America at war! (1941–) – Part 5

6776

La conférence du « blackout »

par Maurice Schumann

…

6777

« Notre action actuelle prélude a l’invasion des grandes iles japonaises »…

…assure l’amiral Nimitz

…

6778

U.S. State Department (July 18, 1945)

860c.00/7-1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in Italy to the Acting Secretary of State

Caserta, July 18, 1945 — 10 a.m.
Secret
2979

War Office informed AFHQ that Daily Telegraph reported extracts from an apparently inflammatory speech on July 11 by General Anders and the Observer of July 15 reported rebuke issued to Anders by SAC. AFHQ was requested to report as War Office “most anxious” to know details.

AFHQ replied that it has no knowledge of any such speech and cited cordial visit Anders to SAC on July 13. No rebuke at this or any other time. Anders issued order of the day on July 6 which not considered inflammatory. Message emphasizes “admirable” attitude Anders has taken under new circumstances. He is now touring Italy addressing all available men stating position in Poland as he knows it, but offers every facility to return with personal guarantee of no victimisation of those who choose to go. War Office further informed that at Anders’ request AFHQ arranging for segregation and return of those who desire to go to Poland.

KIRK

6779

Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.

JCS 197th Meeting

Present
Fleet Admiral Leahy Brigadier General Jamison
General of the Army Marshall Brigadier General Lincoln
Fleet Admiral King Brigadier General Esposito
General of the Army Arnold Captain McDill
General Somervell Captain Stroop
Lieutenant General Hull Captain Oster
Vice Admiral Cooke Colonel Peck
Rear Admiral Flanigan Colonel Dean
Rear Admiral Gardner Colonel Riggs
Major General Gross Colonel Stone
Major General Deane Colonel Donnelly
Major General Norstad Colonel Cary
Brigadier General Cabell Lieutenant Colonel Woodward
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore

JCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 10 a.m.
[Extracts]
Top secret

Memorandum for the President on Unconditional Surrender Formula for Japan (JCS 1275/5)

ADMIRAL LEAHY presented the draft of a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President as prepared by the Secretary and amended by GENERAL ARNOLD.

The memorandum was reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and amended in certain respects.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum for the President as amended during discussion.

Relation Between the Chiefs of Staff of the United States and of the Nations Participating in the War Against Japan (JCS 1423)

ADMIRAL LEAHY said that he had discussed this matter with the President, who considered that it was undesirable to bring up the question of a military alliance with the British at the present time. He considered that our relations with our allies were not sufficiently stabilized to warrant consideration of a permanent relationship between the military commands.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

French and Dutch Participation in the War Against Japan (CCS 842/1)

ADMIRAL KING and GENERAL MARSHALL each proposed changes in the draft memorandum contained in CCS 842/1. These changes were discussed at some length and a draft by GENERAL MARSHALL was modified in accordance with suggestions by ADMIRAL KING.

GENERAL MARSHALL also proposed changes in the draft letter by the British contained in CCS 842. He said that in case the British would not accept the draft proposed by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff could consider the draft by the British as amended by him.

GENERAL MARSHALL’S changes in the proposed draft by the British were reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and changes were made thereto.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the substitute memorandum to the French and Netherlands Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff proposed by GENERAL MARSHALL and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 842/2)

Staff Conversations with Portugal (CCS 462/25)

ADMIRAL LEAHY asked why this matter was being brought up at the present time.

ADMIRAL KING replied that it was because of the negotiations with the Portuguese in regard to Santa Maria which the Portuguese had insisted upon connecting with the question of liberating Timor.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that CCS 462/25 adequately expressed their views.

Disposition of Captured German Passenger Ships (JCS 1405/2)

GENERAL GROSS pointed out that the disposition of captured German passenger ships had already been covered by a memorandum to the President. Since, however, he understood that the British Chiefs of Staff intended to bring this matter up before the Combined Chiefs of Staff, he considered it wise to present a paper to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the subject. He said that the point of issue was that the ships should be allocated in toto to the U.S. lift.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the Enclosure to JCS 1405/2 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently circulated as CCS 679/6)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6780 
740.00119 PW/7-1845

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President

Washington [Babelsberg], 18 July 1945
Top secret

Memorandum for the President

The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the proposed proclamation by the Heads of State dealing with the unconditional surrender formula for Japan as prepared by the State, War and Navy Departments and forwarded to you.

From the military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the proclamation is generally satisfactory. They believe, however, that the wording of the last sentence in the next to the last paragraph might well be clarified. To some of the extreme devotees of the Emperor, the phrase, “This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty,” may be misconstrued as a commitment by the United Nations to depose or execute the present Emperor and install some other member of the Imperial family. To the radical elements in Japan, this phrase may be construed as a commitment to continue the institution of the Emperor and Emperor worship.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff therefore recommend that the next to the last paragraph of the proclamation be changed to read as follows:

The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as our objectives are accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if it be shown to the complete satisfaction of the world that such a government will never again aspire to aggression. Subject to suitable guarantees against further acts of aggression, the Japanese people will be free to choose their own form of government.

Such a statement would involve no commitment by the United Nations to support of any particular form of Japanese government, would enable the United Nations to prevent the establishment of any unacceptable government and would be more likely to appeal to all elements of the Japanese populace.

From a strictly military point of view the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it inadvisable to make any statement or take any action at the present time that would make it difficult or impossible to utilize the authority of the Emperor to direct a surrender of the Japanese forces in the outlying areas as well as in Japan proper.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy

6781

First meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 11 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Dunn Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Clayton Sir William Strang Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Harriman Mr. Ward Mr. Gusev
Mr. Cohen Mr. Sobolev
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Novikov
Mr. Thompson

Thompson Minutes

Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 11 a.m.
Top secret

MR. MOLOTOV proposed that Mr. Byrnes preside at the meeting.

MR. BYRNES said that it had been agreed that they should discuss the creation of the Council of Foreign Ministers. The reasons for creating the Council were set forth in the memorandum which was submitted yesterday. He would like to know the views of the other Foreign Ministers.

MR. MOLOTOV again raised the question of China but said that if the Council was to deal with other than exclusively European affairs the objections to China’s participation would drop.

MR. BYRNES suggested that the Council be composed of five powers but that participation of China be limited to problems concerning the Far East or problems of worldwide significance. He explained that if the war with Japan should end soon they would in this manner have established the organization to deal with the problems of peace in the Far East. The other reason for including China was that China is one of the permanent members of the Security Council.

MR. EDEN said that if they were concerned only with European problems he would prefer four members and that in that case the meetings of the three Foreign Secretaries would merge with the new Council and probably also the European Advisory Commission would disappear and some form of secretariat would have to be set up. He agreed, however, that if the Council’s sphere was to be the world, China should be included.

MR. MOLOTOV proposed that the Council of Foreign Ministers should be established to deal with both European and non-European affairs and should be composed of five members.

MR. EDEN inquired if this meant four members for European affairs.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that so far as Europe was concerned the first task of the Council was to draft treaties of peace with Germany, Italy, Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria. Finland for some reason appeared to be omitted. France did not participate in the armistices with these countries. He had no question about French participation in the discussions relating to the peace with Germany and Italy but he thought that France should be excluded when the peace treaties with the other countries were being considered.

MR. EDEN thought this would be complicated as there would be three members for some purposes, four for some, and five for others.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that this was due to the actual situation.

MR. EDEN thought that the Council would consider day to day problems as well as those of peace in which event it would be well to include France.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that the last wording submitted by the United States delegation referred only to the peace treaties.

MR. BYRNES said that this was done to avoid delay which would occur if the Council were loaded with many diverse problems. He thought, however, that the Council might consider matters referred to it by the respective governments.

MR. EDEN observed that at the Crimea Conference it had been agreed to set up the meetings of the three Foreign Ministers. They had not had a formal meeting although they had an informal meeting in San Francisco. Was the Council to do the work of that body as well as the peace? He thought that it should.

MR. BYRNES said that was also his thought.

MR. MOLOTOV again pointed out that this differed from the American draft although the original draft contemplated broader functions for the Council. He thought it best to be content with the more limited arrangement.

MR. BYRNES said it was true that the earlier draft had been changed. This was done because of fear that pressure for consideration of other questions might delay the work of the Council. He had no objection to including language to provide that it could consider questions referred to it by governments. There was no point in the three Foreign Ministers making a separate trip to meet when they were already meeting in the Council.

MR. MOLOTOV thought it would be well to abide by the later American proposal and it would be possible subsequently to see whether it was advisable to widen the functions of the Council.

MR. EDEN then inquired what would happen to the meeting of the three Foreign Ministers.

MR. MOLOTOV thought this question might receive some consideration. He thought the European Advisory Commission should be terminated and that its members should be thanked.

MR. EDEN then inquired if he understood clearly that the meetings of the three Foreign Ministers would be continued and that the Council would consist of four or five members.

MR. BYRNES replied that the Council would consist of five members and suggested language to provide that China’s participation, so far as European affairs are concerned, should extend only to matters affecting Asiatic interests or of worldwide concern.

MR. MOLOTOV asked if it were settled that Finland should be mentioned.

MR. BYRNES replied that it was.

MR. MOLOTOV then proposed that paragraph 1 of the American draft be amended to provide that the composition of the Council should conform to the character of the matters under discussion.

MR. EDEN preferred to leave paragraph 1 as it was. The Soviet amendment would involve much discussion as to who would be present at each meeting.

MR. MOLOTOV said that while France had perhaps an interest in questions concerning Finland and Rumania, it was not a party to the armistice arrangements concerning those countries.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that the United States had not been at war with Finland and although it would be interested at Council meetings it would not sign any peace treaty with Finland. He assumed that the Council would prepare recommendations to the Governments relating to the terms of peace and in doing so would consider the views of a government which had not been at war. The Council, however, would not be called upon to make recommendations to France in a case where France was not at war.

MR. EDEN thought this would be difficult and pointed out that Vichy had not been at war with these countries whereas the de Gaulle movement was. France had not done much fighting against some of them but also the British had not done much fighting against the Finns because they could not get at them.

MR. MOLOTOV said the point was that France did not participate in the deliberations for an armistice. Of course, France could sign the treaty but the question was who was to make the preparation for it. He said his objections were not directed against France but were based on the fact that France did not participate in the armistice.

MR. EDEN then proposed amending the text to limit membership to those countries who had signed armistice agreements with the countries being considered.

MR. BYRNES agreed and thought that it would be possible to draft language in which all could concur.

MR. EDEN proposed that a drafting committee be set up but he still wished to know what would happen to the meeting of the three Secretaries. They could not keep meeting all the time as they were very busy. He had thought that the Council might have taken over this work.

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that the Council would then have four members. He thought that it should be three and that if necessary they could add some other representatives.

MR. BYRNES said it had been his thought that the meetings of the three would not be affected. They could meet at the same time the Council met. It had been agreed at Yalta that they could discuss anything and he thought that this arrangement was not affected.

MR. EDEN said he would have liked the three to become four but if his colleagues thought otherwise he would have to agree.

MR. MOLOTOV proposed that they begin with three and see what happens. It would be possible to make changes if necessary.

A drafting committee to draw up the text was then appointed consisting of Mr. Dunn, Mr. Cohen, Mr. Vishinsky, Mr. Sobolev, Mr. Ward, and Mr. Dean. The drafting committee reported back later in the meeting and submitted a draft text (Attachment 1, final text).

Germany

MR. BYRNES suggested that the Foreign Ministers now discuss the question of the authority of the Control Council in political questions.

MR. MOLOTOV interposed that it would be desirable to discuss the disposition of the German fleet and merchant ships.

MR. BYRNES replied that he would prefer to begin with the discussion of the topic which he had suggested. He doubted if the Big Three could or should enter this afternoon into a discussion of the difficult and complicated mass of economic problems having to do with Germany. He suggested therefore that insofar as these problems were concerned the Foreign Ministers might appoint a subcommittee consisting of one or two representatives from their staffs which would examine these questions in the first instance and present to the Foreign Ministers those problems, one or two at a time, on which the subcommittee was unable to reach agreement. Such questions might be, for example, the relationship of restitution and war booty to the payment of essential imports or the application of the reparations program to the entire territory of Germany as it existed in 1937.

MR. EDEN inquired whether the Big Three should discuss any of these questions this afternoon.

MR. BYRNES replied that for this afternoon he suggested that they discuss only the authority of the Control Council in political questions. As to the authority of the Council in economic questions he thought that they might follow the procedure he had suggested under which the subcommittee of experts would present to the Foreign Ministers problems on which the subcommittee disagreed, and the Foreign Ministers would determine which of these problems should be recommended to the Big Three for discussion and decision.

MR. MOLOTOV remarked that the agenda for this afternoon’s meeting would therefore be:

  • Topic 1 – Procedures for the peace settlements;
  • Topic 2 – The political authority of the Control Council; and
  • Topic 3 – The appointment of the subcommittee to deal with German economic questions.

MR. BYRNES replied that the Foreign Ministers themselves might well appoint this subcommittee, leaving therefore only two questions for discussion by the Big Three this afternoon.

MR. MOLOTOV reverted to his suggestion in regard to the disposition of the German fleet and merchant ships. He thought that the Big Three might well discuss more than three questions at this afternoon’s meeting. He added that the Polish question might also be considered.

MR. EDEN remarked that the disposition of the German fleet is really the simplest of all the questions before the house and might well be held until another meeting. He promised that the fleet would not be sunk in the meantime.

MR. MOLOTOV declared that he did not insist that this matter be settled today. He thought it should be dealt with rapidly. He pointed out that it is a question which is of a special interest [of especial interest?] to countries which have lost most of their fleet.

Poland

MR. BYRNES said that he agreed that the Big Three might well discuss the question of the liquidation of the London Polish Government.

MR. MOLOTOV added that this would include the discussion of all the problems related to the liquidation of that government.

MR. EDEN pointed out that this is only part of the Polish question and that there should also be discussed the matter of the implementation of the Yalta agreement on Poland, particularly the prompt holding of free and unfettered elections.

MR. BYRNES replied that all aspects of the Polish question should be discussed and there was general agreement on this point.

German Economic Problems

MR. BYRNES returned to his suggestion of the appointment of a subcommittee to deal with German economic problems. He expressed the view that this subcommittee should deal with all German economic matters, including reparations.

MR. MOLOTOV and MR. EDEN agreed.

Agenda for Big Three Meeting

It was thereupon agreed that the agenda for this afternoon’s meeting of the Big Three should consist of three items:

  1. The procedures for peace negotiations and territorial settlements;

  2. The political authority of the Control Council for Germany;

  3. The Polish question, with particular reference to the liquidation of the London government, and the implementation of the Yalta agreement.

German Fleet

MR. MOLOTOV mentioned once again the disposition of the German fleet and merchant marine.

It was agreed at MR. EDEN’S suggestion that the Foreign Ministers would take up this subject soon but that they would not do so today.

Chairmanship of Foreign Ministers Meetings

It was agreed that the Chairmanship of the meetings would rotate and that the chairman of the day would act as rapporteur to the heads of governments.

Political Authority of the Control Council for Germany

MR. MOLOTOV declared that he had no objection to the placing of this subject on the agenda but that he had a number of questions in regard to the U.S. draft which had been circulated yesterday. As to paragraph (1) in regard to the authority of the Control Council, he felt that this matter had been decided upon in the EAC. If there were no changes of substance, he inquired why it was necessary to make any change in the language approved by the EAC.

MR. BYRNES replied that there were no changes of substance or no intention to make any material change in the decisions reached by the EAC.

MR. MOLOTOV said that the language seemed to be slightly different in its shades of meaning and he asked whether it was intended to strengthen the aspect of centralization as compared to the aspect of the zonal administration.

MR. BYRNES replied that there was no intention to change the relationship between the zones and the Control Council.

MR. MOLOTOV said that if there was no intention to change, a drafting subcommittee could easily reconcile the language, and this suggestion was approved.

MR. MOLOTOV then referred to 2(i)(a). He pointed out that prisoners of war cannot be said to be demobilized and inquired whether there was any intention by this paragraph to change the status of prisoners of war.

MR. BYRNES replied that there was no such intention.

It was agreed that the drafting subcommittee could deal with the language on this point.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he had an amendment to propose on paragraph 2(i)(b) but that he would not go into the details of this at this time.

MR. MOLOTOV proposed the following new wording for paragraph 3:

In addition to measures already adopted all Fascist law, as well as all Fascist decrees, orders, instruments should be abolished as directed against democratic liberties, civil rights, and the interests of the German nation. Discrimination on grounds of race, creed or political opinion established by Nazi law should be liquidated. No such discrimination, whether legal, administrative or otherwise, shall be tolerated.

MR. BYRNES replied that this suggestion seemed to him at first glance to be satisfactory but that the drafting committee could work out the language.

MR. EDEN pointed out that the British delegation had a number of small drafting points which they would turn over to the drafting committee.

MR. MOLOTOV then suggested that the language of the last sentence [of] paragraph 5 should be eliminated in order to remove any possible loopholes for the retention of Nazis in office.

MR. EDEN said he had thought the sentence referred only to non-Nazis.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that it might refer to those who had been only nominal participants in the Nazi party or who had been members of the party under duress. He thought that in some cases it might be useful to use persons of this type in public administration but he suggested, in order to make the point perfectly clear, the insertion of the word “other” before the word “Germans” in this sentence.

MR. MOLOTOV stated that he preferred to drop the sentence altogether, and MR. BYRNES said that he would have no objection.

MR. EDEN felt that there should be somewhere in the document the concept of an official holding office only subject to good behavior.

MR. MOLOTOV replied that he felt that this went without saying.

MR. BYRNES said that he was inclined to feel that there should be an indication of this kind in the document but that he would agree either to placing it at some other point or dropping it altogether.

MR. MOLOTOV urged that it be dropped altogether.

MR. MOLOTOV then referred to paragraph 7(i). He inquired whether it is not too soon to start holding elections.

MR. BYRNES replied that the objective, i.e., decentralization of the political structure and development of local responsibility, is stated in the introduction to the paragraph and that the Control Commission will decide when it is appropriate to hold elections. He referred to paragraph 7(iii), which states that elective principles shall be introduced into the higher political units as soon as the results of local self-government seem to warrant.

MR. MOLOTOV still felt that elections at this time would be premature.

MR. BYRNES replied that if they are premature, they will not be held, and the matter is within the discretion of the Control Commission.

MR. EDEN expressed the view that all would agree that elections at this moment are premature but that they should be held whenever possible. He felt that a reservation of the same character as that in 7(iii) should be introduced into 7(i).

MR. BYRNES agreed that this would be acceptable, pointing out that the essential is that the Germans should bear as much responsibility as possible for the carrying on of local affairs.

MR. MOLOTOV suggested the following redraft of paragraph 7(i): “Local self-government shall be restored all over Germany on democratic principles with due regard for safeguarding military and state security.”

MR. MOLOTOV pointed out that this language contained no reference to elections. He felt that this should be left to the discretion of the occupying powers. There should be a general tendency in this direction but we should be cautious in proceeding with it. He felt the U.S. language to be too categorical.

MR. BYRNES said that he had no objection to qualifying 7(i) in the same way as 7(iii) but that he felt any reservation in regard to elections to be not strictly applicable since it is recognized the world over that elections are the proper means of having democratic governments.

MR. EDEN suggested adding to 7(i) the words “at the discretion of the Control Council.”

MR. BYRNES agreed, but MR. MOLOTOV felt the question should be further discussed.

As to paragraph 7(iv) MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether the prohibition on the establishment of a central German political government implied the establishment of some other form of government.

MR. BYRNES agreed that the word might well be stricken since any form of government is in fact political.

MR. MOLOTOV inquired whether some form of central economic administration is intended.

MR. BYRNES replied that he assumed that some central administration for such matters as currency and transport would be necessary.

MR. MOLOTOV concluded that he had some further additions to suggest but felt that they could be dealt with by the drafting subcommittee.

MR. EDEN then suggested that in paragraph 8 after the words “shall be permitted” there be added the words “and any existing instructions will be progressively relaxed.” It seemed to him that it would be undesirable to give Germany freedom of the press all at once.

MR. BYRNES pointed out that under the terms of the paragraph freedom of the press would be subject to military security and inquired as to what other reasons [existed why] this freedom should be limited.

MR. EDEN took the position that the matter should be clarified, pointing out that we would not allow the press to start preaching Nazi doctrine or attacking Allied governments.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he also had an amendment on this paragraph but would refer it to the drafting subcommittee.

MR. BYRNES, returning to paragraph 7(i) took the view that we would wish to consider this language very carefully. If in the U.S. zone we thought that a given community was ready to hold elections, to make this decision subject to the authority of the Control Council might be too restrictive.

MR. EDEN expressed the view that insofar as possible we should attempt to follow the same policy in all zones. He felt that it would be a pity if some held elections while others did not.

MR. BYRNES replied that conditions might warrant elections in one place but not in another.

MR. EDEN felt that in that case the four governments as represented in the Control Commission should decide where elections were warranted.

MR. BYRNES stated that we would be inclined to accept the British judgment as to whether elections were appropriate in a given community in the British zone and that no administering authority should be precluded from starting the democratic processes if it thought the communities in question were ready. He agreed, however, that the drafting subcommittee should work out appropriate language.

MR. EDEN expressed doubt as to whether the drafting subcommittee could revise this document in time for consideration by the Big Three this afternoon. He thought, however, the Big Three might discuss the subject in general terms even though the draft of the text had not been completed.

MR. BYRNES agreed and said that he would wish to appoint on the subcommittee dealing with German economic problems Mr. Clayton and Mr. Pauley.

MR. MOLOTOV said that he would appoint Mr. Maiski and Mr. Arutunian.

MR. EDEN said that he would appoint Sir David Waley and Mr. Coulson.

MR. BYRNES then named as American representatives on the subcommittee working on German political questions Mr. Matthews and Mr. Cohen.

MR. EDEN named Sir William Strang and Mr. Harrison.

MR. MOLOTOV designated Mr. Vyshinski and Mr. Semenov.

The Foreign Ministers then returned to the discussion of the question of the Council of Foreign Ministers, the subcommittee appointed for this purpose having completed its proposed draft.

MR. MOLOTOV proposed that their draft be adopted although he still wished to consider the advisability of clarifying paragraph 1 of the American draft. MR. MOLOTOV proposed and was supported by MR. EDEN and MR. BYRNES that the words “each of” be amended in the text submitted by the drafting committee. This was agreed to.

MR. BYRNES said that he thought that if each of the five Governments wished that the Council should consider a subject other than the question of peace they should be free to do so and he proposed that the sentence covering this point be included.

MR. MOLOTOV thought that if the five were agreed this could of course be done but it would be better to omit much of it in order not to divert attention from the main task.

MR. BYRNES thought that the five Governments would refer only important questions to the Council and that it would be for the Council to determine the order in which they would be considered.

MR. MOLOTOV agreed to this and said that it should be placed on record that the European Advisory Commission had finished its task.

MR. EDEN suggested that it should be stated that the Control Commission would take over the remaining task of the EAC. He pointed out, however, that it would be necessary to have the agreement of the French.

MR. BYRNES said that the decision could be expressed in this way.

Italy

MR. BYRNES observed that the President had yesterday raised the question of Italy becoming a member of the United Nations Organization and he wondered if it would not be possible to decide this matter.

MR. MOLOTOV thought that this question should wait for a day or two as they had not had time to study it.

The meeting adjourned.

6782

Rapporteur’s Report of the Meeting of Foreign Ministers

Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 11 a.m.

The Foreign Ministers agreed that they would recommend to the Heads of Governments that the subjects for discussion at the meeting this afternoon, July 18th, should be the following:

  1. The question of procedure and machinery for peace negotiations and territorial settlements.

  2. The question of the authority of the Control Council for Germany in political questions.

  3. The Polish question, particularly the problems having to do with the liquidation of the former London Polish Government and with the implementation of the Yalta Agreement on Poland.

I. Procedure for peace settlements

  1. The draft proposal for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers, presented by the United States, was approved in principle.

  2. The following redraft of paragraph 3 of the United States draft was approved:

  1. As its immediate important task, the Council would be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the Terms of Surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned.

Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the States Members thereof.

  1. The Soviet Delegation reserved the right to suggest a change in the first paragraph of the United States draft.

  2. It was agreed that the meetings of the three Foreign Ministers approved at the Yalta Conference would not be affected by the establishment of the new Council of Foreign Ministers, though they might at times be held simultaneously with meetings of the Council.

  3. It was agreed that the functions of the European Advisory Commission would, after agreement with France, be transferred to the Allied Control Councils (for Germany and Austria).

II. Political authority of the Control Council for Germany

  1. The political section of the proposed agreement, presented by the United States, on the political and economic principles to govern the treatment of Germany in the initial control period was discussed by the Foreign Ministers. A number of amendments were suggested which were referred to a drafting subcommittee named by the Foreign Ministers. The subcommittee has not yet completed its work but the Foreign Ministers agreed that it would be desirable for the Heads of Governments at this afternoon’s meeting to have a preliminary and exploratory discussion of the authority of the Control Council for Germany in political matters.

  2. The Foreign Ministers agreed that the economic questions connected with Germany are of such a difficult nature that they should be referred in the first instance to a subcommittee of experts. This subcommittee will at the earliest possible time report back to the Foreign Ministers those questions upon which the subcommittee is unable to reach agreement. The Foreign Ministers will then determine which of these questions they will recommend that the Heads of Governments will discuss and decide.

  3. The Foreign Ministers agreed that, while they would not discuss today the question of the disposition of the German fleet and merchant ships, they would take up this question at an early date.

III. Polish question

The Foreign Ministers agreed that they would recommend that the Heads of Governments discuss at this afternoon’s meeting the Polish question. They suggested two aspects of this question as requiring consideration: (1) all of the various problems connected with the liquidation of the former London Polish Government; and (2) the questions connected with the continued implementation of the Yalta Declaration on Poland, especially the arrangements for the early holding of free and unfettered elections.

6783 
740.00119 (Potsdam)/7-1845

Report by the Subcommittee on the Council of Foreign Ministers

[Potsdam, July 18, 1945]
Top secret

I. Procedure for Peace Settlements

  1. The draft proposal for the establishment of a Council of Foreign Ministers, presented by the United States, was approved in principle.

  2. The following redraft of paragraph 3 of the United States draft was approved:

  1. As its immediate important task, the Council would be authorized to draw up, with a view to their submission to the United Nations, treaties of peace with Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland, and to propose settlements of territorial questions outstanding on the termination of the war in Europe. The Council shall be utilized for the preparation of a peace settlement for Germany to be accepted by the Government of Germany when a government adequate for the purpose is established.

For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the Members representing those States which were signatory to the Terms of Surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned.

Other matters may from time to time be referred to the Council by agreement between the States Members thereof.

  1. The Soviet Delegation reserved the right to suggest a change in the first paragraph of the United States Draft.

  2. It was agreed that the meetings of the three Foreign Ministers approved at the Yalta Conference would not be affected by the establishment of the new Council of Foreign Ministers, though they might at times be held simultaneously with meetings of the Council.

  3. It was agreed that the functions of the European Advisory Commission would, after agreement with France, be transferred to the Allied Control Councils (for Germany and Austria).

[Annex]

Council of Five Foreign Ministers

Alternative Drafts Considered by Drafting Committees

A. (Accepted by U.S. and British members of Drafting Committee).
For the discharge of each of these tasks the conclusions of the Council will be prepared for submission to the United Nations by those members who represent States which are at war with the enemy State concerned, but other members may be invited to participate in the Council’s discussions.

B. (Proposed by Soviet member of Drafting Committee).
For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned, but other members may be invited to participate in the Council’s discussions.

C. (Possible compromise).
For the discharge of each of these tasks the Council will be composed of the members representing those States which were signatory to the terms of surrender imposed upon the enemy State concerned. For the purposes of the peace settlement for Italy, France shall be regarded as a signatory to the terms of surrender for Italy.

Other members should be invited to participate when matters of interest to them are under discussion.

6784 
881.00/7-1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in Spain to the Acting Secretary of State

Madrid, July 18, 1945 — 1 p.m.
Confidential
1548

British Chargé has been advised by Castillo that Alba was last week instructed to inform British FonOff that Spanish Govt considers that Russia by refusing to associate itself with statutory regime in Tangier forfeited its rights under act of Algeciras and that present Soviet claim to participation is consequently without juridical basis, for which reason Spain cannot consent to such participation. (My 1452 July 5 repeated London 433 Paris 366 Tangier 79) Castillo admitted however Spain could in fact do nothing to prevent Russian participation but stated that should USSR be admitted to Tangier only course open to Spain, in view of large Spanish colony and extensive Spanish interests in that zone (repeated to London as 456 Paris as 398 Tangier as 82), would be to renounce statute and revert to capitulatory regime.

ARMOUR

6785 
865.01/7-1545

Memorandum by the Special Assistant to the Director of European Affairs

Washington, July 18, 1945

Memorandum of Conversation
Participants: Mr. George H. Middleton, Secretary of British Embassy
Mr. Samuel Reber, EUR

Mr. Middleton called this morning at my request to discuss the appended aide-mémoire from the British Embassy concerning the British Government’s objections to any announcement at this time that Italy, in due course, would be admitted to the World Security organization.

As regards the substance of their objection I explained we felt that a simple announcement that in due course the United States would favor Italy’s admission to the World Security organization did not preclude discussions of the proposed peace treaty with Italy along the lines which the British Government had proposed.

After pointing out that in our opinion the tone of the note did not seem calculated to produce the most helpful results, I invited Mr. Middleton’s attention to a telegram from our Embassy at Rome dated July 15th to the effect that the Italian press had published, apparently with the knowledge and consent of the government and the Soviet Embassy, a statement indicating that the Soviet Ambassador had informed the Prime Minister that Russia would be the first to take the initiative at the Potsdam meeting and would unconditionally support the admission of Italy to the United Nations. I said I assumed that in view of the British communication to us they had made a similar one to the Soviet Government which had taken this step without informing either the United States or British Governments. I then explained to Mr. Middleton that should we delay all steps relating to Italy’s future status until after agreement on the peace treaty, many months would have elapsed and conditions in Italy would have deteriorated to a point which we could not now foresee.

Mr. Middleton then said he would communicate the foregoing observations to London and added that whereas he felt the British Government was in general agreement with our aims and future policy toward Italy it did not always agree on the timing of proposed steps and announcements. The British felt the peace treaty should precede any other steps.

S[AMUEL] REBER

6786

The Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Caserta, 18 July 1945
[Paraphrase]
Top secret
urgent

Naf 1042, FX 24640. Cite Fhgct. Sent to the Special Signals Office of the Air Ministry for the British Chiefs of Staff, and to the Adjutant General, War Department, for the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Repeated for information to the Berlin Conference for the personal attention of Field Marshal Alexander.

There follows an outline, for your information, of a report which the Commanding General of the Eighth Army, General McCreery, has made concerning contacts of recent date with Soviet officers.

On July 16, 1945, Eighth Army representatives, accompanied by representatives of France and the United States, held two meetings in Vienna with the Soviet authorities. The British, French, and United States parties left Vienna the following day.

The Soviet authorities refused to discuss such questions as civilian supplies, railways, roads, and signal communications, despite the fact that Marshal Konev, in writing to McCreery, had agreed to hold the meeting and had stated his belief that the meeting could settle many questions. The reaction of the Allied representatives to the uncooperative Soviet attitude forced the referral of the matter by the Soviet representative to Konev, who agreed that a quadripartite discussion, by specialist officers, should take place at once concerning these questions.

The meeting then made good progress on most of the abovementioned subjects. Guarantees were received for telegraph and telephone facilities both (a) between Vienna and the occupation zones and (b) within the city itself. The meeting reached agreement on establishing combined signals and railways boards, which will not function, of course, until we have reached agreement on moving advance parties into Vienna. Agreement was also reached on road communications.

The Soviet authorities claimed that, since the European Advisory Commission agreements have not been approved at the governmental level, they lacked authorization from Moscow to reach any decisions to implement those agreements. Therefore they could not discuss the movement into Vienna of advance parties of the three Allies or the occupation of Styria on the part of the Eighth Army. Unless steps are taken at the highest level to ensure that Moscow sends the necessary instructions to Konev, it is clearly possible for the Soviet authorities to continue to block any move into Styria or Vienna. Our belief is that we can accomplish nothing more through local contacts. We approached the Soviet authorities on July 1 with respect to the occupation of Styria, and we believe that it would be undesirable to run the risk of a third rebuff on the part of the local Soviet commander.

The Chief of Staff to Konev stated that the Marshal would extend invitations to the three Allied commanders for staff meetings, to be followed by a meeting of the commanders, as soon as he had received instructions from Moscow.

ALEXANDER

6787 
740.00119 Control (Hungary)/7-1845: Telegram

The Representative in Hungary to the Acting Secretary of State

Budapest, July 18, 1945 — 12 p.m.
Secret
priority

304

Mytel 291, July 16.

Key has telegraphed War Department reporting substance of discussion at last night’s meeting of ACC which indicates that new procedure more satisfactory to US is actually contemplated and has begun without formal agreement. Key did not press for formalization of new procedure.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Sent to Dept, repeated to USPolAd Frankfort as 8 and to Moscow as 30.

SCHOENFELD

6788 
881.00/7-1845: Telegram

The Representative in the Conversations Concerning Tangier to the Acting Secretary of State

Paris, July 18, 1945 — 1 p.m.
Secret
4310

From Childs.

Meyrier informed British Counselor Holman and me today that he had made an unofficial communication to Soviet Representatives of Embassy yesterday concerning Soviet participation in Tangier conference and had mentioned August 3 as a tentative date for official opening (my 4262, July 16).

At Meyrier’s request Holman agreed to endeavor to obtain acquiescence of British Govt in date proposed as soon as possible. Meyrier stated he wished to open entirely informal conversations with US and British on July 30 to which no publicity of any kind would be given, such informal talks to continue to August 1, inclusive. (Sent Dept 4310; repeated Madrid 272; London 525; Tangier 22)

It appears to me that USSR might legitimately take exception to participation of American Representatives in such informal talks to which Russian Representatives were not also invited. Accordingly, I believe it might be preferable for such informal discussions in advance of conference to be confined to British and French Representatives whose invitations to US and to Soviet Union are based on their original sponsorship of 1923 statute.

Absence of American Representative from preliminary discussions would not preclude our being kept currently informed of developments of those conversations.

6789 
740.00119 EW/7-1845: Telegram

The Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs and the Acting Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy to the Director of the Office of Financial and Development Policy

[Washington,] July 18 [1945]
Secret
us urgent

51

For Collado from Durbrow and Phelps.

If subject matter of Department’s document on “American and Russian Economic Relationship in Countries of Eastern Europe” should come up for discussion Department suggests emphasis on three points not made explicit in recommendations:

  • First. Distinction between property wholly or substantially owned by United States nationals, and lesser property interests, is not to be construed as meaning that payment is not to be made for such lesser interests. While we may not be in a position, on the basis of the interests of American nationals, to oppose removals of property in which those nationals have less than a substantial interest, we should state our position so as to avoid any implicit waiver of right to compensation in any case merely because of degree of interest.

  • Second. Our objection to removals of property wholly or substantially owned by our nationals covers removals either as war booty or for reparation.

  • Third. Our right to compensation for value, regardless of size, of interest in property removed in past or future includes removals both as war booty and for reparation.

6790

Truman-Churchill luncheon meeting, about 1:30 p.m.

23 Ringstrasse, Babelsberg

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Truman Prime Minister Churchill

Churchill describes the luncheon meeting as follows:

“On July 18 I lunched alone with the President, and we touched on many topics. I spoke of the melancholy position of Great Britain, who had spent more than half her foreign investments for the common cause when we were all alone, and now emerged from the war with a great external debt of three thousand million pounds. This had grown up through buying supplies from India, Egypt, and elsewhere, with no Lend-Lease arrangement, and would impose upon us an annual exportation without any compensatory import to nourish the wages fund. He followed this attentively and with sympathy, and declared that the United States owed Great Britain an immense debt for having held the fort at the beginning. ‘If you had gone down like France,’ he said, ‘we might be fighting the Germans on the American coast at the present time. This justifies us in regarding these matters as above the purely financial plane.’ I said I had told the election crowds that we were living to a large extent upon American imported food, for which we could not pay, but we had no intention of being kept by any country, however near to us in friendship. We should have to ask for help to become a going concern again, and until we got our wheels turning properly we could be of little use to world security or any of the high purposes of San Francisco. The President said he would do his very utmost; but of course I knew all the difficulties he might have in his own country.

“I then spoke about Imperial Preference, and explained that it might cause a split in the Conservative Party if it were not wisely handled. I had heard that America was making great reductions in her tariff. The President said it had been reduced by 50 percent, and he now had authority to reduce it by another 50 percent, leaving it at one-quarter of its pre-war height. I replied that this was a great factor, and would have a powerful influence on our Dominions, especially Canada and Australia.

“The President raised the subject of air and communications.1 He had great difficulties to face about airfields in British territory, especially in Africa, which the Americans had built at enormous cost. We ought to meet them on this, and arrange a fair plan for common use. I assured him that if I continued to be responsible I would reopen the question with him personally. It would be a great pity if the Americans got worked up about bases and air traffic and set themselves to make a win of it at all costs. We must come to the best arrangement in our common interest. President Roosevelt knew well that I wished to go much further on this matter of airfields and other bases, and would have liked to have a reciprocal arrangement between our two countries all over the world. Britain was a smaller Power than the United States, but she had much to give. Why should not an American battleship calling at Gibraltar be able to get the torpedoes to fit her tubes and the shells to fit her guns? Why should we not share facilities for defence all over the world? We could add 50 percent to the mobility of the American Fleet.

“Mr. Truman replied that all these sentiments were very near his own heart. Any plan would have to be fitted in, in some way, with the policy of the United Nations. I said that was all right so long as the facilities were shared between Britain and the United States. There was nothing in it if they were made common to everybody. A man might propose marriage to a young lady, but it was not much use if he were told that she would always be a sister to him. I wanted, under whatever form or cloak, a continuation of the existing war-time system of reciprocal facilities between Britain and the United States about bases and fuelling points.

“The President seemed in full accord with this, if it could be presented in a suitable fashion, and did not appear to take crudely the form of a military alliance à deux. These last were not his words, but give the impression I got of his mind. Encouraged by this, I went on with my long-cherished idea of keeping the organisation of the Combined Chiefs of Staff in being, at any rate until the world calmed down after the great storm and until there was a world structure of such proved strength and capacity that we could safely confide ourselves to it.

“The President was replying to this in an encouraging way when we were interrupted by his officers reminding him that he must now start off to see Marshal Stalin. He was good enough to say that this had been the most enjoyable luncheon he had had for many years, and how earnestly he hoped the relations I had had with President Roosevelt would be continued between him and me. He invited personal friendship and comradeship, and used many expressions at intervals in our discussion which I could not easily hear unmoved. I felt that here was a man of exceptional character and ability, with an outlook exactly along the lines of Anglo-American relations as they had developed, simple and direct methods of speech, and a great deal of self-confidence and resolution.”

The following notes by Churchill also relate to the meeting:*

“I said that the Japanese war might end much quicker than had been expected, and that the eighteen months period which we had taken as a working rule required to be reviewed. Also, Stage III might be upon us in a few months, or perhaps even earlier. I imparted to the President the disclosure about the offer from the Mikado, made to me by Marshal Stalin the night before; and I told him he was quite free to talk it over with the Marshal, as I had informed him at the Marshal’s expressed desire.…

“The President also thought the war might come to a speedy end. Here I explained that Marshal Stalin had not wished to transmit this information direct to him for fear he might think the Russians were trying to influence him towards peace. In the same way I would abstain from saying anything which would indicate that we were in any way reluctant to go on with the war against Japan as long as the United States thought fit. However, I dwelt upon the tremendous cost in American life and, to a smaller extent, in British life which would be involved in forcing ‘unconditional surrender’ upon the Japanese. It was for him to consider whether this might not be expressed in some other way, so that we got all the essentials for future peace and security, and yet left the Japanese some show of saving their military honour and some assurance of their national existence, after they had complied with all safeguards necessary for the conqueror. The President countered by saying that he did not think the Japanese had any military honour after Pearl Harbour. I contented myself with saying that at any rate they had something for which they were ready to face certain death in very large numbers, and this might not be so important to us as to them. He then became quite sympathetic, and spoke, as Mr. Stimson had to me two days [one day?] earlier, of the terrible responsibilities that rested upon him in regard to the unlimited effusion of American blood.”

It also seems probable that the following note by Churchill for the British War Cabinet to this meeting:

“The President showed me telegrams about the recent experiment, and asked what I thought should be done about telling the Russians. He seemed determined to do this, but asked about the timing, and said he thought that the end of the Conference would be best. I replied that if he were resolved to tell it might well be better to hang it on the experiment, which was a new fact on which he and we had only just had knowledge. Therefore he would have a good answer to any question, ‘Why did you not tell us this before?’ He seemed impressed with this idea, and will consider it.

“On behalf of His Majesty’s Government I did not resist his proposed disclosure of the simple fact that we have this weapon. He reiterated his resolve at all costs to refuse to divulge any particulars.…”

6791

Byrnes-Eden luncheon meeting, about 1:30 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
Secretary Byrnes Foreign Secretary Eden

While Truman was having luncheon with Churchill, Byrnes was a luncheon guest at Eden’s quarters in Babelsberg. No record of the substance of the conversation at this meeting has been found.

6792 
840.70/7-1845: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom to the Acting Secretary of State

London, July 18, 1945 — 1 p.m.
secret
us urgent

7236

With regard to suggested procedure for reconvening EIT conference given in Department’s 5808, July 14 Ronald has now suggested that matter could be more advantageously taken up in Berlin. FonOff has telegraphed its delegation at Berlin Conference to consult with US delegation and if agreed discuss with Russians problem of reconvening EIT conference as part of larger discussion of Russian copperation in European economic organizations. Ronald stated Weston is in Berlin and would be able to give both delegations technical background information if necessary.

WINANT

6793

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.

CCS 195th Meeting

Present
United States United Kingdom
General of the Army Marshall Field Marshal Brooke
Fleet Admiral King Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal
General of the Army Arnold Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham
General Somervell Field Marshal Wilson
Lieutenant General Hull General Ismay
Vice Admiral Cooke Lieutenant-General Macready
Major General Norstad Major-General Laycock
Captain Oster Major-General Hollis
Captain McDill
Secretariat
Brigadier General McFarland Captain Moore
Brigadier Cornwall-Jones Lieutenant-Colonel Haddon

CCS Minutes

Potsdam, July 18, 1945, 2:30 p.m.
Top secret

Approval of the Minutes of the CCS 194th Meeting

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the CCS 194th Meeting and approved the detailed report of the meeting subject to the substitution in the first paragraph on page 3 of the words “dispatch of a corps commander and staff to the Pacific” for “above” and subject to any-later minor amendments.

French and Dutch Participation in the War Against Japan (CCS 842, 842/1, and 842/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the enclosure to CCS 842/2 and directed the Secretaries to forward it separately to the French and Netherlands Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Staff Conversations With Portugal (CCS 462/25 and 462/26)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office in the Enclosure to CCS 462/25, as amended in CCS 462/26.

Southeast Asia and Southwest Pacific Area (CCS 890/2)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of CCS 890/2.

In regard to paragraph 2, GENERAL MARSHALL asked the British Chiefs of Staff if they would express their reaction to dividing Indo-China into two parts, leaving the northern part in the China Theater.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM pointed out that the line dividing Indo-China would be dependent to some extent on contemplated operations through Thailand.

ADMIRAL KING stated that the division of Indo-China along the latitude of 15 degrees north was an arbitrary division and might be changed to suit contemplated operational requirements.

The British Chiefs of Staff expressed the view that they should like to study the question of the dividing line before making any proposals in regard to the matter.
The proposals contained in paragraph 3 were accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff without discussion.

In the discussion of paragraph 4, SIR ALAN BROOKE explained that the British Chiefs of Staff were in doubt as to the commitment which they would be undertaking if they agreed to the transfer on a particular date. They did not know when the operations in Borneo were scheduled to be completed nor what sort of liability they would be accepting in the form of maintenance and support for those operations.

In reply, GENERAL MARSHALL referred to the United States Chiefs of Staff reply to the questionnaire which the British Chiefs of Staff had submitted (CCS 852 and 852/1), and described the extent to which the United States Chiefs of Staff were proposing to support operations in the new British command. He said that most of the U.S. troops had been withdrawing from the area of the proposed new British command and that no further operations were scheduled in Borneo. He added that in any event there would be no question of “leaving the Borneo operations in the lurch.”

GENERAL MARSHALL then went on to point out that it would be a great advantage to the United States Chiefs of Staff if the transfer of the area to Admiral Mountbatten could take place at an early date. General MacArthur is fully occupied with operations to the northward and it would be a considerable benefit to him if he could be relieved of these responsibilities as soon as possible.

SIR CHARLES PORTAL said that Admiral Mountbatten also was fully occupied in his present and contemplated operations in the Southeast Asia Command, and since General MacArthur was familiar with and is dealing with the Australians at the present, it might be best to continue that procedure until Admiral Mountbatten was in a better position to undertake these new responsibilities.

The British Chiefs of Staff agreed that it was desirable to effect a transfer of command in the Southwest Pacific Area at an early date, but considered that it would be necessary for them to study the matter before a definite time could be agreed upon.

GENERAL MARSHALL suggested that as Admiral Mountbatten was about to visit General MacArthur in Manila, that he and General MacArthur might discuss the timing of the transfer of command.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff:

a. Agreed in principle that that part of the present Southwest Pacific Area lying south of the boundary proposed in paragraph 2 of CCS 852/1, should pass from United States to British command as soon as possible.

b. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would investigate and report to the Combined Chiefs of Staff the earliest possible date on which the transfer of the above area could be effected.

c. Took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would consider where the dividing line might lie in the event that approximately half of French Indo-China should be included in the new British command.

At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff went into closed session.

Command and Control in the War Against Japan (Paragraphs 5 and 6, CCS 890/2)

GENERAL MARSHALL said that he wished to explain the point of view of the United States Chiefs of Staff.

He pointed out that the general concept of operations in the Pacific had been approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and that the control of operational strategy lay with the United States Chiefs of Staff. He recognized that in the past the British Chiefs of Staff had not had all the information that they wanted and assured them that this would be remedied in the future. He felt, however, that the operational strategy in the Pacific must remain the responsibility of the United States Chiefs of Staff. He explained the extensive difficulties in the conduct of the strategy of the Pacific arising from the great distances involved and the enormous land, sea, and air forces employed. He said that the United States Chiefs of Staff felt that they could not, in addition to these problems, shoulder the burden of debating the “pros” and “cons” of operational strategy with the British Chiefs of Staff.

The United States Chiefs of Staff would be glad to give the British Chiefs of Staff timely information of U.S. plans and intentions and to hear their comments. But they felt bound to retain freedom to decide ultimately what should be done. If then the British Chiefs of Staff felt that they could not commit British troops to the operations decided upon, then they would of course be at liberty to withdraw British forces from those operations; but he desired to make it clear that if this were done, it would be necessary for the United States Chiefs of Staff to be given ample warning of British intentions so that plans of United States Chiefs of Staff could be adjusted accordingly.

SIR ALAN BROOKE said that the British Chiefs of Staff had felt that they had been rather left out of the picture but confirmed that the British Chiefs of Staff entirely supported the strategy which the United States Chiefs of Staff had so far developed. For the future, they hoped that they would be consulted on the further development of strategy but had no wish to suggest that they should interfere in any way with the operational strategy.

ADMIRAL CUNNINGHAM asked if the British Chiefs of Staff would be consulted in regard to the strategy that would be adopted in the event of the Russians coming into the war.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that the strategy to be adopted in these circumstances would be considered on a tripartite basis.

ADMIRAL KING said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would consult with the British Chiefs of Staff, of course, but must reserve the final decision to themselves.

GENERAL MARSHALL said that in the event of any disagreement, the British Chiefs of Staff would certainly be given the opportunity of convincing the United States Chiefs of Staff that they were wrong.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that with respect to the strategic control of the war against Japan:

a. The control of operational strategy in the Pacific Theater will remain in the hands of the United States Chiefs of Staff.

b. The United States Chiefs of Staff will provide the British Chiefs of Staff with full and timely information as to their future plans and intentions.

c. The United States Chiefs of Staff will consult the British Chiefs of Staff on matters of general strategy, on the understanding that in the event of disagreement, the final decision on the action to be taken will lie with the United States Chiefs of Staff.

d. In the event the British Chiefs of Staff should decide that they cannot commit British troops in support of a decision made by the United States Chiefs of Staff as indicated in c. above, the British Chiefs of Staff will give to the United States Chiefs of Staff such advance notice of their decision as will permit them to make timely rearrangements.

e. In the event the USSR enters the war against Japan, the strategy to be pursued should be discussed between the parties concerned.

6794

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 889/2

British Participation in the War Against Japan

The following extracts of a message from General MacArthur to the War Department under date of 9 July 1945 concerning British participation in the war against Japan are furnished for the information of the British Chiefs of Staff:

The scope of the British proposal for participation in CORONET presents problems not heretofore encountered when the Canadian and French contingents were considered.

These problems must be viewed in their proper perspective as they relate to the specific operation in contemplation unless complexity, particularly as applies to logistics, and lack of homogeneity of forces destroy combat effectiveness or require a delay in target date.

This operation, as at present visualized, is confined to narrow limits. There will be no opportunity to assign separate sectors of responsibility along national lines.

The assault is to be made into heavily defended areas and calls for the closest coordination of air, naval, and ground forces, and within the ground forces themselves. Acceptance of the British in the assault with the differences in organization, composition, equipment, training procedures, and doctrines will complicate command, operations, and logistic support. Redeployment geared to the support of homogeneous forces and now well advanced, would have to undergo a large-scale readjustment, particularly taking into consideration a parallel line of British logistic channels, including separate bases, storage, issuance and maintenance facilities, and personnel therefor.

British forces participating in operations against Singapore in November could not be prepared for the assault phase in Coronet. It is considered doubtful that these forces could participate even in the follow-up. Certainly, to utilize considerable numbers of troops without adequate opportunity on the part of higher commanders of this area to exercise command functions prior to their use would be a most dangerous expedient.

Moreover, it would be entirely unsatisfactory to have the availability of troops scheduled for Coronet dependent in any way upon their release from another campaign. Availability of these troops as well as all others committed must be certain for a fixed date.

The following general plan is suggested as being one which will obviate the full impact of the objectionable features indicated above.

This plan takes into consideration previous communications relating to the use of Australian forces as well as Canadian forces.

a. Limit British Empire participation to one corps of three divisions; one British, one Canadian, and one Australian.

b. Re-equip British division and corps troops and Australian division with American equipment, logistic support to be provided by the United States on the same scale as provided for our troops.

c. The Australian division to be either the 7th or 9th Division, now concentrated in the Borneo-Morotai area.

d. British division and corps troops to be concentrated by 1st December in the Borneo-Morotai area or, as an alternate, in the United States, if these units can be equipped there.

e. Amphibiously train one British division and one Canadian division prior to arrival in concentration area. The Australian division is already amphibiously trained.

f. Lift this corps on assault shipping to be provided by the British to arrive in the objective area about Y plus 10. It will there be used as the AFPac assault reserve afloat. Canadian division to be lifted directly from the United States, Australian division from the Borneo-Morotai area, and British division and corps troops from either area depending on where it is concentrated.

g. Fight this corps as an integral corps within a United States Army. Utilize divisions separately within American corps if the exigencies of the situation so demand.

I doubt the advisability of employing troops of native origin in this complex operation where homogeneity of language within the corps is required.

Likewise, there is a question of the advisability of utilizing troops of tropical origin in a temperate zone without an extended period of acclimatization. Hence, the acceptance of Indian troops is not concurred in. The British division should be Anglo-Saxon.

The foregoing comments are equally applicable to Allied air components, aggravated by the difficulties of integrating relatively small air forces in tactical operations under the restrictions imposed by a comparatively limited air deployment potential. There are ample American air forces in or projected for this area to support all troops in CORONET operation.

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 842/2

French and Dutch Participation in the War Against Japan

The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff forward the enclosed memorandum to the French and Netherlands Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff in lieu of the memorandum in the Enclosure to CCS 842/1.

[Enclosure]

Top secret
Draft

Memorandum to the French and Netherlands Representatives to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

The Combined Chiefs of Staff have given consideration to the question of French/Netherlands participation in the war against Japan and wish to inform you of their views which are as follows:

a. While it is at present impracticable due chiefly to logistical difficulties for French or Netherlands armed forces to take a major part in the immediate operations in the Far East, the provision of such assistance which may be synchronized with operations will be taken into account by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The use of such forces will depend solely on military considerations. French or Netherlands forces so accepted must operate under the complete control of the commander in chief concerned.

b. In implementing this policy the Combined Chiefs of Staff undertake to give the French/Netherlands representatives timely information of their intentions in respect of any operations that will directly affect French/Netherlands territories or armed forces in the Far East.

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 679/6

Disposition of Captured German Passenger Ships

  1. The United States Chiefs of Staff have indicated in papers of the CCS 679 series an urgent need for 39,000 troop spaces in captured enemy shipping to supplement the trooplift available for carrying out redeployment plans.

  2. Since the publication of CCS 679/1, U.S. requirements for trooplift in the Pacific have materially increased. Deficits now are serious.

  3. Drastic action has been taken to augment United States resources by conversion of cargo ships, increasing air-lift, and curtailing withdrawals of U.S. troops from Europe. In spite of every possible adjustment in United States resources, the trooplift situation in the Pacific will remain serious during the last half of this year.

  4. The Combined Shipping Adjustment Board (CSAB) has had the matter of distribution of captured German shipping under discussion for several weeks. Certain agreements as to manning and operation have been reached, but the United States view that the seven vessels under consideration should be allocated for the carriage of U.S. troops during the current emergency period has been opposed on the British side of the CSAB pending decision by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

  5. The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that in order to meet emergency requirements for the movement of U.S. troops necessary for forthcoming operations, the Combined Chiefs of Staff agree to the allocation for United States purposes, so long as an emergency exists, of the following seven vessels:

Europa, Caribia, Vulcania, Patria, Potsdam, Pretoria and Milwaukee.

  1. Arrangements as to manning, operation, repair and conversion can be determined by the CSAB, and it is understood that the agreement proposed in paragraph 5 above in no way prejudices ultimate disposition of these vessels.
6795

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 890/2

Control and Command in the War Against Japan

  1. The British Chiefs of Staff have considered the memorandum by the United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 890/1) on Control and Command in the War against Japan. They have the following comments to make.

  2. They fully understand that it will ultimately be necessary to obtain the agreement of the Generalissimo to the inclusion of Indo-China in Southeast Asia Command. They are anxious, however, that the United States Chiefs of Staff should support them in recommending to the President and the Prime Minister that they should press the Generalissimo to agree to this transfer. They suggest, therefore, that a recommendation to this effect should be included in the final report of the Terminal Conference.

  3. The British Chiefs of Staff note that the United States Chiefs of Staff consider it necessary to retain control of the Admiralty Islands. They, therefore, withdraw their proposal for the inclusion of these islands in the Australian command. They also agree not to press for the eastward extension of the present boundary of the Southwest Pacific Area until United States activities are cleared from the area. They note that the United States Chiefs of Staff would offer no objection to British operations against Ocean and Nauru Islands.

  4. The British Chiefs of Staff realize the advantages of an early transfer of the Southwest Pacific Area but are up against two difficulties. The first is the fact that Admiral Mountbatten is now fully engaged on planning further operations. The assumption of further responsibilities at this particular stage must inevitably embarrass him. Secondly, we have no idea what degree of assistance the United States Chiefs of Staff are at present providing to the Borneo operations nor when those operations are due to be completed. On present information, therefore, we cannot assess the commitment we should be undertaking if we agree to the transfer on any particular date. We should like, therefore, to discuss this further with the United States Chiefs of Staff.

  5. On the question of the higher strategic control of the war against Japan, the British Chiefs of Staff wish to reiterate and amplify their view that they should now be given a larger share of control of strategy on the lines suggested in CCS 890. They desire to bring to the notice of the United States Chiefs of Staff the following particular considerations:
    a. The United States and Great Britain are the two major powers allied against Japan, and thus jointly responsible for the prosecution of the war. It is most desirable that they should consult freely on all matters of major strategic importance relating to the conduct of the war.

    b. The British Chiefs of Staff have an inescapable responsibility to advise His Majesty’s Government on the use to which British forces are put in all theatres of war.

    c. Although the United States are of course providing the major share, the war against Japan, like that against Germany, is being fought with pooled United States and British resources, particularly shipping. It is right, therefore, that the British should have full understanding and knowledge of the proposed methods of applying these resources.

  6. The British Chiefs of Staff wish to make it clear that the full extent of what they are asking is that they should be consulted on major strategic policy. They have no intention of suggesting interference with the operational control now accorded to General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz in whom they have the utmost confidence.

    The British Chiefs of Staff ask, therefore, that the United States Chiefs of Staff should reconsider their attitude on this question.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 895/1

Participation of Two French Colonial Infantry Divisions in Far Eastern Operations

  1. We have examined the proposals by the United States Chiefs of Staff for the employment of two French colonial infantry divisions in Far Eastern operations, as set out in CCS 895.

  2. In the light of the discussion at CCS 194th Meeting held on 17 July 1945, we suggest it would be preferable for the two French divisions to be employed in due course in French Indo-China.

  3. The question of under whose command this force would operate would, we suggest, be decided in the light of the situation at the time.

Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff

[Babelsberg,] 18 July 1945
Top secret
CCS 462/26

Staff Conversations with Portugal

  1. We have considered the memorandum (CCS 462/25) by the United States Chiefs of Staff and are in general agreement with the draft letter to the Department of State and Foreign Office attached as the Enclosure thereto.

  2. We propose, however, two minor amendments as follows:
    a. In subparagraph b. of the proposed letter, it is stated that “the larger force is acceptable and can be trained in the theater.” The situation in this respect is that the Australian authorities have informed us that they cannot accept any Portuguese force. An inquiry has now been addressed to the Commander in Chief, Ceylon, asking him whether he can accept the Portuguese and, if so, the size of force he can accommodate, pointing out that we prefer the larger force.

No reply has yet been received. We cannot, therefore, be certain which of the two forces we can accept or where the training area will be.

We, therefore, propose that subparagraph b. of the draft letter should read as follows:

As between the two military forces offered by Portugal (a regimental combat team of 4,000 or a battalion combat team of 2,200, both including 400 native troops), the larger force is likely to be the more acceptable. Steps are being taken to allocate a suitable training area.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

  1. Subject to the above amendments, we recommend that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the despatch of the letter to the Department of State and the Foreign Office as proposed in CCS 462/25.