The Pittsburgh Press (June 29, 1942)
Army and Navy argue but both won Battle of Midway
By B. J. McQuaid
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii –
The unaccustomed lull in the Battle of the Pacific is generating a debate as unprecedented as it is hopeful. For the first time since the beginning of this war, somebody on our side is arguing the point of how we won the major engagement, rather than why we lost it.
It is strictly a family row which, for once, has nothing to do with the tiresome question of planes versus battleships. The dispute confines itself to airpower and the disputants are proponents, respectively, of land-based and carried-based aircraft.
The question is, who did the job at Midway, the Army or the Navy? The answer usually depends upon the last bloke you talk with and which uniform he wears.
‘Git thar with mostest’
The Battle of Midway is a streamline, seagoing version of the oldest and most fundamental precept of warfare:
Git thar the fustest with the mostest airplanes.
Before joining in the argument, I talked with Army and Navy pilots, who fought in the Battle of Midway, and high-ranking naval and military officers. These officers not only had a share in the planning and direction of the battle but took part in the action.
They include, on the Navy side, such authorities as an executive officer on a big carrier and one of the ablest airmen of this or any nation. Among the airmen I talked with are Maj. Gen. Willis H. Hale, recently promoted to the command of the Hawaiian Air Force, who operated from Midway during the battle.
Coordination did the trick
Men of this type are not interested in discussions that promote jealousy of ill feeling between the services. They emphasize cooperation and coordination. Coordination was present in the Battle of Midway to a greater degree than in any previous engagement of this war.
It was the Navy PBY patrol planes that first spotted the Jap invasion force, but it was the Army Flying Fortresses that swung the first punch at the big transports and warships of the invasion fleet and it was either land-based Army bombers, or land-based Marine dive bombers, or both, which got in the first licks at the carriers, battleships and heavy cruisers of the primary attack force.
In my opinion, many of the Jap ships were hit again and again within relatively short time intervals by both the Army and Navy pilots and by both land-based and carrier-based airpower. This explains all the conflict and controversy.
Get close to Jap bases
Certain sideline brain-trusters, taking out of its context a line in one of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz’s communiqués, drew the conclusion that shore-based aircraft on Jap-held islands west of Midway prevented us from following up the route. Actually, our mopping-up operations were far more complete and extended much nearer Jap bases than is generally realized.
The proximity of Jap land-based airpower was merely one of several factors in the termination of the engagement. Furthermore, after four or five days of hard hammering in one of the biggest battles of history, it is reasonable to suppose that fuel replenishment may have become a consideration.