Amerikas größte Flottenbasis
…
L’Aube (July 25, 1945)
Deuxième audience du process Pétain
Les accusations portées par M. Paul Reynaud ont trouvé la défense en défaut
…
Accords de principe à Potsdam
Selon le correspondant de l’agence Reuter, on pense qu’au cours de leur huitième rencontre, M. Churchill, le maréchal Staline et le président Truman sont arrivés à des accords de principe. Ceux-ci vont permettre aux experts de mettre au point de nombreuses questions de détail qui les tiendront occupés jusqu’au retour des hommes d’État britanniques.
Churchill et Attlee se rendent à Londres pour la proclamation des résultats électoraux
La délégation britannique a communiqué officiellement que MM. Churchill, Eden et Attlee se rendent au jourd’hui à Londres pour prendre connaissance du résultat des élections britanniques. On prévoit que les personnalités britanniques regagneraient Potsdam probablement vendredi : on fait remarquer, à ce sujet, dans les milieux de la capitale britannique, que même si M. Churchill n’obtenait pas la majorité, sa démission immédiate ne s’ensuivrait pas nécessairement et qu’il retournerait à Berlin avec MM. Eden et Attlee pour assister à la phase finale de la Conférence des Trois.
Celle-ci n’interrompra d’ailleurs pas ses travaux pendant l’absence des ministres britanniques.
La participation des soviets a la guerre contre le Japon
économiserait aux Américains un million de vies humaines
…
U.S. State Department (July 25, 1945)
Truman-Mountbatten conversation, 9:20 a.m.
Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Truman | Admiral Mountbatten |
Truman-Stalin conversation, about 11 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Soviet Union | |
| President Truman | Generalissimo Stalin |
The U.S. Chiefs of Staff to the Soviet Chiefs of Staff
[Babelsberg, July 24, 1945]
Top secret
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First Question – Has the Soviet High Command received any instructions regarding the proposal to establish United States weather liaison groups in Petropavlovsk and Khabarovsk as presented to Generalissimo Stalin by President Truman on 23 July 1945?
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Second Question – United States naval surface forces will operate without restriction in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan. United States submarine forces will operate without restriction in the Seas of Okhotsk and Japan, south and east of a line established by connecting the following points: Coast of Korea at latitude 38° north, thence to latitude 40° north longitude 135° east, thence to latitude 45°45′ north longitude 140° east, thence along the parallel of latitude 45°45′ north. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. United States submarine operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of naval operations?
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Third Question – United States air forces will operate without restriction south and east of the following line: Cape Lopatka, west to point at latitude 51°10′ north longitude 147° east, thence to point at latitude 45°45′ north longitude 144°20′ east, thence to point at latitude 45°4′ north longitude 139°30′ east, thence to point at latitude 41°20′ north longitude 133°20′ east, thence westward to Seishin [Chongjin], Korea, thence north to railroad at Korean border, thence westward along railroad to Yungki and Changchun, thence along the river to Liaoyuan, Kailu and Chihfeng, thence along the railroad through Tolun, Paochang, Wanchuan [Kalgan], Tatung, Fengchen, Tsining [Chining] to Kweisui, thence northwest to the border of Outer Mongolia. This boundary will be subject to later change as the situation may require. United States air operations north and west of this boundary and Soviet operations south and east of this boundary will be subject to coordination. Does the Soviet General Staff have any suggestions regarding further coordination of air operations?
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Fourth Question – Does the Soviet High Command agree to the proposal for the immediate establishment of operational coordination and liaison as proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in the letter sent by the Commanding General, United States Military Mission, to General Antonov on 5 July 1945?
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Fifth Question – It is assumed that, after D-day, Soviet or United States air and naval craft in emergencies will have access to the nearest Soviet or United States ports or airfields where they may obtain repairs, servicing, medical care and otherwise be assisted in making a speedy return to combat. Although in extreme emergency the nearest friendly facility would be sought, it is considered desirable to designate certain ports, airfields or areas where maximum facilities would be available. Will the Soviet Government designate such ports, airfields or areas furnishing information necessary for proper location, identification and approach together with information on recognition signals, corridors of approach and exit for general use in any emergency, landing or coastal approach? The United States is prepared to take corresponding action in the case of Soviet aircraft.
Ninth plenary meeting, 11 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| President Truman | Prime Minister Churchill | Generalissimo Stalin |
| Secretary Byrnes | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Davies | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Vyshinsky |
| Mr. Bohlen | Mr. Attlee | Mr. Cohen |
| Mr. Thompson | Mr. Gromyko | |
| Mr. Pavlov |
U.S. Delegation Working Paper
Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m.
Agenda for the Meeting of Heads of Governments, July 25, 1945
- Polish Western Frontier –Eden opposed to discussing this morning
- Disposition of German Fleet and Merchant Marine –Br ask to postpone
- German Reparations
- Transfer of populations from Poland & Czechoslovakia –British will ask to add to agenda
[5.] Waterways
Thompson Minutes
Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m.
Top secret
Western Frontier of Poland
CHURCHILL said that he had had a talk with President Bierut and that Mr. Eden had seen the Polish delegation for two hours last evening. The Poles were all in agreement that about one and one-half million Germans were left in the area in the west which was under discussion. Mr. Churchill said he thought that this question was mixed up with the question of reparations and the question of the four-power occupational zones.
THE PRESIDENT observed that this was true. He added that the Secretary of State had talked with the Poles and expected to have more talks. He suggested that the question go over to the Friday meeting.
This was agreed to.
Disposition of the German Fleet
THE PRESIDENT said he thought that they had agreed on this matter.
CHURCHILL replied that some concrete proposals would have to be made. A paper was being drawn up for discussion.
THE PRESIDENT said that Admiral Land and Assistant Secretary Clayton were in consultation on this matter. He said he had only just received the papers on the question and had had no time to study them.
It was agreed that consideration of this matter should be postponed.
Transfers of Populations
CHURCHILL said that he thought this question should be discussed at some time or other. There were a large number of Germans to be moved out of Czechoslovakia. It was necessary to consider where they would go.
Stalin said that the Czechs had evacuated these Germans and that they had gone to Leipzig, Dresden, and other cities.
CHURCHILL said he understood that there were two and one-half million of these Germans in the Sudetenland. Moreover there were about 150,000 Reich Germans in Czechoslovakia. The British information was that only a few thousand of these Germans had left Czechoslovakia. He said it was a big question. Churchill asked Stalin if they were all being moved into the Russian zone.
STALIN replied in the affirmative.
CHURCHILL hastened to add that the British did not want them.
STALIN said he did not suggest that the British take them.
CHURCHILL observed that they brought their mouths with them. He said he understood that emigration had not begun on a large scale yet.
STALIN said his information was that the Czechs gave them two hours’ notice and then threw them out. With respect to Poland he said that the Poles had retained one and one-half million to help with the harvest. As soon as the harvest was over the Poles would evacuate them.
CHURCHILL said he did not think that they should.
STALIN replied that the Poles did not ask but did as they liked.
CHURCHILL pointed out that with respect to Czechoslovakia the situation was different from that of Poland. The Poles were evacuating Germans from an occupational zone. This area was part of the Russian zone and Poles were driving the Germans out. He should have thought that this ought not to be done without consideration being given to the question of food supply, reparations, etc., which matters had not been decided. The position was that the Poles had little food and fuel and that the British had a mass of population thrown on them.
STALIN said that they should appreciate the position in which the Poles found themselves. They were taking revenge on the Germans for the injuries which the Germans had caused them in the course of centuries.
CHURCHILL pointed out that their revenge took the form of throwing the Germans into the American and British zones to be fed.
THE PRESIDENT said he agreed that this should not be done. He was sympathetic with the Poles and with Marshal Stalin in regard to the difficulties they were up against. He had already made his position very clear. If the Poles were to have a zone this matter should be considered very carefully. The occupying powers of Germany were Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, and the United States. If the Poles were to have a zone, they were responsible to the Soviet Union for it. He wanted to be as helpful as he could and the position he had taken was that the frontier should be fixed at the peace conference.
THE PRESIDENT at this point said that he wished to make clear to his colleagues what his powers were in respect to the question of the treaty of peace. When they were discussing matters appropriate for inclusion in the peace treaties he wanted all to understand that under the Constitution of the United States a treaty could only be concluded with the consent of the United States Senate. Of course they could be sure that when he supported a proposal at the Conference he would use his best efforts to support the matter when it came up for consideration in the Senate. This did not preclude, however, his coming back and saying that he considered that the political sentiment in the United States was such that he could not press the matter without the danger of injuring their mutual relations. He said that he made these remarks not in order to change the basis of any discussion with his colleagues nor to change the basis upon which the discussions with President Roosevelt had been held but to make clear what his Constitutional powers were. He had to consider these matters from the standpoint of the United States people and he wished to be able to be in a position to get the best arrangements approved by the Senate. He concluded by saying that he was convinced that world peace could only be maintained by the three of them present at the table.
STALIN inquired if his remarks referred only to the peace treaties or to the whole discussion.
THE PRESIDENT replied only to those agreements or treaties that under the Constitution had to be sent to the Senate for ratification.
STALIN observed that only certain treaties were in question.
THE PRESIDENT replied in the affirmative and added that he had wide powers the same as his colleagues but he did not wish to abuse these powers for he was obliged to have the support of the American people for his policies.
STALIN said that he understood.
CHURCHILL proposed to return to the question of the Polish advance so far to the west.
STALIN said he was not prepared for this question which had come up by accident but he was ready to exchange views.
CHURCHILL said he only wanted to say that this matter lay at the root of the success of the Conference. For example, if the Conference ended in ten days’ time; and if there were no agreement regarding the present state of affairs in Poland; and with the Poles practically admitted as a fifth occupational power; and with no arrangement made for the spreading of food equally over the whole population of Germany; this would undoubtedly mark a breakdown of the Conference. In such an event he supposed they might have to fall back on the proposal of Secretary Byrnes and each would hold on to what was in their areas. The definition given by Mr. Maisky of war booty was a very wide one. As given it would certainly cover ships of war. He had hoped to succeed in reaching agreement on this network of problems that lay at the heart of their difficulties. No progress had been made so far on this point.
STALIN said that coal and steel were much more important than food in the question of supplies for Germany. 90 percent of Germany’s metal came from the Ruhr and 80 percent of its coal.
CHURCHILL said that if supplies from the Ruhr were to be given to the Russian and Polish zones, these would have to be paid for by food from the Russian zone. He could not take the position that everything behind the Russian line was to be disposed of by the Russians without British and American agreement while the Russians could demand plants and materials from them.
STALIN said that if the Ruhr was to remain in Germany its supplies would have to be drawn upon for the whole of Germany.
CHURCHILL inquired then why not food.
STALIN said that this could be discussed. There were two points, the Ruhr and food.
CHURCHILL inquired how the miners would get the coal out without food and where the food was to come from.
STALIN said this was a point they were discussing. It was a question of imports and exports. Germany had always imported large amounts of food and had to export to pay for its imports.
CHURCHILL then inquired how they could pay reparations.
STALIN rejoined that they would be able to pay.
CHURCHILL said he would not be responsible for agreeing to anything which would lead to starvation conditions in the British zone this winter while the Poles had the feeding grounds for themselves.
STALIN said the Poles had asked the Russians for bread as they were short of food until the next harvest.
CHURCHILL said he hoped that Stalin would recognize their difficulties as they would recognize his. He pointed out that in England they would have the most fireless winter of the war this year.
STALIN inquired why.
CHURCHILL replied because coal was short.
STALIN replied that England had always exported coal. He suggested that they make their prisoners of war work. The Russians were working the ones they held in the mines and it would be difficult to dispense with them so far as coal was concerned. He said that the British had 400,000 German soldiers in Norway who were not even disarmed. No one knew what they were waiting for.
CHURCHILL said it was their intention to disarm them. He did not know exactly what the situation was but said that the arrangements had been made under SHAEF. However, he said he would inquire. The British were short of coal because they were exporting to Holland, France, and Belgium. They were denying themselves and they found it odd that the Poles sold coal, taken from ground which they did not recognize as Polish, to Sweden and other countries.
STALIN said the Poles were not selling coal from the territory in question but from other sources. He was not accustomed to make complaints but he pointed out that the Russian situation was still worse than that of the British. They had lost over five million men in this war. He was afraid that if he started complaining Churchill would burst into tears so difficult was the situation in Russia.
CHURCHILL said they were eager to barter coal from the Ruhr in exchange for food for the German population.
STALIN said that this question must be discussed.
CHURCHILL replied that he did not expect a decision today but before his departure and the resulting interruption of the Conference he did not think they should consider that they had solved the major problems. Churchill said that the British position would be more difficult after the war than it had been during the war although it might be less deadly.
STALIN observed that as they had tackled the war properly they would be able to tackle the peace.
EDEN reverted to the question of the transfer of population. They had received a message from Dr. Beneš asking that the question be examined here. Could not the Foreign Ministers look at it.
STALIN inquired whether they should not summon the Czechs to the Conference.
CHURCHILL said he would be very glad to see his old friend Dr. Beneš.
STALIN asked if this would not mean serving the mustard after supper. He assured Mr. Churchill that these transfers had already taken place.
EDEN said he thought that all three Governments had received a note from the Czechs asking that the question be discussed here. He thought they ought to do so.
CHURCHILL said he thought there had been an agreement between the Soviets and the Czechs that not more than 1,000 of these Germans would depart at one time and that since there were two and one-half million of them the transfer would take a long time.
STALIN said there had been no such agreement.
CHURCHILL then proposed that the Foreign Ministers at least look into the matter and ascertain the facts.
This was agreed to.
THE PRESIDENT said he would like to call the attention of the Conference to the question of the inland waterways upon which he had circulated a paper. He would like the Foreign Ministers to examine it.
This was agreed to.
MOLOTOV said that the Soviet delegation would circulate a memorandum on the obstacles in the way of the return of Soviet citizens from Austria and Germany. He also wished to circulate a memorandum regarding the presence of German troops in Norway.
THE PRESIDENT said that any memorandum could be circulated.
CHURCHILL said he could at once give assurance that these troops would be disarmed immediately. They did not want to keep them up their sleeves. He would have a report made.
The meeting adjourned.
Cohen Notes
Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m.
TRUMAN: Shall we discuss the Polish western frontier? I think the Prime Minister had something to say.
CHURCHILL: I saw Mr. Bierut this morning. The Foreign Secretary saw the Polish delegation last night. They all agree that there are about one and a half million Germans in this area. The issue is all mixed up with the reparation issue, and the four power zones of occupation.
TRUMAN: Secretary of State Byrnes expects to have further conversations with the Poles also. In view of the British and American conversations with the Poles, it might go over to Friday. The German fleet and merchant marine are also on the agenda. I thought we had agreed on that.
CHURCHILL: Obviously, we must have some concrete proposals.
TRUMAN: Secretary Byrnes tells me that [Assistant] Secretary Clayton and Admiral Land are working on such proposals.
STALIN: Let us postpone it.
CHURCHILL: We must at some time discuss the question of the transfer of populations. There are a large number of Poles [Germans] to be moved from Czechoslovakia. We must consider where they are to go.
STALIN: The Czechs have already evicted them.
CHURCHILL: The two and a half million of them? Then there are the Germans from the new Poland. Will they go to the Russian zones? We don’t want them. There are large numbers still to come from Sudetenland.
STALIN: So far as the Poles are concerned, the Poles have retained one and a half million Germans to help as laborers. As soon as the harvest is over, the Poles will evict them. The Poles do not ask us. They are doing what they like, just as the Czechs are.
CHURCHILL: That is the difficulty. The Poles are driving the Germans out of the Russian zone. That should not be done without considering its effect on the food supply and reparations. We are getting into a position where the Poles have food and coal, and we have the mass of the population thrown on us.
STALIN: We must appreciate the position of the Poles. The Poles are taking revenge for centuries of injuries.
CHURCHILL: That consists in throwing them on us, and the United States?
TRUMAN: We don’t want to pay for Polish revenge. If Poland is to have an occupation zone, that should be clearly defined, but at the present time there are only four zones of occupation. If the Poles have an occupation zone they should be responsible for it. The boundary cannot be fixed before the peace conference. I want to be helpful, but Germany is occupied by four powers, and the boundary cannot be changed [now;] only at the peace conference.
I must make clear at this point my constitutional powers. (Reads formal statement). Peace treaties must be confirmed by our Senate. When I indicate my support of a proposal, I will use my best efforts to secure its acceptance. That does not guarantee its acceptance, nor does it preclude my coming back and informing you that my continuing to press it might endanger our common interests in the peace.
I make this statement, not to change the basis of our discussions, but to make clear beyond misunderstanding my constitutional authority. This is particularly important with reference to the Polish question. I want a treaty of peace which can be ratified by the Senate.
STALIN: May I ask a few questions? Does your statement refer to peace treaties only, or to other questions?
TRUMAN: Only matters which must go to the Senate. I have large war powers, as have the rest of you, but I do not wish to use them to the point that they may endanger the final conclusion of peace.
CHURCHILL: If the conference ends in ten days without agreement on the present state of affairs in Poland, and with the Poles practically admitted as a fifth occupation power, and no arrangement for the spreading of food over the whole of Germany, it will mark the breakdown of the conference. I suppose we will have to fall back on the proposal of the Secretary of State, and each of us fall back on our own zones. Maisky’s definition of booty is a very wise one (???). I do hope that we will reach a broad agreement. We must recognize that we have made no progress so far on this point.
STALIN: Coal and metal from the Ruhr is more important than the food supply.
CHURCHILL: Coal will have to be paid for by food. We could not agree that Russia could dispose of everything in her zone and still claim supplies and reparations from our zone.
STALIN: Supplies will have to be drawn from the whole of Germany.
CHURCHILL: Why not food?
STALIN: That should be discussed. The question is under discussion. Germany has always had to import foodstuff.
CHURCHILL: How will she pay reparations?
STALIN: There is much fat in Germany.
CHURCHILL: I am not going to consent to arrangements which will lead to starvation in the Ruhr, when the Poles have all the feeding grounds.
STALIN: Only recently the Poles requested help by the way of bread from us until their new harvest.
CHURCHILL: We in England are going to have the most fireless winter since the war.
STALIN: How is this? England has always exported her coal. Let the prisoners of war work. They work in the mines in Russia. You have 400 thousand German soldiers in Norway who have not been disarmed.
CHURCHILL: It is our intention to disarm them. I thought that they were disarmed. I will inquire about it.
CHURCHILL: (continuing) We are short of coal because we export coal to France, Holland and Belgium. We find it odd, when we need coal, that the Poles should be selling coal from lands which we do not regard as Polish, to Sweden and other countries.
STALIN: The Poles are selling their own coal, not the coal from the former German territories. I am not accustomed to complaining. We have lost five million men in this war. We are short of coal and many other things. If I described our situation and our needs, I might make the Prime Minister weep.
CHURCHILL: We will sell coal from the Ruhr for food.
STALIN: This question must be discussed, or thought over.
CHURCHILL: We were only exchanging views. I am finished.
STALIN: What a pity.
TRUMAN: We shall adjourn until Friday at five p.m.
CHURCHILL: I hope to be back.
STALIN: Judging from the expression on Mr. Attlee’s face, I do not think he looks forward avidly to taking over your authority.
We have tackled the problems of the war successfully. We should be able to tackle the problems of the peace as well.
EDEN: The Prime Minister referred to the transfer of populations. President Beneš has sent some communication to us. May the Foreign Secretaries look at it?
STALIN: Yes. May we not have to summon the Czechs?
CHURCHILL: I shall be glad to see Beneš. He is an old friend.
STALIN: But is this not serving mustard after supper? The Germans have already been driven out.
CHURCHILL: They have some agreement for gradual transfer.
STALIN: No such agreement exists.
CHURCHILL: There is still the problem how this is to be done. May the Foreign Secretaries look into it?
STALIN: Yes.
TRUMAN: I should like my suggestion on the waterways, the Rhine, the Danube, the Kiel Canal and the Bosporus considered by the Foreign Secretaries.
STALIN: All right.
MOLOTOV: May I circulate a memorandum on the obstacles in the way of return of Soviet citizens from Austria and Germany, and also a memorandum on the presence of German troops in Norway.
TRUMAN: Yes.
CHURCHILL: I wish to assure the Marshal that I intend to disarm the troops in Norway. I am not keeping them up my sleeve for use, if any misunderstanding arises in the north. Perhaps the Marshal will let me make a report.
STALIN: I promise in advance, and I shall not criticise.
The War Shipping Administrator to the Assistant Secretary of State
[Babelsberg,] 25 July 1945
Secret
Assumption:
The Tripartite Conference will agree that USSR (Russia) will be given as reparations one-third (⅓) of the captured and/or surrendered German merchant tonnage. (This will exclude (a) Fishing vessels; (b) Harbor and Inland Water Craft; (c) Coastal shipping required for German use.)
If the above assumption is correct, the Protocol should definitely cover the following points:
(a) In this one-third distribution full consideration should be given to any enemy merchant tonnage captured or surrendered now in possession of USSR.
(b) Ships may be tentatively “earmarked” for delivery to USSR at the end of the war with Japan.
(c) The implementation should not take place until after the fall of Japan, preferably six months after VJ-Day which, by limitation, is the period of the United Maritime Authority.
(d) The allocation, manning, and operation of these ships now fall under the cognizance and authority of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board and the United Maritime Authority.
These ships are now engaged in providing shipping service for military and other tasks necessary for, and arising out of, the completion of the war in Europe and the Far East and for the supplying of all the liberated areas as well as the United Nations generally and the territories under their authority. They are being handled and integrated accordingly. (NOTE: Any change in the present military and civilian approved instructions covering these vessels will interfere with the successful prosecution of the war with Japan.)
E S LAND
[Attachment]
Secret
Notes To Accompany Attached Memorandum to Assistant Secretary of State Clayton
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Russia is not, at present, a signatory to the “Agreement on Principles having reference to the continuance of coordinated control of merchant shipping,” which was done in London on the 5th day of August, 1944 (United Maritime Authority).
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To date Russia has evinced no interest in joining the United Maritime Authority.
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Our records indicate that Russia endeavored to dissuade both Norway and Sweden from joining the United Maritime Authority but they were not successful. This attitude on the part of Russia indicates either a misunderstanding or a fear, or both, as to the intent and purposes of the United Maritime Authority.
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The shipping allocations to Russia by the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board have been satisfactorily handled by the United States and the United Kingdom throughout the war and if Russia does not choose to accede to the United Maritime Authority, there is no reason why she should not henceforth apply to it for her shipping requirements. This leads to the conclusion that Russia’s accession to UMA is not vital provided that the Protocol definitely states that the delivery of ships to Russia will not take place until the limit of the UMA period, namely within six months after VJ-Day.
LAND
U.S. Delegation Working Paper
[Babelsberg, July 25 (?), 1945]
Draft Statement for President
When we are discussing matters which are appropriate for inclusion in the peace treaties, I am sure it is understood that these treaties under our Constitution must be made with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States. Of course when I indicate my support of a proposal, I shall use my best endeavors to secure its acceptance. That naturally does not guarantee its acceptance. Nor should it preclude my coming back and informing you when I find that political sentiment at home on a proposition is such that I cannot continue to press its acceptance without endangering our common interests in the peace.
I make this statement, not to change the basis of my discussions with you or the bases of President Roosevelt’s discussions with you, but only so that there will be no misunderstanding of my constitutional authority or any question of my exceeding it.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2545
U.S. Delegation Working Paper
Berlin Conference, July 25, 1945
Subject: FREE AND UNRESTRICTED NAVIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATERWAYS
The USA, the UK and the USSR are in accord that there should be free and unrestricted navigation of such inland waterways as border on two or more states, the Kiel Canal, and the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, which are comprised under the general term “Straits”. The navigation on these waterways should be regulated by international authorities representative of all nations directly interested in navigation on the waterways concerned.
As an initial step there should be set up as soon as possible interim navigation agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. The functions of the interim navigation agencies should be the restoration and development of navigation facilities on the river concerned, the supervision of river activities in the interest of equal treatment for various nationalities and the establishment of uniform regulations concerning use of facilities, rules of navigation, customs and sanitation formalities, and other similar questions. Membership on these agencies should include the United States, the United Kingdom, the USSR, France, and the sovereign riparian states recognized by these Governments.
With respect to the Kiel Canal, it is likewise suggested that an interim navigation agency be established with functions similar to those for the Danube and the Rhine rivers. For the time being, membership on this interim navigation agency for the Kiel Canal should be restricted to the UK, USSR, USA and France, as the occupying powers of Germany. Consultation with other nations directly interested in the Kiel Canal could be subsequently arranged.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
740.00119 EW/7-2545
The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the Assistant Secretary of State
Berlin, July 25, 1945
[Translation]
Dear Mr. Dunn: Under instructions of Peoples’ Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, I enclose herewith an aide-mémoire** on the question of the non-application of the unconditional surrender regime toward German troops in Norway.
I would appreciate it if you would acknowledge receipt of this letter.
Sincerely yours,
K NOVIKOV
[Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945
[Enclosure — Translation]
Aide-Mémoire
The Soviet Government has received information that with relation to German troops on Norwegian territory, the unconditional surrender regime provided for in the military capitulation of Germany, signed in Berlin on May 8, 1945 is not being applied in full. It is stated that the German troops located in the region between the cities of Mo and Trondheim, amounting to 260,000 men, and in the region of Tromsö, 140,000 men, are holding on to their arms and military “technique” (this probably means light military equipment). The personnel of these troops have not been interned and they have full freedom of movement. The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw to the attention of the Government of the United States of America and the British Government this information, since the Supreme Allied Control with respect to the surrendered troops on Norwegian territory is effected by the Allied Command.
740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-2545
The Secretary of the Soviet Delegation to the Assistant Secretary of State
Berlin, July 25, 1945
[Translation]
Dear Mr. Dunn: Under instructions of Peoples’ Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, I enclose herewith an Aide-Mémoire concerning the activities, which is unfriendly to the Soviet Union, in British, American and French Zones of occupation in Austria and Germany on the part of white-immigrants and other persons and organizations hostile to the USSR.
I would appreciate it, Mr. Dunn, if you would confirm the receipt of this letter.
Sincerely yours,
K NOVIKOV
[Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945
[Enclosure — Translation]
Aide-Mémoire
The Administration on the Repatriation of Soviet citizens has received information that in the British, American and French zones of occupation in Germany and also in the British and American zones in Austria, activities, having as their purpose to prevent the return to their homeland of Soviet citizens, are being carried on by white-immigrants and other persons and organizations hostile to the USSR.
On Austrian territory such activities are being carried on in areas occupied by the troops of the 8th British and 5th American Armies. It is stated that in the city of Salzburg under the official name “Engineering-Technical Firm of Karyakin” a committee is actually working and is carrying on this activity directed by a Russian immigrant, Colonel Bobrovi. In the suburbs of Salzburg a committee headed by Slipchenko and Mishshenko is working on the non-return of Ukrainians to their homeland. In the region of Klagenfurt agents of the former Vlasov Corps under the command of Colonel Rogozhin are in action. The general leadership in Austria of the hostile activities vis-à-vis the USSR is a “center” in which the well-known white-immigrants, General Kreiter, Engineer Voskresentsev, Ivanov and Lavrov, have entered.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw to the attention of the Government of the United States of America and of the British Government the above-mentioned facts.
740.00119 Control (Germany)/7-2545
The Soviet Delegation to the U.S. Delegation
[Babelsberg,] July 25, 1945
[Translation — Extract]
Aide-Mémoire
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Information has also been received concerning similar activities of white-immigrants in Germany in the zone of the First French Army. Here this activity is carried on under the active support on the part of the French military authorities from the “Sécurité Militaire.” In the British and American zones of occupation the leadership of the hostile activities vis-à-vis the USSR is carried on by the so-called Committee led by the white-immigrants, General Skoropadski, Kostyushchenko, Mironenko and Shmega. According to information received by the Soviet military authorities this Committee in June 1945 created the so-called “Ukrainian Committees” in a number of German cities, including Weissenburg, Kassel and Nuremberg. Each member of such committee is supplied with certificates prepared in a print shop of the “Central Committee.” On each certificate there is the seal and signature of the “President of the Free Ukraine”. Persons supplied with these certificates are free to move about in the Allied zones of occupation in Germany and carry on without hinder [hindrance?] hostile activities vis-à-vis the USSR in camps for Soviet citizens located in the British, American and French zones.
The Soviet Government considers it necessary to draw to the attention of the Government of the United States of America and of the British Government the above-mentioned facts.
840.811/7-2545
Proposal by the U.S. Delegation
Berlin Conference, July 25, 1945
Subject: FREE AND UNRESTRICTED NAVIGATION OF INTERNATIONAL INLAND WATERWAYS
The USA, the U.K. and the USSR are in accord that there should be free and unrestricted navigation of such inland waterways as border on two or more states, of the Kiel Canal, and of the Straits of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and the Bosphorus, which are comprised under the general term “Straits.” This free and unrestricted navigation on these waterways should be assured by international agreement.
As an initial step there will be set up as soon as possible interim navigation agencies for the Danube and the Rhine. The functions of the interim navigation agencies will be the restoration and development of navigation facilities on the river concerned, the supervision of river activities in the interest of equal treatment for various nationalities and the establishment of uniform regulations concerning use of facilities, rules of navigation, customs and sanitation formalities, and other similar questions. Membership on both these agencies will include the U.S., the U.K., the USSR, and France; on the agency for the Rhine River, Switzerland and the Netherlands will be invited to participate; on the agency for the Danube River, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Rumania will be invited to participate. Arrangements with respect to the eventual membership of Austria and Germany will be subject to subsequent agreement among the U.S., the U.K., the USSR, and France.
In accordance with the principle of free and unrestricted navigation, it is likewise agreed that the Control Council in Germany shall provide for equal treatment of all traffic passing through the Kiel Canal.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m.
Top secret
Meeting of Heads of Governments, 25 July 1945
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The information herein regarding the meeting of the Heads of Governments held at Cecilienhof at 1100, 25 July 1945 was furnished by the Secretary General of the U.S. Delegation.
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The Heads of Governments acted on the items of the agenda as follows:
a. Polish Western Frontier.
Deferred until next meeting.b. Disposition of German Fleet and Merchant Marine.
Deferred until papers have been prepared by U.S. and British representatives.c. German Reparations.
Not considered.d. Transfer of German Populations from Czechoslovakia and Poland.
Referred to Council of Foreign Ministers for examination and report.e. Free and Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways (Enclosure).
This paper which had been introduced by the U.S. representatives was referred to the Council of Foreign Ministers. -
The Council of Foreign Ministers appointed sub-committees to study items d and e above, which had been referred to them, and a sub-committee to work on the Protocol of the Conference and on communiqués relative to the Conference.
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The next meeting of the Heads of Governments is scheduled for Friday, 27 July 1945 at 1700.
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2545
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 11 a.m.
Top secret
Status of Problems Before the Conference July 25, 1945
I. Problems on which substantial agreement has been reached
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Council of Foreign Ministers. The final text of the agreement in regard to the Council of Foreign Ministers, a draft passage for inclusion in the final protocol and communiqué, and telegrams on the subject to the Governments of China and France have all been approved.
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Authority of the Control Council for Germany in Political Questions. The draft on this question has been approved but the British have asked for the inclusion of two additional paragraphs which the Russians did not believe were appropriate for the economic agreement concerning Germany.
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Disposition of the German Fleet and Merchant Marine. It has been agreed in principle that the fleet and merchant marine shall be divided in three parts. It is also agreed, however, that (1) a substantial proportion of the submarines shall be destroyed and (2) all of the merchant marine, including the Russian share, shall be available for the prosecution of the war against Japan. The Russians are, however, asking for a specific and definitive agreement on this subject.
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Austria and Vienna. The Soviets have agreed that U.S. and British forces may immediately occupy their zones. The Soviets have also agreed to continue to feed the populations of the U.S. and British zones until the U.S. and British are ready to assume this responsibility. The U.S. and British moreover have agreed in principle that the administrative authority of a central Austrian government should be extended throughout Austria and that this question should be first on the agenda of the Control Council when we enter Vienna.
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The Polish Question – Liquidation of the London Government and Implementation of the Yalta Agreement. A document on this matter has received final approval.
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Trusteeship. It has been agreed that the disposition of the Italian colonies will be dealt with by the Council of Foreign Ministers in London in connection with the negotiation of a peace treaty with Italy.
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Turkey and the Straits. No tripartite agreement was reached on this subject but it was dropped with the understanding that each of the three Powers would consult the Turks, the British and Americans with a view to establishing an international guarantee of free passage of the Straits for all nations at all times; the Russians presumably with a view to obtaining either exclusive Soviet-Turkish control of the Straits or Soviet-fortified bases on the Straits.
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Withdrawal of Troops from Iran. It was agreed that troops of the three Powers should be withdrawn from Tehran at once. It was also agreed that further withdrawals would be discussed by the Council of Foreign Ministers in September, though it was recognized that troops might according to the treaty remain until six months after the close of the Japanese war. The U.S. stated its intention to withdraw its troops within 60 days.
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Tangier. It was agreed that Tangier should remain international and that the three Governments would participate with France in preliminary discussions of this question to be held in Paris in the very near future.
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Syria and Lebanon. After hearing the British explanation of their position in regard to this matter, the Soviets withdrew the proposal which they had made.
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The Transfer to the Soviet Union of the Koenigsberg Area in East Prussia. There was agreement in principle that this area should be transferred to the Soviet Union, with the understanding that the transfer would have to be finally confirmed by the Peace Conference.
II. Problems pending for consideration before the Heads of Governments or Foreign Ministers
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German Economic Questions. The subcommittee has presented a first report on these questions, some portions of which have been approved by the Foreign Ministers. Other parts, however, on which no agreement could be reached have been referred to the Big Three. The subcommittee is in the meantime continuing its work.
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German Reparations. The subcommittee is still at work on this question.
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Italian and Austrian Reparations. The subcommittee is considering Soviet papers which have been presented on these matters.
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Oil for Western Europe. The Economic Subcommittee is still considering a U.S. paper on this subject.
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Admission to the United Nations. A paper has been under consideration by the Foreign Ministers and the Big Three expressing the support of the three Governments to the admission to the United Nations Organization of Italy, Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, when peace treaties have been concluded with the recognized governments of those countries, and of neutral countries when they can comply with the requirements for admission to the United Nations, but opposition to the admission of Franco Spain as long as the present regime remains in power. Though general agreement on this paper seems to have been reached it has been referred back to the Foreign Ministers for reexamination.
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Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe and Satellite States. A subcommittee is working on paragraphs 2 and 3 of the U.S. paper on this subject dealing with the freedom of the press and the Control Commissions. There seems no likelihood of reaching agreement on paragraph 1, which deals with observation of elections.
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Italy and the other Satellite States. The U.S. has presented two papers, one on policy toward Italy and the other on policy toward Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Finland. It had originally been intended to refer these papers to a subcommittee, but Marshal Stalin has now taken the position that, unless the U.S. and Britain are prepared to recognize the present governments of Rumania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Finland, this question should not be discussed further.
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Oil Equipment in Rumania. The British have presented a new paper proposing an examination by representatives of three neutral countries of the ownership of the oil equipment in question.
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The Western Boundary of Poland. This question is still being discussed by the Big Three, to whom the Foreign Ministers have reported the views of the Polish Provisional Government.
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Cooperation in Solving Immediate European Economic Problems. A U.S. paper on this subject, urging Soviet participation in the EEC, ECO and EITO [ECITO] is still being considered by a subcommittee.
III. Questions on the original agenda of the three powers which have not yet been discussed by the conference
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British Proposals.
a. War Crimes
b. Transfer of German populations from Poland and Czechoslovakia -
All items on the original U.S. and Soviet agenda have now been raised before the Conference.
Dunn-Harriman-Mikołajczyk conversation, 11 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Poland | |
| Mr. Dunn | Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk | |
| Mr. Matthews |
860c.01/8-945
Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister
[Babelsberg,] July 24, 1945
[Translation]
Secret
Poland is to be strong, free, independent and sovereign. Poland is to live in alliance with Soviet Russia, with Great Britain and France, and in friendship with the United States and the Slav countries.
This is possible on the following conditions:
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The Soviet forces and the NKVD should quit the territories accorded to, and delimited for, the Polish State.
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The Polish Army is to become a national army.
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The so-called Security should cease to terrorize the community.
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The émigrés and Polish troops should return swiftly, and elections should be held, before which the western frontiers should be settled.
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There should be freedom of the Press and freedom of concourse and the genuine organization of the five Parties in Poland. The PPR (translators note – the Polish Labor Party or really, the Communist Party) does enjoy these freedoms, the PPS (Polish Socialist Party) only enjoys them in part, whilst the Democratic party is at this moment more or less an extension of the PPR.
The Peasant’s Party, thanks to which the Provisional Government of National Unity has been formed and the Polish Government recognised, does not have freedom of action, nor does the Labor Party.
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Personal freedom and the right of property should be safeguarded within the framework of the law.
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The elections should take place at the latest in December or February on the basis of the electoral laws resulting from the 1921 constitution. There must be found a method of ensuring the fairness of the elections. Fair elections are impossible as long as Soviet troops and the NKVD remain in Poland. Elections on the basis of the 1921 constitution are rendered impossible by interpretations relating to the electoral system. These follow the conception of the PKWN (translator’s note: Polish Committee of National Liberation), which was based on the 1921 constitution, and they introduce artificial majorities by the appointment – beside the political parties – of various professional and social organizations which are adjuncts of a party already possessing its own representatives in Parliament (Sejm).
860c.01/8-1445
Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister
[Translation]
[Undated]
(?) As to [To add to (?)] the preceding note from which it follows that at this stage of the dispute one should not limit himself by the relatively small territory which anyway with the support of Russia may by the force of facts appear to be included in Poland.
At this moment the struggle is about the independence and sovereignty of Poland, and the dispute about borders unless it is predetermined is another problem.
To save the independence of Poland the territory should be determined (established?) and the elections should take place as soon as possible.
At the recognition of territory the conditions could be put forward, And so:
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Elections – freedom for parties and for press, eventually the international control of elections.
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Removal of the Soviet troops and NKVD.
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Return and help for return of Polish army from the West in a whole and all émigrés in general.
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Help in repatriation of Poles from the East.
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Immediate stop of dismembering (taking to pieces) of factories and disjoining the railroad tracks on the territory given to Poland and full control by Poland of political, economic and communications administration.
The Soviet transport through Polish territory on the basis of a plan presented by Polish authorities.
Poland is to take part in the assistance to Europe by its industrial production and later by agricultural products. Therefore Poland must be completely freed and can not be hampered from inside by senseless dismembering of industrial objects, railroad tracks and by depriving it of agricultural machinery and livestock.
860c.01/8-945
Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister
[Babelsberg,] July 24, 1945
[Translation]
Secret
Poland, in order to safeguard her existence, development, and independence, must – after the loss of territories in the East, (to which loss the population cannot psychically reconcile itself) acquire in the west, the frontier of the Neisse, Stettin and the Delta.
This frontier should be determined immediately for the following main reasons:
(a) The population east of the Curzon Line, if it is not to perish for ever, must be boldly encouraged to return and transfer to Western Poland.
(b) The population of the west must be repatriated with utmost speed, and the Western Territories must absorb it; the date of the elections is contingent on their swift return.
(c) If these questions had to be dependent on a tardier fixing of the frontiers, then there would be no possibility either of transfer of population from the east or the west, or of holding elections there. Soviet Armies would stand as hosts in those territories and Poland would lose the chance of directing her own national economy within the area of the entire state. The partial holding of elections, after the losses east of the Curzon Line and without the delimitation of the western frontiers would only cover a small portion of the country’s territory.
(d) This state of affairs would not only overthrow the State system of economy, but it would render impossible any normalisation of conditions in the country, which might prejudice the question of the State’s independence or of its system.
(e) The lack of opportunities for transfer to the west of population from the overcrowded central districts of Poland, leads to the parcellation of peasant farm holdings and estates inside Poland, however healthy the agricultural structure of the country, and it will not be possible to effect a recovery.
(f) If Poland does not take over these territories soon, then there will be no point in a later occupation of these derelict areas.
Stimson-Stalin conversation, 12:25 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Soviet Union | |
| Mr. Stimson | Generalissimo Stalin | |
| Mr. Page | Mr. Pavlov |
Memorandum by the Secretary of War
[Babelsberg,] 25 July 1945
Conference With Generalissimo Stalin 25 July 1945[,] 1225 to 1243 at Schloss Cecilienhof, Potsdam, Germany
I stated to Stalin that I was very grateful for the privilege of paying my respects to him; that I was sorry that my duties in the United States called me away from the Conference before its conclusion. I said that there was another reason for my being grateful to the Generalissimo – I had followed during the course of the war the records of the Conferences at Teheran and Yalta, and in that respect I greatly appreciated the help and attitude which the Generalissimo had taken regarding a project I was greatly interested in, namely, the crossing of the Channel as well as the landings in southern France. I distinctly remembered the Generalissimo’s language – it was terse and clear – that he distinguished between a supporting action and an action which was a mere diversion. I considered that the position he had taken contributed to our success – not only to the success in France, but also later, in Germany.
Stalin stated that this was an epochal war unparallelled in history. He greatly appreciated what I had said, and continued saying that he was afraid that he had said less at Teheran and Yalta than he should have said, especially with respect to the Channel operations. This was unparallelled in history. Now we were faced with the Japanese War – also unparallelled in history.
I said that I was particularly interested in the Pacific war. My experiences when I was Governor General in the Philippines made me familiar with the terrain and people in the Pacific.
At this point Stalin again interjected that the Pacific war was unparallelled in history because of its magnitude. I agreed and continued, saying that I hoped that the combination of the forces of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom, would bring a speedy victory – not only complete, but short.
Stalin stated that we all would operate on the same field of battle – it was high time for this.
I said that I hoped our common effort would not only bring success, but bring it promptly. Stalin said that Three Power intervention in the Pacific would surely speed up victory. This was a good thing for the entire world as it would reduce losses. I stated this was one thing we were anxious to have for all.
I stated that I was familiar with history and that I had taken great satisfaction in knowing that the two countries – Russia and the United States – had had no issues or differences during the time of the existence of my Government. Stalin said that that was our great fortune. I continued that this was largely because we had no reasons for dispute, and that our natural objectives were the same. The Generalissimo stated that the Russians and the Americans easily understood each other – more so than in the case of the Russians and the British or the Russians and the French. Russians and Americans had something in common. I stated that I hoped that that was so. I continued that I would do everything in my power to follow that line. I stated that I had noticed, as doubtless the Generalissimo had, that our soldiers encountered no difficulty in working together. I therefore thought that it was important that our commanders should make every effort to live together like our soldiers. Stalin appeared to be entirely in agreement with this view.
Eighth meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 12:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Secretary Byrnes | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Dunn | Sir William Strang | Mr. Vyshinsky |
| Mr. Clayton | Major Birse | Mr. Gromyko |
| Mr. Harriman | Mr. Gusev | |
| Mr. Bohlen | Mr. Golunsky | |
| Mr. Thompson |
Thompson Minutes
Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 12:30 p.m.
Top secret
Inland Waterways
MR. BYRNES said that the President had drawn attention at the morning meeting of the Heads of Government to the American paper on Inland Waterways. He suggested that they appoint a committee to consider it.
MOLOTOV said he had not thought the matter had been referred to them, but after the Secretary had assured him that it was, it was agreed to set up a committee consisting of Messrs. Ward, Dean, Riddleberger, Russell, Labrishchev and Gereschenko.
Transfer of Populations
MR. BYRNES pointed out that they had also been asked to deal with the question of the transfer of populations in respect to Czechoslovakia and he inquired what suggestions his colleagues had.
CADOGAN pointed out that it was not only the Sudeten Germans from Czechoslovakia that were involved. It was also the question of the transfer of Germans from western Poland. It was true that they had been told that a large majority had fled from the territory now claimed by Poland, but this did not entirely dispose of the question if these people were to transfer their domicile permanently. There were a number of arrangements to be made. There was a similar question on a smaller scale in connection with Hungary. The Hungarians wished to transfer to Germany a certain number of people. The British have no detailed plan but they thought that in view of the difficulty that would be caused by this movement the matter should be under the Allied Control Council, acting with the cooperation of the governments concerned.
THE SECRETARY agreed that the Control Council was about the only body competent to regulate the matter. If there were a gradual removal it would not aggravate the food problem, but he assumed that the difficulty was that of unilateral action in trying to force the removal at one time of all of these people. Could they not agree to instruct the Control Council to provide for the orderly removal of these people.
MOLOTOV inquired if anybody had complete and detailed information on the question.
THE SECRETARY said it seemed to him that the Control Council was the only body that could regulate it. If they could agree to direct them to prevent the wholesale removal of these people and on the contrary to arrange for their gradual transfer, it would be a great help.
MOLOTOV said that of course the Control Council could deal with it, but he pointed out that these people were coming from other countries. The Control Council could only close the frontier. It could not take any action in Czechoslovakia.
CADOGAN inquired if they could not ask the Control Council to look into the problem as it already existed. If many were already gone they could examine the existing situation and give an estimate of the rate at which others could be received. Could they not at the same time tell the three governments concerned that this was being done so that they might hold up while they were considering the matter. With regard to Hungary he thought the Allied Control Commission could deal with the matter.
THE SECRETARY suggested that they authorize the Control Commission in Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary accordingly.
MOLOTOV pointed out that until now the Control Commission had not been authorized to confer with other governments. He thought that someone should draw up concrete proposals.
THE SECRETARY agreed and said he had been impressed by Mr. Molotov’s statement that the Control Commission could only stop them from coming in and they might avoid a very bad situation by authorizing the Control Commission to consult with the governments in order to avoid such a situation occurring. He agreed that a draft could be drawn up by a sub-committee and with the approval of his colleagues a committee was appointed consisting of Messrs. Cannon, Harrison, Sobolev and Semenov. The Secretary proposed also that they set up committees to deal with the drafting of the protocol and the communiqué.
After some discussion as to whether there should be one committee or two, it was decided that there should be two separate committees which however could consult together. The following persons were appointed to these committees:
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Communiqué: Mr. Brown
- Mr. Foote
- Mr. Sobolev
- Mr. Galunski
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Protocol: Mr. Dunn
- Mr. Matthews
- Mr. Cohen
- Mr. Gromyko
- Mr. Kausurev
- Mr. Gribanov
CADOGAN named Sir E. Bridges, Mr. Brook, Mr. Hayter and Mr. Dean to cover both committees and said that they would arrange to divide the duties between themselves.
It was agreed to adjourn until Friday morning, at which time the sub-committees which would continue their work would report.
Rapporteur’s Report
Potsdam, July 25, 1945, 12:30 p.m.
[Translation]
Top secret
Statement of Peoples’ Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, V. M. Molotov, Concerning the Meeting of the Three Ministers on July 25, 1945
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The Secretary of State of the USA, MR. BYRNES, proposed that the question concerning waterways be discussed at the meeting. Mr. Byrnes stressed the desire that this question be discussed in advance in a commission [subcommittee]. Mr. [Sir Alexander] Cadogan and Mr. Molotov supported this proposal, as a result of which a commission was formed as follows:
From the USA: Mr. Russell Mr. Riddleberger From Great Britain: Mr. Ward From the USSR: Mr. Gerashchenko Mr. Lavrishchev -
In addition Mr. Byrnes touched on the question of the transfer of the German population from Czechoslovakia.
MR. CADOGAN stated that it was not only a question of the transfer of Germans from Czechoslovakia, but also from western Poland and Hungary. He assumed that the question of the transfer of these German populations would be under the control of the Allied Control Council acting in collaboration with the Governments of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary.
V. M. MOLOTOV proposed referring this question to the preliminary examination of a commission in order that a draft prepared by it might then be examined at a meeting of the three Ministers.
MR. BYRNES and MR. CADOGAN agreed with this proposal. The commission was formed as follows:
From the USA: Mr. Cannon. From Great Britain: Mr. Harrison. From the USSR: Mr. Sobolev Mr. Semenov -
MR. CADOGAN introduced a proposal concerning the formation of a commission to draw up a draft communiqué on the work of the conference and a commission to prepare a draft general protocol of the decisions at the Conference.
MR. BYRNES and V. M. MOLOTOV agreed with this proposal. It was decided to form the following commissions:
(a) to prepare a draft communiqué on the work of the Conference:
From the USA: Mr. Walter Brown. Mr. Wilder Foote. From the USSR: Mr. Loev [Sobolev]. Mr. Golunski. (b) to prepare a draft general protocol of the decisions of the Conference:
From the USA: Mr. Dunn. Mr. Matthews. Mr. Cohen. From the USSR: Mr. Gromyko. Mr. Kozyrev. Mr. Gribanov. From Great Britain: (on both commissions): Messrs. Bridges, Brook, Hayter and Dean.
With this the meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs terminated.