U.S. State Department (July 19, 1945)
871.6363/7-1945: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State
Moscow, July 19, 1945 — midnight
Secret
2634
Letter went forward to Foreign Office in conformity with Department’s 1621, July 16, warning that exclusive Soviet Rumanian trade pact and monopolistic agreements on oil would cause serious concern in United States Government and might compel United States Government to reconsider present favorable oil policy toward USSR. (To Department, repeated Bucharest 94, London 372). Harriman has been informed.
KENNAN
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.
JCS 198th Meeting
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Brigadier General Lincoln | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Brigadier General Esposito | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Captain McDill | |
| General of the Army Arnold | Captain Stroop | |
| General Somervell | Captain Oster | |
| Lieutenant General Hull. | Colonel Peck | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Colonel Dean | |
| Rear Admiral Flanigan | Colonel Donnelly | |
| Major General Gross | Colonel Stone | |
| Major General Deane | Colonel Riggs | |
| Major General Norstad | Colonel Cary | |
| Brigadier General Cabell | Lieutenant Colonel Woodward | |
| Brigadier General Jamison | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Captain Moore |
JCS Minutes
Potsdam, July 19, 1945, 10 a.m.
[Extract]
Top secret
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War (CCS 884, 884/1 and 884/2)
GENERAL HULL said that it was the desire of the British that information be given to the Russians on a combined basis. This had not been the policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Intelligence Committee had prepared an intelligence report on the Japanese situation which had been presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Intelligence Committee had prepared a report which might be given to the Russians. He said that he did not believe that the British would agree to giving the Russians the Combined Intelligence Committee report, but he thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be willing to give the report of the Joint Intelligence Committee to the Russians.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that he thought the British were more concerned in regard to intelligence that might be given the Russians on special projects than in regard to operational intelligence.
GENERAL DEANE said that he believed that the British had two motives in presenting their views: first, to share in the operational running of the war, and second, to exchange information with the Russians on a quid pro quo basis.
He said that he believed that we should give the Russians operational intelligence without reference to the British. He agreed to a certain extent in the exchange of intelligence with the Russians on a quid pro quo basis, but it had been the policy of the Military Mission to Moscow to go further than that and to provide the Russians with information they needed to win the war. He felt that Russian security was entirely adequate and that they would not disclose information furnished them. It was his view that the only relations that the British would have with the Russians in connection with the war in the Far East was in the exchange of intelligence, whereas our interest was operational and much greater than that of the British.
ADMIRAL KING said that he had noted that the British paper on the subject (CCS 884/2) was written before yesterday’s meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and he felt that their motive at that time was to take an equal part with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the operational strategy of the war against Japan. He thought there should be a delimitation between operational intelligence and general intelligence; that we should give the Russians directly such operational intelligence as we considered necessary and that general intelligence should be furnished the Russians on a common basis which would mean a continuation of the present arrangement.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to discuss this subject with the British Chiefs of Staff.
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