As you can see from my avatar , I am a huge fan of Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery. Although I am aware of his personality faults , his lack of tact , proper behavior and insubordination and inability to get along with a lot of his peers , I believe he was the one of the best commanders of Western Allies ranks, because he knew and aware of the army and manpower of the forces he was commanding , knowing their strengths and their limits and how much they could take and what could be expected from them. He advanced , won despite growing manpower shortage crisis for British and Canadian Armies as war closed to its final stage (unlike Auchinleck who was gifted but mainly an Indian Army officer alien to British or other Commonwealth operational methods or commanders and as a result Panzer Army Afrika entered into deep Egypt in 1942 summer despite Auchinleck had only one front to deal wih in Libya unlike say Wavell who had been fighting four or five fronts from East Africa , to Balkans to Iraq to Western Desert with much more limited resources than Auchinleck. Auchinleck despite having numerical and material superiorty did not know what to do unlike Alexander/Montgomery duo who know how to use material , numerical and firepower superiorty advantages )
After the war mainly due to war of generals memoirs , post war historical revisionism and nationalistic jignoism let several unjust accusations against Montgomery to bring down his reputation as if he did not led first an army then an army group sucessfully to victory from Africa to all the way to Northern
Germany. Mainly for his record in Normandy and Northwest Europe Campaigns
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Alamein Line or Etna Line , or Caen were impossible to outflank , so in the frontal attack were firepower is the key , all set pieces and material superiority were essential. Montgomery had to take his time to build up material and logistics , raise morale and train his army because of that after his arrival in desert in August 1942. In a standart classic frontal offensive operation , you need at least three to one superiorty against defending enemy (Panzer Army Africa which reinforced their bottleneck with numereous minefield and anti tank gun belts.) When 8th Army started its attack under Montgomery in 23rd October 1942 , in manpower it had less than two to one supertiorty over enemy and 2,5/1 superiorty in tanks which could be neutralised easiy in defensive firepower and minefields. So first order of business , as soon as Montgomery arrived to Egypt to take 8th Army command , theatrical show of “Forbidding anymore retreat” and “insisting his orders to be obeyed” were displays to raise the morale as soon as he arrived to take the command. Regrouping and reorganizing of 8th Army was absolutely vital if they would prevail in one battle and drive Panzer Army for good from Egypt and Libya which they eventually accomplished. Before that 8th Army fought in small combat groups , aping Germans but unfortunately Germans were both better and more balanced in small combat unit organizations. As a result due to unit organization muddle in 8th Army , small battalion and brigade sized units became easy prey for Afrikakorps and their much better anti tank screen traps. Montgomery put a stop to that , ordering his forces to fight in big division sized units , and not to be divided into smaller brigade or battalions. It made them somewhat clumsy but also kept them safe , prevented them to be taken out one by one piecemental by Panzer Army as happened before so many times.
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Unity of command was essential, army units should have been responsible directly to army commander in order based approach and Montgomery had no time to change that operational culture so he did his best and forced the enemy to fight in same conditions. (as Donald Rumsfeld said “You go to the war with the army you have”) As Montgomery realized when army was broken into smaller units Germans with better field unit command , organization and training ambushed and destroyed Allied units in same size one by one. German panzers also fainted a retreat and draw British armor in front of deadly German anti tank gun screens , destroying them. To stop these , her had to unify the command of 8th Army upon himself in his Field HQ and take the operational initiative on himself. He correctly did not trust his subordinates. Montgomery also put a stop leaving open flanks or gaps on defenses to be exploited by enemy (which Germans were very good at) Defensive lines became robust , reinforced and impossible to break or outflank just like Great War in Western Front style after he took command of 8th Army. No more box style encampments manning defenses , the defensive lines became unbroken chain of reinforced belts after he took command.
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British Army operational method Order Based Approach was worse than German mission based approach and Montgomery was essentially aware that compared to Germans he was commanding an army of Civilian Amateurs in uniform. There was no unified operational culture in British Army that could not adapt changing conditions. (In contrast German Operational method was developing since Franco-Prussia War in 1870-71 which created unified German Empire and Army) That is why most of the time Monty appeared cautious , methodic , systematic and relying on firepower. His step by step methodical approach , build up all set pieces then start operations simplified things a lot for Allies armies on the field. (which were suffering operational method muddle)
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Logistics were essential , too many times pursuit in desert by British petered out that made them open and vulnerable to enemy counter attack. Logistical build up was vital to sustain operations as long as possible. At the other hand material superiority did not guarantee victory since Auchinleck Ritchie due had everything in their disposal almost twice more than Panzer Army Africa and lost both battle of Gazala and Tobruk
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Montgomery had to change command staff of his new 8th Army command since previous commanders were taking orders as basis for discussion. He had to place men he knew in subordinate commands (Generals Sir Brian Horrocks , Sir Oliver Leese as Corps Commanders , Sidney Kirkman as overall artillery commander , Freddie de Guingand as Chief of Staff and later Miles Dempsey as Army Commander) and work with and impose his will and authority upon rest.
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Firepower in frontal warfare was essential. Axis fortified its defenses with two million mines in Alamein line and all of Auckinleck’s previous attacks failed very badly on these reinforced minefields during First Battle of Alamein in July 1942. Axis anti tank gunnery and light weapons were better (with 57 , 75 and 88 mm guns which can knock out even “invincible” US made Sherman and Grant tanks which were also vulnerable to mines. By the way 8th Army had only 267 Sherman and 100 Grant tanks when Second Battle of Alamein started in 23rd October 1942 , remaining 800 or so tanks in 8th Army under Montgomery’s command were older , lighter and unreliable ) so Montgomery needed to fight a set piece battle in frontal offensive into teeth of reinforced enemy defences with firepower. In defense firepower from a fixed defensive position has a definite advantage in modern war. So you need much more firepower and material build up which takes time (hence accusation against Montgomery he was slow made every set piece ready etc) but also reduces the casualties among attacking side (at the end of Second Battle of Alamein Panzer Army Afrika lost 59.000 men including 34.000 prisoners and 430 tanks and 600 guns while 8th Army lost 13.600 men and 150 tanks permanently destroyed ouıt of 500 British tanks knocked out during battle and plus lost 100 guns)
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The past experiences of 8th Army when in pursuit after they were victorious in a battle they were constantly ambushed by Axis (like El Haseiat after Operation Crusader victory in December 19412 which was a cold shower for British) made a deep impression on Montgomery and his subordinates and lower ranks. Their caution in mobile warfare , during pursuit , keeping big division sized units intact under air cover and easy to resupply is understandable. In 1942 , Allies on field could not afford making mistakes , taking unnecessary risks to appear more daring and suffering reverses due to strategic and morale reasons
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Due to lack of a common operations culture , Combined Arms warfare was almost non existent in 8th Army before Monty took over the command. Artillery , armor and infantry and RAF Desert Air Force did not coordinate and cooperate their actions (which had been one of the main blunders of Auchinleck) Especially British armor was problematic , attacking on enemy defences on their own like out of control cavalry in Napoleonic Wars or pursuing the Germans fainting a retreat only to be ambushed by Axis anti tank gun lines , exposing the gunners and infantry to an enemy counter attack , leaving them vulnerable. Before Montgomery took command Allied infantry and gunners had a mutual dislike and hatred towards Allied tankers due to their inability to support them. Montgomery put a stop to that , ordering armor to operate along with artillery and infantry arms in a mutual cooperation. Similarly RAF Desert Air Force was having its own war , having no direction from 8th Army or ME Theater Command. As a result army units on ground left RAF airfields in desert uncovered and RAF aircraft made many friendly fire attacks on 8th Army units. Montgomerytas soon as took command , established a very close cooperation with Desert Air Force , even moving his field HQ next to Vice Air Marshal Arthur Conningham’s Desert Air Force HQ for close coperation in operations. Although he will later fall into quite a big in service infighting wit RAF chiefs like Vice Air Marshalls Arthur Conningham and Arthur Teddler , Montgomery was also aware of air powers essential role
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Unlike Auchinleck/Cunningham/Ritchie , both Alexander and Montgomery established a firm chain of command where each others obligations and responsibilities and what to expect from each other were clear. Previous British commanders like Auk were trying to interfare inexperienced 8th Army commanders a lot from Cairo , “trying to hold their hand” (as if it was a daycare center). Alexander at the other hand let Montgomery complately free in army operations.
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Montgomery had ULTRA inteligence advantage true but he is the first British commander who used it effectively in field thanks to his Chief of Staff Freddie Guingand and his intelligence chiefs. Auchinleck couldn’t make use of ULTRA and constantly got caught suprised despite aving numerical advantage over enemy like Montgomery. At the other hand having good intelligence while gives a good advantage , never wins the war alone. A proper combination of all factor and reforms Montgomery introduced in first 8th Army during 1942 Western Desert at Africa then in 21st Army Group command in UK and Normandy did. His only clear battlefield defeats like inability to open up Antwerp sooner (any other Allied commander would find it hard too since Hitler ordered Scheldt garrison to fight to the death in 1944 autumn to deny the port to Allies as long as possible till their ammunition run out and on top of that Scheldt Estuary was heavily mined by Germans which a lot of time to be cleared. Another Atlantic harbour Brest was so fiercely defended and so badly damaged before German garison gave up in September 1944 against besieging 7th US Corps , the whole harbour became unusable) and Operation Market Garden were costly checks that were sensetionalised by later revisionist books and Hollywood productions like A Bridge Too Far (even Market Garden advanced and gained 59 miles of ground , much better than Hurtgen Forest or Lorreine Campaigns where Allied casaulties were heavier and advanced much less)