Foe raiders adopt inhuman tactics against civilians
…
Salzburger Nachrichten (July 24, 1945)
Briten besetzen die Steiermark
Österreichs Zukunft liegt in den Händen der Österreicher
…
L’Aube (July 24, 1945)
Le procès Pétain a commencé hier
M. Paul Reynaud, premier témoin, a entamé sa déposition
…
L’Allemagne paiera aux « Trois Grands » 20 milliards de dollars de réparations…
…mais la part de la France n’est pas déterminée
…
U.S. State Department (July 24, 1945)
890d.00/7-2445
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs
Berlin Conference, July 24, 1945
Top secret
Memorandum
Subject: DISCUSSION IN BIG THREE MEETING ON JULY 23, 1945, REGARDING SYRIA AND LEBANON
When this item on the agenda was reached, STALIN stated that he would circulate a draft of a proposed brief statement to which he hoped the Conference could agree on this subject (a copy of the draft is attached).
CHURCHILL: At present the burden of maintaining order in Syria and Lebanon has fallen on our shoulders. We have no intention or desire to gain advantages there except those enjoyed by other countries. When we entered this area in 1941 to throw out the Germans and Vichy French, we and the Free French both agreed to recognize the independence of Lebanon and Syria. In consideration of the very long historical connection of France in these countries, we agreed not to object to France having a continued favored position there. We have told General de Gaulle that when he makes a mutually satisfactory treaty with these two countries, we shall withdraw our troops. If we withdraw now, it would lead to a massacre of the French civilians and small number of French troops there. The outbreak would affect security in Palestine and Iraq and possibly also in Egypt. There could not be a worse moment than the present for such a disturbance. The area constitutes an important line of communications to the Far Eastern war. The recent troubles started when the French sent 500 reinforcements to the area. This was a ridiculous action. What could 500 men do? But the entire Arab world was immediately convulsed with excitement. Lately General de Gaulle has agreed to hand over to Syria and Lebanon the Troupes Spéciales. I trust that agreement will be reached on independence and some recognition given to the French cultural and commercial position in the area. We repeat, we have no desires except to withdraw from a thankless task, assumed on behalf of the Allies. Since the matter rests between us and the French, we do not welcome the proposal for a conference in which the United States and the USSR would enter. The whole burden has been borne by us with no help (after prompting by Mr. Eden, Mr. Churchill added: “except for the diplomatic approval and support of the United States”). If the United States cares to take our place, that would offer a new consideration.
TRUMAN: No, thank you. When the trouble started, I had some correspondence with the Prime Minister on the subject. Mr. Churchill wrote to me, saying that another war was about to commence in the Near East and he had the troops to stop it. I said: “Please do so by all means. We do not want a war near the Suez route to the Far East.”
We are in slight disagreement with the Prime Minister, however, in one regard. We are in favor of equal treatment for everybody in the area, with no one having a privileged position.
STALIN: Including France?
TRUMAN: Yes.
STALIN: May I infer that my colleagues do not recognize any special privileges for France in the area?
TRUMAN: I certainly do not.
CHURCHILL: We would like to see France have a privileged position there. We agreed to this when we were weak. We cannot change now. This agreement, however, was only as far as the United Kingdom is concerned. We would not make any serious effort to help France obtain privileges. If they do so, we shall smile benignly.
STALIN: From whom can France get these privileges?
CHURCHILL: From Syria and Lebanon.
STALIN: Only Syria and Lebanon?
CHURCHILL: Only. The French have large interests there. They even have a tune: “Pars [Partant?] pour la Syrie.” (Laughter) Their interests go back to the Crusades.
TRUMAN: The United States favors equal rights for everyone.
CHURCHILL: Will you prevent Syria from giving privileges to France?
TRUMAN: No, but we are certain that the Syrians will not give France privileges.
STALIN: The Syrians are reluctant to do so. (Laughter). I welcome the full explanation given to us on this subject by Mr. Churchill and am happy to withdraw my paper.
(This item on the agenda was considered as having been completed with the foregoing discussion).
GEORGE V. ALLEN
Seventh meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11:15 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Dunn | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Clayton | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Gusev |
| Mr. Harriman | Sir William Strang | Mr. Maisky |
| Mr. Murphy | Mr. Ward | Mr. Sobolev |
| Mr. Pauley | Mr. Novikov | |
| Mr. Matthews | Mr. Vyshinsky | |
| Mr. Cohen | ||
| Mr. Russell | ||
| Poland | ||
| President Bierut | Deputy Prime Minister Mikolajczyk | Deputy Prime Minister Gomulka |
| Prime Minister Osóbka-Morawski | Foreign Minister Rzymowski | Mr. Modzelewski |
| Vice President Grabski | Marshal Rola-Żymierski |
Department of State Minutes
Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 11:15 a.m.
Top secret
The Seventh Session of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers opened at 11:15 a.m. on Tuesday, July 24, 1945. MR. BYRNES was in the Chair.
MR. BYRNES asked that the meeting review some of the matters pending before the Foreign Ministers. The Foreign Ministers had been requested to hear a statement from the representatives of the Polish Provisional Government. Mr. Byrnes had been informed that these gentlemen have now arrived and he suggested that the Foreign Ministers should proceed with the consideration of other matters before them and fix an hour, say 12:30, to invite the gentlemen to come into this room.
MR. MOLOTOV agreed.
MR. BYRNES stated that he would have a message to this effect communicated to the Polish representatives.
German Economic Questions and German Reparations
MR. BYRNES then raised the matter of German economic questions and German reparations.
MR. MOLOTOV added the question of reparations by Italy.
MR. BYRNES agreed and asked whether the economic subcommittee was ready to report.
MR. MOLOTOV asked whether he could suggest something.
MR. BYRNES replied that he was glad to receive the suggestion and asked Mr. Molotov to proceed.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that the first question concerned reparations from Germany. He had a suggestion regarding German [Austrian?] reparations here. He was sorry that it is only a Russian text.2 The next paper circulated concerned Italian reparations. Mr. Molotov added that of course the principal question concerned Germany.
MR. BYRNES after reading the paper asked concerning the pleasure of the Foreign Ministers regarding its disposition. He stated that he had been informed that the subcommittee was meeting tonight in order to discuss Austrian and Italian reparations. It might be well to refer these documents to the committee.
MR. MOLOTOV and MR. EDEN agreed.
MR. BYRNES stated that this would be done.
MR. BYRNES then referred to German reparations and asked whether there was any reason further to discuss this matter at this table or whether the economic subcommittee should be permitted to continue discussions in hope that they might be able to arrange for some report.
MR. MOLOTOV had no objection to the last suggestion since it might then be possible to discuss the matter tomorrow.
MR. BYRNES stated that the matter would be passed in this session.
European Oil Supplies
MR. BYRNES raised the matter of European oil supplies. He pointed out that a paper had been presented on this subject by the American delegation on July 20. He asked whether the meeting was prepared to discuss it.
MR. MOLOTOV asked whether it had been discussed by the economic subcommittee.
MR. BYRNES replied that he was advised that the question was so discussed but that the Soviet representative had asked for further time to consider and that this question is also coming up tonight. Therefore he assumed that this question must also be passed.
Implementation of Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe
MR. BYRNES then stated that the discussion on the implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe was still pending. He had been informed that the subcommittee on this subject had not met since night before last when the Soviet representative, who was Chairman, stated that he would have a new proposal to submit. He asked whether it could be ascertained whether the subcommittee can meet today.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that he could give some information on this question. He had seen the draft of the Soviet representatives which will be submitted to the committee. In connection with the Control Councils he had had to receive the text of the suggested changes mentioned during the last meeting [the meeting on July 22] from Moscow. They had been circulated this morning. He asked whether the American and British representatives had received them.
MR. EDEN stated that they had arrived but were in Russian and were now being translated.
MR. BYRNES added that the paper in Russian had been delivered only a few moments ago. Consideration would have to wait until it had been translated.
Admission of Italy and Non-Admission of Spain into International Organizations
MR. BYRNES stated that the next question remaining open is the admission of Italy and the non-admission of Spain into international organizations. In regard to this matter the subcommittee had been requested to submit its report. The American representative had advised Mr. Byrnes that the Soviet representative was not able to arrange a meeting. There has been no meeting of this subcommittee since July 21. Mr. Byrnes asked whether the Foreign Ministers could not proceed with the discussion of this question at this table.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that he was not quite familiar with the draft.11 However, he could study it now if MR. BYRNES wished.
MR. BYRNES suggested that he do so. So long as there are five or six questions of this character remaining open, we ought to dispose of them as rapidly as possible.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that he was always in favor of progress.
MR. EDEN asked for a minute or two to read the paper.
MR. BYRNES stated that he had been informed by the American representative on the committee that part of this paper had been drafted by the subcommittee and agreed to.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had not been informed of this.
MR. BYRNES continued that he had been further advised that on the first two paragraphs the reasoning had been suggested by the Soviet representative but that the American and British had not agreed to Mr. Maisky’s language. The language of this draft had been suggested by the American and British representatives.
MR. MOLOTOV asked what it is about. He pointed out that the document mentioned Italy, mentioned the neutrals, but the countries who fought with us against the enemy were not mentioned. This would not do. He suggested reference to the Big Three.
MR. BYRNES agreed.
MR. EDEN asked whether they would not look at the draft before reference to the Big Three.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that he would not look at the draft in this form.
MR. EDEN replied that he had wanted to make verbal changes only.
MR. BYRNES stated that he would consider any suggestion, but the best way to dispose of the question was to refer it to the Big Three.
MR. EDEN stated that he would give his changes anyway. He suggested leaving out the last sentence of paragraph [one].
MR. BYRNES agreed.
MR. EDEN also pointed out that the document talked about peace with Italy and that other nations were concerned with this matter. He would redraft to make this clear.
MR. BYRNES then stated that he had been handed a draft and would read it to see if Mr. Eden agreed.
MR. MOLOTOV interjected to state that he was sorry that he could not take part in these changes since they did not deal with substance.
MR. EDEN stated his assumption that what Mr. Molotov wants is to add to the text something regarding the cobelligerents Rumania and Bulgaria. The changes suggested by Mr. Eden did not deal with this matter.
MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether mention could be made here of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that the question of establishment of diplomatic relations was discussed by the Big Three. THE PRESIDENT has stated that the United States was unwilling to recognize these countries and gave the reasons for that attitude. Therefore, that matter may well be discussed in the Big Three if they wish.
The American Delegation will agree to the language suggested by the British. Therefore, I suggest that this paper be reported to the Big Three as agreed between the British and American Delegations. It should also be reported that the Soviet Delegation was unable to agree because they wish action taken regarding Rumania and Bulgaria.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that he would like it to be mentioned in the report that the Soviet Delegation refused to take part in this discussion because his colleagues had refused to discuss the establishment of diplomatic relations. It is the opinion of the Soviet Delegation that the choice between Switzerland and Portugal on the one hand and Rumania and Bulgaria on the other hand should be resolved in favor of those who helped us to win the war. He wouldn’t object to steps being taken to make things easier for Italy if similar steps were taken for Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary did more to help to defeat Germany than Italy, which had played only a small part.
MR. EDEN replied that these governments are not regarded by us as representative and that is why we do not wish to recognize them.
MR. MOLOTOV asked why they were less representative than Italy.
MR. EDEN replied that the Italian Government contained representatives of all parties in the state, while Rumania and Bulgaria were minority governments mainly composed of Communists.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that in all these governments the Communist Party formed a small minority.
MR. EDEN stated that there is another story behind this one.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that it was not a Communist story. He pointed out that the King had appointed the government in Rumania.
MR. EDEN interjected, “with a little help from Vyshinski, perhaps.”
MR. VYSHINSKI entered the conversation to state that he had helped many to enter the government who were not Communists.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that the Soviet Delegation would like this question considered in all its phases and not on the basis of the exception of some countries, but that the Soviet suggestion had been ignored.
MR. BYRNES stated that he had a suggestion to propose for consideration by the Russian Delegation. He read:
The three Governments also hope that the Council of Foreign Ministers may without undue delay prepare peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. It is also their desire on the conclusion of these peace treaties with responsible democratic governments of these countries to support their application for membership in the United Nations Organization.
MR. BYRNES pointed out regarding the first sentence that the Council of Foreign Ministers was already charged with that duty. Therefore, the only question concerned the second sentence. He went on to suggest to Mr. Molotov that the language agreed to regarding Italy be changed in a way that he believed would meet Mr. Molotov’s approval. The change would make the language regarding Italy the same as the language regarding the governments in which Mr. Molotov had expressed an interest.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that he was not speaking of the exact wording, but of the essence of the suggestion. His general position was that Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland should not be in a position as to the Allies worse than that of Italy. If this principle was accepted he suggested the appointment of a drafting committee to prepare a paper for discussion.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that so far as a subcommittee is concerned there is no change in the position of the United States regarding recognition of these governments. The United States did not regard them as governments having broad representation of all democratic parties.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that he was not suggesting that the United States now establish diplomatic relations.
MR. BYRNES then said that so far as the statement under consideration is concerned he was satisfied that as now amended it would place Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria in the same position as Italy because it says that on the conclusion of peace treaties with representative governments it would be possible to support their admission into the United Nations Organization. The same language as used for Italy would be used in the paragraph referring to Bulgaria, Rumania and Hungary. He reread his suggested amendment.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that he thought the wording could be improved. The important thing for the Soviet Delegation is to arrive at an understanding on substance. He asked what the situation was in Italy. The American and Soviet Governments have established diplomatic relations with Italy. The British have not. He asked whether France has an Ambassador there.
MR. EDEN stated that he would check since he did not know. He thought the position of France was the same as the British position.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that perhaps the United States had grounds not to establish relations with Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. The meeting had before it a very complicated question affecting many countries, including Italy, the neutral states and Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary. He suggested that a wording be worked out in order that Rumania, Bulgaria, [and] Hungary not be placed in a worse position than Italy. This is a condition for the participation of the Soviet Union in this matter. The Delegation had no authority to do otherwise. If this suggestion that Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary and Finland be not placed in a worse position than Italy is accepted, it would be easy to agree. If not, it would not be possible to arrive at a common decision.
MR. BYRNES repeated that the proposed language did place Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary in the same position as Italy so far as this statement is concerned.
MR. EDEN interposed to state his belief that we must not try too much to use words to paper over facts. He pointed out that there actually is a real difference between Italy and some of the countries mentioned by Mr. Molotov. The difference is that the British would be willing to make peace with the present Italian Government, and the present British position is that it is not prepared to do so with the governments in Rumania and Bulgaria. This is the fact and Mr. Eden did not think that it should be covered over with words.
MR. MOLOTOV asked that the matter be referred to the Big Three. This would be another good issue. He stated that the Big Three are more reasonable people than we and find a way out.
Rumanian Oil [Equipment]
MR. BYRNES stated that the question of Rumanian oil [equipment] is still pending. The British Delegation wished to make a further statement.
MR. EDEN stated that he had an idea that he thought might help. He circulated a proposal.
MR. BYRNES referred to the proposal that a committee of three Allied nationals be appointed and asked how it would be drawn up.
MR. EDEN stated his idea that it should not be composed of representatives of the three nations here or of Rumania.
MR. MOLOTOV asked what committee and where it would come from.
MR. BYRNES replied that it was on the question of whether the pipes were the property of a British national or Germans.
MR. MOLOTOV asked what the committee’s functions would be.
MR. BYRNES went on to state that the committee’s functions would also include questions of where American citizens said their property had been taken. Therefore, this question could not be decided here but should be decided only after an investigation of the facts. He associated himself with the suggestion for the appointment of representatives of other countries. If this committee said the property was German, then the Russians would have a right to it. If they said it was American, he assumed that the Russians would agree.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that there was no such question on the agenda.
MR. BYRNES replied that we had put it on.
MR. MOLOTOV insisted that he hadn’t received any such suggestion.
MR. BYRNES stated that the question had been on the agenda and had been discussed for some hours. Since the matter was before the meeting it should be disposed of. Now the British had submitted a proposal.
MR. MOLOTOV then stated that he wished to have a Russian text of this paper.
Agenda for Big Three Meeting
MR. BYRNES asked for suggestions for the agenda for the afternoon meeting.
MR. EDEN asked what was on the list.
MR. BYRNES stated that up to now there was very little.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had a short clear paper [two papers] regarding Italian and Austrian reparations.
MR. BYRNES replied that it was his understanding that this matter had been referred to a subcommittee meeting this evening and that the Soviet paper would be considered at that time.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that he knew this but that since there was some free time the matter could be considered.
MR. BYRNES remarked that with regard to free time, he had been informed that the delegation of the Polish Provisional Government had arrived.
MR. EDEN then asked whether Mr. Molotov wanted this matter considered in the afternoon meeting.
MR. MOLOTOV withdrew his suggestion.
MR. BYRNES again asked for suggestions for the agenda for the afternoon meeting.
MR. EDEN asked what was on the agenda now.
MR. BYRNES said that he did not know of any questions except that of Italy and the neutral countries. He thought that it had been agreed that this should be discussed. He pointed out that of the questions considered by the Big Three yesterday afternoon one had not been decided. This is the question of the Straits. THE PRESIDENT had submitted a paper to be studied and this paper can be considered this afternoon. He did not recall any other questions on the Big Three agenda not yet decided.
MR. MOLOTOV mentioned the western frontiers of Poland.
MR. BYRNES agreed that this was still undetermined but pointed out that it would be decided by the Foreign Ministers after hearing the representatives of the Polish Provisional Government whether to add it to the agenda.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that he had another question. The question of the German fleet should be settled before the end of the meeting.
MR. BYRNES replied that the question was proposed earlier and therefore should be noted.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that he wished agreement as to when it would be decided.
MR. EDEN stated that according to his notes it had been agreed to keep this matter for settlement at the end of the Conference.
MR. MOLOTOV replied that the end is now here and he wanted it discussed.
MR. EDEN asked whether we are at the beginning of the end or at the end of the beginning.
MR. BYRNES replied that he thought that we were at the beginning of the end. The United States Delegation wants to dispose of pending matters so that the Conference can end.
MR. MOLOTOV reverted to his question and asked when the German fleet would be discussed. He suggested tomorrow.
MR. EDEN stated that the matter was really one for the Big Three.
MR. MOLOTOV suggested that it be put on their agenda either today or tomorrow.
MR. EDEN agreed.
MR. BYRNES agreed that it should go on tomorrow’s agenda.
MR. MOLOTOV then stated that the question of the partition of reparations among the Allies must be decided. There had been agreement in the subcommittee, to which the Soviet Delegation did not object.
MR. BYRNES stated his understanding that there is no agreement yet in the economic subcommittee on anything. He thought it might be well to report to the Big Three that they had been unable to reach a decision.
MR. MOLOTOV stated that that was why he said that we should consider the draft submitted by the Reparations Commission.
MR. BYRNES entirely agreed and stated there were some matters in disagreement and that there was no apparent chance of reaching agreement.
MR. MOLOTOV insisted that questions on which the Commission has agreed could be discussed here.
MR. BYRNES replied that the American representative, Mr. Pauley, had called attention to certain portions of this draft. He read a brief statement.
MR. MOLOTOV argued that the British and American Delegations had circulated papers as agreed documents.
MR. BYRNES replied that they had but had wound up with the statement just read. This statement means that there is absolutely no agreement so far as the United States Delegation is concerned. He suggested that the matter should not be discussed here but should be reported tomorrow. If in the meantime anything had been agreed to, it could be so stated in the report.
MR. MOLOTOV agreed.
Western Frontier of Poland
MR. BYRNES announced that the Polish Delegation was waiting and upon his proposal they were invited to come to the table and present their views on the question of the western frontier of Poland. A summary of their statement is attached (Annex 1).
MR. MOLOTOV inquired if any other Polish delegates wished to speak.
MR. BYRNES said that they would certainly invite any other gentlemen present who wished to present his views and if there were any he would ask them to submit them in writing.
MR. MOLOTOV said that the position of the Soviet Union was different from that of the other countries. It was common knowledge that at Yalta they had discussed the eastern as well as the western frontier of Poland. Because of the action taken on the eastern frontier the Soviet Union was in a special position. The question of the Polish border was important not only for Poland and her neighbors but also for the whole world. He said what he would say on the question of the western frontier was not new as the Soviet view was well known. He felt it his duty to say, however, that this was a matter of justice. He considered that the views put forward by the Polish Government were just and that justice required that Germany be turned out of this area in the interests of the people of Europe and the whole world. It would cause a considerable weakening of Germany and permit the correction of the situation of Poland. It would mean that Poland as a racial state would be strong and one of the pillars of peace in Europe. Germany would be weakened from the point of view of her aggressive intentions and strengthened only from the point of view of her legitimate interests. All Poles would be brought together in one state which would be democratic and economically strong. Therefore, the Soviet Delegation hoped that sympathetic intention [attention?] would be given to the request of the Polish Government.
MR. EDEN said that as the matter was before the Big Three he had no comments to make.
MR. BYRNES said that they would present to the Heads of Governments the views expressed by the Polish Delegation.
MR. MOLOTOV repeated that the Soviet position was a special one and that they had certain obligations to Poland.
MR. BYRNES pointed out that although the United States was not a neighbor of Poland they had always been a friend of Poland.
MR. EDEN said that it was because of Poland that Great Britain had entered the war.
The meeting adjourned.
[Annex 1]
Summary of Statements Made by Members of the Polish Delegation to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers
Top secret
MR. BIERUT said that the war had begun in Poland and that Poland had suffered enormous losses in men and material. Poland was losing 180,000 square kilometers in the east to the establishment of the new Polish frontier there. Poland considered that the new eastern frontier which had been regulated on the basis of nationality was correct but their position was that they should acquire territory in the west. They considered the matter from the security and economic points of view.
They considered that the territories in the west were one unit from the economic point of view. They proposed a line running from the Baltic on the north through Swinemünde including Stettin in Poland, along the Oder River and thence along the Western Neisse River to Czechoslovakia.
The territory thus included in Poland would be smaller than that which Poland had lost in the east. Under this arrangement the total area of Poland would be reduced from 388,000 square kilometers to 309,000 square kilometers but it would give Poland a sound economy. The population of Poland which had been 34 million would be reduced to 26 million but it would be homogeneous. A great many Germans had fled and he thought many of the other one to [one and] one-half million Germans left would be willing to leave. The population east of the Curzon Line had included many Ukrainians, White Russians and some Lithuanians. It had also included about 4 million Poles which they expected would be repatriated to Poland. The density of the population of Poland before the war was 83 persons to one square kilometer. To preserve the same density they would need to have 314,000 square kilometers but they would get only 309,000 square kilometers. Thus the density would increase but they would be better off from an economic point of view.
If they received the territory proposed it would no longer be necessary for Poles to emigrate to the United States or Germany as was the case before the war. Thousands of Poles had formerly worked in this territory in the west, chiefly on farms. It was prejudicial to Poland that these workers gave their labor whereas their production went to others.
MR. RZYMOWSKI pointed out that the war began with the attack by Germany on Poland, that Poland had been under German occupation longer than any other country, and that the manner in which the Germans had behaved in Poland was proof that they wanted to destroy Polish civilization. It was the only country in which there were so many death camps. The Germans had tried to kill off the population to obtain “Lebensraum” for Germans and had attempted to destroy Polish culture. It would be an expression of historical justice that a Polish state be created that was powerful and which had the possibility to resist any German aggression. There should be a place in Poland for those Poles who lived east of the Curzon Line and for those who had emigrated elsewhere. There should also be a place for the increase in the population which amounted yearly to 250,000 people. Poland had ceded territory in the east for the sake of peace and it was right that Germany should also cede territory for the sake of peace. It was in the interest of peace in Europe that Germany should be deprived of this territory as a “place d’armes” in the east. Poland would be a territory without national minorities which would make for peace. Under Germany the industries of Silesia were an armament factory but in Poland they would be devoted to satisfy the peaceful needs of the Polish people.
Polish rights in Silesia were justified also by the fact that the population would consider themselves as Poles once the German administration and pressure was removed.
The line proposed was the shortest boundary possible between the Germans and Poles and would be the easiest to defend. This would give Poland the opportunity to reconstruct its social and economic structure.
Before the war Polish rural districts were overpopulated. There were about 4 million unemployed living in villages who could not be absorbed in the urban districts. The acquisition of Silesia would enable these people to be employed.
Stettin had always been an outlet under the Germans for the products of Silesia and their claim to Stettin was justified by the fact that it was needed as a Poland [Polish] outlet for Silesian products.
MR. MIKOLAJCZYK agreed with the opinions of his colleagues. It was in the interest of all that Germany should not be able to undertake any aggressions. The Germans had two bases for their imperialism. One was the armament industry and the second the profit which they made as an intermediary between other nations. One of the bases of German armaments was the territory which they claimed for Poland. Among its basic resources were zinc and coal. The Poles thought that these resources should not be in German hands.
With respect to the profits which Germany had made as an intermediary, he said that in 1937 Germany had transported to Czechoslovakia 2,300,000 tons; to Hungary 400,000 tons; to Rumania 500,000 tons; and to Yugoslavia 200,000 tons in addition to the goods transported to Poland.
He argued that the Oder River and its whole basin should go to Poland. Poland had to export and import in large quantities in order to give work to Polish workers. One river system, the Vistula, was not enough for this purpose. It would be necessary to control the whole of resources of water of the Oder. These sources are in the Neisse area and if not controlled by Poland they could be cut off.
Summing up, he said his arguments in favor of the Polish proposal were:
-
To take from the Germans one of the bases of their armaments.
-
To take from Germany the control of commerce and her role as an intermediary between other states.
-
Turning this area over to Poland would not only contribute to security and peace of all nations and of Poland but it would create a new economic and commercial system in which Poland would be able to prosper.
Relatively Germany which had lost the war would lose less territory than Poland. If Polish claims were satisfied Poland would lose 20 percent of her territory whereas Germany would lose 18 percent.
He asked for a speedy decision and for full agreement between the powers pointing out the necessity for the repatriation of the Poles from the Soviet Union and the other countries to which they had been driven by the war in order that they could participate in the reconstruction of their country.
Proposal by the Soviet Delegation
[Babelsberg, July 24, 1945]
[Translation]
Regarding Reparations from Austria
-
To establish the general sum of reparations from Austria of $250,000,000, to be liquidated in equal parts during six years commencing with July 1, 1945.
-
To exact reparations generally in the form of deliveries of products of Austrian industry.
-
Reparations to be exacted to compensate for losses caused by the war to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States of America, Yugoslavia.
Proposal by the Soviet Delegation
[Babelsberg, July 24, 1945]
[Translation]
Regarding Reparations from Italy
-
To establish the total sums of reparations from Italy at $600,000,000.
-
Italy must bear the expense of the established reparations over a period of six years with deliveries of products of Italian industry and agriculture.
-
Reparations from Italy must serve as compensation of losses caused by the participation of Italy in the war to the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States of America, Yugoslavia, Greece and Albania.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2445
Text Submitted to the Heads of Government
[Babelsberg,] July 24, 1945
Admission to the United Nations
The three Governments consider that the time has come terminate the present anomalous position of Italy. Italy was first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she has made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the re-establishment of a democratic government and institutions.
The three Governments have therefore resolved that it is desirable that very early steps should be taken to conclude a peace treaty with Italy and they trust that the other interested Allied Governments will share their views. They have, therefore, included the preparation of the treaty as the first among the immediate important tasks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. The conclusion of such a peace treaty will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership of the United Nations Organization.
As regards the admission of other States, Article IV of the Charter of the United Nations declares that:
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membership in the United Nations is open to all other peace-loving States who accept the obligations contained in the present Charter and, in the judgment of the organization, are able and willing to carry out these obligations.
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the admission of any such State to membership in the United Nations will be effected by a decision of the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council.
The three Governments so far as they are concerned will support applications for membership from those States which have remained neutral during the war and which fulfill the qualifications set out above.
The Three Governments feel bound however to make it clear that they for their part would not favor any application for membership put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded on the support of the Axis powers, does not, in view of its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor states, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2445
Proposal by the British Delegation
Potsdam, 24th July, 1945
Secret
Removal of Allied Industrial Equipment Especially in Roumania
Our case can, I think, be stated simply as follows.
There are only two articles in the Roumanian Armistice under which property can be removed from Roumania.
One of these is Article 11 which provides for the payment of reparations. The Soviet Government do not claim that the oil equipment was removed under this Article, but that it was taken as booty.
The second is Article 7, which provides that the Roumanian Government should hand over as “trophies” war material of Germany and her Satellites located on Roumanian territory. (It is clear from Article 1 that Satellites here exclude Roumania).
It is clear therefore that the only property which can be claimed as booty is German property or the property of another Satellite of Germany.
The question is whether any of the property now in question is German property. The Soviet Delegation have not claimed that any equipment acquired by Allied nationals before the war can be regarded as German property and I cannot understand why this property has not been returned at once without further argument.
The more difficult case is that of property acquired by the companies during the war when they were under German management. But even this is clear if we examine it carefully. The companies at the time when they were seized by the Germans had certain assets (money, equipment, oil concessions). When under German management, they parted with some of these assets (money or oil) and received from Germany other assets in return (equipment). Thus the equipment was indubitably the property of the company at the time of liberation.
If any British company had on its premises property which clearly belonged to Germany and had merely been deposited there for custody, its removal as booty would of course be justified.
As a means of settling this question I now propose that the ownership of the disputed property should be subject to impartial and expert investigation. This might be entrusted to a Committee of three allied nationals drawn from States not interested in this dispute. If the property is found to belong to Germany, we would agree that it should be retained by the Russians. If it is found to belong to one of the British companies the property should be returned by the Soviet Government or compensation paid to the company.
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
[Babelsberg, July 24, 1945]
Summary of the Views Expressed by the Polish Delegation to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers July 24, 1945, on the Subject of Poland’s Western Frontiers
The delegation considered that Poland’s western frontier should run from the Baltic through Swinemünde, including Stettin in Poland, along the Oder River to the Neisse, and along the Western Neisse to Czechoslovakia. The principal arguments they put forward were the following:
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Poland would lose 180,000 square kilometers in the east and should be compensated for this in the west.
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The territory under consideration was one unit from an economic point of view.
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Under the proposed arrangement Poland would acquire less than it had lost in the east. The whole area would be reduced from 388,000 square kilometers to 309,000 square kilometers. The population would be reduced from 34,000,000 to 26,000,000 but would then be homogenous [homogeneous?].
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There were about 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 Germans left in this area, but they would be willing to return home. This territory would enable Poland to support its population without recourse to emigration. This would enable Poland to enjoy the results of the labor of Poles who had formerly emigrated to work in this area.
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From the point of view of security, this was the shortest possible frontier between Poles and Germans and would be easy to defend.
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The Germans had attempted to destroy the Polish population and ruin Polish culture. It would be an expression of historical justice to create a powerful Polish state which could resist any German aggression.
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Poland had ceded territory in the east for the sake of peace and it would be right that Germany should cede territory for the same purpose.
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The proposed solution would deprive Germany of a “place d’armes” in the east.
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Poland would be a territory without national minorities.
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Before the war Poland had an excess of rural population which could not be absorbed in its urban centers. This territory was necessary to enable them to be employed and to enable the Poles forced abroad by the war to return to Poland and obtain employment.
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This area was one of the bases of German armaments and had resources in zinc and coal. This was one of the bases of German imperialism.
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Taking this area from Germany would deprive Germany of the other basis of its imperialism, namely, profits made as an intermediary between other countries. In 1937 Germany transported 2,300,000 tons of goods to Czechoslovakia, 400,000 tons to Hungary, 500,000 tons to Rumania, and 200,000 tons to Yugoslavia, in addition to that transported to Poland.
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The whole basin of the Oder River should go to Poland to enable Poland to have an economic base which would support its whole population and in order to prevent the possibility of cutting off the source of water supply to the Oder which lay in the Neisse area.
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Stettin should be in Polish hands because it was the natural outlet for Silesia.
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Germany which had lost the war would lose less than Poland. If Polish claims were satisfied, Poland would lose 20 percent of her territory whereas Germany would lose only 18 percent.
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A speedy decision and full agreement among the Powers was necessary because of the need to repatriate Poles from abroad in order that they could participate in the reconstruction of Poland.
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2445
Rapporteur’s Report
Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 11:15 a.m.
1. German, Austrian and Italian reparations and German economic questions
The Chairman declared that the subcommittee dealing with the German economic questions and German reparations was not yet ready to present a further report on these matters. Mr. Molotov pointed out that these committees had also been assigned the question of Austrian and Italian reparations. He presented two brief papers in regard to reparations from these two latter countries. It was agreed that these papers should be referred to the economic subcommittee for study. It was also agreed that discussion of German reparations and German economic questions should be postponed until tomorrow.
2. European oil supplies
The Chairman inquired whether a report was ready on the U.S. paper on this subject which had been presented on July 20. He was informed that this paper was still before the economic subcommittee and it was agreed that discussion on this subject should be postponed until that committee reports.
3. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe and satellite states
The subcommittee dealing with this subject was also not yet ready to report and it was agreed to postpone discussion until that report is available.
4. Admission to the United Nations
The Chairman suggested that, since the subcommittee dealing with this matter had also not been able to come to any agreement, the question should be considered at this meeting by the Foreign Ministers on the basis of the document on which the subcommittee had been working. Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation would not be able to take part in the discussion of this document since it omitted reference to the admission to the United Nations of Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland.
Mr. Eden suggested that the last sentence of the first paragraph of the paper in question be dropped and Mr. Byrnes agreed. Mr. Eden proposed a redraft of paragraph two of the paper which would take into account the interest of other countries concerned with the peace treaty with Italy. This paragraph is embodied in the revised document “Admission to the United Nations” attached to this report.
The Chairman proposed the following additional paragraph to be inserted in the document in order to meet the point which Mr. Molotov had raised:
The three Governments also hope that the Council of Foreign Ministers may without undue delay prepare peace treaties for Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. It is also their desire on the conclusion of the peace treaties with responsible democratic governments of these countries to support their application for membership in the United Nations Organization.
Mr. Molotov urged that it be agreed in principle that Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland not be put in a worse position than Italy in connection with the matter under discussion. After some further discussion it was agreed that, since full agreement could not be reached, the problem should be referred to the Heads of Government and placed on the agenda for this afternoon.
5. Rumanian oil equipment
The British Delegation circulated a new paper in regard to the disposition of British and U.S. oil equipment in Rumania. The Soviet Delegation asked for time to study this paper and discussion of this question was therefore adjourned.
6. Agenda for meeting of Heads of Government
It was agreed that the following subjects should be recommended to the Heads of Government for their agenda this afternoon:
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Admission to the United Nations. The paper presented to the Foreign Ministers this morning is available to the Heads of Government as a basis for discussion.
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The Black Sea Straits and Free and Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways. Discussion of this question was adjourned from yesterday’s meeting in order to afford an opportunity for study of the paper on “Free and Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways” which the President circulated.
7. Agenda for tomorrow’s meeting of the Heads of Government
It was agreed that the following subjects should be recommended to the Heads of Government for the agenda of their meeting tomorrow morning:
- Disposition of the German fleet and merchant marine.
- German reparations.
8. The Polish Western Frontier
A delegation representing the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and headed by President Bierut, which appeared in response to the invitation sent on July 22 by President Truman in accordance with the decision of the three Heads of Government, stated its case in regard to the Polish Western Frontier. A summary of the principal points covered in their presentation is attached to this report.
Leahy-Churchill conversation, morning
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Prime Minister Churchill |
From the memorandum by Captain James K. Vardaman Jr., Naval Aide to the President:
“Remind the President Wednesday morning to write a letter to Mr. Churchill and send him a copy of telegram despatched to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek and also copy of revised Lend Lease document read to Churchill by Leahy on the porch this morning.”
865.014/7-2445
Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs
Berlin Conference, July 24, 1945
Subject: DISCUSSION IN THE FOREIGN MINISTERS’ MEETING ON JULY 22, 1945, REGARDING ITALIAN COLONIES
MR. MOLOTOV recalled that at the San Francisco Conference the Soviet Delegation had gone on record as expressing the intention of the Soviet Government to apply for designation as a trustee power. He said that Mr. Eden had recently made a statement in the House of Commons that Italy had lost its colonies in Africa and the Mediterranean. Mr. Molotov wanted to know by what right Great Britain had decided this question, and who had “found” the colonies.
MR. EDEN said that Italy had lost her colonies to the British Army. He said they were under British military occupation pending their final disposal in the peace treaty with Italy.
MR. MOLOTOV said that his delegation would introduce [had introduced?] a paper on the subject and hoped it might be discussed at the next meeting.
G[EORGE] V A[LLEN]
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Truman and Churchill, 11:30 a.m.
Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Truman | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Lord Leathers | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| General of the Army Arnold | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Somervell | General Ismay | |
| Field Marshal Wilson | ||
| Major-General Laycock | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major-General Hollis | |
| Brigadier Cornwall-Jones |
JCS Minutes
Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 11:30 a.m.
Top secret
Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 900/2)
The Meeting had before them CCS 900/2, the draft of the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER on the results of the TERMINAL Conference.
THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER proceeded to examine the report paragraph by paragraph.
With respect to paragraph 4, Admiral Leahy explained that there was a divergence of opinion on two or three points in connection with the basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war and that the respective views of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff were set out in Appendix “A.”
Appendix “A” paragraph 4
ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff proposed to include the following:
• “a. Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth.
• “b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the United States and the British Commonwealth in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan.”
The British Chiefs of Staff on the other hand wished to combine these two paragraphs into the following:
“Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept.”
The view of the United States Chiefs of Staff was that the basic commitment in this respect should be confined to the maintenance of war-making capacity in so far as it was connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, whereas the British Chiefs of Staff felt that it should be extended to include the occupation of Germany and Austria, as provided in the strategic concept.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that he supported the British Chiefs of Staff and suggested that the holding down of Germany and Austria was certainly a very vital matter. He felt therefore that this commitment should be embraced in this particular section of the basic undertakings.
He called attention to the extent to which the British industrial effort had been interwoven with that of the United States by reason of agreements reached earlier in the war and his own discussions with President Roosevelt at Quebec. As a result of these agreements many British units were equipped with U.S. equipment and no provision had been made to replace this equipment from British sources. To make such provision would take time and he hoped very much that the President would be able to make it possible for him to pass smoothly from this position of dependence on the United States to one in which British forces could be independent. He feared that a rigid interpretation of an undertaking to maintain the British war-making capacity only in so far as it was connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, would place him in great difficulties. He hoped also that the rules applied to the supply of lend-lease equipment would not be held to limit British sovereign rights over British equipment. He must be free to give British equipment, for example, to the Belgians, if His Majesty’s Government felt that this was desirable, and he hoped that this would not result in the drying up of equivalent supplies from the United States.
THE PRESIDENT explained that he was handicapped in his approach to this matter by the latest renewal of the Lend-Lease Act. As Vice President, he had worked out its clauses together with Senator George, who had explained to the Congress that the Act was intended to be a weapon of war only. The President was now striving to give to the Act the broadest interpretation possible and he had no intention of causing the British any embarrassment in the matter of furnishing supplies to the British troops or the maintenance thereof. However, he must ask the Prime Minister to be patient as he wished to avoid any embarrassment with Congress over the interpretation of the Act and it might be necessary for him to ask for additional legislation in order to clear the matter up.
With respect to the basic undertaking under discussion, THE PRESIDENT said that he thought that the holding down of Germany and Austria was quite definitely a part of war. After all, we were technically still at war with Germany and Austria.
GENERAL MARSHALL said in view of the foregoing that the United States Chiefs of Staff accepted the paragraph proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff.
THE PRESIDENT agreed.
Appendix “A” paragraph 4c
THE PRIME MINISTER said that he could not see very much difference between the two subparagraphs proposed. He suggested that the proposal of the United States Chiefs of Staff should be accepted.
THE PRESIDENT agreed.
Appendix “A” first sentence of paragraph 6c
ADMIRAL LEAHY explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were anxious to add a clause at the end of the first sentence of this paragraph which would extend the combined liability to provide assistance not only to such of the forces of the liberated areas as could fulfill an active and effective role in the present war but also to such of those forces as were “required to maintain world order in the interests of the war effort.” In his view, therefore, the issue before the meeting was whether or not the United States was prepared to undertake a commitment to equip and supply forces of occupation other than American.
THE PRIME MINISTER asked what the British Chiefs of Staff had in mind in proposing this clause.
FIELD MARSHAL BROOKE instanced the Belgian and Dutch forces and Admiral Cunningham suggested that such French divisions as were not going to the Far East would also fall into this category.
In the light of this explanation, The Prime Minister felt that the point had already been covered under paragraphs 4 a. and b. above, where it had already been agreed that occupational forces should be included in that particular basic undertaking.
It was agreed that the point would be adequately covered if the words “in accordance with the over-all strategic concept,” were added to the first sentence of paragraph 6c, in lieu of the clause proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff.
Appendix “A” paragraph 7
At this point LORD LEATHERS entered the meeting.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that he attached great importance to the United Kingdom import program and would not wish to see it lose its status in a document of this nature.
THE PRESIDENT said that he was not quite clear how far he could accept liability for reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom under existing United States law. Therefore, if this paragraph were intended to indicate any such liability his acceptance of it would have to be on the understanding that the necessary authority did exist.
ADMIRAL KING and GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff felt that the matter contained in this paragraph was out of place among the basic undertakings. General Marshall drew attention to paragraphs 20, 21, and 22 at the end of the report and pointed out that there was no more reason for including cargo shipping among the basic undertakings than the similar matters dealt with in these paragraphs. He suggested that this paragraph should also be placed at the end of the report under the heading “Miscellaneous.”
LORD LEATHERS pointed out that the inclusion of the United Kingdom import program had been implicit in the basic undertakings at previous conferences. In consonance with the changed situation, a major change was now being made in the presentation of the basic undertakings. As shipping requirements for military and civilian needs were closely interlocked, his view was that the United Kingdom import program would be more properly associated with military requirements if it were linked to them in the basic undertakings.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that he did not consider that any great change had been made in the presentation of the basic undertakings. He still felt that the matter would be more appropriately placed at the end of the report under the heading “Miscellaneous.”
THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether this would result in the sweeping aside of the United Kingdom import program.
THE PRESIDENT said the Prime Minister could take his word for it that the United Kingdom import program would not suffer from this change. He suggested that General Marshall’s proposal be accepted and the paragraph incorporated at the end of the report.
THE PRIME MINISTER said that on this undertaking he would certainly agree that the paragraph should be included at the end of the report.
Appendix “A” last sentence of paragraph 6c
LORD LEATHERS suggested that as it had now been agreed that paragraph 7 should be removed from the basic undertakings and placed at the end of the report, the last sentence of paragraph 6c would more properly be deleted. However, if it were held that this sentence merely referred to supplies and not to shipping, he thought it might remain.
THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that the last sentence of paragraph 6c should stand.
[CCS 900/2, paragraph 8d]
THE PRIME MINISTER referred to paragraph 8d of the report in which it had been agreed that “In the event the British Chiefs of Staff should decide that they cannot commit British troops in support of a decision made by the United States Chiefs of Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff will give to the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as would permit them to make timely rearrangements.” The Prime Minister said that he hoped it would not be thought the British Chiefs of Staff would wish to take advantage of this arrangement. What was good enough for the United States would certainly be good enough for the British.
ADMIRAL KING said that the United States Chiefs of Staff did not expect the British Chiefs of Staff to invoke this paragraph and General Marshall explained that it had been put in at his suggestion. After Olympic for example, if the British Chiefs of Staff did not agree with the action proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff, they would, under this paragraph, be free to take such action as they thought fit. The paragraph was a result of an attempt on his part to cover both sides.
THE PRIME MINISTER thanked the United States Chiefs of Staff for their explanation and the spirit in which this provision had been made.
THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER accepted and approved the report as amended in the above discussion and directed the [that] copies of the revised version be submitted to them for signature. (The report in its approved form was subsequently circulated as CCS 900/3)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill
[Babelsberg, July 24, 1945]
Top secret
Enclosure to CCS 900/3
- The agreed summary of conclusions reached at the TERMINAL Conference is submitted herewith.
I. Over-all objective
- In conjunction with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.
II. Over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war
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In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives in other than the Japanese home islands as will contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese-occupied territory if required.
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In cooperation with other Allies to establish and maintain, as necessary, military control of Germany and Austria.
III. Basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war
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The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the prosecution of the war:
a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept.
b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas, with first priority given to those forces in or designated for employment in combat areas in the war against Japan.
c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.
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In order to attain the over-all objective, first priority in the provision of forces and resources of the United States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, will be given to meeting requirements of tasks necessary to the execution of the over-all strategic concept and to the basic undertakings fundamental to the prosecution of the war.
The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations.
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The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept:
a. Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith.
b. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan.
c. Provide assistance to such of the forces of liberated areas as can fulfill an active and effective role in the present war in accordance with the over-all strategic concept. Within the limits of our available resources assist co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the capacity of the United Nations to prosecute the war against Japan.
d. In cooperation with other Allies conduct operations, if required, to liberate enemy-occupied areas.
IV. The war against Japan
Strategic Direction of the War
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We have discussed the strategic direction of the war against Japan and have agreed as follows:
a. The control of operational strategy in the Pacific Theater will remain in the hands of the United States Chiefs of Staff.
b. The United States Chiefs of Staff will provide the British Chiefs of Staff with full and timely information as to their future plans and intentions.
c. The United States Chiefs of Staff will consult the British Chiefs of Staff on matters of general strategy on the understanding that in the event of disagreement the final decision on the action to be taken will lie with the United States Chiefs of Staff.
d. In the event the British Chiefs of Staff should decide that they cannot commit British troops in support of a decision made by the United States Chiefs of Staff as indicated in c. above, the British Chiefs of Staff will give to the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as will permit them to make timely rearrangements.
e. In the event the USSR enters the war against Japan, the strategy to be pursued should be discussed between the parties concerned.
Operations in the Pacific
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We have taken note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in Appendix “A.”
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We have considered the scope and nature of British participation in operations in the Pacific area. Our conclusions are as follows:
a. The British Pacific Fleet will participate as at present planned.
b. A British very long-range bomber force of 10 squadrons, increasing to 20 squadrons when more airfields become available, will participate. There is little prospect that airfield space for more than 10 squadrons of this force will become available before 1 December 1945 at the earliest.
c. We have agreed in principle that a Commonwealth land force and, if possible, a small tactical air force, should take part in the final phase of the war against Japan, subject to the satisfactory resolution of operational and other problems. In addition, some units of the British3 East Indies Fleet may also take part.
-
In connection with paragraph 10 c. above, we have agreed that the appropriate British commanders and staff should visit Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur and draw up with them a plan for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Operations in Southeast Asia Command
- We have discussed the instructions that should be issued to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, and have agreed upon the terms of the directive in Appendix “B.”
Reallocation of Areas and Command in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia Areas
-
We have agreed in principle that that part of the Southwest Pacific Area lying south of the boundary described in Appendix “C” should pass from United States to British command as soon as possible. The British Chiefs of Staff have undertaken to obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to these proposals and to investigate and report the earliest practicable date on which the transfer can be effected.
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We consider it desirable that initially Admiral Mountbatten control operations undertaken in southern Indo-China since these are more closely related to those of Southeast Asia Command than to those of the China Theater. We are agreed that the best arrangement would be to include that portion of Indo-China lying south of latitude 16° north in Southeast Asia Command. This arrangement would continue General Wedemeyer’s control of that part of Indo-China which covers the flank of projected Chinese operations in China, and would enable Admiral Mountbatten to prepare the ground in the southern half of Indo-China where any initial operations by him would develop.
We recommend that an approach to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek4 be made by our two governments to secure his agreement to this arrangement.
At a later date it may prove to be desirable to place all or part of the remainder of Indo-China within the sphere of operations of the Southeast Asia Command.
French and Dutch Participation in the War
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We have considered the arrangements which can be made for French and Dutch participation in the war against Japan and our conclusions are as follows:
a. While it is at present impracticable due chiefly to logistical difficulties for French or Netherlands armed forces to take a major part in the immediate operations in the Far East, the provision of such assistance which may be synchronized with operations will be taken into account. The use of such forces will depend solely on military considerations. French or Netherlands forces so accepted must operate under the complete control of the commander in chief concerned.
b. The French/Netherlands representatives will be given timely information of our intentions in respect of any operations that will directly affect French/Netherlands territories or armed forces in the Far East.
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We have considered an offer by the French of a French corps of two infantry divisions to serve in the Pacific war and have agreed on the following reply:
a. Whether the corps will serve under U.S. or British command and the area in which it will operate will be determined later.
b. Final acceptance of the corps will involve an agreement with the government concerned on basic matters including command, combat efficiency, replacements, and logistical support.
c. Maximum use will be made of equipment provided under the North African and Metropolitan Rearmament Programs.
d. The time of movement will be in accordance with the priority of the operations in which it is to be used. Pressing shipping and other requirements for operations in the Pacific make certain that the corps cannot be moved from France for at least several months. Whether used in the main effort or in the South China Sea area, it will not be possible to commit it to operations prior to the spring of 1946.”
Portuguese Participation in the War
- We have examined a report by an Anglo-American Military Mission which discussed with the Portuguese military authorities Portuguese proposals for participation in such operations as may eventually be conducted to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. We have informed the State Department and the Foreign Office of our views, which are set out in Appendix “D.”
Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War
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We have discussed the policy to be followed by the British and the United States Chiefs of Staff in passing to the Russians information and intelligence concerning the Japanese war and have agreed as follows:
a. The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will pass to the Russians such operational information and intelligence regarding the theaters in which they are respectively responsible as either may wish and without bargaining.
b. The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will consult together before passing to the Russians any information and intelligence other than operational. Neither party will pass to the Russians information or intelligence derived wholly or in part from the other party’s sources without their consent.
Planning Date for the End of Organized Resistance by Japan
- We recommend that for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower, the planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan be 15 November 1946 and that this date be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.
V. Miscellaneous
Personnel Shipping
-
We have considered the employment of certain captured enemy ocean-going passenger shipping and have agreed that the total lift of the Europa, Caribia, Vulcania, Patria, Potsdam, Pretoria, and Milwaukee should be allocated for United States employment up to 31 December 1945. We have taken note that the United States Chiefs of Staff will allocate to the United Kingdom a lift of 16,000 during the remainder of 1945 for the movement of Canadians.
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We have directed the completion by 15 September 1945 of a study of the combined requirements and combined resources, including captured enemy trooplift, for the first half of 1946.
Personnel Shipping for the Requirements of Allied Governments
- We have considered the best means of insuring the efficient coordination of the demands for personnel shipping submitted by Allied governments, other than British and American military movements, and of providing a machinery for dealing with essential personnel movements other than those already approved. We have forwarded to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board the memorandum contained in Appendix “E.”
Cargo Shipping
-
Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, for an additional amount for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom, for supplies to liberated areas, and for essential programs of the Western Hemisphere.
Should substantial conflict arise, the shipping situation will be a matter for examination by the two governments at the time and in the light of changed conditions.
[Appendix A]
Top secret
Plans and Operations in the Pacific
(See paragraph 9 of the Report)
-
In conformity with the over-all objective to bring about the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible date, the United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific:
a. From bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Marianas, and the Philippines to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to:
b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to:
c. The decisive invasion of Honshu.
-
We have curtailed our projected expansion in the Ryukyus by deferring indefinitely the seizure of Miyako Jima and Kikai Jima. Using the resources originally provided for Miyako and Kikai, we have accelerated the development of Okinawa. By doing this, a greater weight of effort will more promptly be brought to bear against Japan and the risk of becoming involved in operations which might delay the seizure of Kyushu7 is avoided.
-
In furtherance of the accomplishment of the over-all objectives, we have directed:
a. The invasion of Kyushu.
b. The continuation of operations for securing and maintaining control of sea communications to and in the western Pacific as are required for the accomplishment of the over-all objective.
c. The defeat of the remaining Japanese in the Philippines by such operations as can be executed without prejudice to the over-all objective.
d. The seizure of Balikpapan. (This operation is now approaching successful completion.)
e. The continuance of strategic air operations to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective.
-
Planning and preparation for the campaign in Japan subsequent to the invasion of Kyushu are continuing on the basis of meeting the target date for the invasion of Honshu. This planning is premised on the belief that defeat of the enemy’s armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to unconditional surrender, and that such a defeat will establish the optimum prospect of capitulation by Japanese forces outside the main Japanese islands. We recognize the possibility also that our success in the main islands may not obviate the necessity of defeating Japanese forces elsewhere; decision as to steps to be taken in this eventuality must await further developments.
-
We are keeping under continuing review the possibility of capitalizing at small cost8 upon Japanese military deterioration and withdrawals in the China Theater, without delaying the supreme operations.
-
We have directed the preparation of plans for the following:
a. Keeping open a sea route to Russian Pacific ports.
b. Operations to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational purposes in order to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances such as a sudden enemy collapse or surrender.
[Appendix B]
The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia
Top secret
Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia
(See paragraph 12 of the Report)
The following directive has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the understanding that the British Chiefs of Staff will obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to the proposed reallocation of areas and command set-up in Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia.
-
Your primary task is the opening of the Straits of Malacca at the earliest possible moment. It is also intended that British Commonwealth land forces should take part in the main operations against Japan which have been agreed as the supreme operations in the war; and that operations should continue in the Outer Zone to the extent that forces and resources permit.
-
The eastern boundary of your command will be extended to include Borneo, Java, and the Celebes.
Full details of this extension are contained in the Annex hereto. -
Further information will be sent to you regarding Indo-China.
-
It is desirable that you assume command of the additional areas as soon as practicable after 15 August 1945. You will report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the date on which you expect to be in a position to undertake this additional responsibility.
-
From that date, such Dominion and Dutch forces as may be operating in your new area will come under your command. They will, however, continue to be based on Australia.
-
The area to the east of your new boundary will be an Australian command under the British Chiefs of Staff.
-
It has been agreed in principle that a British Commonwealth land force of from three to five divisions, and, if possible, a small tactical air force, should take part in the main operations against Japan in the spring of 1946. Units of the British9 East Indies Fleet may also take part. Certain important factors relating to this are still under examination.
-
You will be required to provide a proportion of this force together with the assault lift for two divisions. The exact composition of this force and its role and the mounting and supporting arrangements will be discussed between Admiral Nimitz, General MacArthur, and the British force commanders, and will receive final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
-
The requirements for the force taking part in the main operations against Japan must have priority over all the other tasks indicated below.
-
Subject to the fulfillment of the higher priority commitments given above, you will, within the limits of available resources, carry out operations designed to:
a. Complete the liberation of Malaya.
b. Maintain pressure on the Japanese across the Burma-Siam frontier.
c. Capture the key areas of Siam.
d. Establish bridgeheads in Java and/or Sumatra to enable the subsequent clearance of these areas to be undertaken in due course. -
You will submit a program of operations to the British Chiefs of Staff as soon as you are in a position to do so.
-
You will develop Singapore and such other bases as you may require to the extent necessary for operations against the Japanese.
[Annex]
Top secret
Eastern Boundary of Southeast Asia Command
(See paragraph 2 of Appendix “B”)
Beginning on the coast of Indo-China at 16° north; thence to intersect at 7°40´ north latitude 116° east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to latitude 05° north longitude 127° east; thence southwestward to 02° south 123° east; thence southeastward to 08° south 125° east; thence southwestward to 18° south 110° east.
[Appendix C]
Top secret
Boundary Between the British and U.S. Areas of Command in the Southwest Pacific
(See paragraph 13 of the Report)
Beginning on the coast of Indo-China at 16° north; thence to intersect at 7°40´ north latitude 116° east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to latitude 05° north longitude 127° east; thence east to 05° north 130° east; thence south to the equator; thence east to 140° east; thence generally southeast to 02°20´ south 146° east; thence east to 02°20´ south 159° east; thence south.
[Appendix D]
Top secret
(See paragraph 17 of the Report)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have communicated to the Department of State and the Foreign Office the following views on Portuguese participation in the war against Japan:
a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed on the acceptance of Portuguese assistance in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. While they have made no agreement with the Portuguese military authorities as to the direct use of Portuguese forces, they have recognized the possibility of such use and agreed that plans will be worked out as a result of the studies conducted in staff conversations in Lisbon.
b. As between the two military forces offered by Portugal (a regimental combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200, both including 400 native troops), the larger force is likely to be the more acceptable. Steps are being taken to allocate a suitable training area.
c. The air component offered by Portugal should under no circumstances be included in the acceptance of the Portuguese offer in view of the small number of planes available and the state of the training of the pilots, mechanics, and radio specialists.
d. There is no objection from the military viewpoint to Portugal receiving munitions when they can be spared but negotiation as to the basis for transfer is an action to be taken on a governmental level.
e. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in accepting Portuguese participation do not intend to enter into a commitment for the retaking of Portuguese Timor. Neither is acceptance to be construed as a commitment to use Portuguese troops in any other area.
f. Military operations against Portuguese Timor must for the present await the completion of operations against higher priority Japanese-held objectives. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will notify the Portuguese military authorities of impending operations against Portuguese Timor in time for them to prepare their troops for participation therein. Details as to the assembly, shipment, training, and equipping of the Portuguese force will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the appropriate time.
They have informed the State Department and the Foreign Office that they have no objection to the disclosure of any of the above information to the Portuguese if the Department of State or Foreign Office deem it necessary in diplomatic conversations.…
[Appendix E]
The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board
Confidential
Memorandum for the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board
(See paragraph 22 of the Report)
-
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been studying the problem of providing passenger carrying shipping to meet the urgent demands for the essential military operations in the prosecution of the war against Japan, and for the provision of such shipping of this type to meet other requirements as can be made available without adversely affecting military operations.
-
The available passenger space is insufficient to meet all the urgent requirements of the United Nations, and coordination of demands is, therefore, essential in order to determine priority and to secure shipping efficiency as well as to ensure the fullest consideration being given to all claimants.
-
The Combined Chiefs of Staff have, therefore, agreed that in accordance with the “Agreement on Principles,” dated 5 August 1944, contained in the United Maritime Authority’s report, October, 1944, the following procedure in respect of the submission of demands should be adopted by all the Allied nations:
a. The current procedure for handling the United States and United Kingdom personnel shipping for military requirements will be continued. This procedure will permit on an operational basis the opportune use of such shipping on return voyages, or legs of such voyages, to move passengers of any of the Allied governments.
b. All requirements of the Allied governments for the movement of passengers, whether military or civilian, involving definite additional commitments of shipping, whether on a short or long-term basis, should be submitted to the United Maritime Authority in terms of the shipping space required. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board should confer with the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to practicability of meeting such requirements. On military requests of the other Allied governments the decision will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
c. When a satisfactory arrangement in regard to the movement of civilians cannot be made under a. and b. above, the matter may be referred to the appropriate authorities of the United Kingdom and United States, to decide whether passenger vessels should be withdrawn at the expense of the military effort. Ships, if so allocated, would operate under the control of the United Maritime Authority on the basis of the “Agreement on Principles” but would be retained in the common pool and assigned for particular voyage employment as might be decided from time to time.
-
Vital demands for shipping should, therefore, be submitted to the United Maritime Authority for consideration.
-
The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board is requested to transmit the foregoing policy to the United Maritime Executive Board in Washington and London.
Tripartite military meeting, 2:30 p.m.
Cecilienhof Palace, Potsdam
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Brooke | Army General Antonov |
| General of the Army Marshall | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov |
| Fleet Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | Marshal of Aviation Falaleyev |
| General of the Army Arnold | Field Marshal Wilson | Lieutenant General Slavin |
| Lieutenant General Hull | General Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | ||
| Major General Norstad | ||
| Major General Deane | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Lieutenant-Colonel Mallaby | |
| Captain Moore | ||
| Interpreters | ||
| Lieutenant Chase | Major Lunghi | Major Evsekov |
JCS Minutes
Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret
GENERAL OF THE ARMY ANTONOV asked Fleet Admiral Leahy to preside at this, the first tripartite meeting of the Chiefs of Staff at TERMINAL.
ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he was glad to accept the duties of presiding officer at this session.
ADMIRAL LEAHY then asked that General Antonov outline the intentions and plans of the USSR with reference to the Japanese.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that Soviet troops were now being concentrated in the Far East and would be ready to commence operations in the last half of August. The actual date, however, would depend upon the result of conferences with Chinese representatives which had not yet been completed. The objective of the USSR in the Far East was the destruction of the Japanese troops in Manchuria and the occupation of the Liaotung Peninsula. After the defeat of Japan in combination with the Allied armies it was the Russian intention to withdraw their troops from Manchuria.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that at the present time the Japanese have in Manchuria approximately 20 infantry divisions, two tank divisions, and a sufficient number of depot divisions, separate brigades and separate battalions to bring the total Japanese forces up to a strength of approximately 30 divisions. In addition to these there were approximately 20 divisions of Manchurian troops, making an aggregate of approximately 50 divisions in all on the Russian front.
If the Russian operations were to be successful it was important to prevent the Japanese from strengthening their Manchurian front by reinforcements from China and the Japanese Islands. It was estimated that the Japanese might bring for this purpose 10 divisions from China and 7 from the Japanese Islands. If, therefore, the USSR was to be able to carry out its operations successfully it was necessary to prevent any such reinforcement.
GENERAL ANTONOV said he wished to call attention to the fact that there was only a single railroad line connecting Central Russia with the Far East; the effect of this was to limit rail movements of all kinds and effectively prevent any rapid movement of troops.
ADMIRAL LEAHY then asked General Marshall to outline the situation of the Japanese with respect to ground troops.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that it is estimated that the Japanese have at present approximately 1,800,000 Japanese troops in Japan proper; there are approximately 500,000 troops in Kyushu and a fairly large garrison in the Ryukyus outside of Okinawa. The Japanese garrison in Formosa has recently been increased to about 260,000 men.
In the Philippines there are now about 12,000 to 14,000 Japanese survivors collected in the mountains of northern Luzon for the final death struggle. In Mindanao there are about 20,000 troops scattered throughout the central plateau, all of the coastline positions having now been lost. In the remainder of the Philippines there are approximately 25,000 troops who are widely scattered.
There are, throughout the Pacific islands, isolated garrisons who are under constant surveillance and periodic bombing and whose presence cause no inconvenience to United States forces. There are a considerable number of isolated Japanese troops in Borneo, in New Guinea and the Celebes, in Bougainville in the Solomons group and in the Bismarck Archipelago. The Japanese troops in the Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago are confronted by the Australians, who are also taking care of a considerable force in the north central part of New Guinea. All of these island garrisons are suffering from gradual exhaustion of their military supplies. In New Guinea they are suffering, in addition, from malaria and other tropical diseases. The remaining garrisons in Java and Sumatra have been reduced by movements to the Malay Peninsula.
The United States Chiefs of Staff estimate that there are about a million Japanese in China. At the present time the most noticeable movements of Japanese troops have been towards Kyushu. In the last three months two divisions from Manchuria had been identified there and it is understood that these divisions have left in Manchuria the cadres for two additional divisions. Two divisions have recently been moved from Korea to the Japanese homeland. One of these is composed of depot troops and the composition of the other is unknown. In the recent past deceptive measures instituted by U.S. forces have resulted in the concentration of Japanese troops in the Kuriles north of Hokkaido. It is known now, however, that the Japanese are moving troops out of the Kuriles and a division of these troops has recently been identified in Kyushu.
U.S. troops now have firm control of Okinawa where they are busy improving harbors and developing numerous airfields. It is expected that in addition to the naval and Marine Corps planes now on Okinawa that General MacArthur’s air force will have 2,000 planes there before the end of the summer. On Luzon strenuous efforts are being made to develop the necessary base facilities for incoming troops. Because of harbor destruction and the sinking of 500 ships in Manila Bay this has been a difficult task but satisfactory progress is being made.
With reference to General Antonov’s remark regarding the severing of Japanese communications with Manchuria, GENERAL MARSHALL said it is the present understanding the Japanese communications have been seriously interfered with by U.S. submarine action in the Sea of Japan, and by the continued laying of submarine mines by B-29s at the western entrance of the Inland Sea near Shimonoseki and the blockade of such harbors on the west coast of Honshu as Niigata.
The ferry service between Japan and Fusan [Pusan] and shipping in the Yellow Sea has been terminated. Ferry service to Fusan has been moved to the ports further north in Korea. Mine laying by B-29s has extended north along the Korean coast from Fusan to Genzan [Wonsan]. Mines have also been laid in the Inland Sea in the Bungo Channel and in the Bay of Tokyo. Naval air action has extended to northern Honshu and Hokkaido and numerous coastal ports have been attacked by naval aircraft and by direct bombardment. In recent months aircraft based in the Philippines have reduced the normal traffic from ports as far south as Indo-China to Japan from forty convoys a day to none whatever at the present time. By these various actions the Japanese have been compelled to stop all operations at sea except minor operations in the Sea of Japan and coastal lugger traffic in the Java Sea and along the coasts of Malaysia. As a result of increased naval action and mining by super-bombers, there is little likelihood of any Japanese troop movements between Japan and Manchuria. By September or October we expect it to be impossible for the Japanese to move any cargo over this route. It is believed that Japanese operational shipping of one thousand tons and over has been reduced from seven or eight million tons at the beginning of the war to 1¼ million tons at the present time.
In referring to General Antonov’s remarks relating to the movement of Japanese reinforcements from China to Manchuria, GENERAL MARSHALL said that the general movement of Japanese troops in China indicates a withdrawal from the south. Garrisons in Indo-China and to the southward have been cut off by Chinese forces. It appears that the Japanese are establishing a fortress garrison of about 150,000 men for the defense of Hong Kong and Canton. A similar garrison is being established in Shanghai, including Chusan Island. An inland fortress garrison is being established in Hankow. Our evidence indicates that in spite of their efforts to withdraw their forces to the northward, the continued air attacks on the single-track railroad and sabotage by Chinese guerrillas will prevent the Japanese from moving more than a trickle of troops to the north. Not only is the rail route interrupted, but the rolling stock is in bad condition. They are, therefore, dependent largely on water transportation. In the course of time the Japanese could move troops from North China to Manchuria through the Peking–Kalgan and the Tientsin regions.
The redeployment of troops from the European Theater to the Pacific is now well underway. The first troops have reached Manila. Our first requirement is for engineering and similar troops to restore the harbors and prepare cantonments. Six divisions from Germany with the attached corps and army troops are now in the United States. They will be moved from the west coast of the United States as rapidly as shipping is available.
In the Pacific at the present time the principal difficulty is to find ground room for troops and aircraft we wish to deploy there. The early requirement for engineering troops in the Philippines is thus apparent.
The divisions already in the Pacific have largely been withdrawn from combat and are now being reconditioned and trained for the next operation.
The next most important difficulty in the Pacific is the provision of shipping. By the improvement of harbors, by decreasing the turnaround of our vessels and by making all possible air transport available we hope to overcome the shipping shortage.
In closing, GENERAL MARSHALL said that attacks upon Japan from the air and the sea are now proceeding in tremendous volume, but the intensity of these attacks would increase each week.
ADMIRAL KING said that he would briefly supplement General Marshall’s remarks. He said that since Yalta the United States Navy had participated in the complete conquest of the Philippine Islands. Commencing in April the conquest of Okinawa and adjacent islands had been accomplished, and bases for land, sea, and air forces were being developed preparatory to the next move against the Japanese homeland. In addition to the Okinawa operation, carrier task forces had attacked air and naval bases in Japan proper. Recently the Third Fleet, under Admiral Halsey, had bombarded the Tokyo area and northern Honshu and Hokkaido. Commencing with the Ryukyus campaign a part of the British Fleet had operated as a task force of the U.S. naval forces. The Japanese navy is now only one-third of its maximum strength and most of the remaining units are of questionable military value, except perhaps for suicide purposes. Naval reconnaissance aircraft now range to the Shantung Peninsula, Korea and the Sea of Japan. Our submarines are operating against the sea communications between Japan and Korea, in Japanese home waters and in the Sea of Japan. We have developed naval bases in Guam and Saipan, in the Marianas group, and are now developing a base in Okinawa.
GENERAL ARNOLD said that he would furnish some additional details regarding the matters discussed by General Marshall. The limited land areas in the Pacific Theater make it impossible to utilize at present all of the large number of airplanes which had been used in the European Theater. When commencing the air campaign against Japan proper we were limited in operations by the airfields we could develop in the Marianas. From these islands the B-29s performance enabled us to carry out attacks against the Japanese industrial areas in Honshu. During the first part of the campaign Japanese air opposition, as well as anti-aircraft fire, was intense. Navigation problems were most difficult. The weather through which we had to fly had an effect on the ability of the plane crews to carry the maximum weight in bombs. With the increase in the strength of our attacks the opposition by the enemy decreased. After the capture of Iwo Jima we were able to base fighter planes there which were able to accompany the B-29s on their attacks on Japanese Islands. Not long after the employment of long-range accompanying fighters was initiated the Japanese Air Force assumed a condition of impotency and we have records of many instances when B-29s reached their objectives without encountering any enemy air opposition. We have learned more about Japanese weather and this and experience gained enabled us to add 30 percent to the bomb load of our B-29s. With fields established on Okinawa B-24s will be able to operate to the north of Port Arthur and B-29s to a range of 200 miles north of Harbin. We will be able to carry maximum bomb loads against Japanese industries and lines of communication in Manchuria. The B-29s operating from Okinawa will carry a bomb load of 20,000 pounds. The difficulty of operating air units from Okinawa will be appreciated when it is realized that the island is only 80 miles long and that only 48 miles of its length can be used for airfields. This usable part of the island is only six or seven miles wide at the widest part. We expect to operate between 2,000 and 3,500 planes from the fields we are building there.
GENERAL ARNOLD said that the exact proportion of Japanese industry now operating in Manchuria was not known but it was estimated to be about twenty percent.
He said that the Japanese Air Forces now have some 5,000 planes, a larger number than they have ever had before, but their air force is at its weakest point operationally.
The 5,000 planes referred to above include all types of planes – operational and non-operational – reconnaissance, photographic and combat. Of these the Japanese have set aside about 1,200 for suicide operations. These are now concentrated largely in northern Honshu where the crews are being given special training in suicide technique against airplanes both on the ground and in the air and against ships – warships as well as cargo ships unloading at our ports such as Okinawa.
The Japanese have lost many of their best air leaders – most of their experienced pilots and large numbers of their maintenance crews. They are also very short of gasoline and oil. As a result, Army and Navy planes operating over Hokkaido, Honshu, and the Ryukyus rarely encounter more than 70 or 80 planes.
GENERAL ANTONOV asked General Marshall if he thought it would be possible for the Japanese to move large forces from Japan to Manchuria and from China to Manchuria.
In reply, GENERAL MARSHALL said that he believed no troops could be moved from Japan to Manchuria. He thought the Japanese would be unable to move a large number of troops from China to Manchuria by rail but, given time, they could increase their forces in Manchuria from Central China via the Peking–Kalgan route or via Tientsin. The rail line south of Shantung is susceptible to air attack and sabotage. For this reason it would be a slow process to move large numbers of troops over this route.
General Wedemeyer, the United States Commander in China, has 1,000 planes of the Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces under his command to operate against this railroad.
Continuing, GENERAL MARSHALL said that at the present time 100,000 tons of supplies a month are being moved into China by air over the mountains and via the old Burma Road. Over this route heavy movements of Chinese troops have been made from Burma to China. The movement of troops and supplies to China has been undertaken in order to have ready by August, 15 Chinese divisions of 10,000 men each equipped with American arms, trained by American officers and enlisted men, and directed under American guidance. He said he mentioned this movement of troops and their equipment from Burma since these movements had prevented an increase in the gasoline supply to China. As the equipping of these divisions is completed and the operations to be undertaken succeed, a greatly increased gasoline supply will be available which will enable heavy attacks to be made on the railroad to North China.
Chinese troops in August will attack Fort Bayard, a port on the China Sea north of Hainan and south of Canton. This port is within 150 miles of the area from which the American-trained Chinese troops will advance on Canton and Hong Kong. It had been estimated that one Liberty ship in Fort Bayard was the equivalent of three or four in Calcutta; one transport plane in Fort Bayard was the equivalent of ten or more in Burma, and 20,000 men in Fort Bayard was the equivalent of 150,000 in Burma. All of these advantages would be reflected in the air operations against the railroad in China.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Chinese troops had given a good account of themselves in Burma and their effectiveness was encouraging beyond expectations. He thought that with heavy air support the Chinese troops would operate with considerable success against a Japanese withdrawal to the northward.
With support of the Chinese forces by ship rather than through Burma he thought that the air forces would be able to completely destroy the Chinese railroad, and although the railroad could be attacked from Okinawa it would not be a profitable target for aircraft based there.
GENERAL ANTONOV asked if the United States would operate against the Kuriles in order to open the line of communications to Siberia. He said that they had some strength in Kamchatka and would like to assist with some forces, and that he considered opening this sea route to be most important. He also asked if it would be possible for the United States forces to operate against the shores of Korea in coordination with the Russian forces which would be making an offensive against the peninsula.
ADMIRAL KING said that it would not be possible to operate against the Kuriles and that he saw no reason why a line of communications could not be maintained through the Kuriles as the passages were wide and deep. In reply to the question in regard to operations against Korea, GENERAL MARSHALL said that such amphibious operations had not been contemplated, and particularly not in the near future. To undertake amphibious operations against Korea would seriously expose our shipping to Japanese suicide attack by air and surface vessels until we had completely destroyed enemy air strength in southern Korea and until certain portions of the Japanese homeland had been brought completely under our control. To stage such an operation would require a great number of assault ships which would be engaged in three landings on Kyushu. There were no additional assault ships which would permit a landing in Korea. With only a small amphibious force landings could be made on the China coast south of Shanghai which would be of great assistance to General Wedemeyer. He realized the importance of Korea to the Russian operations but said that the possibility of an attack on Korea would have to be determined after the landings on Kyushu. He thought that Korea could be controlled from airfields that would be established in Kyushu.
ADMIRAL KING said that he hoped and expected that after the Kyushu operation we would have such control over the waters of Japan and Korea that we could establish a line of sea communications through those waters to Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces.
GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that we had already severed the line of communications between Korea and the main islands of Japan.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had with him some questions which he would leave with General Antonov to be answered at his convenience since he did not think that he would be prepared to give the answers at the present time.
ADMIRAL KING said that he would like to call the attention of the Russian Chiefs of Staff to the conversation that took place at Yalta regarding La Perousse Strait, the control of which, we understood, would be undertaken by the Russians by capturing the southern end of Sakhalin Island at as early a time as the Russian Chiefs of Staff thought practicable.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that the first task facing the Russians would be the destruction of the Japanese troops in Manchuria. Because of the distance of Sakhalin, additional troop movements would be required in order to complete its capture in time to be of value in opening La Perousse Strait. Therefore, the attack on southern Sakhalin would be undertaken as a second offensive.
GENERAL MARSHALL then gave General Antonov a book explaining the experiences of our forces in fighting the Japanese which he thought might be of value to him. He also gave him an estimate of the situation in the Far East.
GENERAL ANTONOV said that he was grateful for the very valuable information which General Marshall had given him and said that it would be truly exploited.
In regard to operations in Southeast Asia under Admiral Mountbatten, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the reconquest of Burma had recently been completed but that some Japanese still remained in Burma where they had been cut off by the advance on Rangoon. These Japanese had been making an attempt to join other enemy forces in Siam and five hundred of them had been killed in the last two days. Operations in Burma were being interfered with by the monsoon which was still continuing. When the weather clears, Sir Alan Brooke said that Admiral Mountbatten would continue on towards Siam. In Burma there were the remnants of nine enemy divisions facing the British and behind these remnants was one division in Siam and four in Indo-China.
SIR ALAN BROOKE said that they were preparing for an operation to secure Malaya and Singapore and to open the Straits of Malacca. The opening of these straits would shorten the line of communications for the support of British forces operating in the Pacific Theater against the main islands of Japan.
In Malaya there were little more than two divisions of Japanese troops which were being reinforced from Java and Sumatra.
Plans were being prepared for a small expeditionary force to cooperate with the United States forces in the attack on Japan. The limiting factor for operations in this area was shipping.
ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that only remnants of the Japanese Fleet in the Southeast Asia area remained and that within the last two months the two efficient Japanese cruisers had been sunk. Only two damaged ones remained in Singapore. The British East Indies Fleet was unrestricted in its movements except in the very narrow parts of Malacca Strait.
SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the British and United States air forces in Southeast Asia maintained complete supremacy over the Japanese air forces in that area. His estimate of the strength of enemy air forces in Burma, Siam, Malaya, Sumatra, and Indo-China on 15 July was 260 operating aircraft plus 150 training units. He said he considered any substantial increase in air strength most unlikely and that Admiral Mountbatten had ample aircraft for his future operations.
ADMIRAL LEAHY asked General Antonov if he desired to ask the British Chiefs of Staff any questions, to which General Antonov replied that he did not.
GENERAL ANTONOV said, however, that he would require some time to consider the questions which had been presented to him by General Marshall and that when he was prepared he would like to arrange another meeting. He said he was very grateful for the information that had been furnished him by the United States and the British Chiefs of Staff.
ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed the appreciation of both the United States and the British Chiefs of Staff for the information given to them by the Russian Chiefs of Staff.