America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

Private funds held adequate for business

Banker sees no need of government help


Steelworkers earnings rise to new peak

Employment in 1944 declines sharply

Stokes: A real factor

By Thomas L. Stokes

Othman: Duel of words

By Frederick C. Othman

Maj. Williams: Rocket projectiles

By Maj. Al Williams

War surpluses continue to pile up despite sales effort of six agencies

Rules to provide preference for veterans, other groups may retard disposal move
By Roger W. Stuart, Scripps-Howard staff writer


Senators hunt for ‘lesson’ in Goldberg saga

Auctioneer defends sale of surpluses

Gracie Allen Reporting

By Gracie Allen

Today I’m going to dispense a bit of advice to all the nice young war brides our boys have been sending home from Australia, Scotland, Ireland, Egypt and all the other countries overseas where we have bases.

I’m afraid you girls will find America a bit different from your homeland. Those of you from Egypt will miss the camels, both for riding and smoking purposes.

You lassies from Scotland may be surprised to find that men don’t wear skirts here, but in our part of California neither do the women.

You girls from England and Australia will find that bobby sox aren’t worn by policemen but by members of a strange cult given to the practice of swooning and collecting autographs.

And you will certainly be at something of a loss in a domestic argument as you can’t threaten to go home to mother, particularly if she lives in Sydney, Australia. But your husband will be happy because it will mark one of the first times the mother-in-law can definitely be said to be down under.

Dental student racial quota hit

ADSA repudiates official’s alleged plan


Prejudice charged at REA hearing

Senators clash in Williams case

Millett: Improve!

Don’t give up your glamor
By Ruth Millett

Majors plan to checkmate gambling

Clubs to join war on menace to their parks

Radio reporter says Nazi homes are forts

‘Farmhouses’ are gun emplacements
By Si Steinhauser

U.S. Navy Department (February 9, 1945)

Joint Statement

For Immediate Release
February 9, 1945

The following joint Anglo‑American statement on submarine and anti­submarine operations is issued under the authority of the President and the Prime Minister:

Throughout January the enemy’s U‑boat activity was slightly greater than in December, but losses of merchant shipping were not substantially different. The U‑boats making use of their new devices penetrated further into focal areas of shipping close in shore. Results of our countermeasures have been encouraging.


U.S. State Department (February 9, 1945)

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, 10:30 p.m.

Yusupov Palace, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar Molotov
Mr. Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan Mr. Vyshinsky
Mr. Matthews Mr. Jebb Mr. Gusev
Mr. Bohlen Mr. Roberts Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Allen Mr. Golunsky

Log of the Trip

Friday, February 9, 1945

1230: The President attended a plenary meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at Livadia. Present were:

For the U.S. For Great Britain
The President. The Prime Minister.
Admiral Leahy. Field Marshal Brooke.
General Marshall. Air Marshal Portal.
Admiral King. General Ismay.
General Kuter. Admiral Cunningham.
General McFarland. Brigadier Cornwall-Jones.

1330: Lunch at Livadia. – The President, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Boettiger, Mrs. Oliver, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Admiral Leahy and Justice Byrnes.

1600: The President, the Prime Minister and Marshal Stalin and members of the American, British and Soviet Delegations met in the courtyard of Livadia where they sat for still and motion pictures.

1615: The Sixth Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened in the grand ballroom of Livadia. Present:

For the U.S. For Great Britain For the USSR
The President. The Prime Minister. Marshal Stalin.
Mr. Stettinius. Mr. Eden. Mr. Molotov.
Admiral Leahy. Mr. Cadogan. Mr. Vyshinski.
Mr. Hopkins. Mr. Clark Kerr. Mr. Maisky.
Justice Byrnes. Mr. Jebb. Mr. Gousev.
Mr. Harriman. Mr. Bridges. Mr. Gromyko.
Mr. Matthews. Mr. Wilson. Mr. Pavlov.
Mr. Hiss. Mr. Dixon.
Mr. Bohlen. Major Birse.

The meeting adjourned at 1950.

1930: Lieutenant (j.g.) W. K. Kloock, USNR, White House courier, arrived at Livadia with mail from Washington. He made the journey from Washington in three days.

2030: Dinner at Livadia. – The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Major General John E. Hull, Major General Kuter, Fleet Admiral Leahy and Vice Admiral C. M. Cooke.

Völkischer Beobachter (February 10, 1945)

Verstärkte Kampftätigkeit im Westen

Wir und die Dreierkonferenz

vb. Wien, 9. Februar – Eine Reihe von Tagen ist schon vergangen, seitdem jene drei Männer, die für diesen Krieg und damit für alles Leid, das durch ihn über die Menschen gekommen ist, verantwortlich sind, ihre Konferenz im Schwarzen Meer begonnen haben, aber was man bisher davon gehört hat, War spärlich und ziemlich nichtssagend. Das will nicht heißen, dass wir etwa ungeduldig auf das „Ergebnis“ dieser Besprechungen warten würden, im Gegenteil, denn wir halten uns nur an die nackten Tatsachen. In dieser Hinsicht ist aber zweierlei Interessantes festzustellen.

Erstens ist bemerkenswert, dass diese Konferenz an sich scheinbar dringendst notwendig war, denn so leicht ist der schwerbewegliche Mann des Weißen Hauses nicht zu einer so weiten Reise zu veranlassen. Was Churchill betrifft, so sind genug Meldungen bekannt und veröffentlicht worden, die erkennen ließen, wie sehr er sich um das Zustandekommen der Konferenz bemüht hat, wie dienstbeflissen er Stalin sagen ließ, dass er „an jedem Ort und zu jeder Zeit bereit“ stünde. Das ist ein vielsagendes, ja untrügliches Zeichen dafür, dass es England sehr eilig und sehr nötig hat, irgendwie politisch mit erfolgversprechenden Ereignissen aufwarten zu können.

Die Zustände in Belgien und Frankreich, vor allem aber in Griechenland sprechen für die Welt eine zu deutliche Sprache von dem Tiefstand der politischen Ebene, auf die das englische Weltreich herabgesunken ist, seitdem Churchill das Steuer führt. So dumm und verblendet sind auch die Briten nicht, dass sie das Verhängnisvolle dieser Entwicklung nicht begriffen hätten. Die weihnachtliche „Siegesfeier“ ist eine Churchillsche Illusion geblieben und das ununterbrochene deutsche Vergeltungsfeuer auf London und Südengland trägt kaum dazu bei, solchen Illusionen für einen absehbaren späteren Zeitpunkt neuen Auftrieb zu geben. Im Gegenteil, wir wissen aus den Nachrichten, die von der Feindseite selbst verbreitet werden, dass das ehemals so stolze England schon mit sehr viel Wasser kochen muss…

Zweitens lässt sich aus der Tatsache, dass zum „Konferenzort“ die Wasser des Schwarzen Meeres gewählt wurden, von jedem Schuljungen die logische Folgerung ableiten, dass hier Stalins Wunsch der Befehl war, dem Roosevelt und Churchill Folge leisten mussten. Der Massenansturm der Bolschewisten gegen den deutschen Osten hat. Stalins bisher schon bestandenes politisches Übergewicht über seine beiden Komplicen derart verstärkt, dass sie einfach nur mehr Befehlsempfänger geworden sind. Was aber die Bolschewisten mit ihren Panzerarmeen erreichen wollen, nämlich die Niederringung des deutschen Widerstandes und die Brechung der deutschen Kampfkraft und Kampfmoral, das wollen Roosevelt und Churchill mit dem alten Betrug von 1918 Wilsonscher Prägung erreichen und so das Ihrige zum erhofften „Siege“ beitragen, um damit bei der Teilung der Beute noch halbwegs gut abzuschneiden.

Das deutsche Volk aber ist gewarnt, ja geradezu immun gegen das Gift scheinheiliger Versprechungen. Wir wissen, was uns blühen würde, wenn wir schwach würden, wenn wir die Waffen aus der Hand legten, ehe nicht Leben und Freiheit uns in unserem Sinne gesichert sind. Wir sahen, und sehen an dem Beispiel der Wehrlosen, die im Westen dem amerikanischen „Eroberer“ und im Osten den Bolschewisten in die Hände fielen, was das Schicksal ist, das sie uns im Falle ihres Sieges zu bereiten gedenken. Was sie uns angekündigt hatten, haben sie in beiden Fällen voll und ganz wahr gemacht. Wenn sie jetzt in lockenden Tönen vom „Weltfrieden“ reden wollten, kann uns das keinen Eindruck mehr machen, denn wir hatten uns, wie gesagt, nur an die nackten Tatsachen. Und die sind von vornherein der klarste Beweis für die lügenhaften Verkündungen, die man auf den Wellen des Schwarzen Meeres zusammenbraute. Schon in Teheran gedachte man sich mit einer „Botschaft“ an das deutsche Volk zu wenden und hat dann doch in letzter Minute davon Abstand genommen, weil die Sache zu aussichtslos erschien.

Noch leben ja zu viele Zeugen der Folgen des Novembers 1918. Die Deutschen in den Donau- und Alpengauen haben sich die Erinnerung an die Auswirkungen des Vertrages von St. Germain gut bewahrt. Sie war wohl etwas verblasst in den Jahren des harten täglichen Lebenskampfes, die nachher kamen und von den meisten als eine Art Naturnotwendigkeit hingenommen wurden. Als aber das Großdeutsche Reich geschmiedet war, da ist uns allen erst so richtig aufgegangen, was es heißt, Angehörige und Mitbestimmende eines großen Volksstaates zu sein, eines Staates, der wahrhaft für das Volk selbst und nicht für das Alleinwohl von Geldsäcken oder Gottesgnadenmenschen geschaffen ist.

Viel zu kurz nur war die Zeit, die gerade diesen Gauen gegönnt, war, um den neuen Aufschwung voll zu leben; denn das Komplott der Feinde war schon geschmiedet, die Schlinge, die das Reich erwürgen sollte, von den Juden in der ganzen Welt schon geknüpft. Aber gerade weil wir wissen, wie die wahre Freiheit eines tüchtigen und arbeitsamen Volkes beschaffen ist, was sie dem einzelnen bietet und gibt, gerade darum gewinnen wir auch aus uns selbst die Kraft, jedem feindlichen Ansturm zu widerstehen, in Zähigkeit und Beharrlichkeit auszuhalten, bis wir unsere Freiheit wiedergewonnen haben, ungeachtet der Opfer, die der Kampf uns noch auf erlogen macht.

Darum wird auch jener neue Feldzug unserer Feinde, der jetzt von dieser Dreierkonferenz ausgeht, weder mit den militärischen noch mit den agitatorischen Waffen zu dem vom Feind erstrebten Ziele führen, weil es lediglich an uns liegt, ihn abzuwehren mit jener unwiderstehlichen Kraft und Stärke, die in der deutschen Einheit und Einigkeit liegt. Ganz abgesehen von jenen militärischen Mitteln, die für uns noch im Schoss der nächsten Zukunft liegen…

A. E. T.

Sowjetblatt bestätigt Vernichtungspläne

Stockholm, 9. Februar – Die sowjetische Iswestija nimmt in einem Kommentar zu der Dreierkonferenz Stellung und legt dabei eine Offenherzigkeit an den Tag, die alle Zweifel aus der Welt schafft.

Die Iswestija fasst in einem Satz das Endziel der bolschewistischen Politik gegenüber Deutschland zusammen und legt mit brutaler Ehrlichkeit den Plan vor, den der Kreml zu verwirklichen erstrebt, falls es gelänge, Deutschland in die Knie zu zwingen.

„In der Endphase des Krieges wird die Todesstrafe, die von der gesamten freiheitsliebenden Menschheit über Deutschland verhängt wurde, durchgeführt werden,“ so schreibt Iswestija.

An diesem Satz gibt es kein Deuteln: Moskaus Ziel ist die Ausrottung des deutschen Volkes, das wird hier noch einmal klar und unmissverständlich von dem führenden bolschewistischen Blatt bestätigt.

Es ist kennzeichnend, dass das englische Reuters-Büro von dem Iswestija-Kommentar gerade diesen einen Satz in die Welt verbreitet. Das bedeutet, dass England das bolschewistische Kriegsziel gutheißt und mit allen Mitteln unterstützt. Diese Erkenntnis ist für uns Deutsche nicht neu, aber jede Bestätigung gibt uns immer wieder die Gewissheit, dass wir mit einer geschlossenen Feindfront zu rechnen haben, wenn es sich darum handelt, Deutschland zu vernichten, das deutsche Volk zu dezimieren und seine Männer als Arbeitssklaven zu deportieren.

Unsere Antwort auf diesen Knechtungs- und Ausrottungsplan haben wir dem Gegner tausendmal ins Gesicht geschleudert. Was auch immer Stalin und seine plutokratischen Komplicen Roosevelt und Churchill bei ihrem Dreiertreffen aushandeln mögen oder mochten, es wird nichts an den Feindplänen ändern und wir werden dem nur noch eine fanatischere Entschlossenheit entgegenstellen. Dass wir um unser Leben kämpfen, ist uns gerade in den letzten Wochen, wo die bolschewistische Flut gegen das Deutsche Reich anbrandet, klarer denn je geworden, dass wir aber diesen Kampf bis zur letzten Entscheidung durchstehen, darüber dürfte es im Feindlager keinen Zweifel geben.

Führer HQ (February 10, 1945)

Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht

Die Verteidiger von Budapest setzen in der Burg and in der Zitadelle Ihren heldenhaften Kampf fort. Östlich des Plattensees wurden feindliche Angriffe bis auf einen inzwischen abgeriegelten Einbruch vor unseren Stellungen zerschlagen.

Nördlich der Westbeskiden wird bei Saybusch und Zielitz in Angriff und Abwehr heftig gekämpft. Im Brückenkopf von Brieg blieben alle Angriffe des Gegners erfolglos. Im Kampfraum von Breslau–Liegnitz–Glogau warfen die Sowjets starke Kräfte in die Schlacht und konnten trotz zäher Gegenwehr unserer Truppen nach Westen Raum gewinnen. Zwischen Fürstenberg und Küstrin wurde der Feind aus seinen Brückenköpfen weiter auf die Oder zurückgeworfen.

Im Südteil von Pommern hielt der feindliche Druck bei Amswalde und Deutsch-Krone an, während in den übrigen Frontabschnitten unsere Abwehrerfolge ein Abflauen der feindlichen Angriffe bewirkten. Im südlichen Westpreußen nahmen die Bolschewisten nach starker Feuervorbereitung mit mehreren Schützendivisionen ihre Angriffe nordwestlich Schwetz und südwestlich Graudenz wieder auf. Sie wurden in harten Kämpfen aufgefangen. Von Osten gegen Graudenz geführte Angriffe scheiterten. Die Besatzu en von Schneidemühl und Elbing erfüllen in schweren Kämpfen und vorbildlicher Tapferkeit die ihnen übertragenen Aufgaben.

Eine aus dem Panzerschiff Admiral Scheer und drei Torpedobooten bestehende Kampfgruppe der Kriegsmarine griff wirkungsvoll in die Kämpfe um Elbing und Frauenburg ein.

In Ostpreußen versuchten die Bolschewisten mit starken Infanterie- und Panzerkräften bei Landsberg und Kreuzburg unsere Front zu durchbrechen. Nach anfänglichem Geländegewinn wurde die Wucht der Angriffe durch den hartnäckigen Widerstand und die Gegenangriffe unserer Divisionen gebrochen. In erbitterten Kämpfen wurden über 100 sowjetische Panzer vernichtet, davon 80 im Bereich des Fallschirmpanzerkorps „Hermann Göring.“ Auch im Samland scheiterten heftige Angriffe der Bolschewisten.

Jagd- und Schlachtfliegerverbände griffen auch gestern in den Schwerpunkten in die Erdkämpfe ein und vernichteten außer Hunderten von Fahrzeugen 37 Panzer und 28 Geschütze. Oberst Rudel schoss in den letzten Tagen elf sowjetische Panzer ab und erhöhte damit seine Abschusserfolge auf 516 Panzer.

Aus einem durch Jäger geschützten britischen Kampffliegerverband schossen deutsche Jäger an der norwegischen Westküste elf Torpedoflugzeuge und drei Jäger ab. Leichte deutsche- Seestreitkräfte und Sicherungsfahrzeuge der Kriegsmarine brachten weitere neun der erfolglos angreifenden britischen Bomber zum Absturz.

Im Westen sind zwischen dem Niederrhein östlich Nimwegen und der Maas bei Gennep heftige Abwehrkämpfe im Gange. Im Verlaufe starker Angriffe konnte der Feind im Reichswald Boden gewinnen.

An der Rur scheiterten zahlreiche Aufklärungsvorstöße und Übersetzversuche des Gegners. Am Oberlauf des Flusses riegelten Panzergrenadiere in heftigen Kämpfen den angreifenden Gegner ab, bevor er das Ostufer gewinnen konnte. Südwestlich Schleiden warf ein Gegenstoß die Amerikaner aus einer Einbruchsstelle. In der Schnee-Eifel blieben die angreifenden Verbände der 3. amerikanischen Armee im zusammengefassten Feuer aller Waffen vor oder in unserem Hauptkampffeld liegen. An der oberen Oure wurden feindliche Bereitstellungen durch unsere Artillerie zerschlagen.

Heftige Kämpfe sind um Brückenköpfe an der unteren Sauer entbrannt, die der Feind nach Zuführung von neuen Kräften auszuweiten versuchte. Mehrere Angriffe der Amerikaner südöstlich Vianden brachen unter hohen blutigen Verlusten für den Gegner schon vor unseren Stellungen zusammen. Südöstlich Remich an der Mosel warfen unsere Panzer den angreifenden Feind wieder auf seine Ausgangsstellungen zurück.

Im Unterelsass blieben feindliche Aufklärungsvorstöße vor unseren Gefechtsvorposten liegen oder scheiterten in unserem Artilleriefeuer.

Nach schweren Kämpfen gegen die bei Tag und Nacht angreifenden De-Gaulle-Truppen wurden unsere noch auf dem Westufer des Oberrheins stehenden Kräfte mit allen Waffen und Versorgungsgutem auf das Ostufer übergeführt und vor dem nachdrängenden Feind die Brücken bei Neuenburg gesprengt. Die einundzwanzigtägige Schlacht um den Brückenkopf im oberen Elsass, in der unsere Truppen tapfer kämpfend eine oft zehnfache feindliche Übermacht abwehrten, ist damit abgeschlossen. Im Verlaufe dieser Kämpfe vernichteten unsere Truppen 200 Panzer sowie zahlreiche Panzerspähwagen und Kraftfahrzeuge des Feindes.

An der ligurischen Küste in Mittelitalien dauert die örtliche Kampftätigkeit an. Feindliche Aufklärungsvorstöße auf den Höhen östlich des Serchio scheiterten.

In dem Gebiet westlich Mostar in der Herzegowina dauern die feindlichen Angriffe an. An der unteren Drina haben unsere Truppen den Fluss nach Osten überschritten und dem zäh kämpfenden Feind die Uferhöhen nordwestlich Zvornik, entrissen. Südlich der Drau stießen deutsche Truppen und Kosakenverbände lm Zusammenwirken mit kroatischen Kampfgruppen konzentrisch von Osten und Westen vor und nahmen die Stadt Virovitica im Sturm.

Nordamerikanische Terrorverbände warfen am gestrigen Tage Bomben auf Magdeburg sowie auf Orte in Thüringen und Westfalen. Dabei entstanden Gebäudeschäden und Personenverluste, vor allem in Weimar und Jena. Weitere Angriffe richteten sich gegen Städte lm südostdeutschen Raum. Tiefflieger terrorisierten im westlichen und südwestlichen Reichsgebiet durch Bordwaffenangriffe die Zivilbevölkerung.

Das Feuer unserer Vergeltungswaffen auf London dauert an.


Der mit dem Ritterkreuz zum Eisernen Kreuz ausgezeichnete Hauptmann Rath schoss in der Nacht zum 8. Februar sechs feindliche Flugzeuge ab.

Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (February 10, 1945)

FROM
(A) SHAEF MAIN

ORIGINATOR
PRD, Communique Section

DATE-TIME OF ORIGIN
101100A February

TO FOR ACTION
(1) AGWAR
(2) NAVY DEPARTMENT

TO (W) FOR INFORMATION (INFO)
(3) TAC HQ 12 ARMY GP
(4) MAIN 12 ARMY GP
(5) AIR STAFF
(6) ANCXF
(7) EXFOR MAIN
(8) EXFOR REAR
(9) DEFENSOR, OTTAWA
(10) CANADIAN C/S, OTTAWA
(11) WAR OFFICE
(12) ADMIRALTY
(13) AIR MINISTRY
(14) UNITED KINGDOM BASE
(15) SACSEA
(16) CMHQ (Pass to RCAF & RCN)
(17) COM ZONE
(18) SHAEF REAR
(19) AFHQ for PRO, ROME
(20) HQ SIXTH ARMY GP
(REF NO.)
NONE

(CLASSIFICATION)
IN THE CLEAR

Communiqué No. 308

The Allied offensive in the area southeast of Nijmegen continues to make good progress.

In spite of stiff enemy resistance from his prepared positions, difficult terrain, numerous minefields and anti-tank obstacles our units have captured Zyfflich, Neil, Kranenberg, Frasselt and Bredeweg and are fighting in the western fringe of the Reichswald Forest.

Southeast of the battle area, enemy troops and equipment just east of the Reichswald Forest and at Goch, Geldern and Rheinberg were attacked by medium, light and fighter-bombers. East of Wesel, a road bridge spanning the railway line was destroyed by rocket-firing fighters which also hit Rhine River traffic in the area.

Our forces have cleared the towns of Harscheidt and Schmidt in the area northeast of Monschau, against stiff resistance and have advanced to Hasenfeld, two miles southeast of Schmidt.

Farther south, in the area north of Prüm, our infantry captured Olzheim and entered the town of Neuendorf. Other elements have captured the towns of Gondenbrett, Hermespand and Niedermehlen. West of Prüm, our forces are three-fourths of a mile from the town.

Across the Our River in the area five and one-half miles northeast of Clervaux, our units have gained one-half miles. Other elements farther southeast have pushed 1,000 yards in the area and one-half miles southeast of Wallendorf. North of the Our River, one and one-half miles northeast of Wallendorf, two infantry counterattacks were repulsed.

The Bannholz Forest, one-half mile northeast of Sinz, has been cleared by our troops. A counterattack by tanks and infantry in this area was repulsed.

Enemy artillery activity was increased along the sector east of the Hardt Mountains.

East of Haguenau, in the Rhine Valley, Oberhöfen was cleared except for a few houses in the northwestern section of the town.

Patrols in the Drusenheim region farther east drew strong hostile reactions.

In southern Alsace, all organized enemy resistance on the west bank of the Rhine has ceased.

Allied forces in the west captured 1,049 prisoners on 7 February.

The communications center of Kempen, and railway yards at Viersen, Rheydt, and Grevenbroich were struck at by medium and light bombers. Fighter-bombers attacked railway yards at Euskirchen, Koblenz, Trier Kaiserslautern and Würzburg, and a rail junction at Wengerohr, northeast of Trier. Rail bridges at Sinzig and Neuwied, northwest of Koblenz, were attacked by small formations of medium and light bombers.

Rail traffic over a wide area ranging from Mannheim south to the German-Swiss frontier, rail bridges at Rastatt, Hornberg and Offenburg, enemy barracks at Donaueschingen and road traffic near Oberkirch were targets for medium and fighter-bombers.

Escorted heavy bombers in very great strength attacked the synthetic oil plant at Lützen, south of Halle; an ordnance and motor transport factory at Weimar; oil installations and railroad marshalling yards at Magdeburg and other communications targets in Germany. Escorting fighters shot down 23 enemy aircraft, destroyed 41 others on the ground and strafed rail transport.

From all operations, according to reports so far received, 19 heavy bombers and five fighters are missing.

Last night, bombers attacked road and rail movement in Holland and western Germany.

COORDINATED WITH: G-2, G-3 to C/S

THIS MESSAGE MAY BE SENT IN CLEAR BY ANY MEANS
/s/

Precedence
“OP” - AGWAR
“P” - Others

ORIGINATING DIVISION
PRD, Communique Section

NAME AND RANK TYPED. TEL. NO.
D. R. JORDAN, Lt Col FA2409

AUTHENTICATING SIGNATURE
/s/

U.S. State Department (February 10, 1945)

Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon

Vorontsov Villa, USSR

Present
United States United Kingdom Soviet Union
Secretary Stettinius Foreign Secretary Eden Foreign Commissar
Mr. Harriman Sir Alexander Cadogan Molotov
Mr. Matthews Sir Archibald Clark Kerr Mr. Vvshinskv
Mr. Hiss Mr. Jebb Mr. Maisky
Mr. Page Mr. Dixon Mr. Gusev
Major Theakstone Mr. Gromyko
Mr. Pavlov

Page Minutes

Alupka, February 10, 1945, noon
Top secret

Subjects:

  1. THE POLISH FORMULA
  2. DECLARATION ON LIBERATED EUROPE
  3. YUGOSLAVIA
  4. REPARATIONS
  5. COMMUNIQUÉ ON THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE
  6. WORLD ORGANIZATION
  7. AUSTRO-YUGOSLAV FRONTIER
  8. YUGOSLAV-ITALIAN FRONTIER
  9. YUGOSLAV-BULGARIAN RELATIONS
  10. IRAN

Mr. Eden, who presided, opened the meeting.

The Polish Formula

Mr. Stettinius stated that the American experts as well as the President had given serious study to the Polish formula and that the American Delegation was prepared to withdraw the last sentence, which Mr. Molotov had objected to, on the understanding that the President would be free to make any statement he felt necessary on Poland relative to his receiving information from his Ambassador on the question.

Later in the conversation Mr. Eden stated that he did not wish to indicate during the conversation on the Polish formula that he agreed with the American proposal to drop this last sentence.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he, of course, preferred the document as it existed. The President, however, was so anxious to reach agreement that he was willing to make this concession.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had several amendments to the formula. He proposed that “as soon as practicable” be changed to “as soon as possible.” He also proposed that the last part of the last paragraph be drafted to read: “the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Government as has been done by the Soviet Union.”

Mr. Stettinius stated that he could not agree with this second change.

Mr. Molotov pointed out that a special situation existed in Poland. The Soviet Government had accorded the Polish Government recognition, whereas, the United States and Great Britain had not.

Mr. Eden said that the Government referred to in the formula was a new government and that it was most necessary that the three Allies move together in recognizing it.

Mr. Stettinius supported Mr. Eden and added that it was vital for public opinion in the United States to adhere to the principle of a new Polish Government.

Mr. Molotov stated that the present situation was a different one and that the document would reflect this difference. He referred to the inadvisability of prejudicing the present situation or raising difficulties in the rear of the Red Army. He suggested that the matter be given consideration and be subsequently discussed. Mr. Molotov later suggested that Mr. Eden make a full report on last night’s and today’s discussion on the Polish situation for submission to the plenary session.

Declaration on Liberated Europe

Mr. Stettinius stated that he had consulted with his experts and with the President on the Declaration on Liberated Areas and that he was obliged to say that the American Government found it impossible to accept the amendment proposed by Mr. Molotov at the Plenary Session of February 9. To do so would cause untold difficulties in United States domestic affairs. The text of this Declaration, with Mr. Molotov’s amendment is attached hereto.

Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to submit a second amendment. He suggested that in the fifth paragraph the words “they will immediately establish appropriate machinery for the carrying out of the joint responsibilities set forth in this declaration,” be replaced by the words “they will immediately take measures for the carrying out of mutual consultation.”

Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Eden agreed to this formula.

Mr. Stettinius inquired as to the status of Mr. Molotov’s amendment of February 9.

Mr. Molotov agreed that it should be dropped, though he remarked that he thought it very useful in that it might prevent recurrences similar to those in Greece.

Mr. Eden inquired whether the British proposals regarding French association were acceptable.

Mr. Molotov replied that he had not had sufficient time to give full consideration to this proposal. He suggested that it be discussed at the four o’clock meeting.

Mr. Stettinius observed that he approved highly the British proposal and recommended that it be included in the Declaration.

Yugoslavia

Mr. Eden stated that he had been informed that Subasic was due to leave today or tomorrow for Belgrade. The principal question under dispute, as he understood it, has been about the names of the Regents. However, in the British view, there was no reason why this should hold up the execution of the agreement. If Mr. Molotov so desired, Mr. Eden stated that Marshal Stalin’s proposal might be accepted to the effect that a telegram be sent setting forth the views of the Foreign Ministers on the Yugoslav situation.

Mr. Molotov inquired whether any mention should be made of Yugoslavia in the Crimea Conference Communiqué.

Mr. Eden suggested that both courses might be advisable.

Mr. Molotov recalled that Marshal Stalin had suggested that a telegram be sent to Tito and Subasic suggesting that they expedite the coming into force of the agreement.

Mr. Eden stated that he would submit such a draft telegram to the Foreign Ministers for consideration.

Reparations

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to reserve the position of the British Government with respect to pre-war debts and claims. He was in favor of setting up the Reparations Commission as soon as possible.

Mr. Maisky interjected that unless the British agreed to the American draft submitted February 9, the Commission would have no basis, no directives for its work.

Mr. Eden stated that he agreed on the principles involved in the American proposals concerning the immediate withdrawal of property from Germany and the annual contributions. However, he wished to submit a redraft of the proposals.

Mr. Eden stated that reparations should be considered in connection with the dismemberment of Germany. There seemed to be two Russian objectives which were difficult to reconcile – the depletion of German manufacturing capacity and the insuring of German ability to make large payments at a later date. The British were most anxious to avoid conditions in which it would be necessary for them to finance and feed Germany at a later date as a result of reparations. Furthermore, the British would like France on the Moscow Commission from the start. The British Government also felt that the question of labor should be considered by the Moscow Commission and that it would be inadvisable to name any figure for deliveries until the Moscow Commission had started its work. In addition, reparations arrangements should be made without prejudices to the restitution of looted property.

Mr. Molotov agreed to this last statement.

Mr. Maisky stated that Mr. Eden’s reply was very disappointing. Its whole spirit was to take from Germany as little as possible.

Mr. Eden interjected that this was not the case; however, he could say that the Prime Minister did not believe that the Russians would receive anywhere near as much as they hoped for.

Mr. Maisky stated that naturally when the dismemberment of Germany had been decided in a practical form the reparations plan must be adjusted. This problem was considered from its initiation. There was no contradiction. The amount of annual payments were quite possible after the contemplated removals. If Mr. Eden had any doubts the easiest way out was to accept the formula agreed upon by the Americans and Russians yesterday as the basis for discussion and to raise the British proposals in Moscow on this basis. He stated that the question of labor would certainly come up for discussion of the plan during the Commission studies of Germany. He pointed out that the formula did not commit the Allies to the exact figure. Taking into account all considerations advanced by Mr. Eden, Mr. Maisky maintained that the British could easily agree to the formula.

Mr. Eden maintained that the British wished a period shorter than ten years for the reparations payments. They preferred five years.

Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the ten-year period was merely mentioned as a basis for discussion. It might result that all the capital movements could be effected in seven years. He added that the Soviet Government was not committing itself to ten years or twenty billion dollars.

Mr. Eden inquired why this time limit should then be put in the formula.

Mr. Maisky replied that it was desired as a basis for discussion.

Mr. Eden stated that he would submit an alternative draft and that he hoped that the subject might be discussed at the 4:00 o’clock meeting.

Communiqué on the Crimean Conference

Mr. Molotov inquired whether any thought had been given to the communiqué on the Conference.

Mr. Stettinius stated that the American Delegation was drafting something for the consideration of the Foreign Ministers. He suggested that the first item on the afternoon’s agenda be the question of a communiqué and that the drafting of a communiqué be assigned to the Foreign Ministers.

Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden agreed to this suggestion.

World Organization

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to submit a report of the subcommittee.

Mr. Molotov stated that he agreed to both points contained in the report, i.e., regarding the method of consulting France and China and the text of the invitation to the Conference.

Mr. Eden and Mr. Stettinius also agreed.

Austro-Yugoslav Frontier

Mr. Eden stated that this problem would surely arise and that he did not wish a repetition of “Athens.” He wished to submit a small paper on the question.

Mr. Molotov stated that he would wish to study this paper before discussing it.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he felt that paragraph (b) on page two went beyond the period of occupation and that it might be improved by redrafting.

Yugoslav-Italian Frontier

Mr. Eden stated that he wished to submit a paper on this question. He added that he did not expect to discuss it at the present meeting. A copy of this document is attached.

Yugoslav-Bulgarian Relations

In accordance with Mr. Eden’s suggestion, Mr. Molotov stated that he wished to make a few remarks on the Bulgarian-Yugoslav treaty of alliance. The British Embassy in Moscow had transmitted to the Narkomindel a note on the Balkan Federation in which it was stressed that such a Federation might include Turkey. This was not an urgent matter at the present time; however there were conversations in progress between Yugoslavia and Bulgaria on a treaty of friendship and alliance. The Soviet Government entertained favorable views on this treaty and had informed the British accordingly. The Bulgarians and Yugoslavs were collaborating militarily against the Germans in Yugoslavia. There should, consequently, be no objections to such a treaty.

Mr. Eden stated that this treaty raised the important question of principle. The British held the view that former enemy states should be debarred from entering into treaty relations with other states when they were under an occupational regime and certainly not without the permission of the Allies. Apart from this principle, the British were somewhat anxious concerning the effect of the treaty on reparations which Greece should obtain from Bulgaria. He wished to submit a separate memorandum on this matter.

Mr. Molotov stated that the Soviet Foreign Office had received a note from the British to the effect that former enemies under an armistice regime should not have treaty relations with other enemy states. But now it was a question of an ex-enemy and a friendly state. He maintained that the British had stated that they had no objections to treaties between ex-enemy and friendly states.

Mr. Eden questioned this.

Mr. Molotov continued that this principle was also implied in the British proposal concerning a Balkan Federation in which former enemy and friendly states would enter.

Mr. Eden maintained that he did not believe that states under an armistice regime should be permitted to make peace treaties without the permission of the Allies. Furthermore, the British never had in mind a Balkan Federation until the armistice period had terminated.

Mr. Stettinius stated that he was completely in accord with Mr. Eden’s views.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it would not be preferable for the states in question to wait.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had no power to speak for them.

Mr. Eden reminded him that Bulgaria had signed an armistice and was not free to do what it wished.

Mr. Stettinius suggested that this question be discussed by the Ambassadors and Mr. Molotov in Moscow promptly.

Mr. Molotov stated that it might be preferable to postpone discussion of this matter until tomorrow and then to seek agreement.

Iran

Mr. Eden inquired whether Mr. Molotov had considered the British document on Iran.

Mr. Molotov stated that he had nothing to add to what he had said several days ago on the subject.

Mr. Eden inquired whether it would not be advisable to issue a communiqué on Iran.

Mr. Molotov stated that this would be inadvisable.

Mr. Stettinius urged that some reference be made that Iranian problems had been discussed and clarified during the Crimean Conference.

Mr. Molotov stated that he opposed this idea.

Mr. Eden suggested that it be stated that the declaration on Iran had been reaffirmed and reexamined during the present meeting.

Mr. Molotov opposed this suggestion.

Hiss Notes

Alupka, February 10, 1945, noon

Ed. chmn
2/10
For Mins
12.10 p m

ERS asked make statement

We are prepared to withdraw our insistence on the final sentence in the Polish memo, which Mr. Mol. objected to with the understanding that the Pres would be perfectly free to make any statement to the Am. people he might think he had to relative to receiving inform. from his Amb.

Mol. Would like to make a small amend. to yesterday’s text: one cond: as soon as possible

of U.S. & Gt Brit will est. dip. reis, with it as has been done by the Soviet Un

Ed. Objected – It’s to be a new govt

Mol we can leave out “as has been done by the Soviet Un” Ed. But we would all have to recognize it.

Mol. our sit. is diff. from that of U.S. We have already given recog. to present govt

Ed: Yes but this will be a new gov’t

ERS: Advisable that we all move together

Mol: Present sit. being different the doc. must reflect this diff. We quite agree on the future. Let us think about it.

ERS Decl, on Lib. Areas Have discussed Mr. Mol’s proposal Impossible for us to consider amend. Would create untold diffs. for us with respect to our dom, situation

Mol: Then I will propose another amend:

2nd ¶ from the end “they would immed. take measures for carrying out mutual consultation”

Suggests one or other amend.

Ed: An improvement

ERS I’m very favorably impressed

Mol. As to the former amend. Thinks it would be very useless because we don’t wish shots which have occurred in Athens to take place elsewhere

ERS. Sorry, I’m not authorized to consider this amend. any further.

New amend. agreed to

—>Mol Withdraws his former amend.

Ed: One other point. About Fr. sit. Proposed addition of a last ¶

Mol Hasn’t had time to study it, perhaps at 4.00

ERS As stated yesterday, thinks it most desirable

Ed. Little further inform. Re Yug. Sub. due leave today or tomorrow for Bel. Argument, as I as [sic] understand, has been about names of regents. But in our view no reason this should hold up coming into force of agt. We can send tel. setting forth our views as Mar. St. suggested

Mol. and communique?

Ed Can do that, too

Mol. Tel. telling them to hurry up That the agt. come into force immed.

Ed. Will show other 2 delegs. draft of tel.

Ed. Re Pol. – I didn’t mean to indicate agt. with Am. proposal to drop last sentence

ERS We would of course still prefer doc. as it exists but Pres so anxious reach agt, he is willing to make this concession

Mol. Thanks him Mr. Stett. very much

Reparations
Ed:

  1. 1st reps should be considered in connection with dismemberment

  2. Two R objects – depletion Ger. mfg. capacity & ensuring ability make large payments later – are difficult to reconcile We are very anxious to avoid conditions making it nec. finance or feed Ger later as result reparations

  3. Would like Fr. on Mos. Commission from start

  4. Labor should be considered too

  5. Can’t name any figure for deliveries until Commission has studied matter

Mol: Any points Mr Ed. agrees on?

Ed. Add: These arrangements are without prejudice to restitution of looted property Mol. Of course

Ed. reserve position re pre-war claims We are in favor of Com. being set up in Mos as soon as possible

Mol: No basis for work of Com. We don’t give it any directives or principles on which to work.

Ed. We agree on principles: immediate withdrawal of machinery, etc – quicker the better – & annual payments Has a redraft

Maisky: Mr. Ed’s reply is very disappointing – Whole spirit of reply Spirit apparently is to take from Ger little as poss.

Ed: Never said anything of kind but can say my P.M. doesn’t think you’ll get anything like as much as you think.

Re Ed’s points

  1. Naturally when dismemberment decided in practical form, plan be adjusted

  2. Problem was considered from beginning. No contradiction. Ain’t of annual payments quite possible after contemplated removals. If you have doubts, shortest cut to accept our formula of yesterday – to take our proposals as basis for discussion & then bring up your points Never expected support Ger.

Nothing on 3

  1. Labor certainly will come in in elaboration of whole plan, but as Com. studies q.

  2. Our formula doesn’t commit you to the figures. Taking into account all your points, you can easily agree to formula agreed on by Sov & Am. delegs

Ed. We consider $20 billion equals 500,000,000£ a yr.

Maisky No in ten yrs

Ed: We wanted a shorter period

Mol. Let us write down 10 yrs

Ed: We prefer 5 yrs

ERS Its all a basis of discussion Might end up all these capital movements possible in 7 yrs Sov. Gov’t isn’t committing itself to 10 yrs or $20 billion

Maisky Certainly. In end might be 5 or 6

Ed Then why put in 10 yrs

Maisky: As basis for discussion

Ed. Let each put in its own plan Will give alternate draft & discuss at 4.00 p m Agreed

Mol. re communique

ERS We are hard at work drafting something for your consid.

Mol: You take initiative?

ERS There will be a draft, we would be glad to take initiative I would suggest 1st order bus. this afternoon that drafting of commun. be assigned to For Mins

Mol. Good

Ed. all right

World Org. report of subcommittee

Mol. I agree to both points – consultation of Ch & Fr. & the invitation

Ed We all agree then

Austria-Yug. frontiers

Ed: presented proposal

Mol. Translate & study

ERS: we feel (b) on p 2 should be pretty carefully considered. We feel that as phrased this goes beyond period of occupation

Ed: That is all that is meant Drafting may need to be made clearer

Yug-It frontier

Ed: proposal to be studied

Yug-Bul. relations

Mol. Mentioned treaty of alliance between Yug & Bul.

  1. Recently For. Commissariat rec’d a note re federation, stressing federation might include Turkey. This is not an urgent q.

  2. There are conversations between Yug & Bul about a treaty of friendship & alliance Sov. Govt holds a favorable view. They are collaborating militarily ag. Gers in Yug. There should be no objections to it.

Ed: Glad to hear treaty is not actual (?) Anxious about effect of this treaty on reparations we are anxious & all agreed Gr. should receive from Bul. Has separate memo on this.

Mol All obligs. of Bul. have been enforced. No one can change them without consent of 3 powers Bul & Rum. cannot have a treaty between them Now is q. of treaty between 1 friendly country & an ex-enemy There was a direct agt by Brit Govt to it. Q by Eden?

Mol. There were objections to treaty between 2 former enemies but not friendly & enemy

Ed. We do not think a country under armistice terms can make a treaty without consent of 3 powers. I never had it in mind a country under armistice would come into a federation until armistice over

ERS I’m completely in accord with Ed’s views

Ed: Can’t they wait?

Mol: Has no power to speak for them.

Ed. Bul. has signed armistice. Isn’t free to do as she wants. Although has threatened to shoot our planes coming here.

Mol. Our planes have been shot at in Yug but was mistake & our troops shot at by Am planes

Ed. I don’t know why Bul. can shoot at any planes Can we ask this wait awhile

Mol Can go on with discussions

ERS Suggest our Ambs discuss with Mol. in Mos. promptly Mol. Would wait until tomorrow

Iran
Mol. Has nothing to add

Ed: Would Mol like to put out communique

Mol: Undesirable. Can discuss this later

ERS I would urge some reference that Iranian problems have been discussed & clarified. Very troublesome q.

Mol Against that

Ed: Say re-examined & reaffirmed Teheran Decl.

Mol Against that

ERS status of Pol. Agreed Ed. to report on yesterday’s & today’s progress.

Reparations:
Mol.: mention in document just 2 figures as basis for discussion

U.S. Delegation Memorandum

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Items Still Before the Foreign Ministers

Poland
There is probably no reason to discuss this until the plenary meeting.

Declaration of Liberated Europe
Same status as Number 1.

Iran
The British may propose adoption of their paper – Mr. Matthews has a copy of it.

Reparations
The British have not yet agreed to Soviet-American paper. The British or Russians may want to bring this up.

Mr. Eden Wants
(a) To have the provisions relating to the Hungarian Control Commission apply also in Bulgaria;
(b) To get an agreement for Bulgarian reparations to Greece;
(c) To express opposition to Russian proposal favoring an alliance between Tito and Bulgaria.


U.S. Delegation Memorandum On The Polish Government

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Text of Formula on Poland So Far Agreed by the Three Foreign Ministers

A new situation has been created by the complete liberation of Poland by the Red Army. This calls for the establishment of a provisional Polish government more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of western Poland. The provisional government now functioning in Poland should be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from those living abroad. This new government will then be called the “Polish Provisional Government of National Unity.” Mr. Molotov, Mr. Harriman, and Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, are authorized to consult in the first instance in Moscow with members of the present provisional government and with other democratic leaders from within Poland and from abroad with a view to the reorganization of the present government along the above lines. This “Polish Provisional Government of National Unity” would be pledged to the holding of free and unfettered elections as soon as possible on the basis of universal suffrage and secret ballot. In these elections all democratic and anti-Nazi parties would have the right to take part and to put forth candidates.

When a “Polish Provisional Government of National Unity” has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition.

In lieu of the following sentence: “When a ‘Polish Provisional Government of National Unity’ has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the three governments will then accord it recognition.” Mr. Molotov suggests the following rewording:

When a “Polish Provisional Government of National Unity” has been properly formed in conformity with the above, the Governments of the United States and of Great Britain will establish diplomatic relations with it as has been done by the Soviet Union.

This sentence was not accepted by Mr. Stettinius or Mr. Eden.

He said he would bring it up again at the four o’clock meeting this afternoon.

The British still advocate inclusion of the following sentence:

The ambassadors of the three powers in Warsaw, following such recognition, would be charged with the responsibility of observing and reporting to their respective governments on the carrying out of the pledge in regard to free and unfettered elections.


U.S. Delegation Memorandum on the Soviet Proposal for the Final Paragraph of the Formula on Poland

Yalta, February 10, 1945

Mr. Molotov’s latest draft proposal for the end of the last sentence of the Polish formula:

… the Government of the USSR, which now maintains diplomatic relations with the present Provisional Government of Poland and the Governments of Great Britain and the United States will establish diplomatic relations with the Polish Provisional Government of National Unity. and will exchange Ambas. by whose reports the respect. Govts. will be kept informed about the situation in Poland.