Editorial: Our policy toward Hirohito
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Allies in need of anti-Nazis
Group in Germany to play big role in political reeducation of Reich
By Max Werner
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Lawrence: Russians seen in peace role
Molotov’s talk with Jap envoy may foreshadow surrender move
By David Lawrence
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*Mussolini says he erred in 1922, let king remain
Duce believed Fascists were welcome in Rome but after that began complex diarchy
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U.S. State Department (July 18, 1945)
761.94/7-2145: Telegram
The Japanese Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs
Moscow, July 18, 1945 — 11:28 p.m.
[Translation]
very secret
very urgent
1416
Re your telegram No. 913-2
The so-called unconditional surrender or peace obtained by some-thing close to unconditional surrender referred to in my telegram No. 1392 and others which I sent from time to time, omits the problem of protecting the fundamental character of our nation. It goes without saying that even in conducting negotiations with the Soviets on the subject of your telegram, the absolute desire on the part of 70 million citizens as regards our form of government should be forcefully stressed. Therefore I have already added a statement in the latter portion of my telegram No. 1143, believing that there should be no fear of a misunderstanding arising therefrom on this matter; I mention this only in order to make sure.
If the matter of the preservation of our form of government were already taken care of, whether you call it unconditional surrender or whether you call it something close to this condition, in the final analysis it is a matter of degree. As for us I think it should not be made an absolute condition. Concerning the early portion of the telegram, I would like to express my humble opinion at another time after giving the matter full consideration.
Log of the President’s Trip to the Berlin Conference
Wednesday, July 18:
Sergeant Truman had breakfast with the President this morning.
The President conferred with the Secretary of State and a number of his advisers during the forenoon.
At 1315 the President, accompanied by Mr. Ross, General Vaughan, and Captain Vardaman, left the Little White House by foot for the Prime Minister’s quarters. There the President lunched privately with the Prime Minister while Mr. Ross, General Vaughan, and Captain Vardaman had lunch with Junior Commander Mary Churchill and some, other members of the Prime Minister’s personal staff.
At 1450 the President, together with the Prime Minister and Miss Churchill, left the Prime Minister’s residence and walked down the street to Mr. Eden’s quarters where they met Mr. Eden and Secretary Byrnes. The party then returned to the Prime Minister’s house. The President’s party assembled at the Prime Minister’s and left with him for Generalissimo Stalin’s quarters so that the President could return Marshal Stalin’s earlier call.
At 1500 a pouch with mail for the White House was dispatched to Washington.
1504: The President and his party arrived at the Generalissimo’s quarters. The President was met as he alighted from his car by Mr. Molotov who escorted him and his party inside where Mr. Stalin awaited. Although most of our party had just left the luncheon table, we were ushered to a large dining table where a buffet lunch was served us. After lunch with attending toasts, the President talked briefly with the Generalissimo. Then they posed for still and motion pictures. The President and party left the Generalissimo’s house at 1600 for Cecilienhof. We arrived at the Palace at 1608.
At 1615 the second meeting of the Berlin Conference was convened. The meeting adjourned at 1800, and the President and his party left immediately to return to the Little White House.
1930: Assistant Secretary Clayton, Assistant Secretary Dunn, and Mr. Donald Russell were dinner guests of the President. The U.S. Headquarters, Berlin District, Army Band, under the direction of Warrant Officer Frank J. Rosato, played during the dinner hour…
The Syonan Shimbun (July 19, 1945)
Enemy admits 291 B-29s lost in recent raids on Nippon homeland
Foe air strength being steadily destroyed
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Salzburger Nachrichten (July 19, 1945)
Truman führt den Vorsitz
BERLIN, 18. Juli (PW) – Am Dienstagnachmittag begann in Potsdam die Dreimächte-Konferenz. Folgendes amtliche Kommuniqué wurde ausgegeben:
Die Potsdamer Konferenz der Regierungschefs von Großbritannien, den Vereinigten Staaten und der Sowjetunion nahm heute um 17 Uhr ihren Anfang. Der Präsident der Vereinigten Staaten wurde von den beiden anderen Regierungschefs aufgefordert, den Vorsitz bei den Zusammenkünften der Konferenz zu übernehmen. Es fand ein vorläufiger Meinungsaustausch darüber statt, welche Fragen von den drei Regierungschefs entschieden werden sollen. Ferner wurde beschlossen, dass die drei Außenminister regelmäßig zusammentreffen sollen, um die vorbereitende Tätigkeit der Konferenz durchzuführen.
Churchill lud Präsident Truman zu einem Frühstück in die Villa am See den Wohnsitz des Ministerpräsidenten, ein. In einer der benachbarten Villen empfing der britische Außenminister Anthony Eden den amerikanischen Außenminister James Byrnes als Gast.
L’Aube (July 19, 1945)
Quinze hommes autour d‘une table ronde gardent le secret de leurs entretiens
…et 180 journalistes estiment s’être déplacés pour rien
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L’offensive aéronavale contre le Japon se développe –
« Débarquement en trois phases dès le mois prochain »
…annonce l’amiral Barbey
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Le procès des grands chefs nazis s’ouvrira en septembre, annonce Londres qui précise que Goering, Hess et Ribbentrop seront jugés.
U.S. State Department (July 19, 1945)
871.6363/7-1945: Telegram
The Chargé in the Soviet Union to the Acting Secretary of State
Moscow, July 19, 1945 — midnight
Secret
2634
Letter went forward to Foreign Office in conformity with Department’s 1621, July 16, warning that exclusive Soviet Rumanian trade pact and monopolistic agreements on oil would cause serious concern in United States Government and might compel United States Government to reconsider present favorable oil policy toward USSR. (To Department, repeated Bucharest 94, London 372). Harriman has been informed.
KENNAN
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.
JCS 198th Meeting
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Brigadier General Lincoln | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Brigadier General Esposito | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Captain McDill | |
| General of the Army Arnold | Captain Stroop | |
| General Somervell | Captain Oster | |
| Lieutenant General Hull. | Colonel Peck | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Colonel Dean | |
| Rear Admiral Flanigan | Colonel Donnelly | |
| Major General Gross | Colonel Stone | |
| Major General Deane | Colonel Riggs | |
| Major General Norstad | Colonel Cary | |
| Brigadier General Cabell | Lieutenant Colonel Woodward | |
| Brigadier General Jamison | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Captain Moore |
JCS Minutes
Potsdam, July 19, 1945, 10 a.m.
[Extract]
Top secret
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Information for the Russians Concerning the Japanese War (CCS 884, 884/1 and 884/2)
GENERAL HULL said that it was the desire of the British that information be given to the Russians on a combined basis. This had not been the policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Combined Intelligence Committee had prepared an intelligence report on the Japanese situation which had been presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Intelligence Committee had prepared a report which might be given to the Russians. He said that he did not believe that the British would agree to giving the Russians the Combined Intelligence Committee report, but he thought the Joint Chiefs of Staff would be willing to give the report of the Joint Intelligence Committee to the Russians.
GENERAL MARSHALL said that he thought the British were more concerned in regard to intelligence that might be given the Russians on special projects than in regard to operational intelligence.
GENERAL DEANE said that he believed that the British had two motives in presenting their views: first, to share in the operational running of the war, and second, to exchange information with the Russians on a quid pro quo basis.
He said that he believed that we should give the Russians operational intelligence without reference to the British. He agreed to a certain extent in the exchange of intelligence with the Russians on a quid pro quo basis, but it had been the policy of the Military Mission to Moscow to go further than that and to provide the Russians with information they needed to win the war. He felt that Russian security was entirely adequate and that they would not disclose information furnished them. It was his view that the only relations that the British would have with the Russians in connection with the war in the Far East was in the exchange of intelligence, whereas our interest was operational and much greater than that of the British.
ADMIRAL KING said that he had noted that the British paper on the subject (CCS 884/2) was written before yesterday’s meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and he felt that their motive at that time was to take an equal part with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the operational strategy of the war against Japan. He thought there should be a delimitation between operational intelligence and general intelligence; that we should give the Russians directly such operational intelligence as we considered necessary and that general intelligence should be furnished the Russians on a common basis which would mean a continuation of the present arrangement.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to discuss this subject with the British Chiefs of Staff.
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