the 10,400-ton German tanker Friedrich Breme to scuttle off Dakar. On June 15 the carrier HMS Eagle and the cruiser HMS Dunedin captured German tanker Lothringen intact , obtaining Enigma materials and wiping out the proposed resupply of the U-boats in the Freetown area. On June 21 light cruiser HMS London forced the 4,400-ton German supply ship Babitonga, (a merchant-raider supply ship), to scuttle. On June 23 destroyers of the 8th Flotilla and the destroyer HMS Marsdale teamed with aircraft and forced another German merchant-raider supply ship, the 3,000-ton Alstertor, to scuttle.
Nor was that all. Thanks to intelligenge captured on German tanker Gedania , on June 28 the cruiser HMS Nigeria and three destroyers of the Royal Navy Home Fleet pounced on the 136-foot, 344-ton German weather-reporting trawler Lauenburg, commanded by fifty-eight-year-old Hinrich Gewald off Greenland. A boarding party from the destroyer HMS Tartar, commanded by Lt. T. Hugh P. Wilson and advised by code-breaker Allon Bacon, captured the trawler and intelligence materials of “inestimable value” (as the Admiralty later put it), including the daily Enigma ring and plugboard keys for July 1941. These enabled Bletchley Park to continue reading naval Enigma fluently and currently through that month.
Denied the services of the supply ships Egerland, Gedania, and Lothringen, which, as related, the British wiped out, and badly in need of refits or overhauls and rest for the crews, one by one the boats in West African waters returned to France. George Schewe in U-105 and Jürgen Oesten in U-106 arrived on June 13 and June 18, having been out for 112 and 110 days, respectively. Dönitz had high praise for both skippers. Schewe’s score of twelve ships for 70,500 tons established a new record for a single patrol. Trailing U-105 homeward by about a week, Heinrich Liebe in U-38 sank his eighth ship, the 7,600-ton British freighter Kingston Hill. This sinking put Liebe over the 200,000-ton mark and he thus became the sixth skipper to earn Oak Leaves to his Ritterkreuz. Having commanded U-38 since the outbreak of war, Liebe had been in continuous Atlantic combat longer than any other skipper. When he reached Lorient, Dönitz sent him to a job in the Training Command, but the weary U-38 was retained in the Atlantic.