America at war! (1941–) – Part 5

7364 
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2445

Proposal by the British Delegation

Potsdam, 24th July, 1945
Secret

Removal of Allied Industrial Equipment Especially in Roumania

Our case can, I think, be stated simply as follows.

There are only two articles in the Roumanian Armistice under which property can be removed from Roumania.

One of these is Article 11 which provides for the payment of reparations. The Soviet Government do not claim that the oil equipment was removed under this Article, but that it was taken as booty.

The second is Article 7, which provides that the Roumanian Government should hand over as “trophies” war material of Germany and her Satellites located on Roumanian territory. (It is clear from Article 1 that Satellites here exclude Roumania).

It is clear therefore that the only property which can be claimed as booty is German property or the property of another Satellite of Germany.

The question is whether any of the property now in question is German property. The Soviet Delegation have not claimed that any equipment acquired by Allied nationals before the war can be regarded as German property and I cannot understand why this property has not been returned at once without further argument.

The more difficult case is that of property acquired by the companies during the war when they were under German management. But even this is clear if we examine it carefully. The companies at the time when they were seized by the Germans had certain assets (money, equipment, oil concessions). When under German management, they parted with some of these assets (money or oil) and received from Germany other assets in return (equipment). Thus the equipment was indubitably the property of the company at the time of liberation.

If any British company had on its premises property which clearly belonged to Germany and had merely been deposited there for custody, its removal as booty would of course be justified.

As a means of settling this question I now propose that the ownership of the disputed property should be subject to impartial and expert investigation. This might be entrusted to a Committee of three allied nationals drawn from States not interested in this dispute. If the property is found to belong to Germany, we would agree that it should be retained by the Russians. If it is found to belong to one of the British companies the property should be returned by the Soviet Government or compensation paid to the company.

7365

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

[Babelsberg, July 24, 1945]

Summary of the Views Expressed by the Polish Delegation to the Meeting of Foreign Ministers July 24, 1945, on the Subject of Poland’s Western Frontiers

The delegation considered that Poland’s western frontier should run from the Baltic through Swinemünde, including Stettin in Poland, along the Oder River to the Neisse, and along the Western Neisse to Czechoslovakia. The principal arguments they put forward were the following:

  1. Poland would lose 180,000 square kilometers in the east and should be compensated for this in the west.

  2. The territory under consideration was one unit from an economic point of view.

  3. Under the proposed arrangement Poland would acquire less than it had lost in the east. The whole area would be reduced from 388,000 square kilometers to 309,000 square kilometers. The population would be reduced from 34,000,000 to 26,000,000 but would then be homogenous [homogeneous?].

  4. There were about 1,000,000 to 1,500,000 Germans left in this area, but they would be willing to return home. This territory would enable Poland to support its population without recourse to emigration. This would enable Poland to enjoy the results of the labor of Poles who had formerly emigrated to work in this area.

  5. From the point of view of security, this was the shortest possible frontier between Poles and Germans and would be easy to defend.

  6. The Germans had attempted to destroy the Polish population and ruin Polish culture. It would be an expression of historical justice to create a powerful Polish state which could resist any German aggression.

  7. Poland had ceded territory in the east for the sake of peace and it would be right that Germany should cede territory for the same purpose.

  8. The proposed solution would deprive Germany of a “place d’armes” in the east.

  9. Poland would be a territory without national minorities.

  10. Before the war Poland had an excess of rural population which could not be absorbed in its urban centers. This territory was necessary to enable them to be employed and to enable the Poles forced abroad by the war to return to Poland and obtain employment.

  11. This area was one of the bases of German armaments and had resources in zinc and coal. This was one of the bases of German imperialism.

  12. Taking this area from Germany would deprive Germany of the other basis of its imperialism, namely, profits made as an intermediary between other countries. In 1937 Germany transported 2,300,000 tons of goods to Czechoslovakia, 400,000 tons to Hungary, 500,000 tons to Rumania, and 200,000 tons to Yugoslavia, in addition to that transported to Poland.

  13. The whole basin of the Oder River should go to Poland to enable Poland to have an economic base which would support its whole population and in order to prevent the possibility of cutting off the source of water supply to the Oder which lay in the Neisse area.

  14. Stettin should be in Polish hands because it was the natural outlet for Silesia.

  15. Germany which had lost the war would lose less than Poland. If Polish claims were satisfied, Poland would lose 20 percent of her territory whereas Germany would lose only 18 percent.

  16. A speedy decision and full agreement among the Powers was necessary because of the need to repatriate Poles from abroad in order that they could participate in the reconstruction of Poland.

7366 
740.00119 Potsdam/7-2445

Rapporteur’s Report

Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 11:15 a.m.

1. German, Austrian and Italian reparations and German economic questions
The Chairman declared that the subcommittee dealing with the German economic questions and German reparations was not yet ready to present a further report on these matters. Mr. Molotov pointed out that these committees had also been assigned the question of Austrian and Italian reparations. He presented two brief papers in regard to reparations from these two latter countries. It was agreed that these papers should be referred to the economic subcommittee for study. It was also agreed that discussion of German reparations and German economic questions should be postponed until tomorrow.

2. European oil supplies
The Chairman inquired whether a report was ready on the U.S. paper on this subject which had been presented on July 20. He was informed that this paper was still before the economic subcommittee and it was agreed that discussion on this subject should be postponed until that committee reports.

3. Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on liberated Europe and satellite states
The subcommittee dealing with this subject was also not yet ready to report and it was agreed to postpone discussion until that report is available.

4. Admission to the United Nations
The Chairman suggested that, since the subcommittee dealing with this matter had also not been able to come to any agreement, the question should be considered at this meeting by the Foreign Ministers on the basis of the document on which the subcommittee had been working. Mr. Molotov said that the Soviet Delegation would not be able to take part in the discussion of this document since it omitted reference to the admission to the United Nations of Bulgaria, Hungary, Rumania and Finland.

Mr. Eden suggested that the last sentence of the first paragraph of the paper in question be dropped and Mr. Byrnes agreed. Mr. Eden proposed a redraft of paragraph two of the paper which would take into account the interest of other countries concerned with the peace treaty with Italy. This paragraph is embodied in the revised document “Admission to the United Nations” attached to this report.

The Chairman proposed the following additional paragraph to be inserted in the document in order to meet the point which Mr. Molotov had raised:

The three Governments also hope that the Council of Foreign Ministers may without undue delay prepare peace treaties for Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland. It is also their desire on the conclusion of the peace treaties with responsible democratic governments of these countries to support their application for membership in the United Nations Organization.

Mr. Molotov urged that it be agreed in principle that Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland not be put in a worse position than Italy in connection with the matter under discussion. After some further discussion it was agreed that, since full agreement could not be reached, the problem should be referred to the Heads of Government and placed on the agenda for this afternoon.

5. Rumanian oil equipment
The British Delegation circulated a new paper in regard to the disposition of British and U.S. oil equipment in Rumania. The Soviet Delegation asked for time to study this paper and discussion of this question was therefore adjourned.

6. Agenda for meeting of Heads of Government
It was agreed that the following subjects should be recommended to the Heads of Government for their agenda this afternoon:

  1. Admission to the United Nations. The paper presented to the Foreign Ministers this morning is available to the Heads of Government as a basis for discussion.

  2. The Black Sea Straits and Free and Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways. Discussion of this question was adjourned from yesterday’s meeting in order to afford an opportunity for study of the paper on “Free and Unrestricted Navigation of International Inland Waterways” which the President circulated.

7. Agenda for tomorrow’s meeting of the Heads of Government
It was agreed that the following subjects should be recommended to the Heads of Government for the agenda of their meeting tomorrow morning:

  1. Disposition of the German fleet and merchant marine.
  2. German reparations.

8. The Polish Western Frontier
A delegation representing the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity and headed by President Bierut, which appeared in response to the invitation sent on July 22 by President Truman in accordance with the decision of the three Heads of Government, stated its case in regard to the Polish Western Frontier. A summary of the principal points covered in their presentation is attached to this report.

7367

Leahy-Churchill conversation, morning

Present
United States United Kingdom
Fleet Admiral Leahy Prime Minister Churchill

From the memorandum by Captain James K. Vardaman Jr., Naval Aide to the President:

“Remind the President Wednesday morning to write a letter to Mr. Churchill and send him a copy of telegram despatched to Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek and also copy of revised Lend Lease document read to Churchill by Leahy on the porch this morning.”

865.014/7-2445

Memorandum by the Deputy Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs

Berlin Conference, July 24, 1945

Subject: DISCUSSION IN THE FOREIGN MINISTERS’ MEETING ON JULY 22, 1945, REGARDING ITALIAN COLONIES

MR. MOLOTOV recalled that at the San Francisco Conference the Soviet Delegation had gone on record as expressing the intention of the Soviet Government to apply for designation as a trustee power. He said that Mr. Eden had recently made a statement in the House of Commons that Italy had lost its colonies in Africa and the Mediterranean. Mr. Molotov wanted to know by what right Great Britain had decided this question, and who had “found” the colonies.

MR. EDEN said that Italy had lost her colonies to the British Army. He said they were under British military occupation pending their final disposal in the peace treaty with Italy.

MR. MOLOTOV said that his delegation would introduce [had introduced?] a paper on the subject and hoped it might be discussed at the next meeting.

G[EORGE] V A[LLEN]

7368

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Truman and Churchill, 11:30 a.m.

Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill
Fleet Admiral Leahy Lord Leathers
General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke
Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
General of the Army Arnold Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Somervell General Ismay
Field Marshal Wilson
Major-General Laycock
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major-General Hollis
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones

JCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 11:30 a.m.
Top secret

Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 900/2)

The Meeting had before them CCS 900/2, the draft of the final report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER on the results of the TERMINAL Conference.

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER proceeded to examine the report paragraph by paragraph.

With respect to paragraph 4, Admiral Leahy explained that there was a divergence of opinion on two or three points in connection with the basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war and that the respective views of the United States and British Chiefs of Staff were set out in Appendix “A.”

Appendix “A” paragraph 4
ADMIRAL LEAHY said that the United States Chiefs of Staff proposed to include the following:
• “a. Maintain the security of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth.
• “b. Maintain the war-making capacity of the United States and the British Commonwealth in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan.”

The British Chiefs of Staff on the other hand wished to combine these two paragraphs into the following:
“Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept.”

The view of the United States Chiefs of Staff was that the basic commitment in this respect should be confined to the maintenance of war-making capacity in so far as it was connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, whereas the British Chiefs of Staff felt that it should be extended to include the occupation of Germany and Austria, as provided in the strategic concept.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he supported the British Chiefs of Staff and suggested that the holding down of Germany and Austria was certainly a very vital matter. He felt therefore that this commitment should be embraced in this particular section of the basic undertakings.

He called attention to the extent to which the British industrial effort had been interwoven with that of the United States by reason of agreements reached earlier in the war and his own discussions with President Roosevelt at Quebec. As a result of these agreements many British units were equipped with U.S. equipment and no provision had been made to replace this equipment from British sources. To make such provision would take time and he hoped very much that the President would be able to make it possible for him to pass smoothly from this position of dependence on the United States to one in which British forces could be independent. He feared that a rigid interpretation of an undertaking to maintain the British war-making capacity only in so far as it was connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, would place him in great difficulties. He hoped also that the rules applied to the supply of lend-lease equipment would not be held to limit British sovereign rights over British equipment. He must be free to give British equipment, for example, to the Belgians, if His Majesty’s Government felt that this was desirable, and he hoped that this would not result in the drying up of equivalent supplies from the United States.

THE PRESIDENT explained that he was handicapped in his approach to this matter by the latest renewal of the Lend-Lease Act. As Vice President, he had worked out its clauses together with Senator George, who had explained to the Congress that the Act was intended to be a weapon of war only. The President was now striving to give to the Act the broadest interpretation possible and he had no intention of causing the British any embarrassment in the matter of furnishing supplies to the British troops or the maintenance thereof. However, he must ask the Prime Minister to be patient as he wished to avoid any embarrassment with Congress over the interpretation of the Act and it might be necessary for him to ask for additional legislation in order to clear the matter up.

With respect to the basic undertaking under discussion, THE PRESIDENT said that he thought that the holding down of Germany and Austria was quite definitely a part of war. After all, we were technically still at war with Germany and Austria.

GENERAL MARSHALL said in view of the foregoing that the United States Chiefs of Staff accepted the paragraph proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff.

THE PRESIDENT agreed.

Appendix “A” paragraph 4c
THE PRIME MINISTER said that he could not see very much difference between the two subparagraphs proposed. He suggested that the proposal of the United States Chiefs of Staff should be accepted.

THE PRESIDENT agreed.

Appendix “A” first sentence of paragraph 6c
ADMIRAL LEAHY explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were anxious to add a clause at the end of the first sentence of this paragraph which would extend the combined liability to provide assistance not only to such of the forces of the liberated areas as could fulfill an active and effective role in the present war but also to such of those forces as were “required to maintain world order in the interests of the war effort.” In his view, therefore, the issue before the meeting was whether or not the United States was prepared to undertake a commitment to equip and supply forces of occupation other than American.

THE PRIME MINISTER asked what the British Chiefs of Staff had in mind in proposing this clause.

FIELD MARSHAL BROOKE instanced the Belgian and Dutch forces and Admiral Cunningham suggested that such French divisions as were not going to the Far East would also fall into this category.

In the light of this explanation, The Prime Minister felt that the point had already been covered under paragraphs 4 a. and b. above, where it had already been agreed that occupational forces should be included in that particular basic undertaking.

It was agreed that the point would be adequately covered if the words “in accordance with the over-all strategic concept,” were added to the first sentence of paragraph 6c, in lieu of the clause proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff.

Appendix “A” paragraph 7
At this point LORD LEATHERS entered the meeting.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that he attached great importance to the United Kingdom import program and would not wish to see it lose its status in a document of this nature.

THE PRESIDENT said that he was not quite clear how far he could accept liability for reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom under existing United States law. Therefore, if this paragraph were intended to indicate any such liability his acceptance of it would have to be on the understanding that the necessary authority did exist.

ADMIRAL KING and GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff felt that the matter contained in this paragraph was out of place among the basic undertakings. General Marshall drew attention to paragraphs 20, 21, and 22 at the end of the report and pointed out that there was no more reason for including cargo shipping among the basic undertakings than the similar matters dealt with in these paragraphs. He suggested that this paragraph should also be placed at the end of the report under the heading “Miscellaneous.”

LORD LEATHERS pointed out that the inclusion of the United Kingdom import program had been implicit in the basic undertakings at previous conferences. In consonance with the changed situation, a major change was now being made in the presentation of the basic undertakings. As shipping requirements for military and civilian needs were closely interlocked, his view was that the United Kingdom import program would be more properly associated with military requirements if it were linked to them in the basic undertakings.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he did not consider that any great change had been made in the presentation of the basic undertakings. He still felt that the matter would be more appropriately placed at the end of the report under the heading “Miscellaneous.”

THE PRIME MINISTER inquired whether this would result in the sweeping aside of the United Kingdom import program.

THE PRESIDENT said the Prime Minister could take his word for it that the United Kingdom import program would not suffer from this change. He suggested that General Marshall’s proposal be accepted and the paragraph incorporated at the end of the report.

THE PRIME MINISTER said that on this undertaking he would certainly agree that the paragraph should be included at the end of the report.

Appendix “A” last sentence of paragraph 6c
LORD LEATHERS suggested that as it had now been agreed that paragraph 7 should be removed from the basic undertakings and placed at the end of the report, the last sentence of paragraph 6c would more properly be deleted. However, if it were held that this sentence merely referred to supplies and not to shipping, he thought it might remain.

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER agreed that the last sentence of paragraph 6c should stand.

[CCS 900/2, paragraph 8d]
THE PRIME MINISTER referred to paragraph 8d of the report in which it had been agreed that “In the event the British Chiefs of Staff should decide that they cannot commit British troops in support of a decision made by the United States Chiefs of Staff, the British Chiefs of Staff will give to the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as would permit them to make timely rearrangements.” The Prime Minister said that he hoped it would not be thought the British Chiefs of Staff would wish to take advantage of this arrangement. What was good enough for the United States would certainly be good enough for the British.

ADMIRAL KING said that the United States Chiefs of Staff did not expect the British Chiefs of Staff to invoke this paragraph and General Marshall explained that it had been put in at his suggestion. After Olympic for example, if the British Chiefs of Staff did not agree with the action proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff, they would, under this paragraph, be free to take such action as they thought fit. The paragraph was a result of an attempt on his part to cover both sides.

THE PRIME MINISTER thanked the United States Chiefs of Staff for their explanation and the spirit in which this provision had been made.

THE PRESIDENT and THE PRIME MINISTER accepted and approved the report as amended in the above discussion and directed the [that] copies of the revised version be submitted to them for signature. (The report in its approved form was subsequently circulated as CCS 900/3)

7369

The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill

[Babelsberg, July 24, 1945]
Top secret
Enclosure to CCS 900/3
  1. The agreed summary of conclusions reached at the TERMINAL Conference is submitted herewith.

I. Over-all objective

  1. In conjunction with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of Japan.

II. Over-all strategic concept for the prosecution of the war

  1. In cooperation with other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date the defeat of Japan by: lowering Japanese ability and will to resist by establishing sea and air blockades, conducting intensive air bombardment, and destroying Japanese air and naval strength; invading and seizing objectives in the Japanese home islands as the main effort; conducting such operations against objectives in other than the Japanese home islands as will contribute to the main effort; establishing absolute military control of Japan; and liberating Japanese-occupied territory if required.

  2. In cooperation with other Allies to establish and maintain, as necessary, military control of Germany and Austria.

III. Basic undertakings and policies for the prosecution of the war

  1. The following basic undertakings are considered fundamental to the prosecution of the war:

    a. Maintain the security and war-making capacity of the Western Hemisphere and the British Commonwealth as necessary for the fulfillment of the strategic concept.

    b. Support the war-making capacity of our forces in all areas, with first priority given to those forces in or designated for employment in combat areas in the war against Japan.

    c. Maintain vital overseas lines of communication.

  2. In order to attain the over-all objective, first priority in the provision of forces and resources of the United States and Great Britain, including reorientation from the European Theater to the Pacific and Far East, will be given to meeting requirements of tasks necessary to the execution of the over-all strategic concept and to the basic undertakings fundamental to the prosecution of the war.

    The invasion of Japan and operations directly connected therewith are the supreme operations in the war against Japan; forces and resources will be allocated on the required scale to assure that invasion can be accomplished at the earliest practicable date. No other operations will be undertaken which hazard the success of, or delay, these main operations.

  3. The following additional tasks will be undertaken in order to assist in the execution of the over-all strategic concept:

    a. Encourage Russian entry into the war against Japan. Provide such aid to her war-making capacity as may be necessary and practicable in connection therewith.

    b. Undertake such measures as may be necessary and practicable in order to aid the war effort of China as an effective ally against Japan.

    c. Provide assistance to such of the forces of liberated areas as can fulfill an active and effective role in the present war in accordance with the over-all strategic concept. Within the limits of our available resources assist co-belligerents to the extent they are able to employ this assistance in the present war. Having regard to the successful accomplishment of basic undertakings, to provide such supplies to the liberated areas as will effectively contribute to the capacity of the United Nations to prosecute the war against Japan.

    d. In cooperation with other Allies conduct operations, if required, to liberate enemy-occupied areas.

IV. The war against Japan

Strategic Direction of the War

  1. We have discussed the strategic direction of the war against Japan and have agreed as follows:

    a. The control of operational strategy in the Pacific Theater will remain in the hands of the United States Chiefs of Staff.

    b. The United States Chiefs of Staff will provide the British Chiefs of Staff with full and timely information as to their future plans and intentions.

    c. The United States Chiefs of Staff will consult the British Chiefs of Staff on matters of general strategy on the understanding that in the event of disagreement the final decision on the action to be taken will lie with the United States Chiefs of Staff.

    d. In the event the British Chiefs of Staff should decide that they cannot commit British troops in support of a decision made by the United States Chiefs of Staff as indicated in c. above, the British Chiefs of Staff will give to the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as will permit them to make timely rearrangements.

    e. In the event the USSR enters the war against Japan, the strategy to be pursued should be discussed between the parties concerned.

Operations in the Pacific

  1. We have taken note of the plans and operations proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in Appendix “A.”

  2. We have considered the scope and nature of British participation in operations in the Pacific area. Our conclusions are as follows:

    a. The British Pacific Fleet will participate as at present planned.

    b. A British very long-range bomber force of 10 squadrons, increasing to 20 squadrons when more airfields become available, will participate. There is little prospect that airfield space for more than 10 squadrons of this force will become available before 1 December 1945 at the earliest.

    c. We have agreed in principle that a Commonwealth land force and, if possible, a small tactical air force, should take part in the final phase of the war against Japan, subject to the satisfactory resolution of operational and other problems. In addition, some units of the British3 East Indies Fleet may also take part.

  3. In connection with paragraph 10 c. above, we have agreed that the appropriate British commanders and staff should visit Admiral Nimitz and General MacArthur and draw up with them a plan for submission to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Operations in Southeast Asia Command

  1. We have discussed the instructions that should be issued to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia, and have agreed upon the terms of the directive in Appendix “B.”

Reallocation of Areas and Command in the Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia Areas

  1. We have agreed in principle that that part of the Southwest Pacific Area lying south of the boundary described in Appendix “C” should pass from United States to British command as soon as possible. The British Chiefs of Staff have undertaken to obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to these proposals and to investigate and report the earliest practicable date on which the transfer can be effected.

  2. We consider it desirable that initially Admiral Mountbatten control operations undertaken in southern Indo-China since these are more closely related to those of Southeast Asia Command than to those of the China Theater. We are agreed that the best arrangement would be to include that portion of Indo-China lying south of latitude 16° north in Southeast Asia Command. This arrangement would continue General Wedemeyer’s control of that part of Indo-China which covers the flank of projected Chinese operations in China, and would enable Admiral Mountbatten to prepare the ground in the southern half of Indo-China where any initial operations by him would develop.

    We recommend that an approach to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek4 be made by our two governments to secure his agreement to this arrangement.

    At a later date it may prove to be desirable to place all or part of the remainder of Indo-China within the sphere of operations of the Southeast Asia Command.

French and Dutch Participation in the War

  1. We have considered the arrangements which can be made for French and Dutch participation in the war against Japan and our conclusions are as follows:

    a. While it is at present impracticable due chiefly to logistical difficulties for French or Netherlands armed forces to take a major part in the immediate operations in the Far East, the provision of such assistance which may be synchronized with operations will be taken into account. The use of such forces will depend solely on military considerations. French or Netherlands forces so accepted must operate under the complete control of the commander in chief concerned.

    b. The French/Netherlands representatives will be given timely information of our intentions in respect of any operations that will directly affect French/Netherlands territories or armed forces in the Far East.

  2. We have considered an offer by the French of a French corps of two infantry divisions to serve in the Pacific war and have agreed on the following reply:

    a. Whether the corps will serve under U.S. or British command and the area in which it will operate will be determined later.

    b. Final acceptance of the corps will involve an agreement with the government concerned on basic matters including command, combat efficiency, replacements, and logistical support.

    c. Maximum use will be made of equipment provided under the North African and Metropolitan Rearmament Programs.

    d. The time of movement will be in accordance with the priority of the operations in which it is to be used. Pressing shipping and other requirements for operations in the Pacific make certain that the corps cannot be moved from France for at least several months. Whether used in the main effort or in the South China Sea area, it will not be possible to commit it to operations prior to the spring of 1946.”

Portuguese Participation in the War

  1. We have examined a report by an Anglo-American Military Mission which discussed with the Portuguese military authorities Portuguese proposals for participation in such operations as may eventually be conducted to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. We have informed the State Department and the Foreign Office of our views, which are set out in Appendix “D.”

Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War

  1. We have discussed the policy to be followed by the British and the United States Chiefs of Staff in passing to the Russians information and intelligence concerning the Japanese war and have agreed as follows:

    a. The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will pass to the Russians such operational information and intelligence regarding the theaters in which they are respectively responsible as either may wish and without bargaining.

    b. The United States and British Chiefs of Staff will consult together before passing to the Russians any information and intelligence other than operational. Neither party will pass to the Russians information or intelligence derived wholly or in part from the other party’s sources without their consent.

Planning Date for the End of Organized Resistance by Japan

  1. We recommend that for the purpose of planning production and the allocation of manpower, the planning date for the end of organized resistance by Japan be 15 November 1946 and that this date be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.

V. Miscellaneous

Personnel Shipping

  1. We have considered the employment of certain captured enemy ocean-going passenger shipping and have agreed that the total lift of the Europa, Caribia, Vulcania, Patria, Potsdam, Pretoria, and Milwaukee should be allocated for United States employment up to 31 December 1945. We have taken note that the United States Chiefs of Staff will allocate to the United Kingdom a lift of 16,000 during the remainder of 1945 for the movement of Canadians.

  2. We have directed the completion by 15 September 1945 of a study of the combined requirements and combined resources, including captured enemy trooplift, for the first half of 1946.

Personnel Shipping for the Requirements of Allied Governments

  1. We have considered the best means of insuring the efficient coordination of the demands for personnel shipping submitted by Allied governments, other than British and American military movements, and of providing a machinery for dealing with essential personnel movements other than those already approved. We have forwarded to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board the memorandum contained in Appendix “E.”

Cargo Shipping

  1. Present estimates of the requirements for cargo shipping indicate the position to be sufficiently manageable to provide for the maximum effort in the prosecution of the war against Japan, for the maintenance of the war-making capacity of the British Commonwealth of Nations and the Western Hemisphere in so far as it is connected with the prosecution of the war against Japan, for an additional amount for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the United Kingdom, for supplies to liberated areas, and for essential programs of the Western Hemisphere.

    Should substantial conflict arise, the shipping situation will be a matter for examination by the two governments at the time and in the light of changed conditions.

[Appendix A]

Top secret

Plans and Operations in the Pacific
(See paragraph 9 of the Report)

  1. In conformity with the over-all objective to bring about the unconditional surrender of Japan at the earliest possible date, the United States Chiefs of Staff have adopted the following concept of operations for the main effort in the Pacific:

    a. From bases in Okinawa, Iwo Jima, Marianas, and the Philippines to intensify the blockade and air bombardment of Japan in order to create a situation favorable to:

    b. An assault on Kyushu for the purpose of further reducing Japanese capabilities by containing and destroying major enemy forces and further intensifying the blockade and air bombardment in order to establish a tactical condition favorable to:

    c. The decisive invasion of Honshu.

  2. We have curtailed our projected expansion in the Ryukyus by deferring indefinitely the seizure of Miyako Jima and Kikai Jima. Using the resources originally provided for Miyako and Kikai, we have accelerated the development of Okinawa. By doing this, a greater weight of effort will more promptly be brought to bear against Japan and the risk of becoming involved in operations which might delay the seizure of Kyushu7 is avoided.

  3. In furtherance of the accomplishment of the over-all objectives, we have directed:

    a. The invasion of Kyushu.

    b. The continuation of operations for securing and maintaining control of sea communications to and in the western Pacific as are required for the accomplishment of the over-all objective.

    c. The defeat of the remaining Japanese in the Philippines by such operations as can be executed without prejudice to the over-all objective.

    d. The seizure of Balikpapan. (This operation is now approaching successful completion.)

    e. The continuance of strategic air operations to support the accomplishment of the over-all objective.

  4. Planning and preparation for the campaign in Japan subsequent to the invasion of Kyushu are continuing on the basis of meeting the target date for the invasion of Honshu. This planning is premised on the belief that defeat of the enemy’s armed forces in the Japanese homeland is a prerequisite to unconditional surrender, and that such a defeat will establish the optimum prospect of capitulation by Japanese forces outside the main Japanese islands. We recognize the possibility also that our success in the main islands may not obviate the necessity of defeating Japanese forces elsewhere; decision as to steps to be taken in this eventuality must await further developments.

  5. We are keeping under continuing review the possibility of capitalizing at small cost8 upon Japanese military deterioration and withdrawals in the China Theater, without delaying the supreme operations.

  6. We have directed the preparation of plans for the following:

    a. Keeping open a sea route to Russian Pacific ports.

    b. Operations to effect an entry into Japan proper for occupational purposes in order to take immediate advantage of favorable circumstances such as a sudden enemy collapse or surrender.

[Appendix B]

The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia

Top secret

Directive to the Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia
(See paragraph 12 of the Report)

The following directive has been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the understanding that the British Chiefs of Staff will obtain the agreement of the Australian, New Zealand, and Dutch Governments to the proposed reallocation of areas and command set-up in Southwest Pacific and Southeast Asia.

  1. Your primary task is the opening of the Straits of Malacca at the earliest possible moment. It is also intended that British Commonwealth land forces should take part in the main operations against Japan which have been agreed as the supreme operations in the war; and that operations should continue in the Outer Zone to the extent that forces and resources permit.

  2. The eastern boundary of your command will be extended to include Borneo, Java, and the Celebes.
    Full details of this extension are contained in the Annex hereto.

  3. Further information will be sent to you regarding Indo-China.

  4. It is desirable that you assume command of the additional areas as soon as practicable after 15 August 1945. You will report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the date on which you expect to be in a position to undertake this additional responsibility.

  5. From that date, such Dominion and Dutch forces as may be operating in your new area will come under your command. They will, however, continue to be based on Australia.

  6. The area to the east of your new boundary will be an Australian command under the British Chiefs of Staff.

  7. It has been agreed in principle that a British Commonwealth land force of from three to five divisions, and, if possible, a small tactical air force, should take part in the main operations against Japan in the spring of 1946. Units of the British9 East Indies Fleet may also take part. Certain important factors relating to this are still under examination.

  8. You will be required to provide a proportion of this force together with the assault lift for two divisions. The exact composition of this force and its role and the mounting and supporting arrangements will be discussed between Admiral Nimitz, General MacArthur, and the British force commanders, and will receive final approval by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

  9. The requirements for the force taking part in the main operations against Japan must have priority over all the other tasks indicated below.

  10. Subject to the fulfillment of the higher priority commitments given above, you will, within the limits of available resources, carry out operations designed to:
    a. Complete the liberation of Malaya.
    b. Maintain pressure on the Japanese across the Burma-Siam frontier.
    c. Capture the key areas of Siam.
    d. Establish bridgeheads in Java and/or Sumatra to enable the subsequent clearance of these areas to be undertaken in due course.

  11. You will submit a program of operations to the British Chiefs of Staff as soon as you are in a position to do so.

  12. You will develop Singapore and such other bases as you may require to the extent necessary for operations against the Japanese.

[Annex]

Top secret

Eastern Boundary of Southeast Asia Command
(See paragraph 2 of Appendix “B”)

Beginning on the coast of Indo-China at 16° north; thence to intersect at 7°40´ north latitude 116° east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to latitude 05° north longitude 127° east; thence southwestward to 02° south 123° east; thence southeastward to 08° south 125° east; thence southwestward to 18° south 110° east.

[Appendix C]

Top secret

Boundary Between the British and U.S. Areas of Command in the Southwest Pacific
(See paragraph 13 of the Report)

Beginning on the coast of Indo-China at 16° north; thence to intersect at 7°40´ north latitude 116° east longitude, the boundary between the Commonwealth of the Philippine Islands and British North Borneo; thence along the 1939 boundary line of the Philippines to latitude 05° north longitude 127° east; thence east to 05° north 130° east; thence south to the equator; thence east to 140° east; thence generally southeast to 02°20´ south 146° east; thence east to 02°20´ south 159° east; thence south.

[Appendix D]

Top secret

(See paragraph 17 of the Report)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have communicated to the Department of State and the Foreign Office the following views on Portuguese participation in the war against Japan:

a. The Combined Chiefs of Staff are agreed on the acceptance of Portuguese assistance in such operations as may be conducted eventually to expel the Japanese from Portuguese Timor. While they have made no agreement with the Portuguese military authorities as to the direct use of Portuguese forces, they have recognized the possibility of such use and agreed that plans will be worked out as a result of the studies conducted in staff conversations in Lisbon.

b. As between the two military forces offered by Portugal (a regimental combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200, both including 400 native troops), the larger force is likely to be the more acceptable. Steps are being taken to allocate a suitable training area.

c. The air component offered by Portugal should under no circumstances be included in the acceptance of the Portuguese offer in view of the small number of planes available and the state of the training of the pilots, mechanics, and radio specialists.

d. There is no objection from the military viewpoint to Portugal receiving munitions when they can be spared but negotiation as to the basis for transfer is an action to be taken on a governmental level.

e. The Combined Chiefs of Staff in accepting Portuguese participation do not intend to enter into a commitment for the retaking of Portuguese Timor. Neither is acceptance to be construed as a commitment to use Portuguese troops in any other area.

f. Military operations against Portuguese Timor must for the present await the completion of operations against higher priority Japanese-held objectives. The Combined Chiefs of Staff will notify the Portuguese military authorities of impending operations against Portuguese Timor in time for them to prepare their troops for participation therein. Details as to the assembly, shipment, training, and equipping of the Portuguese force will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the appropriate time.

They have informed the State Department and the Foreign Office that they have no objection to the disclosure of any of the above information to the Portuguese if the Department of State or Foreign Office deem it necessary in diplomatic conversations.…

[Appendix E]

The Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board

Confidential

Memorandum for the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board
(See paragraph 22 of the Report)

  1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have been studying the problem of providing passenger carrying shipping to meet the urgent demands for the essential military operations in the prosecution of the war against Japan, and for the provision of such shipping of this type to meet other requirements as can be made available without adversely affecting military operations.

  2. The available passenger space is insufficient to meet all the urgent requirements of the United Nations, and coordination of demands is, therefore, essential in order to determine priority and to secure shipping efficiency as well as to ensure the fullest consideration being given to all claimants.

  3. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have, therefore, agreed that in accordance with the “Agreement on Principles,” dated 5 August 1944, contained in the United Maritime Authority’s report, October, 1944, the following procedure in respect of the submission of demands should be adopted by all the Allied nations:

    a. The current procedure for handling the United States and United Kingdom personnel shipping for military requirements will be continued. This procedure will permit on an operational basis the opportune use of such shipping on return voyages, or legs of such voyages, to move passengers of any of the Allied governments.

    b. All requirements of the Allied governments for the movement of passengers, whether military or civilian, involving definite additional commitments of shipping, whether on a short or long-term basis, should be submitted to the United Maritime Authority in terms of the shipping space required. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board should confer with the Combined Chiefs of Staff as to practicability of meeting such requirements. On military requests of the other Allied governments the decision will rest with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

    c. When a satisfactory arrangement in regard to the movement of civilians cannot be made under a. and b. above, the matter may be referred to the appropriate authorities of the United Kingdom and United States, to decide whether passenger vessels should be withdrawn at the expense of the military effort. Ships, if so allocated, would operate under the control of the United Maritime Authority on the basis of the “Agreement on Principles” but would be retained in the common pool and assigned for particular voyage employment as might be decided from time to time.

  4. Vital demands for shipping should, therefore, be submitted to the United Maritime Authority for consideration.

  5. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board is requested to transmit the foregoing policy to the United Maritime Executive Board in Washington and London.

7370

Tripartite military meeting, 2:30 p.m.

Cecilienhof Palace, Potsdam

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Fleet Admiral Leahy Field Marshal Brooke Army General Antonov
General of the Army Marshall Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal Admiral of the Fleet Kuznetsov
Fleet Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham Marshal of Aviation Falaleyev
General of the Army Arnold Field Marshal Wilson Lieutenant General Slavin
Lieutenant General Hull General Ismay
Vice Admiral Cooke
Major General Norstad
Major General Deane
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Lieutenant-Colonel Mallaby
Captain Moore
Interpreters
Lieutenant Chase Major Lunghi Major Evsekov

JCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret

GENERAL OF THE ARMY ANTONOV asked Fleet Admiral Leahy to preside at this, the first tripartite meeting of the Chiefs of Staff at TERMINAL.

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he was glad to accept the duties of presiding officer at this session.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then asked that General Antonov outline the intentions and plans of the USSR with reference to the Japanese.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that Soviet troops were now being concentrated in the Far East and would be ready to commence operations in the last half of August. The actual date, however, would depend upon the result of conferences with Chinese representatives which had not yet been completed. The objective of the USSR in the Far East was the destruction of the Japanese troops in Manchuria and the occupation of the Liaotung Peninsula. After the defeat of Japan in combination with the Allied armies it was the Russian intention to withdraw their troops from Manchuria.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that at the present time the Japanese have in Manchuria approximately 20 infantry divisions, two tank divisions, and a sufficient number of depot divisions, separate brigades and separate battalions to bring the total Japanese forces up to a strength of approximately 30 divisions. In addition to these there were approximately 20 divisions of Manchurian troops, making an aggregate of approximately 50 divisions in all on the Russian front.

If the Russian operations were to be successful it was important to prevent the Japanese from strengthening their Manchurian front by reinforcements from China and the Japanese Islands. It was estimated that the Japanese might bring for this purpose 10 divisions from China and 7 from the Japanese Islands. If, therefore, the USSR was to be able to carry out its operations successfully it was necessary to prevent any such reinforcement.

GENERAL ANTONOV said he wished to call attention to the fact that there was only a single railroad line connecting Central Russia with the Far East; the effect of this was to limit rail movements of all kinds and effectively prevent any rapid movement of troops.

ADMIRAL LEAHY then asked General Marshall to outline the situation of the Japanese with respect to ground troops.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that it is estimated that the Japanese have at present approximately 1,800,000 Japanese troops in Japan proper; there are approximately 500,000 troops in Kyushu and a fairly large garrison in the Ryukyus outside of Okinawa. The Japanese garrison in Formosa has recently been increased to about 260,000 men.

In the Philippines there are now about 12,000 to 14,000 Japanese survivors collected in the mountains of northern Luzon for the final death struggle. In Mindanao there are about 20,000 troops scattered throughout the central plateau, all of the coastline positions having now been lost. In the remainder of the Philippines there are approximately 25,000 troops who are widely scattered.

There are, throughout the Pacific islands, isolated garrisons who are under constant surveillance and periodic bombing and whose presence cause no inconvenience to United States forces. There are a considerable number of isolated Japanese troops in Borneo, in New Guinea and the Celebes, in Bougainville in the Solomons group and in the Bismarck Archipelago. The Japanese troops in the Solomons and the Bismarck Archipelago are confronted by the Australians, who are also taking care of a considerable force in the north central part of New Guinea. All of these island garrisons are suffering from gradual exhaustion of their military supplies. In New Guinea they are suffering, in addition, from malaria and other tropical diseases. The remaining garrisons in Java and Sumatra have been reduced by movements to the Malay Peninsula.

The United States Chiefs of Staff estimate that there are about a million Japanese in China. At the present time the most noticeable movements of Japanese troops have been towards Kyushu. In the last three months two divisions from Manchuria had been identified there and it is understood that these divisions have left in Manchuria the cadres for two additional divisions. Two divisions have recently been moved from Korea to the Japanese homeland. One of these is composed of depot troops and the composition of the other is unknown. In the recent past deceptive measures instituted by U.S. forces have resulted in the concentration of Japanese troops in the Kuriles north of Hokkaido. It is known now, however, that the Japanese are moving troops out of the Kuriles and a division of these troops has recently been identified in Kyushu.

U.S. troops now have firm control of Okinawa where they are busy improving harbors and developing numerous airfields. It is expected that in addition to the naval and Marine Corps planes now on Okinawa that General MacArthur’s air force will have 2,000 planes there before the end of the summer. On Luzon strenuous efforts are being made to develop the necessary base facilities for incoming troops. Because of harbor destruction and the sinking of 500 ships in Manila Bay this has been a difficult task but satisfactory progress is being made.

With reference to General Antonov’s remark regarding the severing of Japanese communications with Manchuria, GENERAL MARSHALL said it is the present understanding the Japanese communications have been seriously interfered with by U.S. submarine action in the Sea of Japan, and by the continued laying of submarine mines by B-29s at the western entrance of the Inland Sea near Shimonoseki and the blockade of such harbors on the west coast of Honshu as Niigata.

The ferry service between Japan and Fusan [Pusan] and shipping in the Yellow Sea has been terminated. Ferry service to Fusan has been moved to the ports further north in Korea. Mine laying by B-29s has extended north along the Korean coast from Fusan to Genzan [Wonsan]. Mines have also been laid in the Inland Sea in the Bungo Channel and in the Bay of Tokyo. Naval air action has extended to northern Honshu and Hokkaido and numerous coastal ports have been attacked by naval aircraft and by direct bombardment. In recent months aircraft based in the Philippines have reduced the normal traffic from ports as far south as Indo-China to Japan from forty convoys a day to none whatever at the present time. By these various actions the Japanese have been compelled to stop all operations at sea except minor operations in the Sea of Japan and coastal lugger traffic in the Java Sea and along the coasts of Malaysia. As a result of increased naval action and mining by super-bombers, there is little likelihood of any Japanese troop movements between Japan and Manchuria. By September or October we expect it to be impossible for the Japanese to move any cargo over this route. It is believed that Japanese operational shipping of one thousand tons and over has been reduced from seven or eight million tons at the beginning of the war to 1¼ million tons at the present time.

In referring to General Antonov’s remarks relating to the movement of Japanese reinforcements from China to Manchuria, GENERAL MARSHALL said that the general movement of Japanese troops in China indicates a withdrawal from the south. Garrisons in Indo-China and to the southward have been cut off by Chinese forces. It appears that the Japanese are establishing a fortress garrison of about 150,000 men for the defense of Hong Kong and Canton. A similar garrison is being established in Shanghai, including Chusan Island. An inland fortress garrison is being established in Hankow. Our evidence indicates that in spite of their efforts to withdraw their forces to the northward, the continued air attacks on the single-track railroad and sabotage by Chinese guerrillas will prevent the Japanese from moving more than a trickle of troops to the north. Not only is the rail route interrupted, but the rolling stock is in bad condition. They are, therefore, dependent largely on water transportation. In the course of time the Japanese could move troops from North China to Manchuria through the Peking–Kalgan and the Tientsin regions.

The redeployment of troops from the European Theater to the Pacific is now well underway. The first troops have reached Manila. Our first requirement is for engineering and similar troops to restore the harbors and prepare cantonments. Six divisions from Germany with the attached corps and army troops are now in the United States. They will be moved from the west coast of the United States as rapidly as shipping is available.
In the Pacific at the present time the principal difficulty is to find ground room for troops and aircraft we wish to deploy there. The early requirement for engineering troops in the Philippines is thus apparent.

The divisions already in the Pacific have largely been withdrawn from combat and are now being reconditioned and trained for the next operation.

The next most important difficulty in the Pacific is the provision of shipping. By the improvement of harbors, by decreasing the turnaround of our vessels and by making all possible air transport available we hope to overcome the shipping shortage.

In closing, GENERAL MARSHALL said that attacks upon Japan from the air and the sea are now proceeding in tremendous volume, but the intensity of these attacks would increase each week.

ADMIRAL KING said that he would briefly supplement General Marshall’s remarks. He said that since Yalta the United States Navy had participated in the complete conquest of the Philippine Islands. Commencing in April the conquest of Okinawa and adjacent islands had been accomplished, and bases for land, sea, and air forces were being developed preparatory to the next move against the Japanese homeland. In addition to the Okinawa operation, carrier task forces had attacked air and naval bases in Japan proper. Recently the Third Fleet, under Admiral Halsey, had bombarded the Tokyo area and northern Honshu and Hokkaido. Commencing with the Ryukyus campaign a part of the British Fleet had operated as a task force of the U.S. naval forces. The Japanese navy is now only one-third of its maximum strength and most of the remaining units are of questionable military value, except perhaps for suicide purposes. Naval reconnaissance aircraft now range to the Shantung Peninsula, Korea and the Sea of Japan. Our submarines are operating against the sea communications between Japan and Korea, in Japanese home waters and in the Sea of Japan. We have developed naval bases in Guam and Saipan, in the Marianas group, and are now developing a base in Okinawa.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that he would furnish some additional details regarding the matters discussed by General Marshall. The limited land areas in the Pacific Theater make it impossible to utilize at present all of the large number of airplanes which had been used in the European Theater. When commencing the air campaign against Japan proper we were limited in operations by the airfields we could develop in the Marianas. From these islands the B-29s performance enabled us to carry out attacks against the Japanese industrial areas in Honshu. During the first part of the campaign Japanese air opposition, as well as anti-aircraft fire, was intense. Navigation problems were most difficult. The weather through which we had to fly had an effect on the ability of the plane crews to carry the maximum weight in bombs. With the increase in the strength of our attacks the opposition by the enemy decreased. After the capture of Iwo Jima we were able to base fighter planes there which were able to accompany the B-29s on their attacks on Japanese Islands. Not long after the employment of long-range accompanying fighters was initiated the Japanese Air Force assumed a condition of impotency and we have records of many instances when B-29s reached their objectives without encountering any enemy air opposition. We have learned more about Japanese weather and this and experience gained enabled us to add 30 percent to the bomb load of our B-29s. With fields established on Okinawa B-24s will be able to operate to the north of Port Arthur and B-29s to a range of 200 miles north of Harbin. We will be able to carry maximum bomb loads against Japanese industries and lines of communication in Manchuria. The B-29s operating from Okinawa will carry a bomb load of 20,000 pounds. The difficulty of operating air units from Okinawa will be appreciated when it is realized that the island is only 80 miles long and that only 48 miles of its length can be used for airfields. This usable part of the island is only six or seven miles wide at the widest part. We expect to operate between 2,000 and 3,500 planes from the fields we are building there.

GENERAL ARNOLD said that the exact proportion of Japanese industry now operating in Manchuria was not known but it was estimated to be about twenty percent.

He said that the Japanese Air Forces now have some 5,000 planes, a larger number than they have ever had before, but their air force is at its weakest point operationally.

The 5,000 planes referred to above include all types of planes – operational and non-operational – reconnaissance, photographic and combat. Of these the Japanese have set aside about 1,200 for suicide operations. These are now concentrated largely in northern Honshu where the crews are being given special training in suicide technique against airplanes both on the ground and in the air and against ships – warships as well as cargo ships unloading at our ports such as Okinawa.

The Japanese have lost many of their best air leaders – most of their experienced pilots and large numbers of their maintenance crews. They are also very short of gasoline and oil. As a result, Army and Navy planes operating over Hokkaido, Honshu, and the Ryukyus rarely encounter more than 70 or 80 planes.

GENERAL ANTONOV asked General Marshall if he thought it would be possible for the Japanese to move large forces from Japan to Manchuria and from China to Manchuria.

In reply, GENERAL MARSHALL said that he believed no troops could be moved from Japan to Manchuria. He thought the Japanese would be unable to move a large number of troops from China to Manchuria by rail but, given time, they could increase their forces in Manchuria from Central China via the Peking–Kalgan route or via Tientsin. The rail line south of Shantung is susceptible to air attack and sabotage. For this reason it would be a slow process to move large numbers of troops over this route.

General Wedemeyer, the United States Commander in China, has 1,000 planes of the Tenth and Fourteenth Air Forces under his command to operate against this railroad.

Continuing, GENERAL MARSHALL said that at the present time 100,000 tons of supplies a month are being moved into China by air over the mountains and via the old Burma Road. Over this route heavy movements of Chinese troops have been made from Burma to China. The movement of troops and supplies to China has been undertaken in order to have ready by August, 15 Chinese divisions of 10,000 men each equipped with American arms, trained by American officers and enlisted men, and directed under American guidance. He said he mentioned this movement of troops and their equipment from Burma since these movements had prevented an increase in the gasoline supply to China. As the equipping of these divisions is completed and the operations to be undertaken succeed, a greatly increased gasoline supply will be available which will enable heavy attacks to be made on the railroad to North China.

Chinese troops in August will attack Fort Bayard, a port on the China Sea north of Hainan and south of Canton. This port is within 150 miles of the area from which the American-trained Chinese troops will advance on Canton and Hong Kong. It had been estimated that one Liberty ship in Fort Bayard was the equivalent of three or four in Calcutta; one transport plane in Fort Bayard was the equivalent of ten or more in Burma, and 20,000 men in Fort Bayard was the equivalent of 150,000 in Burma. All of these advantages would be reflected in the air operations against the railroad in China.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the Chinese troops had given a good account of themselves in Burma and their effectiveness was encouraging beyond expectations. He thought that with heavy air support the Chinese troops would operate with considerable success against a Japanese withdrawal to the northward.

With support of the Chinese forces by ship rather than through Burma he thought that the air forces would be able to completely destroy the Chinese railroad, and although the railroad could be attacked from Okinawa it would not be a profitable target for aircraft based there.

GENERAL ANTONOV asked if the United States would operate against the Kuriles in order to open the line of communications to Siberia. He said that they had some strength in Kamchatka and would like to assist with some forces, and that he considered opening this sea route to be most important. He also asked if it would be possible for the United States forces to operate against the shores of Korea in coordination with the Russian forces which would be making an offensive against the peninsula.

ADMIRAL KING said that it would not be possible to operate against the Kuriles and that he saw no reason why a line of communications could not be maintained through the Kuriles as the passages were wide and deep. In reply to the question in regard to operations against Korea, GENERAL MARSHALL said that such amphibious operations had not been contemplated, and particularly not in the near future. To undertake amphibious operations against Korea would seriously expose our shipping to Japanese suicide attack by air and surface vessels until we had completely destroyed enemy air strength in southern Korea and until certain portions of the Japanese homeland had been brought completely under our control. To stage such an operation would require a great number of assault ships which would be engaged in three landings on Kyushu. There were no additional assault ships which would permit a landing in Korea. With only a small amphibious force landings could be made on the China coast south of Shanghai which would be of great assistance to General Wedemeyer. He realized the importance of Korea to the Russian operations but said that the possibility of an attack on Korea would have to be determined after the landings on Kyushu. He thought that Korea could be controlled from airfields that would be established in Kyushu.

ADMIRAL KING said that he hoped and expected that after the Kyushu operation we would have such control over the waters of Japan and Korea that we could establish a line of sea communications through those waters to Vladivostok and the Maritime Provinces.

GENERAL MARSHALL pointed out that we had already severed the line of communications between Korea and the main islands of Japan.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he had with him some questions which he would leave with General Antonov to be answered at his convenience since he did not think that he would be prepared to give the answers at the present time.

ADMIRAL KING said that he would like to call the attention of the Russian Chiefs of Staff to the conversation that took place at Yalta regarding La Perousse Strait, the control of which, we understood, would be undertaken by the Russians by capturing the southern end of Sakhalin Island at as early a time as the Russian Chiefs of Staff thought practicable.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that the first task facing the Russians would be the destruction of the Japanese troops in Manchuria. Because of the distance of Sakhalin, additional troop movements would be required in order to complete its capture in time to be of value in opening La Perousse Strait. Therefore, the attack on southern Sakhalin would be undertaken as a second offensive.

GENERAL MARSHALL then gave General Antonov a book explaining the experiences of our forces in fighting the Japanese which he thought might be of value to him. He also gave him an estimate of the situation in the Far East.

GENERAL ANTONOV said that he was grateful for the very valuable information which General Marshall had given him and said that it would be truly exploited.

In regard to operations in Southeast Asia under Admiral Mountbatten, SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the reconquest of Burma had recently been completed but that some Japanese still remained in Burma where they had been cut off by the advance on Rangoon. These Japanese had been making an attempt to join other enemy forces in Siam and five hundred of them had been killed in the last two days. Operations in Burma were being interfered with by the monsoon which was still continuing. When the weather clears, Sir Alan Brooke said that Admiral Mountbatten would continue on towards Siam. In Burma there were the remnants of nine enemy divisions facing the British and behind these remnants was one division in Siam and four in Indo-China.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that they were preparing for an operation to secure Malaya and Singapore and to open the Straits of Malacca. The opening of these straits would shorten the line of communications for the support of British forces operating in the Pacific Theater against the main islands of Japan.

In Malaya there were little more than two divisions of Japanese troops which were being reinforced from Java and Sumatra.

Plans were being prepared for a small expeditionary force to cooperate with the United States forces in the attack on Japan. The limiting factor for operations in this area was shipping.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM said that only remnants of the Japanese Fleet in the Southeast Asia area remained and that within the last two months the two efficient Japanese cruisers had been sunk. Only two damaged ones remained in Singapore. The British East Indies Fleet was unrestricted in its movements except in the very narrow parts of Malacca Strait.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that the British and United States air forces in Southeast Asia maintained complete supremacy over the Japanese air forces in that area. His estimate of the strength of enemy air forces in Burma, Siam, Malaya, Sumatra, and Indo-China on 15 July was 260 operating aircraft plus 150 training units. He said he considered any substantial increase in air strength most unlikely and that Admiral Mountbatten had ample aircraft for his future operations.

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked General Antonov if he desired to ask the British Chiefs of Staff any questions, to which General Antonov replied that he did not.

GENERAL ANTONOV said, however, that he would require some time to consider the questions which had been presented to him by General Marshall and that when he was prepared he would like to arrange another meeting. He said he was very grateful for the information that had been furnished him by the United States and the British Chiefs of Staff.

ADMIRAL LEAHY expressed the appreciation of both the United States and the British Chiefs of Staff for the information given to them by the Russian Chiefs of Staff.

7371

Memorandum by the Polish Deputy Prime Minister

Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 12:30 p.m.
[Translation]

Meeting of the Three Foreign Ministers on July 24, 1945, at 12:30

SECRETARY BYRNES, as Chairman, opens the meeting: We have invited3 the representatives of the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity to come here so that they would have the opportunity to explain to us their point of view with regard to the Polish western frontier. Who is going to speak on behalf of the Polish Provisional Government in answer to our invitation? I should like to ask President Bierut to name the speaker who will present to us the position of the Polish Government.

PRESIDENT BIERUT: (Expresses thanks for the invitation to the Conference and begins the report.) In connection with this World War, Poland has been placed in a situation which changes her boundaries. Resolutions of the Crimean Conference4 determined the eastern boundary of Poland, but the western boundary was not established. We accepted the eastern boundary in accordance with the resolutions of the Crimean Conference and the Moscow Conference. Our government would like to express its opinion with regard to the western boundary of Poland. I should like to point out that the Government of National Unity has unanimously arrived at the following conclusions: we should all like to ask, when our western borders are established, that there be taken into consideration the vital interests of Poland, i.e., the factors without which Poland will not be able to exist.

Poland is a state which became the object of German aggression. As a result of this war Poland has suffered the most heavily in population and material of all the states participating in the war. Our country was damaged more than any other country in this war. We realize that in order to establish a lasting peace in all Europe Poland, which suffered great losses in the war for that peace, must also make certain common sacrifices at this time, in the same way as other nations. From the territorial standpoint, Poland had to give up an area of 180,000 square kilometers in establishing her eastern boundary. We consider it proper and just that the eastern boundary was established in accordance with ethnic principles. I believe that the equivalent which Poland should receive in accordance with the decisions of the Big Three should include such a territorial increase as would guarantee to Poland a boundary appropriate from the standpoint of security as well as an area which would be a compact unit from the standpoint of economy and defense of the state. In our plan we drew up precisely such a boundary, based in the north on Swinemünde, which gives Stettin to Poland and runs along the Oder and the Neisse to the Czechoslovak border. It is true that from the territorial standpoint the establishment of such a boundary would return to Poland less than what Poland has lost in the east, but from the economic standpoint it would guarantee better conditions for development. The total area of Poland would be reduced from 380,000 square kilometers to 309,000 square kilometers, i.e., by approximately 70,000 square kilometers. From the demographic standpoint the total population of Poland would decrease from 34 million to 26 million, but the new figure would represent a homogeneous Polish population.

SECRETARY EDEN: Are we to assume that all Germans have been expelled from Poland?

PRESIDENT BIERUT: Most of the Germans have fled from these former German territories; we should assume that the remaining German population does not want to move to areas which are inhabited strictly by Germans. According to our figures about 1 to 1½ million Germans still live there.

SECRETARY BYRNES: How large is the Polish population which came under Russian rule?

PRESIDENT BIERUT: The areas to the east of the Curzon Line7 are inhabited predominantly by a Ukrainian, White Russian, and Lithuanian population. There were about 4 million Poles in those areas. Most of these 4 million have probably already moved to Polish territory.

With regard to the population, the important fact is that the average population density in Poland was 83 per square kilometer. The new boundaries which we propose would slightly increase the population density. If we take the prewar density of 83 persons, we would have to have an area of 314,000 square kilometers. Under the plan we would have only 310,000 square kilometers. Thus the population density would slightly increase, but the areas claimed are richer from the economic standpoint; they would therefore absorb the people and alleviate their lot so that the population would no longer need to emigrate.

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER MIKOŁAJCZYK adds: Either to America or to Germany.

PRESIDENT BIERUT: I wish to draw the attention of the High Commission8 to the fact that a large part of the agricultural population has emigrated from that area every year. With regard to the agricultural population, the western territories which we have claimed depended mainly on the production of Polish labor, except that it was the Germans who benefited from it. I consider it unjust that the Polish population should supply the labor and that the Germans should obtain the fruits of this labor. Every year hundreds of thousands of our people migrated to these German areas.

In order to present our arguments fully, I should like to ask the Chairman for permission to let my colleagues, Minister Rzymowski and Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk, testify also on this subject.

SECRETARY BYRNES consents.

MINISTER RZYMOWSKI: In the Second World War the Polish state became the first victim of German imperialism. Poland remained under occupation for the longest period of time, and the conduct of the Germans, whose victims we became, shows that the basic purpose of their aggression was to undermine the national and economic existence of Poland. Poland was a country where the German occupation created many death camps so that the Polish population could be destroyed and our territory converted into Lebensraum for German settlement and colonization.

When the German authorities came to Kraków, which is the metropolis of Polish learning and culture, they started by sending university professors to death camps on the assumption that the destruction of Polish culture would be the best start toward destroying the nation. Since the destruction of the Polish nation was one of the basic aims of German imperialism, I consider it to be just if the triumph over the Germans manifests itself through the revival of Poland as a strong state capable of further development. It would be an expression of historical justice to give Poland a territory which would represent a guarantee of her strength and development, a strength capable of resisting German aggression. In the interest of friendship with the Soviet Union and of peace in the east we have given up territory inhabited by 4 million Poles. It is necessary to find a place for these Poles in the new Poland. The population which had previously been forced to emigrate to other countries – to France or to Germany – must find room in the territory of postwar democratic Poland. There must be room for the natural increase in Polish population, which amounts to 250,000 people yearly. I consider it to be just that for the territory which Poland has renounced in the east Poland should receive in compensation those areas which for centuries have been the base of German imperialism. If we had to cede lands to the east of the Curzon Line, then I consider it to be fair that the Germans also cede those territories which have been the base for their aggression. This is in the interest of security and peace in Europe. I believe that a territory for Poland which will extend to the Curzon Line in the east and the Oder-Neisse Line in the west will represent a territory on which the Polish nation can satisfy its economic, demographic, and cultural needs and achieve an appropriate foundation for its security. In the interest of the security of Poland, as well as in the interest of the peace of the world, the Germans must be deprived of those territories which they have used as a base for their aggression. The Poland which will arise in the proposed territory will be a country without national minorities; it will be a state of one nationality, which means that it will acquire a most healthy and peaceful basis for its development.

I consider our proposed boundaries to be modest and moderate in view of the fact that the territory of the new Poland will be smaller by 80,000 square kilometers, and I also believe that in this smaller territory the population will have all the conditions necessary for prosperous development because its social structure will change. The industry of Silesia, which under German rule worked on the production of weapons to conquer the world, under the government of the Polish state will work to satisfy the peaceful needs of a society which has heretofore been at a very low level of social development. Our right to Silesia is based on the fact that that part of the territory is inhabited by a Polish population. It suffices to remove the cloak of oppression to become convinced that the population there belongs to the Polish motherland.

The boundary running along the Oder–Neisse Line is not an accidental boundary which we have drawn arbitrarily. It is an ancient boundary of a state which was the cradle of the Polish nation. In addition, the boundary along the Oder-Neisse Line is the shortest boundary possible between Poland and Germany. It is clear that the shortest boundary is at the same time the most secure one, the most favorable boundary from the standpoint of defense in case of renewed German aggression. The other borders of Poland consist of a seashore, which is a boundary of maximum security, and then of another boundary which is a frontier of peace and friendship with the Soviet Union, and also with Czechoslovakia. Therefore the only boundary which may create doubts as far as security is concerned is the Polish-German border. A boundary which is reduced to the shortest distance is the best guarantee for security against a new war. A long seashore and an industrial base in Silesia will provide the Polish state with a powerful lever for social and economic reconstruction. Before the war Poland was the only country in Europe which had such an unfavorably preponderant majority of rural population over urban population. The rural overpopulation, coupled with little urban development, was one of the basic reasons for the collapse of Poland. The approximately 4 million farm workers residing in rural areas represented a reservoir of unemployment in Poland. Cities could not absorb these farm workers. Therefore we consider the inclusion of Silesia up to the banks of the Neisse to be an economic necessity for Poland, because in that way we shall create an opportunity for the rural population to move into cities. The inclusion of Silesia is most closely connected with our postulate to acquire Stettin, because Stettin serves Silesian industry. Since Stettin serves Silesian industry, it should by the same token be in Polish hands.

DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER MIKOŁAJCZYK: My views are the same as those of the previous speakers. In a few words I would like to raise two questions. We know that it is in the interest of all of us to prevent the Germans from causing another war. I see two sources of aggressive German imperialism: armaments, and profits which they derived from the fact that they were intermediaries between several nations. (1) One of the German military bases was precisely the territory which we are claiming for Poland. One of the basic raw materials was zinc. Out of the total production of 160,000 tons of zinc in Germany, 107,000 tons was produced in Silesia. I believe that it would be a good thing if those sources were not in German hands. There is also the question of coal. After the last World War, the Germans increased their exports of coal from 22% to 27% of the entire world export. The German exports increased by 5.1%, while the entire Polish exports amounted to only 6%. The transfer of this core of industry represents a source of world security. (2) Profits derived from acting as an intermediary: It must be taken into consideration that the value of German foreign trade in 1937 amounted to 926 million pounds sterling. If we take those figures, we see that the shipping of goods from Bohemia amounted to 2,300,000 tons; from Hungary, 400,000 tons; from Rumania, 500,000 tons; and from Yugoslavia, 200,000 tons—not to speak of the fact that Poland was also forced to ship its own products through Germany. Well, the shortest route for exports from those countries goes through Stettin. The Germans directed their exports through Hamburg. The exports from Poland would go through Stettin and would be under the control of a nation belonging to the United Nations.

Now about the reasons why the Oder and its basin ought to be in Polish hands.

Poland must also export on a large scale in order to compensate speedily for those losses which it suffered during the war and to provide employment for its population. One river system – the Vistula – is not sufficient. It would not be right if it could not be arranged for the Oder to be entirely in Polish hands. I recall the case of Danzig and how the blocking of the Vistula affected the Polish economy. Therefore I take the view that Stettin, not controlled by the Germans, ought to be completely under Polish control and in Polish hands. If we look at the problem more closely, we see that the Oder would not be such an easily navigable river if it were not for the supply of water which is concentrated below the Oder. In view of the fact that the supply of water is found between the Oder and the Lausitzer Neisse, if the Oder’s tributaries were controlled by someone else the river would be blocked. For that reason both problems are closely connected with each other. In summing up, we come to the conclusion that: (1) the sources of raw material for armaments should be taken away from the Germans; (2) the Germans should be deprived of the controlling position and the profits resulting from their acting as an intermediary. By transferring these affairs to Polish hands, we perform not only an act of security and justice with regard to Poland and an act of security with regard to all nations, but we also create a new economic system which will make Poland a great transit area both for the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia, as well as for all those countries which benefited from it before the war.

One more consideration with regard to the territorial basis of Poland: I should like to bring to your attention the fact that in spite of all, Germany, which lost the war, is losing less than Poland, because on a percentage basis Poland will be 20% smaller, while Germany will be only 18% smaller.

As to the exchange of populations, I should like to say that it was the Germans who began to expel the population in adjacent areas and turn them into slaves, while we intend to gather Poles who have resided in German territory.

I believe that the whole world will agree to such a settlement. Therefore in closing I should like to ask for a speedy and full decision, because it is necessary for us to repatriate our population both from the Soviet Union and from other territories of Europe to which the war has forced them to move. A rapid reconstruction of our state depends on that.

SECRETARY OF STATE BYRNES: According to the decisions of the Crimean Conference, we were to consult the Polish Provisional Government with regard to the problem of the western boundary of Poland. However, the peace conference should decide on the size of the territory which will go to Poland. After it has expressed its views, the Polish Government will have to wait for the final delimitation of the western boundary. The Foreign Ministers were very pleased to hear the opinion of the Polish Government on the subject, and your arguments will be submitted to the Tripartite Conference for consideration.

(A brief discussion follows concerning the possibility of having a fourth delegate of the Polish Government make a statement. President Bierut mentions Professor Grabski, and Minister Molotov supports the desire of the Polish Delegation. Secretary Byrnes makes a reservation, saying that according to his understanding only three delegates were supposed to speak, and he adds:) If President Bierut desires to submit additional arguments to support his views, then please formulate them in writing and I assure you that your arguments will be considered most carefully.

MINISTER MOLOTOV: The position of the Soviet Union in this matter is a special one. The Crimean Conference examined the problems of both the Polish eastern boundary and the western boundary. As far as the eastern boundary is concerned, the problem refers to Soviet-Polish relations and it has been settled. As far as the Polish western boundary is concerned, we have heard here the arguments of the Polish Government and we want to give the Polish delegates an opportunity to present fully their arguments.

SECRETARY BYRNES: I have no objection to our meeting again, so that you can have the opportunity to discuss the problem again.

MINISTER MOLOTOV: I believe that the problem of the Polish boundaries is one of historical importance. It has enormous historical significance not only for Poland and its neighbors but also for all Europe. The settlement of the Polish eastern boundary at the Crimean Conference was the result of an agreement between Poland and the Soviet Union as neighbors. Poland transferred to us the western part of the Ukraine and White Russia. For that reason we feel that we have special obligations toward Poland with regard to its western boundary. I do not say here anything that is new either to the representatives of England, the United States, or Poland. I feel obligated to support the Polish demands, because I believe that it is a question of justice. The Soviet Union considers the efforts of Poland to transfer its boundary to the Oder, including Stettin, and to the Neisse to be justified and timely. On the basis of justice Germany should lose the territory in favor of Poland. I consider such a solution to be in the interest of Europe and of the whole world. In international relations it means checking German aggression. It also means a revival of the Polish nation. A revived Poland will be again a pillar of peace in Europe. Germany will be weakened and Poland will become stronger not only in the present but also in the future. All Poles will be grouped together in one state. The Poland – a truly democratic Poland – which will be revived within these boundaries will be a homogeneous state from the economic and social point of view. Therefore the Soviet Delegation hopes that the Polish plan will meet with understanding.

(Minister Molotov stresses again the fact that the position of the Soviet Union is a special one, because it is Poland’s neighbor, and because in addition it has special obligations with regard to Poland.)

SECRETARY BYRNES: The United States is not Poland’s neighbor, to be sure, but the United States of America has always been Poland’s great friend.

SECRETARY EDEN: And England entered this war to defend Poland.

7372

Byrnes-Eden-Molotov luncheon meeting; Byrnes-Molotov meeting immediately thereafter, 3:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Pavlov

Page Minutes

Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 3:30 p.m.
Top secret

Council of Foreign Ministers

At lunch today with Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden, THE SECRETARY took occasion to express his views on the work of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

MR. EDEN was obliged to leave immediately after lunch and was not present during the majority of the conversation.

The main points which Secretary Byrnes brought out and Mr. Molotov’s reactions thereto are as follows:

  1. THE SECRETARY expressed the desirability, in general, to avoid a general peace conference made up of delegates from fifty-odd nations. Such a conference would result in endless discussions and in no satisfactory results. Small nations not having direct interests in important European questions should not be given the opportunity to air their views thereon. The Prime Minister and Mr. Eden did not appear to agree, but it was not likely [unlikely?] that they would do so when they had given more thought to the matter.

    MR. MOLOTOV indicated that he was in accord with the Secretary’s views on the desirability of avoiding a general peace conference.

  2. In reply to Mr. Molotov’s inquiry, THE SECRETARY stated that he thought the Council of Foreign Ministers should convene in London on September 1. This meeting should be of an organizational character in which directives would be issued to the staffs of the Foreign Ministers and then the Foreign Ministers should return home. This, as other meetings, should not require the presence of the Foreign Ministers for more than a week or ten days on each occasion.

    MR. MOLOTOV stated that he agreed that the first meeting should take place on September 1 and appeared pleased to hear the Secretary’s views to the effect that the Foreign Ministers would not have to be away from their respective governments for more than a week or ten days.

  3. THE SECRETARY stated that it was of major importance that a high-ranking assistant to the Foreign Secretaries be appointed. Such assistants or deputies should have power and authority to reach decisions on questions not having primary importance without referring back to their respective governments or Foreign Ministers.

    MR. MOLOTOV fully agreed. He stated that the Foreign Ministers were too busy to give attention to matters not having primary importance. He asked whom the United States would designate as Mr. Byrnes’ deputy.

    MR. BYRNES stated that the man had not been chosen.

    MR. MOLOTOV indicated that the Soviet Government had not as yet selected his deputy.

  4. MR. BYRNES recommended that a competent staff of experts be appointed to work on the problems at issue and, when the decisions were reached, to present their briefs to the Foreign Ministers. This work should be done in the interim periods between the meetings of the Foreign Ministers. After consideration of these briefs the Foreign Ministers should convene again, and if considered advisable, in the localities of the question under consideration (Trieste, for example) to examine the question. If necessary the parties interested in the issue might be called in.

    MR. MOLOTOV appeared to be fully in accord with Mr. Byrnes’ views on this question.

  5. MR. BYRNES further suggested that the United Nations be informed of action contemplated or taken by the Three Governments on recommendation of the Council of Foreign Ministers.

    MR. MOLOTOV again concurred.

  6. In reply to Mr. Molotov’s inquiry as to whether any draft Italian peace treaty had been drawn up, The Secretary answered in the negative. He suggested that upon the return of the Foreign Ministers to their respective capitals instructions immediately be issued to prepare such drafts and that the views of the Three Governments be exchanged prior to the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers.

    MR. MOLOTOV indicated his approval of this suggestion.

7373 
740.00119 Potsdam/8-745: Telegram

The President to the Ambassador in China

[Babelsberg,] 24 July 1945
Top secret

Personal and Top Secret for Ambassador Hurley from the President. Number 311.

Please inform Chiang Kai-Shek that we propose to issue in the near future the following message to Japan in regard to surrender and request the Generalissimo to inform us without delay of his concurrence.

Proclamation by the Heads of Governments, United States, United Kingdom and China

  1. We, – the President of the United States, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be given an opportunity to end this war.

  2. The prodigious land, sea and air forces of the United States, the British Empire and of China, many times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the west are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan. This military power is sustained and inspired by the determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

  3. The result of the futile and senseless German resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to the people of Japan. The might that now converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people. The full application of our military power, backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed forces and just as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese homeland.

  4. The time has come for Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of reason.

  5. Following are our terms. We will not deviate from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook no delay.

  6. There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.

  7. Until such a new order is established and until there is convincing proof that Japan’s war-making power is destroyed, points in Japanese territory to be designated by the Allies shall be occupied to secure the achievement of the basic objectives we are here setting forth.

  8. The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku and such minor islands as we determine.

  9. The Japanese military forces, after being completely disarmed, shall be permitted to return to their homes with the opportunity to lead peaceful and productive lives.

  10. We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or destroyed as a nation, but stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of religion, and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights shall be established.

  11. Japan shall be permitted to maintain such industries as will sustain her economy and permit the exaction of just reparations in kind, but not those which would enable her to re-arm for war. To this end, access to, as distinguished from control of, raw materials shall be permitted. Eventual Japanese participation in world trade relations shall be permitted.

  12. The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.

  13. We call upon the Government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all the Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction.

Please acknowledge receipt of this.

HARRY S. TRUMAN

7374

Morse-Weston conversation, afternoon

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Morse Mr. Weston

The principal subject of conversation was the accuracy of Soviet statements relating to Finnish shipping captured by the Soviet Union.

7375

Truman-Bierut conversation, 4:30 p.m.

Truman’s quarters, 2 Kaiserstrasse, Babelsberg

Present
United States Poland
President Truman President Bierut
Mr. Harriman Vice President Grabski
Mr. Dunn Prime Minister Osóbka-Morawski
Mr. Bohlen Deputy Prime Minister Mikołajczyk
Mr. Matthews Deputy Prime Minister Gomułka
Foreign Minister Rzymowski
Mr. Modzelewski
Marshal Rola-Żymierski 
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-2445

Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Babelsberg, July 24, 1945
Top secret

Subject: POLAND

Mr. Bierut presented on behalf of the Polish Delegation the basis of the Polish claims to the German territory as far as the Oder-Lower Neisse line along the general lines of his presentation to the Foreign Ministers. The President explained that he had great interest in Poland and its future and would do all he could to see that they got justice; on the other hand in frankness he pointed out that he did not like the arbitrary manner in which the boundary question was being handled by the Soviet and Polish governments.

He explained that the title would not be valid unless approved at the peace settlement and that a disagreement would be a source of trouble in the future. In answer to Bierut’s argument that it was German territory that was being taken, the President pointed out that under agreement there were four occupying countries responsible for the entire territory of Germany and that he did not wish to have a fifth. He further pointed out that France might wish the Ruhr and the Rhineland but that there was no question of any territory in the western part of Germany being given to France until the matter could be considered in an orderly way with full allied agreement.

Mr. Bierut said that he understood the legal point of view but that there were many homeless people who had to be settled in the new territory which all agreed Poland was to have in compensation for the loss of territory in the East. He spoke of the 4,000,000 Poles east of the Curzon Line and 3,000,000 Poles in Germany or in western Europe.

The conversation ended with a statement by the President that the boundary question must be determined at the peace settlement and that it could not be settled here. As the Poles were fifteen minutes late, having been with Prime Minister Churchill, and as the President had a meeting of the Big Three, the conversation lasted only fifteen to twenty minutes.

W A H[ARRIMAN]

7376

Eighth plenary meeting, 5:15 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill Generalissimo Stalin
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Fleet Admiral Leahy Mr. Attlee Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Davies Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Gusev
Mr. Bohlen Manor Birse Mr. Pavlov
Mr. Cohen Field Marshal Alexander
Mr. Thompson

Thompson Minutes

Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 5 p.m.
Top secret

MR. BYRNES read his report as rapporteur of the morning meeting of the Foreign Ministers (annex l).

Admission of Italy and the Other Satellite States into the United Nations Organization

THE PRESIDENT said that the first topic of the agenda was the admission of Italy and the other satellite states into the United Nations Organization.

MR. BYRNES said he understood that agreement had been reached by the United States and the British delegations on the draft as it now stood.

MR. EDEN said that the British had been in full agreement with the first paper submitted by the United States but he had some question with regard to the second draft. As drafted it looked as though they were undertaking to reconstruct the Italian Government before Italy could be admitted to the United Nations and he questioned the effect of this on the present Italian Government.

MR. BYRNES replied that it had been agreed that there should be no odious comparisons. He submitted to the British delegation that there was no doubt nor reflection on the present Italian Government as the language proposed related only to the contraction of a peace treaty. It was not known what Italian Government there would be at that time and it was not a reflection on the present Italian Government.

MR. EDEN remarked that it was only a question of drafting and he felt that they could reach agreement.

STALIN said that if the point at issue was to ease the position of the satellite states then all satellite countries should be mentioned. The position of the Italian Government would be eased and it would be difficult to object to this. An abnormal position was being created for the other satellite states and an artificial distinction was being drawn between them. It appeared that Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Finland were being put in the category of leprous states in which fact the Soviet delegation saw a danger that attempts would be made to discredit the Soviet Union. What were the merits of Italy as compared with the other satellite states? It was the first to capitulate but it had done more harm and its behavior had been worse than that of the others. There was no doubt that Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland had done less harm to the Allies than had Italy. He asked if the Italian Government was really more democratic than the Governments of these countries. Was the Italian Government more responsible? No democratic elections had been held in Italy or in the other satellite countries. He, therefore, did not understand the cause of such a benevolent attitude towards Italy as compared with the others. The position of Italy was eased when the first step was taken, namely, the resumption of diplomatic relations. Now a second step was proposed. He agreed to take this second step but thought that they should take this first step with regard to the other satellite states and resume diplomatic relations with them. Italy would still occupy a first place which was due to the fact that it was the first to surrender. This would be so in spite of the fact that she had done more harm than the others.

CHURCHILL said that the British were in general agreement with the United States delegation on this matter.

THE PRESIDENT said that he had a different point of view with regard to Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary than in the case of Italy. We had not been able to have free access to the former countries and had not been able to get information concerning them. Everybody had free access to Italy – the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and other countries. He declared that when Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria were set up on a basis where we would have free access to them we would recognize them but not sooner. To meet the Soviet position the language in the American document was the same in regard to Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary as it was in the case of Italy.

MOLOTOV stated that Italy, however, already maintained diplomatic relations with the other powers.

THE PRESIDENT replied that the satellites could have diplomatic relations if they would comply with our requirements which they had not done.

STALIN inquired what requirements were referred to and added that none of these satellite governments could hamper allied agents to move freely and to have access to information.

THE PRESIDENT replied that nevertheless they did.

MOLOTOV pointed out that there were also restrictions on the Soviet representatives in Italy.

THE PRESIDENT said that we were asking for the reorganization of the other satellite governments along democratic lines as had been agreed upon at Yalta.

STALIN said he wished to assure the President that the Governments in those countries were more democratic than that in Italy and that they were closer to the people than the Italian Government.

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the language of the proposal meant that they would have the same status for the Council of Foreign Ministers.

MOLOTOV pointed out that if their status was equal that would include maintaining diplomatic relations.

THE PRESIDENT replied that this was not the case and that with respect to diplomatic relations he had said that we could not recognize them until they were set up on democratic lines.

MOLOTOV said that his proposal had been that the satellites would be placed in a position of equality and that he could not agree that the wording corresponded to the suggestion he had made.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that in the paper which he had circulated reference was made to the effort to ease the situation in Italy. The only way–

MOLOTOV broke in to say that there was some misunderstanding. Mr. Byrnes had suggested two amendments orally. The Soviet delegation had one of those amendments before them in writing and in Russian translation. That amendment referred to the four small satellites. The second amendment proposed by the Secretary concerning Italy they did not have in writing.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that the American delegation had circulated the final text of the document which included that amendment.

MOLOTOV replied that they did not have it in circulation.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that the only way in which it was proposed to ease the situation of Italy was to give support to the entry of Italy into the United Nations Organization. In an effort to meet the objections of the Soviet delegation, the United States delegation had submitted language which read, “The conclusion of such a peace treaty with the democratic and responsible Italian Government will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support the admission of Italy into the United Nations Organization.” In the next paragraph referring to Finland, Rumania, Hungary, and Bulgaria the same language was used with regard to Italy and the other satellite states. He also drew attention to the fact that this statement had been used to do what Stalin had asked to be done, namely, express a view upon the Government of Franco. This was set forth in the last paragraph of the statement.

STALIN said that the words “responsible and democratic governments” should be deleted as it served to discredit these countries.

THE PRESIDENT said that this language was used to show that the only way in which they could obtain our support for entry into the United Nations Organization was for them to have democratic governments.

STALIN said that these were not Fascist governments. There was a far less democratic government in Argentina which in spite of this had been admitted to the United Nations. “If a government is not Fascist a government is democratic.” If the word “responsible” was used it would discredit these governments.

MOLOTOV proposed to add to the paragraph on diplomatic relations that each of the three Governments would consider separately the resumption of diplomatic relations with those countries. In Italy the United States and the Soviet Union had diplomatic relations now with Italy. There were no diplomatic representatives there for Great Britain and France – only political representatives not holding the rank of Ambassador.

CHURCHILL said the British considered their Ambassador in Italy as fully accredited.

MOLOTOV pointed out that he was not called an Ambassador.

CHURCHILL said this was because the British were at war with Italy and that the status of their Ambassador did not obtain full formality but that for practical purposes he was an Ambassador. The distinction was made for technical reasons.

MOLOTOV repeated that he was not called an Ambassador.

CHURCHILL replied that he was so called and that he was 90 percent a full ambassador.

STALIN remarked that their representative was not the same as those of the Soviet Union and the United States. He suggested that the same kind of ambassador could be sent to Rumania and Bulgaria as the British had in Italy.

THE PRESIDENT said that the United States was making every effort to arrive at a point where they could send an ambassador. He had already stated the difficulties which prevented this.

STALIN remarked that that was in the past and that there were no such difficulties now. Speaking generally it was hard for the Soviet delegation to adhere to this resolution as they would be discredited by it.

THE PRESIDENT replied that we had had no such intention.

STALIN admitted this but insisted that this is what would happen.

CHURCHILL said that they wanted no words which would be a slur on any of them. He would like to put in a plea for Italy. It was not only because Italy was first out of the war that this proposal was made. Nearly two years had passed since Italy went out of the war. It was a very short time since the other satellites had been fighting against them.

STALIN rejoined that diplomatic relations with Italy had been resumed seven to ten months after Italy’s surrender.

CHURCHILL continued that Italy had been out of the war for two years and had been fighting on their side all of that time. They had been living in Italy and knew all about political conditions there. That was not the case in Bulgaria and Rumania. Italy had not been a united country. The great democratic north had been under the enemy until two months ago. Italy had given a great measure of help. It had always been recognized that Italy could not have a completely democratic government until the north was liberated. He had been in agreement with Stalin with respect to holding on to Badoglio longer and had disagreed with the Americans on this. The march of events had carried things in a different way. They had built up considerable sympathy for Italy. There was no censorship there. He had been frequently attacked in Italian newspapers only a few months after Italy had unconditionally surrendered. There was a considerable growth of freedom in Italy. Now that the north was liberated they were going to have democratic elections. He did not see why they could not discuss peace with them. With regard to Rumania and particularly with regard to Bulgaria they knew nothing. Their mission in Bucharest had been penned up with a closeness approaching internment.

STALIN broke in to ask if it were really possible for him to cite such facts that had not been verified.

CHURCHILL said that they knew this by their representatives there. Stalin would be very much astonished to read a long catalog of difficulties encountered by their mission there. An iron fence had come down around them.

STALIN broke in to exclaim, “All fairy tales.”

CHURCHILL said that of course they could call each others statements fairy tales and added that he had complete confidence in his representatives there. He had known Stevenson for many years. The conditions in the British mission there had caused them the greatest distress. It was not for him to make a statement in regard to the experience of the United States. Even their motor cars which circulated within the permitted bounds were followed by other cars which supervised their every movement. There had been complaints from their Soviet friends with regard to the size of their mission which had not been large. The Control Commission which was supposed to consist of three representatives almost always met as two. The Soviet representative sometimes saw the American representative, sometimes the British, but rarely both together. In Italy Soviet representatives were welcomed and many Russians had come.

STALIN broke in to say that this was not the case. The Russians had no rights in Italy. Vyshinski had never been on the Control Commission. He sat on the Advisory Council.

CHURCHILL said that their position was that the Russians were welcome to come to Italy and to go anywhere. The position there was not on the same footing as that in the other satellite states.

THE PRESIDENT said that there had been many difficulties encountered by our mission in Rumania and Bulgaria and that these had caused us much concern. He added, however, that we had no intention to make any reflection upon Stalin or upon his Government at this Conference.

MR. BYRNES said that in the hope of reaching agreement he suggested an amendment which was to substitute the word “recognize” [recognized] for the word “responsible.”

STALIN said this was more acceptable but he would like also that the words suggested by Molotov be added at the end of the amendment proposed by Mr. Byrnes.

MOLOTOV then read his amendment which was as follows: “The three Governments agree to consider each separately in the immediate future the establishment of diplomatic relations with Finland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary.”

CHURCHILL said that this amendment did not reflect what they had been saying.

STALIN rejoined that it was not right to say this. They had decided to prepare peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, and the other satellites. This could not be done if they did not have diplomatic relations.

THE PRESIDENT said he saw no objection to Molotov’s amendment.

STALIN said that in this case they had no objections to the draft as a whole.

CHURCHILL thought this would be covering with words, which would be read by the whole world, a difficulty which had not been removed around the conference table. He thought that the President had said that he would not recognize the present governments of Rumania and Bulgaria.

THE PRESIDENT admitted that this was correct, but said that they were now agreeing only to examine the question.

CHURCHILL said that this in no way removed the disagreement and that it would mislead the public.

STALIN inquired: “Why?”

CHURCHILL replied because the purport of the statement would be that there would be immediate recognition of these governments; whereas, he understood that this was not the position of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments.

STALIN suggested that the President could speak for himself. It had already been accepted by the British and the Council for [of] Foreign Ministers was charged with the preparation of peace treaties with Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland. A peace treaty could be concluded only after recognition; this meant that the question of recognition was on the agenda. If they made no mention of the resumption of diplomatic relations then the paragraph in regard to peace treaties should be left out.

CHURCHILL inquired if the President contemplated that in the autumn the representatives of Rumania and Bulgaria would come to the Council of Foreign Ministers and that they would discuss a peace treaty with representatives of the present governments of those countries.

THE PRESIDENT replied that the only government that could be dealt with was one that they could recognize.

STALIN replied that that was correct.

CHURCHILL said that the present governments would not be recognized and that there could be no peace treaty with them until they were.

STALIN said he did not see how that followed.

CHURCHILL said it should follow.

STALIN replied that it did not. He said that these governments might be recognized or they might not. All of them might be recognized or some of them might be recognized. It should be understood in the following way. A peace treaty with them would be considered when they had been recognized.

CHURCHILL said that anyone reading this paragraph would not realize that the United States, insofar as he had gathered, would not recognize the present governments of Rumania and Bulgaria. If other governments were created which they could recognize, then they would take up the preparation of the peace treaties. He was sorry to press on these points but this document would be published and this must be explained. They would have to say that they would make treaties with governments which they recognized, but that they did not intend to recognize these governments. That was almost meaningless.

THE PRESIDENT proposed to refer the question to the Foreign Ministers again.

STALIN remarked that Churchill was not right. There was no reference to the conclusion of the peace treaties, but only to their preparation. Peace treaties could be prepared even if governments were not recognized.

CHURCHILL replied that of course they could prepare them by themselves. He referred then to the word “with” in the second line of paragraph three. Suppose they substituted the word “for.”

STALIN said that he had “for” in his text. That was what was meant.

CHURCHILL expressed his thanks and agreed that it be sent to the Foreign Ministers to be looked at again.

This was agreed.

Question of the Black Sea Straits

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that he had circulated a paper on in-land waterways and inquired if it had been considered.

STALIN pointed out that this paper did not deal with the question of Turkey and the Straits but dealt with the Danube and the Rhine. The Soviet Delegation would like to receive a reply to their proposal in regard to the Black Sea Straits.

THE PRESIDENT replied that he wished the two questions to be considered together.

STALIN said he was afraid they would not be able to reach an agree-ment in regard to the Straits, since their views differed so widely. He said that perhaps they should postpone the question and take up the next question.

CHURCHILL said he understood that it was agreed that freedom in the Black Sea Straits should be approved and guaranteed by the Big Three and other powers and that the United States would come into that kind of an organization and said that to his mind this was a remarkable and important fact.

THE PRESIDENT said that the Prime Minister had clearly stated the position of the United States.

CHURCHILL pointed out that this was a big step.

STALIN said that this was correct with respect to freedom of passage for the British were in favor of freedom for all traffic.

CHURCHILL said that they hoped that the guarantee proposed would be more than a substitute for the fortification of the Straits.

MOLOTOV inquired if the Suez Canal were under the same principle.

CHURCHILL rejoined that it was open in war and peace to all.

MOLOTOV inquired if it were under the same international control as was proposed for the Black Sea Straits.

CHURCHILL said that this question had not been raised.

MOLOTOV said that he was asking. If it was such a good rule why not apply it to the Suez.

CHURCHILL said that they had an arrangement with which they were satisfied and that this arrangement had operated for some seventy years with no complaints.

MOLOTOV said there had been a lot of complaints. They should ask Egypt.

EDEN said that Egypt had signed the treaty with them.

MOLOTOV said that the British asserted that international control was better.

CHURCHILL said that their suggestion had been made to meet the Russian position that Russia should be able to move freely in and out of the Black Sea and that they were prepared to join in a guarantee with other nations and were prepared to press It upon Turkey. Was it to be supposed that Turkey would resist when the three Great Powers agreed and took an interest in the matter. Freedom could be attained in this way and without trouble for Turkey. He quite agreed that the question must be put off, but he hoped that the tremendous fact that they had heard at this meeting should not be underestimated by their Russian friends.

THE PRESIDENT said he wished to make clear his understanding of an international guarantee of the freedom of the Straits; it meant that any nation had free ingress for any purpose whatever. He did not contemplate any fortifications of any kind.

CHURCHILL said he fully sympathized and agreed with Stalin that a great power, such as the Soviet Union, must not have to go to a smaller power, like Turkey, hat in hand, any time it wanted to send ships through the Straits, only because Turkey said she had fears of war. He did not oppose Stalin’s complaint in this respect.

STALIN pointed out that this question had been raised at the Conference by Great Britain. It was evident that they differed in their views. They had many more urgent questions before them and this one could be put off.

CHURCHILL said the question had been brought up following all their conversations with the Russians regarding the Soviet wish to change the Montreux Convention, which position they were prepared to support.

STALIN said the question was not yet ripe. Some talks with the Turks should take place.

CHURCHILL inquired “With Turkey by whom?”

STALIN replied that the Russians had interrupted their conversations with the Turks, but only temporarily. The United States could talk with Turkey as well as Great Britain. He was not certain whether Turkey would be prepared to agree to international control.

CHURCHILL said it was more likely that they would agree to this than to the construction of big fortifications in the Straits.

STALIN replied that this might be, he did not know.

THE PRESIDENT drew attention to the word “control.” If the Straits were free there would be no control. He said that we would endeavor to make Turkey see our point of view.

STALIN then proposed that each of them work on the matter.

Preparation of the Communiqué

THE PRESIDENT pointed out that the Conference would have to be wound up in not more than a week or ten days and that a communiqué would have to be prepared. He proposed that a committee be appointed to start working on it and suggested that the Foreign Ministers make a proposal to them the next day.

STALIN inquired if they were to meet the next day.

THE PRESIDENT said he was anxious to do as much work as possible because when there was nothing more upon which they could agree he was returning home. He had much business in the City of Washington.

CHURCHILL said that Mr. Attlee and he would have to be back in England on the eighth and that he could not stay longer than the sixth.

Question of Poland’s Western Frontiers

This question was postponed upon the proposal of Mr. Churchill who said he was having talks with the Poles.

Soviet Prisoners of War in a British Prison Camp in Italy

CHURCHILL said the position was the following. It was true that there were 10,000 persons in this camp. It should be remembered that they had just taken one million prisoners. These 10,000 were in the process of being sifted by the Russian Mission at Rome. This Mission had full access to the camps in question. The personnel in these camps was said to be chiefly non-Soviet Ukrainians and to include numbers of Poles who, insofar as they could find out, were domiciled within the 1939 Polish frontiers. Six hundred and sixty-five persons within this camp wanted to return to their native Soviet Union and their return was being arranged. The British would hand over any others who would go without the use of force. The question of how much force would be used must be considered and must be carefully handled. This 10,000 had surrendered almost intact as an enemy division. They had retained the division as organized under their own general for administrative reasons exclusively. They would have been glad if General Golikov had made his complaints to Field Marshal Alexander at his headquarters.

FIELD MARSHAL ALEXANDER said that he would like everyone present to know that he had always given the Russian representatives in Italy complete freedom of movement and assistance to see anything and everything they wished to see at any time. In questions of this sort where they had a great number of Russian soldiers on their hands it was a great help to receive advice from responsible Russian representatives. He hoped that the Generalissimo would agree and that these facilities could continue to be made available.

STALIN said that under the treaty concluded between them they were bound to give each other admission to such camps and not to raise obstacles in the way of returning Soviet nationals to their own country. If Field Marshal Alexander thought this was possible he would be grateful.

CHURCHILL said that if Stalin would send his generals they would examine the situation and see if it could be done.

STALIN replied: “All right.”

Occupation of Vienna

STALIN said he had talked to Marshal Konev and that they were ready to continue to issue rations to all zones in Vienna until such time as the British and Americans found it possible to make some other arrangements.

CHURCHILL said that as soon as they got to Vienna one of the first things they would examine would be the question of the extension of the administrative control of the Renner Government in the American and British zone and that in principle they thought this could be done.

STALIN said that this would be a good thing to do.

THE PRESIDENT remarked that he agreed with the Prime Minister.

Meeting adjourned.

7377

Cohen Notes

Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 5 p.m.

SECRETARY BYRNES reads the report of the Foreign Secretaries.

  1. The economic committee [subcommittee] was not yet ready to report on German reparations. They have not yet reported on reparations for Austria and Italy. The Russian delegation submitted papers on Austria[n] and Italian reparations. These economic matters have been postponed a day. The economic committee will meet tonight.

  2. The United States had submitted a paper on European oil supplies, but action was postponed pending the committee’s report.

  3. Implementation of Yalta Declaration on Europe and satellite states. The subcommittee was not ready to report, and the matter was postponed. The paper proposed eventual admission – Italy and neutrals, excluding Spain – into the United Nations, which was discussed.

    Disagreement of the Foreign Secretaries was to be submitted to the Big Three. Soviets’ objection to the paper was because it omitted reference to Bulgaria, Rumania, Hungary and Finland. Mr. Eden proposed certain changes regarding Italy, and these changes were agreed to. SECRETARY BYRNES proposed a paragraph to include reference to admission of Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland when peace treaties were concluded, with responsible democratic governments of these countries. The Chairman had hoped that this would meet the objection of Mr. Molotov. As MR. MOLOTOV was not satisfied, it was referred to the Big Three.

  4. Rumanian oil equipment. British paper proposing arbitration referred to committee.

Agenda for Big Three meeting to include admission of Italy, neutrals, and satellite countries to United Nations organization, Polish western frontier, and the Straits

BYRNES: The Foreign Secretaries heard representatives of the Polish provisional government this morning. I assume the Foreign Secretaries have each made their own report to the beads of state, but I will give a brief summary, if desired.

The Polish government proposed the Oder and western Neisse, including the city of Stettin as the basis of their western frontier. The principal arguments in support of this thesis were: Poland should be compensated in the west for what was taken from her in the east. The territory proposed in the west comprises one economic unit. Poland will receive less in the west than she lost in the east. The population would be reduced, but would be more homogenous. Only one to one and a half million Germans [were?] left in area, but they would be willing to return to Germany.

This territory would enable Poland to support her population without resort to emigration. This frontier would enable many Poles to return to Germany. It is the shortest possible frontier, and the most easy to defend. Germany had attempted to destroy the Polish population, and it would be an act of historic justice to give this territory to Poland. Poland had ceded territory in the east for world peace. It was right that Germany should also cede territory for this purpose. Territory sought would take away Germany’s war potential in the east. It would leave Poland without a large minority. It would absorb excess urban population in the west, which is not absorbable in old Poland’s industries. It would enable Poles abroad to return. Territory to be taken was one of the bases of Germany’s imperialism.

It would deprive Germany of her profits from the exploitation of this area. If not given this territory, Poland would lose more territory in the war than Germany. A speedy decision was urged so that Poles abroad could return and participate in the reconstruction of Poland.

TRUMAN: The first question before us is the statement on the admission of Italy, neutrals, and other satellites to the United Nations.

BYRNES: The British and American delegations are agreed on the statement.

TRUMAN: What has the Soviet delegation to say?

STALIN: To ease the situation of all satellite countries, all of them should be mentioned on an equal basis. The artificial distinction drawn prompts us to believe that satellites other than Italy are put in a leprous category. Such a distinction tends to discredit the Soviet armies. Italy was the first to surrender, but she did more harm than any other satellite state. There is no doubt that the other satellites did less harm than Italy.

Is the Italian government really more democratic than the governments of Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria and Finland? Is it more responsible? No elections have been held in Italy. It is not clear to me that the benevolent attitude towards Italy has been shown to the other satellites. Italy’s position has been eased by the renewal of diplomatic relations. Now a second step is proposed. Yes, let us take the second step towards Italy. But let us also take the first step towards the other satellites. That would be just. You can renew diplomatic relations with the other satellites and then you can make a peace treaty with Italy first.

CHURCHILL: We are in general agreement with the United States. Our point of view is divergent only with reference to these other satellites. We have been unable to get information, or to have free access to the satellite states. As soon as we have proper access to them, and proper governments are set up, we will recognize them – not sooner. The language is the same in the proposed document regarding Finland, and the southeastern European satellite states, as it is regarding Italy.

STALIN: But you have recognized Italy.

TRUMAN: The other satellite states will be recognized when they meet the same conditions as Italy has met.

STALIN: No one of these governments can prevent access to information to the Allied governments. There were restrictions on the Soviet government’s representatives in Italy.

TRUMAN: We are asking reorganization of these governments along democratic lines.

STALIN: The other satellites have democratic governments closer to the people than does Italy.

TRUMAN: I have made clear we will not recognize these governments until they are reorganized.

MOLOTOV: It was my suggestion that the satellites other than Italy be put on the same basis, including diplomatic recognition.

BYRNES: May I ask whether the Marshal has had translated the paper that has been circulating?

MOLOTOV: We have an amendment concerning the small satellites.

BYRNES: We submitted the whole paper in amended form. I should like it translated and read to the Marshal. It is an effort to treat Italy and the other satellites on the same basis, and to find a vehicle to condemn Franco’s Spain.

STALIN: The reference to “responsible and democratic government” should be deleted.

TRUMAN: We cannot make peace with them until we recognize them.

MOLOTOV: Reference to responsible democratic governments discredits the satellite governments. There should also be a reference to the recognition of these governments. My proposal is to add words that each of the governments will consider the resumption of diplomatic relations.

CHURCHILL: We do not want to use words to slur these governments. I would like to put in a word for Italy. It is not that she was the first out of the war, but two years have passed since she got out of the war. The other countries are out of the war only a few months. Our mission in Bucharest has been practically confined. I am sure the Marshal would be amazed to read the long list of incidents which have occurred.

STALIN: They are all fairy tale[s].

CHURCHILL: Statesmen may call one another’s statements fairy tales, if they wish.

STALIN: The same condition prevails in Italy.

CHURCHILL: That is not accurate. You can go where you like in Italy.

TRUMAN: Our missions have encountered great difficulties in the satellite states.

BYRNES: I suggest that we use the term recognize[d] democratic governments in the proposed statement, in lieu of responsible democratic governments.

STALIN: That is more acceptable, but I should also like that the amendment added by Mr. Molotov be put at the end; that is, add to the Byrnes paragraph on satellites a provision that the three governments will consider each separately in the near future, the question of the establishment of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria, Rumania, Finland and Hungary. This does not run counter to what has been said. Treaties cannot be concluded until countries are recognized.

CHURCHILL: This gives the impression that we were considering recognizing the present governments. That is not the position of the President, nor is it ours.

TRUMAN: May I suggest that we again refer the matter to the Foreign Ministers?

STALIN: Mr. Churchill is not right. Peace treaties can be prepared even though governments are not recognized.

CHURCHILL: Then we should provide for the conclusion of treaties for not with these countries.

STALIN: That will be more satisfactory.

CHURCHILL: Thank you, Marshal.

STALIN: Don’t mention it.

CHURCHILL: It would be a good thing for the Foreign Secretaries to have another look at the wording.

TRUMAN: We may now discuss the problem of the Straits. I circulated a paper on this.

STALIN: The paper put in by President Truman refers to the Danube and the Rhine, and not the Straits. We would like a reply to our statement on the Straits, and a base.

TRUMAN: I should like to consider them together.

STALIN: I am afraid we won’t reach an agreement on the Straits. Our ideas differ widely. Perhaps we can pass over this point now.

CHURCHILL: I think that the freedom of the Straits in war and in peace, for war and merchant vessel[s], should be guaranteed by the three great powers. That is a proposal worthy of discussion.

STALIN: We are also for the freedom of all traffic.

CHURCHILL: We should think that an international guaranty would be more than the equivalent of a base.

STALIN: What will be done about the Suez Canal?

CHURCHILL: It will be open.

STALIN: What about international control?

CHURCHILL: That question has not been raised.

STALIN: I am raising it.

CHURCHILL: We have an agreement, with which we are satisfied. There have been no complaints.

STALIN: Egypt should be consulted.

CHURCHILL: We have a treaty.

STALIN: You suggest that international control is preferable. We want a treaty with Turkey.

CHURCHILL: We should be prepared to press on Turkey the acceptance of this idea, which will give the Soviets a guarantee of freedom for their traffic. I quite agree that this must be put off, but I hope that the proposal put forth at this table, which gives the Soviets absolute security, will not be underrated by the Marshal.

TRUMAN: I want to make it clear that this guarantee is for freedom of traffic for all of us, without any fortifications by anyone.

CHURCHILL: I fully sympathize and agree with the Marshal that he should not have to go cap in hand to a smaller power like Turkey every time he wants to send a ship through the Straits.

STALIN: This question was brought up for discussion by Great Britain. It becomes evident that we differ in our views. We have more urgent questions than the Straits, so this question can be passed.

CHURCHILL: It was brought up by Great Britain because the Marshal indicated he wanted a revision of the Montreux Convention.

STALIN: The question is not ripe for discussion. There must be further talks with the Turks.

TRUMAN: I have made my position clear.

STALIN: The United States and the British can talk to Turkey as well as we. I am not sure that Turkey will agree to international control.

TRUMAN: Control by international guarantee that the Straits are open, means freedom of traffic, and no control. We shall endeavor to make Turkey see our point of view.

I have a suggestion. I hope we can wind up the conference in a week or ten days. I think a committee should be appointed to work on a communiqué so that everything will not have to be done at once. I hope the Foreign Secretaries will report to us on this tomorrow.

STALIN: Do we meet at eleven tomorrow?

EDEN: We had doubt[s] whether there would be enough on the agenda for the Big Three for tomorrow, but as today’s agenda is not completed, you can meet.

TRUMAN: As soon as we can finish, I must be back in Washington. Let us meet tomorrow.

STALIN: There is the Polish frontier to discuss.

CHURCHILL: Field Marshal Alexander is waiting.

TRUMAN: Shall we talk about Poland?

STALIN: Have we time to discuss it?

CHURCHILL: I am having a talk with Bierut in the morning. We can postpone it.

TRUMAN: Bring in Marshal Alexander then.

CHURCHILL: In a few words, following is our position about the Soviet war prisoners in Italy, about which the Soviets have asked information.

The Soviets have full access to the camp in question. These prisoners are said to be mainly non-Soviet Ukrainians, and they include Poles not domiciled within the 1939 Russian boundaries, and those who wish to return to Russia may go. We will hand over the others who will go, without the use of force. This body of about 10 thousand personnel surrendered almost intact as a Polish division. We would have been glad if the commanding general had made his complaint direct to Field Marshal Alexander.

ALEXANDER: I have nothing to add to the Prime Minister’s statement. I should like everyone here to know the following: I have always given Russian representatives in Italy freedom of movement to see anything at any time. I think this is a good thing to do, when we have Russian soldiers to look after in our camps. I hope that the Generalissimus will enable me to give the fullest facilities to his representatives.

STALIN: Under our treaty, we must both grant each other admission, and not raise obstacles to the return of men to their own country. I will be grateful if Field Marshal Alexander would so arrange.

CHURCHILL: Will the Generalissimus send his representatives to investigate?

STALIN: I have already talked to Marshal [Konev]. I will give you time to work this out.

CHURCHILL: There was also the question of giving the Renner government civilian administrative authority in all zones. This is one of the first questions which we will tackle when we get into Vienna. We agree that in principle this is desirable.

TRUMAN: I agree with the Prime Minister.

7378

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 5:30 p.m.

CCS 200th Meeting

Present
United States United Kingdom
General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke
Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
General of the Army Arnold Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Somervell Admiral Mountbatten
Lieutenant General Hull Field Marshal Wilson
Vice Admiral Cooke General Ismay
Major General Norstad Lieutenant-General Macready
Captain McDill
Captain Oster
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Major-General Hollis
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones
Lieutenant-Colonel Mallaby

CCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 24, 1945, 5:30 p.m.
Top secret

200th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff took note that this was their 200th Meeting.

Operations in Southeast Asia Command

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would like to extend a welcome to Admiral Mountbatten and take this opportunity of congratulating him personally on the conclusion of his great campaign in Burma.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN thanked the United States Chiefs of Staff and then proceeded to give an account of past, present, and future operations in his command.

In recounting the broad tale of events in Southeast Asia from the SEXTANT Conference in 1943 to the capture of Rangoon in May, 1945, he emphasized two points of importance:

a. Air transport was the lifeblood of all operations in his command. They had saved the day when things looked black in the spring of 1944 and had enabled him to complete successfully the great overland campaign to recapture Burma which had previously been thought impracticable. The Dakota was far and away the best transport aircraft for his purposes.

b. The tremendous steps in the reduction of casualties made possible by preventive medicine.

In describing the current situation in Burma, ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN explained that:
a. He had some 56,000 Japs still to destroy. At the moment seven divisions were employed on the job, three of which would soon be withdrawn to take part in forthcoming operations. Considerable fighting was still going on.

b. He had a big problem in getting supplies through to the native population in the face of one of the worst monsoons in history. He was being forced to use some air transport for this as well as for the maintenance of the troops.

c. His air transport squadrons were some 20 percent under strength.

As regards future operations, the Supreme Commander paid tribute to the immense effort being put forward by the India Command to organize India as a base for these operations which were the largest that had ever been undertaken from the country. He drew a picture of the problem of mounting operation ZIPPER; the vast distances over which the forces would have to converge on the objective; the fact that they would have to rely on carrier-borne air support for the landing; and the degree of opposition they were likely to meet. Risks were involved but these were calculated risks which he was prepared to accept.

Finally, he paid tribute to the morale of the troops and the high degree of inter-Allied cooperation that had been built up in the past two years. This spirit, he felt, would carry the command through forthcoming operations in spite of the disappointments inevitably involved in the acceptance of a second priority in the war as a whole.

SIR ALAN BROOKE then invited the United States Chiefs of Staff to put any questions they would like to Admiral Mountbatten, observing that the British Chiefs of Staff would have the opportunity at subsequent discussions in London.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that it might be possible to use more submarines to prevent the infiltration into Malaya of further Japanese reinforcements.

SIR ANDREW CUNNINGHAM said that no specific demand for further submarines for this purpose had been made from the theater and that within reason there was no limitation on the number that might be employed. There were, however, very few worthwhile targets left in the area.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that he felt that the present distribution of submarines, balanced as it was to meet the various tasks to be carried out, was satisfactory.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked the Supreme Commander how soon he thought he would be able to take over the new command, explaining that the United States Chiefs of Staff were very anxious to relieve United States commanders in the Pacific of their responsibilities for the area at the earliest possible moment.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that he had not expected to be called upon to assume these new responsibilities until Mailfist had been completed. He would like a little further time to consider the idea of taking them on earlier, but assured the United States Chiefs of Staff that he would do his best to meet them. When assured by General Marshall that the forces now in the area would be left there, he said that this certainly made things easier. It appeared that the problem would be merely a matter of assuming the higher direction of operations in the area.

GENERAL MARSHALL asked what Admiral Mountbatten thought of the idea of splitting French Indo-China into two and placing the southern half, south of 16° N, in the Southeast Asia Command.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that he had just heard of the proposition and that his first reactions were favorable. He would have liked some latitude in the actual northern limit of the area in case his operations were to develop either to the north or to the south of the degree of latitude suggested, but did not feel very strongly on the point. He thought the French might find the proposition a little less agreeable.

GENERAL MARSHALL explained the background to the French offer of two French divisions for operations in the war against Japan, and said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were agreed that the best place to employ these divisions would probably be in French Indo-China. One of these two divisions had had battle experience and had done well. Both were composed of white men and the French proposal specifically provided that they would arrive with corps-supporting and service units. He asked Admiral Mountbatten’s opinion as to the acceptance of these two divisions in Southeast Asia Command. They could not be moved out for several months and it would probably be the late spring of 1946 before he could expect to get them.

ADMIRAL MOUNTBATTEN said that, subject to the views of the British Chiefs of Staff, he would certainly welcome these two French divisions provided they came with a proper proportion of service and supporting units. The obvious place to employ them would be in French Indo-China where he would be relieved of the necessity of dealing with a problem which could be satisfactorily handled only by Frenchmen.

GENERAL HULL said that General MacArthur had drawn up a list of the supporting and service units which these two divisions would require if they came out to the Pacific, and this list has been communicated to the French. He undertook to provide Admiral Mountbatten with this list.

7379 
761.94/7-2145: Telegram

The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs

Moscow, July 24, 1945 — 5:56 p.m.
[Translation]
Urgent

1441

Re your telegram No. 932

We received this telegram on the 22nd, but your telegram No. 931 did not arrive until today, the 24th. After considering the manner of presenting our proposal, we intend to suggest a meeting with Lozovsky.

7380

Truman-Stalin conversation, 7:30 p.m.

Cecilienhof Palace, Potsdam

Present
United States Soviet Union
President Truman Generalissimo Stalin
Mr. Pavlov

Truman: “On July 24 I casually mentioned to Stalin that we had a new weapon of unusual destructive force. The Russian Premier showed no special interest. All he said was that he was glad to hear it and hoped we would make ‘good use of it against the Japanese.’”

Byrnes: “At the close of the meeting of the Big Three on the afternoon of July 24, the President walked around the large circular table to talk to Stalin. After a brief conversation the President rejoined me and we rode back to the ‘Little White House’ together. He said he had told Stalin that, after long experimentation, we had developed a new bomb far more destructive than any other known bomb, and that we planned to use it very soon unless Japan surrendered. Stalin’s only reply was to say that he was glad to hear of the bomb and he hoped we would use it.”

Leahy: “At the plenary session on July 24, Truman walked around to Stalin and told him quietly that we had developed a powerful weapon, more potent than anything yet seen in war. The President said later that Stalin’s reply indicated no especial interest and that the Generalissimo did not seem to have any conception of what Truman was talking about. It was simply another weapon and he hoped we would use it effectively.”

Churchill: “Next day, July 24, after our plenary meeting had ended and we all got up from the round table and stood about in twos and threes before dispersing, I saw the President go up to Stalin, and the two conversed alone with only their interpreters. I was perhaps five yards away, and I watched with the closest attention the momentous talk. I knew what the President was going to do. What was vital to measure was its effect on Stalin. I can see it all as if it were yesterday. He seemed to be delighted.… As we were waiting for our cars I found myself near Truman. ‘How did it go?’ I asked. ‘He never asked a question,’ he replied.”

7381

Byrnes conversation with members of the Polish Delegation

Present
United States Poland
Secretary Byrnes

Morse-Weston conversation, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Morse Mr. Weston

The principal subject of discussion was the distribution of captured German vessels. In the course of the conversation Morse communicated to Weston a draft memorandum from Land to Clayton on this subject.

7382

Second meeting of the Subcommittee on Implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe, evening

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Mr. Brown Mr. Gromyko

Brown: “There was a conference tonight on freedom of press and movement in liberated areas in Balkans. Gromyko came up with a weasel-worded statement on assuring correspondents the right to report out of these countries. He still insisted on military censorship and admitted this could cover political censorship of certain stories. Would not agree to affirmative declaration against political censorship and freedom of press in these areas. Meeting adjourned with no agreement.”

7383

The Pittsburgh Press (July 24, 1945)

JAP FLEET HIDEOUT RIDDLED
Enemy fliers lash back fiercely

2,000 planes hit foe, including 1,000 Navy craft, 600 Superforts

…