Simms: Post-war hints by Moscow disturbing
By William Philip Simms, Scripps-Howard foreign editor
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Aussies close on Jap forces in New Guinea
Planes support assault on Sattelberg, northwest of Finschhafen
By Brydon C. Taves, United Press staff writer
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Relief plans sped to time with invasion
First major hurdles are cleared in program to aid captive nations
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In Washington –
Deaths of Ditter, Steagall delay House subsidy vote
Both Congressmen among foes of New Deal’s favored anti-inflation weapon; action may be switched to new tax bill
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Roving Reporter
By Ernie Pyle
Ernie Pyle is describing his impressions of the home front is a short series of columns before shoving off again on assignment to the battlefronts.
Albuquerque, New Mexico –
One of the few souvenirs I brought back from the Mediterranean was a snappy German infantry cap I’d picked up in Sicily. It just happened to fit me perfectly.
So, I took to wearing it when I drove That Girl to work every day at Kirtland Field, the big Army air base here, and thought it might cause some amusement by befuddling the sentries at the gate. But nobody paid any attention to it; in fact, I guess nobody knew what it was. I was disappointed.
That went on for a couple of weeks, and then one evening as I was on the way in, the sentry, instead of smiling and waving me through as usual, said very severely:
Pull over to the side and park, sir.
I protested I’d be late to pick up That Girl, but he repeated his order, and I’ve been around the Army enough to know an order when I hear one. He took my pass, went into the booth, and had a long conversation on the telephone. When he came out, he said, “Come with me, sir.” I knew the sentry and he’d always been friendly, but now he was so official and firm he had me scared stiff.
We started for the provost marshal’s office. I got so weak I could hardly walk. I couldn’t imagine what I’d done, but there was no doubt in my mind that whatever crime I’d committed was plenty bad.
Just getting acquainted
We went into the big provost marshal’s building and were ushered right on through to the provost’s office, in a manner which indicated that my execution was to be immediate. And there sat the provost, laughing fit to kill.
He said:
I understand you’ve been going in and out of here wearing a German cap.
I said:
I sure have, but it took somebody around here a hell of a long time to recognize it.
The provost had authorized my pass originally, but we had never met. This was just his way of getting acquainted.
So, we all laughed, the sentry gave my pass back, a little of my strength returned, and I got back in the car swearing to wear only caps made in America, preferably by Indians, after this.
Provosts are good guys
I like provost marshals. I don’t know whether it’s because they’re usually nice guys, or whether it’s just because it’s a good idea to know them. But I do think I’m friends with the provost of every division and corps I ever served with. And while in Washington I got invited to lunch one day with the chief provost of all provosts – Maj. Gen. Allen Gullion.
I’ve had some nice experiences with provosts. For example, in Tunisia and Sicily there was a regulation that everybody had to wear his steel helmet and leggings at all times.
Now the steel helmet makes me top-heavy, and hurts my neck, and the wind blows through it and I can’t hear, so I never wear mine unless actually under fire. As for the leggings, I can’t stand them except in very cold weather.
Faces fines of $120
Just before the end of Sicily, while I was riding along gaily in a jeep, I was stopped and ticketed three times in one day for not wearing my helmet and leggings. The MP’s ticket you just like traffic cops, and the tickets go through channels to headquarters, and you’re called up and fined. Each count against me called for a $40 fine, which would have socked me $120 for my day’s misdemeanors.
I didn’t think anything about it for a couple of days, and then one evening an Army messenger rode up to our little camp in the woods, handed me an official-looking envelope, and rode off. The envelope was from the provost marshal.
My heart sank. I could hardly bear to open the envelope. Of course, I knew the provost marshal, but you never can tell.
Inside the envelope were the official conviction papers. The charges were typed out, and the MP’s tickets were clipped to it. And then I saw the sentence, and almost fainted with relief. It said:
You are hereby sentenced to recite 10 times a night for the next 30 nights, as follows:
I am a good soldier, and will try to conduct myself as such by wearing my helmet and leggings at all times.
JOHN HURLEY
Major – Provost Marshal
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Hollywood is gold mine for authors, but marketing of books is actually big task for most of their agents
By Douglas Gilbert, Scripps-Howard staff writer
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There’s anxiety and danger in life of war reporter
Writers back from front often can’t sleep; it’s duck or die during air raids
By Marcel Wallenstein, North American Newspaper Alliance
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Board studies plan to ease credit curbs
Some bankers favor lifting of installment buying restrictions
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Attempt to record Yank invasion is failure
Network ace says it just can’t be done
By Si Steinhauser
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No favorite son affair –
Stassen’s bid for presidency gains strength
Well-financed Minnesota group behind campaign of ex-Governor
By Thomas L. Stokes, Scripps-Howard staff writer
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U.S. State Department (November 22, 1943)
President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin
Cairo, 22 November 1943
Secret
Op priority
I have arrived in Cairo this morning and begin [begun?] discussions with the Prime Minister. Conferences will follow with the Generalissimo by the end of the week. He will thereupon return to China. The Prime Minister and I with our senior staff officers can then proceed to Teheran to meet you, Mr. Molotov and your staff officers. If it suits your convenience I could arrive the afternoon of November 29. I am prepared to remain for two to four days depending upon how long you can find it possible to be away from your compelling responsibilities. I would be grateful if you would telegraph me what day you wish to set for our meeting and how long you can stay. I realize that bad weather sometimes causes delays in travel from Moscow to Teheran at this time of the year and therefore would appreciate your keeping me advised of your plans.
I am informed that your Embassy and the British Embassy in Teheran are situated close to each other whereas my Legation is some distance away. I am advised that all three of us would be taking unnecessary risks by driving to and from our meetings if we were staying so far apart from each other.
Where do you think we should live?
I look forward to our talks with keen anticipation.
ROOSEVELT
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The Ambassador to the Soviet Union to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs
Cairo, 22 November 1943
Secret
The British and ourselves are sending representatives from Cairo to Tehran tomorrow, November 23, to make the physical arrangements for the Conference including the living quarters and security in all details. It would be helpful if you would advise our Commanding General in Tehran, General Connolly, what representative of the Soviet Government he should get in touch with to coordinate our planning with yours. I would be grateful if you would also cable me in Cairo that this has been arranged.
I had a most hospitable welcome and interesting afternoon during our unexpected stop in Stalingrad for which I am very grateful.
I look forward to seeing you. Regards.
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Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Admiral Leahy |
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The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, November 22, 1943
Secret
For the President from Secretary Hull:
Steinhardt reports Turkish Government has now made official reply to Eden’s recent proposals, summarized as follows:
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Turkey does not share British opinion that war between Turkey and Germany would not result from Turkey’s granting air bases, and Turkey is consequently unwilling to do so.
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Turkey believes she should take effective part in war on Allied side.
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However, the British have not supplied indispensable minimum arms promised by Churchill at Adana, nor has German strength deteriorated to extent contemplated at Adana before Turkey would be asked to come in.
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Consequently, Turkey’s coastal cities, communications, military bases, and industries would be promptly destroyed and Turkey would become liability instead of asset.
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Moreover, Eden’s proposals would leave Turkey as isolated belligerent, since they do not provide for collaboration of Turkey in action undertaken by Great Britain as contemplated in Anglo-Turk Alliance.
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Thus, demand that Turkey enter war before end of year would entail sacrifices beyond Turkey’s material capacity and inconsonant with Turkish Government’s elementary duty toward the people.
Steinhardt also reports from reliable Turkish sources that:
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Von Papen recently informed Turkish Government cession of even one Turkish air base would lead to immediate war declaration by Germany and Bulgaria with disastrous consequences for Turkey.
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Bulgaria has decided on active and effective cooperation with Germany in event of Turkish concessions to Allies, agreeing to immediate joint attack to occupy Thrace and Straits within three days, meanwhile destroying Istanbul from air and paralyzing Turkish communications in order to make prompt Allied assistance impossible.
Helsinki reports November 19 that it is clear that the Finnish Government as a result of intense German pressure, and despondency following Moscow Declaration has decided to continue in more strict collaboration with Germany.
The Chargé at Lisbon has been unable to arrange an interview with the Prime Minister before November 22. The Chargé has learned that the Portuguese apparently do not wish to be consulted or informed regarding the use of facilities at Horta and Teceria [Terceira?] by United Nations’ forces, since they consider this to be a matter entirely between the British and the Americans. The Chargé intends to ask Salazar to confirm this position particularly as it applies to the use of American engineering personnel.
I assume that the British are keeping you informed on developments in Lebanese crisis. We have been supporting the British from the beginning. Murphy informs us the question of authorizing Catroux to order recall Helleu approved by Committee by vote of 12 to 3. Three dissenting members were de Gaulle, Pleven and Diethelm.
CH
American-British preliminary meeting, 9 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | General Brooke | |
| Admiral Leahy | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Admiral King | Field Marshall Dill | |
| General Arnold | Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Lieutenant-General Stilwell | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Lieutenant-General Carton de Wiart | |
| Major General Stratemeyer | Brigadier Hollis | |
| Major General Wheeler | ||
| Major General Chennault | ||
| Major General Wedemeyer | ||
| Captain Royal |
Leahy indicates that the Combined Chiefs joined the President’s dinner party after the meal and that “Mountbatten outlined his plans and his needs for the Burma campaign which had been assigned to him at the Québec Conference held in August 1943.” Alan Brooke states that the purpose of the meeting was “to discuss Dickie Mountbatten’s plans and to prepare for meetings with Chiang Kai-shek.” Arnold mentions Chiang as one of the participants, while the Log indicates that Chiang, Madame Chiang, and three Chinese generals were present. It appears doubtful that the Chinese contingent actually attended.
Völkischer Beobachter (November 23, 1943)
Neuer USA.-Vorstoß –
Die Gilbertinseln angegriffen
dnb. Tokio, 22. November –
Nach einer Verlautbarung des Kaiserlichen Hauptquartiers griffen starke Marineeinheiten des Feindes, die Flugzeugträger und Schlachtschiffe einschlossen, am Morgen des 19. November die Inseln Makin und Tarawa der Gilbertgruppe an.
Die letzten Nachrichten von dort besagen, daß am 21. November die Kämpfe zwischen den japanischen Verteidigern und den Angreifern immer noch im Gange sind, nachdem es einem Teil der feindlichen Kräfte gelungen war, auf den Inseln zu landen.
Bougainville-Kosten in Menschen und Dollars –
Die ‚brutale Wahrheit‘ für die USA
dnb. Tokio, 22. November –
Ein kürzlich in der New York Times erschienener Leitartikel, in dem „mehr Wahrheit und weniger Bemäntelung“ der eigenen Verluste durch die USA.-Zensur verlangt wird, wurde am Montag vom Sprecher des japanischen Informationsamtes zum Anlaß genommen, den Korrespondenten unter Hinweis darauf, daß Washington sich immer noch nicht zu einem Eingeständnis des durchschlagenden japanischen Erfolges in den fünf Schlachten bei Bougainville habe entschließen können, die USA.-Verluste in Form ausführlicher Aufstellungen anschaulich zu machen.
Einleitend zitierte der Sprecher die New York Times, die wörtlich geschrieben hatte:
Der Zustand muß aufhören, daß dem Publikum immer nur eine Art von „Traumkrieg“ vorgesetzt wird, in dem nur der Feind Schläge erleidet. Die brutale Wahrheit würde am besten dazu dienen, die breiten Massen aus ihrer Lethargie zu erwecken. Washington weigert sich, sein Versprechen einzulösen und ein wahres Bild der Lage zu geben, weil befürchtet wird, daß der Eindruck zu niederschmetternd sein würde.
An Hand ausführlicher Tabellen, die den Korrespondenten überreicht wurden, gab der japanische Sprecher dann die „brutale Wahrheit“ bekannt. Aus der ersten Aufstellung, die dem merkantilen Denken der Nordamerikaner vielleicht am besten entspricht, haben die Vereinigten Staaten in der Zeit vom 27. Oktober bis zum 17. November einen Verlust an Kriegsschiffsraum erlitten, dessen Herstellung die Summe von 626 Millionen Dollars gekostet hat. Diese Summe umfasse nur die sicher versenkten Einheiten und deren Herstellungskosten nach vorsichtiger Schätzung. Tatsächlich dürfte der Feind so viel Schiffsraum verloren haben, daß die Summe von einer Milliarde Dollar den Wiederaufbau kaum decken dürfte.
Ebenso durchschlagend wie die Versenkung von Kriegsschiffsraum sind die Verluste der ausgebildeten Mannschaften, die dabei ums Leben gekommen sind. Nach einer weiteren ausführlichen Aufstellung, die sich in sofort versenkte Schiffe mit 80 bis 100 Prozent, versenkte mit 30 bis 40 Prozent und beschädigte mit 10 Prozent Verlustannahme gliedert, haben die Nordamerikaner in dem gleichen Zeitraum bei der Versenkung oder Beschädigung von 80 Kriegsschiffen einen Minimalverlust von 10.095 Mann oder einen Maximalverlust von 24.045 Mann an Besatzungen erlitten.
Wie der Sprecher abschließend noch einmal darlegte, seien die feindlichen Verluste nach den vorsichtigsten Schätzungen zusammengestellt und dürften sich tatsächlich auf weit höhere Ziffern belaufen.
U.S. Navy Department (November 23, 1943)
CINCPAC Communiqué No. 19
Central Pacific.
Our forces have captured Makin. On Tarawa, the Marines have consolidated their positions and are making good progress against enemy concentrations on eastern end of Betio Island with capture assured. The situation on Abemama is well in hand.
Raids are being continued against the Marshalls by carrier aircraft and Army Seventh Air Force Liberators.
U.S. State Department (November 23, 1943)
U.S. Delegation memorandum
Cairo, November 23, 1943
Comments on reports that the Generalissimo is deeply concerned over the Soviet Government’s attitude toward his regime and its intention to support the Chinese communists
In Moscow there are definite indications that the Soviet Government:
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In the post-war period wants peace within China and a strong central government,
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Recognizes that this objective can be obtained only through the Generalissimo,
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Will insist on a more liberal policy based on democratic principles and improvement in social conditions,
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Desires some solution of the Chinese communist problem either by the Generalissimo’s acceptance of them as an independent political party or by bringing them into the Government in some manner,
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Does not have ambitions in respect to Chinese territory in general. This view is supported by their recent withdrawal from the Province of Sinkiang. The recognition of Outer Mongolia’s independence was for military protection against the Japanese advance. There is no indication yet as to the Soviet Government’s attitude regarding the question of a warm water port, although it would be consistent for them to agree to the independence of Korea under some type of trusteeship in which the four great powers would participate.
The Chinese Ambassador in Moscow has expressed opinions along these lines.
Harriman-Vyshinsky conversation, forenoon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Soviet Union | |
| Ambassador Harriman | Mr. Vyshinsky | |
| Mr. Bohlen |
Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Memorandum of Conversation
Cairo, November 23, 1943
Secret
While waiting to see the President, I followed up Mr. Hopkins’ request that I obtain more information about the attitude of the Soviets on some of the Mediterranean problems.
I bluntly told Vyshinski of the serious view we took of the French Committee’s actions in Lebanon. I said we could not permit the French Committee to destroy the confidence of the world in the sincerity of American principles on freedom and democracy. I asked him what the Soviet Government’s views were in the matter. He said he had not been instructed but he was quite sure there could be no other point of view for his Government.
Next I asked him what he thought about the King of Italy. He said he was going to keep his mind open till he could judge the situation on the ground but he certainly made it clear that he was predisposed not to favor the retention of the King. He said:
We have all stated the principles which we are going to apply in Italy as agreed to in the Moscow Conference and these certainly must be put into effect.
He said that any elements or institutions which tend to impede these principles will have to be moved out of the path and anything that assists in the implementation of these principles should be encouraged.
I then asked him whether he had any recent information about Mihailović. He said he had none. I said I had none either but I thought it was time to tell Mihailović “that he should fish, cut bait, or go ashore.” He heartily agreed with this statement and added that, from his point of view, up to the present Mihailović had not only not been helpful in the prosecution of the war but had even been harmful.