The Combined Bomber Offensive (CCS 166 Series)
Sir Charles Portal explained that his object in raising this question was to find out if the United States Chiefs of Staff had any views on the possible move of the Fifteenth Air Force from the Mediterranean to Western Europe. Such a move, involving some 1,000 heavy bombers, would, of course, have considerable effect on the potentialities in other theaters.
General Kuter explained that CCS 400/2 did in effect give the commander of the United States strategic air forces the right to move such forces within the two theaters. He understood in fact that General Spaatz had been considering the possibility of moving the Fifteenth Air Force to the United Kingdom but had decided against such a course.
General Marshall said that he had directed an examination of the possibility of using the Fifteenth Air Force, or part of it, from southern France, thus avoiding the bad weather over the Po Valley. This proposal, however, had not commended itself to his staffs.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that any large move as between theaters should, he felt, be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff since it had a great effect on the strategy in the theaters concerned. The number of bombers available in Italy, for instance, very materially affected the possibility of withdrawing ground forces from that theater.
General Marshall said that as he remembered it, the agreement with regard to the movement of the Fifteenth Air Force was designed to permit the commander of the strategic air forces the freedom of movement and flexibility to employ his forces temporarily in whichever theater provided the best weather at that time. There was in his mind no question of a permanent move of forces.
Sir Charles Portal said that it had been felt that temporary moves of air units to the United Kingdom was undesirable in view of the difficult weather and the fact that operating out of the United Kingdom was a highly specialized business.
Admiral King said that he considered the permanent allocations of forces to be the function of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. If necessary, the paper under discussion (CCS 400/2) should be modified to bring it into line with this view.
Sir Charles Portal said that he was entirely reassured by General Marshall’s statement with regard to the future of the Fifteenth Air Force.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not at present contemplating the transfer of any formations of the Fifteenth Air Force from the Mediterranean.
Planning Date for the End of the War with Germany (CCS 772)
Sir Alan Brooke presented a memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff dealing with the planning date for the end of the war with Germany (CCS 772). He explained that it had been necessary to estimate such a date or dates in order to provide a basis for production and manpower planning.
General Marshall explained that United States production planning was based on a bracket of the first of July and the 31st of December, 1945.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Deferred action on CCS 772 pending consideration by the United States Chiefs of Staff.
Planning Date for the End of the War with Japan
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Reaffirmed the planning date for the end of the war against Japan as recommended in paragraph 32 of CCS 680/2.
The U-Boat Threat
Sir Andrew Cunningham explained that at present we were in a somewhat similar position to that of 1918. The ASDIC was proving less effective against present U-boat operations in shallow water where the tide affected the efficiency of the ASDIC. The Germans had discovered this and were working their submarines close inshore around the United Kingdom. At present they were operating principally in the Channel, the Irish Sea, and one had even penetrated the entrance to the Clyde. Our aircraft were also hampered by the extremely small target presented by the schnorkel. This relatively small object was normally used only some three feet above the water and ASV aircraft could therefore only detect it in calm weather.
Further, the Germans were fitting a radar device on their schnorkel which enabled them to detect the ASV emissions before the aircraft contacted the schnorkel.
In the last month there had been six sinkings in the Irish Sea, an escort carrier had been torpedoed in the Clyde, and at least four ships sunk in the Channel. He hoped, however, that the position would improve, and, in fact, two submarines had been sunk in the Irish Sea in the last week and a further one south of Land’s End. The object was to force the submarines back into deep water where the ASDIC would be effective, and to achieve this deep mine fields were being laid in order to shut the enemy out of the Irish Sea.
The Chief of the Air Staff explained that from the air point of view new devices were being brought into action, … It must be remembered, however, that with a submerged submarine using her schnorkel, the aircraft, even after it had contacted the submarine, found difficulty in sinking it since it could dive in some three seconds and left no swirl at which to aim.
Sir Andrew Cunningham explained that the Germans were building new types of submarines which were a vast improvement over those which had been used previously. There were two new types: one of 1600 tons with a speed of up to 18 knots submerged, and carrying twenty torpedoes; the other, a small coastal type, was capable of 13 knots submerged and carried two torpedoes. The larger boat had an extremely long range. It was thought that these new boats would be coming into operation about the middle or end of February.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of the foregoing statements.
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
January 30, 1945
Top secret
Proposed Programme of Work
Tuesday, 30 January
- A. War Against Germany
- C. Co-ordination of Operations
Bomblines, etc. - E. Combined Bomber Offensive
- F. Planning Date for End of German War
Wednesday, 31 January
- B. Strategy in Mediterranean
- War Against Japan
A. South-East Asia
B. Allocation of Resources Between SEAC and China
Thursday, 1 February
- C. Pacific Operations
- D. Planning Date for End of Japanese War
- D. U-Boat Threat
Friday, 2 February
- Review of Cargo Shipping
- Additional Item.
- Oil Stocks
- Basic undertakings
Castille, 30.1.45.
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
Malta, 30 January 1945
CCS 772
Top secret
Planning Date for the End of the War with Germany
We have reviewed the planning date for the end of the war against Germany as follows:
- In considering German capacity to resist we have been guided by the latest study by the Joint Intelligence Subcommittee on this subject. Their conclusions are:
a. If, as seems just possible, the Russians succeed in overrunning the eastern defences of Germany before the Germans can consolidate there, the effect might be to force the Germans so to denude the West as to make an Allied advance comparatively easy. As the result of such advances in the East and in the West, a German collapse might occur before mid-April, 1945.
b. On balance, however, we conclude that distance combined with stiffening German resistance is likely to bring the Russians to a halt on approximately the line Landsberg-Giant Mountains. This will involve the loss of industrial Silesia.
c. As the result of the loss of industrial Silesia, production of finished armaments, mainly land armaments, would fall over a period of about six months by a quarter or more.
d. If, as now appears improbable, the Germans succeed in stopping the Russian advance forward of Upper Silesia, thus retaining their two main industrial areas, in Silesia and in the Ruhr, we nevertheless consider that the overall decline in Germany’s capacity to resist will be such that an Allied offensive in the West followed by a further Russian offensive in the summer should lead to the collapse of German resistance before November.
e. The need for forces to stem the Russian advance may cause a German withdrawal in Italy, at least to the line of the River Adige.
f. Germany, at any rate until the summer of 1945 when the U-boat campaign is expected to be at its height, is likely to retain sufficient forces to hold at least southern Norway.
- Based on the above, we have considered three cases:
a. The best case.
b. A reasonably favourable case.
c. An unfavourable case.
The best case
- It is clear from paragraph 1a above that there is a possibility that the result of the present Russian offensive may lead to a German collapse by mid-April. We do not consider, however, that there is sufficient likelihood of this timing being realised to justify its acceptance, for planning purposes, as the earliest date for the defeat of Germany.
The reasonably favourable case
-
Eastern Front. Distance and stiffening German resistance may well bring the Russians to a halt on approximately the line Landsberg–Giant Mountains. Thereafter, the Russians will have to re-establish their communications and prepare for a further major offensive as soon as weather conditions and their logistics allow. This might be in mid-May or early June.
-
Western Front. Preliminary operations to reach the Rhine should be completed before the end of March. An all-out Allied offensive could then be launched in the latter part of April or early May, with the object of isolating the Ruhr and advancing deep into Germany.
-
The result of these two offensives, if successful, should bring the end of organised German resistance by the end of June.
The unfavourable case
-
Eastern Front. In this case, we assume that the Russian advance is stopped short of Upper Silesia. Thereafter, if all factors are unfavourable, the combination of German resistance and Russian logistic difficulties may prevent a further major Russian offensive from being launched until the late summer.
-
Western Front. The Allied offensive in the spring may fail to achieve any decisive result. This might be caused by too great a dispersion of effort along the whole front, together with the qualitative superiority of the German heavy tanks and jet-propelled aircraft. It would then be necessary to re-group with a view to launching another offensive. This offensive could be launched in the summer, but it might well suffer in weight and momentum as the result of a successful U-boat campaign of which the effects are likely to be felt in the third quarter of the year.
-
In these circumstances we consider that the results of these two offensives, particularly the Russian, should bring about the end of German organised resistance by the beginning of November.
Conclusion
- There is a possibility that, as a result of the present Russian offensive, Germany may be defeated by the middle of April. This, however, should be regarded as a bonus and should not influence our production or manpower planning.
For planning purposes, we consider that:
a. The earliest date on which the war is likely to end is the 30 June, 1945.
b. The date beyond which the war is unlikely to continue is the 1 November, 1945.
U.S. Navy Department (January 30, 1945)
CINCPOA Communiqué No. 246
More than 40 tons of bombs were dropped on Iwo Jima in the Volcanos by Army Liberators of the Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas, on January 28 (West Longitude Date). An explosion was observed on an airstrip and several fires were started in storage areas.
Liberators of the same force bombed Marcus Island on the same date.
Night-flying StrAirPoa Marine Mitchells struck at shipping around the Bonins and Volcanos on January 29. Hits scored with rockets caused large explosions on a large enemy cargo ship and a medium cargo ship in the Bonins.
On January 28, fighters and torpedo aircraft of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing attacked shore and harbor installations on Yap in the Western Carolines.
Facilities on Babelthuap in the Palaus were attacked by Marine aircraft on January 29.