Othman: Poor Congress
By Frederick Othman
…
Reiss: German generals and industrialists oppose Nazi ‘war of desperation’
Large group ready to surrender in hope of saving something
By Curt Reiss
…
Despite ‘scandalous’ charge –
Surplus material auctions to continue, board says
Such sales ‘all right if run correctly,’ spokesman asserts in defending policy
By Roger W. Stuart, Scripps-Howard staff writer
…
George bill faces fight in House
Rules Committee to meet tomorrow
…
Ickes, McKellar may join in fight on TVA chief
Tart-tongued pair, who often have fought between themselves, both oppose Lilienthal
By Daniel M. Kidney, Scripps-Howard staff writer
…
Gracie Allen Reporting
By Gracie Allen
Well, the latest rumor has Hitler seeking refuge in a Bavarian monastery and looking very innocent about this nasty old war. Believe me, you’re going to see some a real academy-award acting all over Germany from now on.
Goering probably will appear as Little Eva in Uncle Tom’s Cabin and Heinrich Himmler, with a shawl over his head and a kindly twinkle in his eye, will do his best to look like Whistler’s Mother.
Then all the big Prussian generals will point after the Nazis and say to the Allies: “They went thettaway, sheriff.”
Believe me, factories in Germany are working overtime these days, but they aren’t producing planes and tanks. They’re all busy turning out halos for the Nazis to wear.
U.S. State Department (February 7, 1945)
Agreed Text of Preliminary Yalta Press Release
Yalta, February 7, 1945
Crimean Conference Press Release
Statement for the press and radio released at 4:30 o’clock p.m., Eastern War Time Wednesday, February 7, 1945.
The President of the United States of America, the Premier of the Soviet Union and the Prime Minister of Great Britain, accompanied by their chiefs of staff, the three foreign secretaries and other advisors, are now meeting in the Black Sea area.
Their purpose is to concert plans for completing the defeat of the common enemy and for building, with their Allies, firm foundations for a lasting peace. Meetings are proceeding continuously.
The conference began with military discussions. The present situation on all the European fronts has been reviewed and the fullest information interchanged. There is complete agreement for joint military operations in the final phase of the war against Nazi Germany. The military staffs of the three Governments are now engaged in working out jointly the detailed plans.
Discussions of problems involved in establishing a secure peace have also begun. These discussions will cover joint plans for the occupation and control of Germany, the political and economic problems of liberated Europe and proposals for the earliest possible establishment of a permanent international organization to maintain Peace.
A communiqué will be issued at the conclusion of the Conference.
Approved by Marshal Stalin, the Prime Minister and President Roosevelt. Released simultaneously in Washington, London and Moscow.
Log of the Trip
Wednesday, February 7, 1945
1300: Lunch at Livadia. – The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Mr. Flynn and General Watson.
1610: The Fourth Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened at Livadia. Present were:
| For the U.S. | For Great Britain | For the USSR |
|---|---|---|
| The President. | The Prime Minister. | Marshal Stalin. |
| Mr. Stettinius. | Mr. Eden. | Mr. Molotov. |
| Admiral Leahy. | Mr. Cadogan. | Mr. Vyshinski. |
| Mr. Hopkins. | Mr. Clark Kerr. | Mr. Maisky. |
| Justice Byrnes. | Mr. Jebb. | Mr. Gousev. |
| Mr. Harriman. | Mr. Bridges. | Mr. Gromyko. |
| Mr. Matthews. | Mr. Wilson. | Mr. Pavlov. |
| Mr. Hiss. | Mr. Dixon. | |
| Mr. Bohlen. | Major Birse. |
This meeting adjourned at 2000.
2030: Dinner at Livadia. – The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Justice Byrnes, Admiral Leahy and Mr. Stettinius.
U.S. State Department (February 8, 1945)
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.
Livadia Palace, USSR
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Rear Admiral Olsen | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Brigadier General Roberts | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Brigadier General Loutzenheiser | |
| Major General Kuter | Brigadier General Cabell | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Brigadier General Lindsay | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Brigadier General Bessell | |
| Major General Bull | Brigadier General Everest | |
| Major General Deane | Commodore Burrough | |
| Major General Anderson | Colonel Peck | |
| Major General Hull | Colonel Lincoln | |
| Major General Wood | Colonel Dean | |
| Major General Hill | Colonel Bogart | |
| Rear Admiral Smith | Colonel Cary | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Captain Stroop | |
| Rear Admiral Carter | Captain McDill | |
| Rear Admiral Duncan | Commander Clark | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | ||
| Captain Graves |
JCS Minutes
Leningrad, February 8, 1945, 10 a.m.
Top secret
Levels of Supply of All Petroleum Products in All Theaters
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Overall Review of Cargo and Troop Shipping Position for the Remainder of 1945 (CCS 746/11)
Admiral Leahy said that although the paper was an agreed report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board it appeared to him that the essence of the report was an agreement to reexamine the position when a need for further study arose.
General Somervell said that the necessity for a revision had already arisen, particularly with reference to redeployment plans. On the other hand, he felt that the paper in its present form was entirely satisfactory. Referring to paragraph 4b (1) (d) of the paper he said that during the Committee negotiations the British had insisted upon the submission of the report referred to therein on 1 June.
General Marshall said that if the war ended by 1 April 1945 the combined redeployment plan and the related combined report by the Combined Military Transportation Committee and shipping authorities would be too late if submitted on 30 April 1945, as required in the paper.
General Somervell felt that the date for the submission of the report might well be moved up to 1 April.
Admiral King pointed out that the reports could be submitted at any time prior to 30 April. The requirement as stated in the paper was that they should be ready not later than 30 April.
Colonel Lincoln said that as far as the U.S. side was concerned the Planners already had a redeployment paper under way and that they could make this plan available by 1 April.
Admiral Leahy said that a change of the date to 1 April might not be acceptable to the British.
Admiral Smith said that the British members of the combined committees appeared to have no objection to a 1 April date. The date of 30 April had been selected to afford the U.S. Planners ample time to produce their redeployment plan.
General Somervell thought there might be some objection on the part of the British to moving the date up to 1 April. He understood that the British plans for redeployment had not progressed as far as the U.S. plans.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend approval of CCS 746/11 subject to the change of the date in the third line on Page 4 from 30 April to 1 April.
Employment of War-Weary U.S. Bombers Against Large Industrial Target Areas in Germany (JCS 1150/1)
Admiral Leahy said that in this paper the representative of the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, proposed that the question of the employment of war-weary bombers be reopened by recommending that the President address a memorandum on the subject to the Prime Minister. He understood the Prime Minister had instructed the British Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their previous concurrence in the employment of this type of weapon and felt that to request the President to ask the Prime Minister to reverse his stand would be undesirable.
General Anderson explained that there was no intention of launching uncontrolled aircraft indiscriminately against the German countryside. He believed that there had been a misunderstanding on the part of the British as to the employment of this weapon. Recent developments had proved that explosive-laden aircraft could be directed against military targets with considerable accuracy and therefore had a definite military value when used against heavily protected underground installations.
General Marshall said that as he understood it, the British Chiefs of Staff have no military objection to the project but that certain Cabinet Members had opposed it. He doubted the propriety of having the President press the Prime Minister to urge these Cabinet Members to reverse their position, for heretofore these same Members had supported the British Chiefs of Staff in war measures advocated by the U.S.
In reply to a question by Admiral King as to why this project should not be restricted entirely to France, General Anderson said that while the launchings were to be made in France all of the developments so far had taken place in base installations set up in England and to move these base installations to France would be a waste of effort.
General Kuter pointed out that further development of this project was highly important in view of the prospects of a very profitable employment of this type of weapon against Japanese targets.
Admiral Leahy said the discussion had given him an entirely different conception of the weapon. When this matter first came up, he understood that the aircraft would be launched in the general direction of Germany and that the explosive-laden planes would fall aimlessly when the fuel was exhausted. This he considered an inhuman and barbarous type of warfare with which the United States should not be associated; but now, since it appeared that the missiles could be controlled with a considerable degree of accuracy, he agreed that they could be usefully employed. He inquired why, since the planes employed were American and would be operated under American command, it was necessary to collaborate with the British in their use.
General Kuter said that, in view of the instructions already received on this subject by the British Chiefs of Staff and since the matter had heretofore been dealt with on a combined basis, it would be undesirable for the United States now to employ this weapon unilaterally. Moreover, the bases where the project was being developed were located in England.
Admiral Duncan felt that it would be entirely proper for the United States Chiefs of Staff to withdraw their original proposal to use uncontrolled missiles and present the project as a development of a controlled missile.
General Kuter said that the development of the control of this type of aircraft had progressed very rapidly, and it was essential that this development continue.
In view of the foregoing, Admiral Leahy said that he felt an approach should be made to the British Chiefs of Staff for reconsideration at the next meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to bring up for discussion at the meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to follow, the question of the employment of radio-controlled explosive-laden bombers.
Subjects for First U.S.-USSR Staff Meeting (JCS 1227/4 and 1227/5)
Admiral Leahy said that in JCS 1227/4 the Joint Staff Planners suggest certain subjects which the United States Chiefs of Staff should discuss with the Soviet General Staff. In JCS 1227/5 General Deane recommends a series of questions as the basis of the discussions. The Planners’ paper appears to go into considerable detail and to contain items not covered in the questions suggested by General Deane.
Admiral Leahy said that he entertained little hope of engaging in extended conversations with the Soviet General Staff.
General Marshall observed that our success in arranging a meeting with the Soviet Army Staff was a good omen as to the Soviets’ willingness to discuss the matters in which we are interested.
Admiral King said that he favored the approach to the Soviets advanced by the Planners.
General Deane said that he found no fault with the Planners’ paper except that he would not recommend that the status of the MILEPOST project be discussed by the United States Chiefs of Staff unless the Soviets first brought up the matter. Moreover, he proposed that the United States Chiefs of Staff refrain from suggesting a Russian strategic air force, inasmuch as it appeared that the aircraft necessary to constitute such a force could not be provided.
General Deane felt that it would be a mistake to bring up the matter of the exchange of weather information in view of the satisfactory progress that had been made so far. The Soviets had met every United States request for the exchange of this information.
General Kuter said that the weather information received so far did not meet the full requirements of the Twentieth Air Force in dealing with Japanese targets and suggested that there should be an increase in the number of weather stations in Siberia.
Admiral Olsen said that the Soviets had encountered considerable difficulty in setting up weather stations in Siberia because of the lack of transportation and communication facilities. They prefer to use their own personnel and equipment and therefore, if it were suggested that more stations be installed, the request should indicate willingness to make U.S. equipment available. He confirmed General Deane’s view that it would be a mistake to insist on a further exchange of weather information on a high level, since negotiations to meet United States requirements could be satisfactorily handled by the United States Mission in Moscow.
General Deane said he had arranged his list of questions with a view to permitting the Soviets to do the talking. The questions were designed to draw out Soviet views. Whether or not the questions were proper ones is a matter for decision by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In reply to an inquiry by Admiral Leahy, General Deane said that the operations referred to in Question 7 in JCS 1227/5 were those to be initially undertaken by the Soviets if they entered the war against Japan. General Deane felt that the Soviet answer to the first question in his paper would undoubtedly lead to several contributory questions which would cover the points made by the Planners in their paper.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to use both JCS 1227/4 and 1227/5 in their conference with the Soviet General Staff.
Meeting of the Foreign Ministers, noon
Vorontsov Villa, USSR
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | Soviet Union |
| Secretary Stettinius | Foreign Secretary Eden | Foreign Commissar Molotov |
| Mr. Matthews | Sir Alexander Cadogan | Mr. Vyshinsky |
| Mr. Hiss | Sir Archibald Clark Kerr | Mr. Gusev |
| Mr. Page | Mr. Jebb | Mr. Gromyko |
| Major Theakstone | Mr. Pavlov | |
| Mr. Golunsky |
Page Minutes
Alupka, February 8, 1945, noon
Top secret
Subjects:
- WORLD SECURITY ORGANIZATION
- YUGOSLAVIAN FRONTIERS
- CONTROL COMMISSION IN BULGARIA AND HUNGARY
- REPARATIONS
- IRAN
World Security Organization
Mr. Eden, who presided, stated that the Foreign Secretaries had been requested to consider two points vis-à-vis the World Security Organization; first, the question of membership which included that concerning the admission of two or three of the Soviet Republics, and, second, the question of the time and place of the meeting.
Mr. Stettinius interjected that there was also the question of exactly which nations should be invited to the initial conference.
Mr. Eden inquired whether anyone desired to initiate the discussion on this general question.
Mr. Stettinius stated that he wished to start at the bottom. He said that he would be delighted to invite the great Allies to confer in the United States. He hoped that the President had not shocked the Foreign Secretaries yesterday by mentioning the month of March as the time for the opening of the conference, and he continued that he felt sure that the time could be arranged to fit in with the convenience of Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden. However, he was anxious to open the conference at the earliest possible date. Personally, he hoped that it could be held no later than the latter part of April. With respect to the question concerning who would be invited, he recalled that at Dumbarton Oaks there had been considerable talk of inviting the Associated Nations as well as the United Nations. He stated that he had come to the conclusion that it would probably be most satisfactory to limit the invitations to those who had signed the United Nations Declaration and declared war on the common enemy. With respect to Mr. Molotov’s references to multiple membership for the Soviet Union, it was his feeling, from the standpoint of geographical area and population, that this question should be given sympathetic consideration at the opening conference. He continued that he had thus far been unable in his own mind to decide just how inclusion of these entities could be arranged. In the Dumbarton Oaks proposals there was a provision to the effect that each sovereign state had one vote. He had not thus far been able to see clearly how the Dumbarton Oaks proposals could be amended to provide for multiple participation. He concluded that he wished again to refer the matter to the President who had said that the subject was most interesting and deserved sympathetic consideration.
Mr. Molotov stated that he had expressed his views on the inclusion of two or three Soviet Republics in the World Organization at the last plenary meeting. He requested Mr. Eden to state his ideas on the other subjects on the World Security agenda.
Mr. Eden stated that he would be glad to accept the invitation of the United States Government to hold the conference in the United States. He only wished to enter one caveat. He remarked that Mr. Winant, Mr. Gusev, and himself were getting a little jealous in never having any large conferences in London. If Mr. Molotov and he were to go to the United States for this conference, he hoped that there would be an early meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in London.
Mr. Stettinius and Mr. Molotov supported Mr. Eden’s views with respect to a meeting of the Foreign Secretaries in London.
Mr. Eden continued that since some time would be needed to get the Chinese and possibly the French in line, and since the lawyers would need possibly two weeks before the conference opened, he would prefer to postpone the opening of the conference until the second half of April. He pointed out that he would be committed to debates in Parliament before he would be able to go to the United States. After some discussion it was agreed by Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden that the conference should open on April 25.
Mr. Molotov had previously accepted the invitation to hold the conference in the United States.
Mr. Eden stated that he wished to make a few observations on the inclusion of Soviet Republics in the Organization. He said that he was sympathetically inclined to the Soviet position in this respect and would be ready to say so at whatever was considered to be an appropriate moment.
Mr. Molotov interjected “The sooner the better.” Mr. Molotov then pointed out, in relation to the remarks made by Mr. Stettinius, that the President had indicated yesterday that according to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals each Government had one vote. However, Canada and Australia had individual votes and the fact that they were component parts of the British Empire did not prevent them from being individual members of the assembly. He said that amendments had been made to the Soviet constitution which gave the Soviet Republics the right to have contact with foreign states. The Soviet Union was a union of states. The constitution had now been revised to increase the rights of the Republics. The development of relations between the Republics and foreign states, which had already begun, was in this direction and was developing according to democratic principles. He continued that he believed that it would be superfluous to mention the political, economic and military importance of the Ukraine, White Russia and the Lithuanian Republic. He urged that it would be most desirable if agreement could be reached on this question today.
Mr. Molotov then referred to Mr. Stettinius’ statement that only those nations which had signed the United Nations Declaration and declared war on Germany should be invited to the conference. This immediately gave rise to some questions. Which Polish Government, for example, should be invited.
Mr. Eden immediately interjected that this was a good reason for settling the Polish problem now.
Mr. Molotov continued that certain countries which did not maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union would also be invited. He stated that he would like to check the exact list of states which would attend the conference.
Mr. Stettinius gave Mr. Molotov such a list and pointed out that although Ecuador had recently declared war on Germany it was not included on the list since it had not yet signed the United Nations Declaration.
Mr. Molotov pointed out that if agreement could not be reached on the membership of the organization it should be reported accordingly.
Mr. Eden stated that only the question of the membership of the two Soviet Republics remained open.
Mr. Cadogan pointed out that if a conference were called to complete the work of Dumbarton Oaks and to reach final agreement on a charter, he did not see how any of the original members of the organization could be excluded from the conference.
Mr. Stettinius stated that the United Nations should meet to complete the charter. New members could be elected at this meeting. He said that he was trying to find a way to arrange for consideration of the Soviet request before the first meeting of the assembly.
Mr. Eden suggested as a possible procedure that the United Nations might meet and might draw up an order of the day which would include the question of extending foundation membership to two Soviet Republics. He said that he was quite ready to agree to this proposal.
Mr. Molotov suggested an amendment to Mr. Eden’s proposal to the effect that the three Foreign Secretaries had agreed that it would be advisable to grant admission to the assembly to two or three Soviet Republics.
Mr. Stettinius stated that he was favorably impressed with what Mr. Eden had said. He had not had an opportunity to discuss this matter with the President this morning and it was, therefore, impossible for him to make any firm commitment. However, he would be glad to discuss the question with the President promptly and hoped and expected that the United States would be able to give a favorable reply before the end of the day. He stated that he would not bring up the question of Poland since he hoped that agreement would be reached on this matter at the present conference.
Mr. Stettinius stated that there were a number of other details with respect to Dumbarton Oaks, such as the status of France, how China would be consulted, who would issue the invitations, etc.
Mr. Eden suggested that a sub-committee be set up to study these details and report back to the Foreign Secretaries. Messrs. Jebb, Gromyko and Hiss were appointed to study these matters.
Yugoslavian Frontiers
Mr. Eden stated that although he did not wish to raise the question of Yugoslavian frontiers with Austria and Italy, he would like to point out that with the occupation of Austria by the Red Army there might well be administrative questions relative to the frontiers which should be handled. For this reason, the British Delegation was submitting a note to the Soviet Delegation on the question.
Control Commission in Bulgaria and Hungary
Mr. Eden stated that he also wished to discuss the question of a Control Commission in Bulgaria in the light of the decisions reached vis-à-vis the Hungarian Control Commission. It was agreed to confine the present meeting to those matters which had been referred to the Foreign Secretaries by the Chiefs of State for consideration.
Reparations
Mr. Molotov inquired as to when the American and British Delegations would be prepared to discuss the question of reparations.
Mr. Stettinius stated that he would be ready tomorrow.
Mr. Eden added that he hoped that the British side would also be ready.
Iran
Mr. Eden recalled the signing of the Declaration on Iran. He stated that the Allies had signed treaties with Iran in which certain privileges had been granted to them for the duration of the war. In all other respects, however, he felt that the Iranian Government should be the master in its own house and free to make its own decisions. The British Government felt that it was most important to observe this principle – otherwise the Allies might find themselves in competition in Iranian affairs. No one desired that. For this reason, he urged that the Allies refrain from interfering in internal Iranian matters. With respect to oil, Mr. Eden stated that the British Government did not dispute the Soviet need for Iranian oil and that it was no part of British policy to prevent the Soviet Union from obtaining oil from Northern Iran. Indeed, the Soviet Union was a natural market for this oil. The British Government did not wish to put any obstacles in the way of the Soviet Union’s obtaining oil concessions if and when the Iranians were prepared to negotiate. He continued that he felt that it should be made known publicly that the Allies would not press the matter concerning oil concessions any further until their troops had been withdrawn from Iran. The British Government was ready to consider at the Crimean Conference the advisability of making some statement which would indicate that the Allies were prepared to start to withdraw their troops earlier than was provided for in the Declaration on Iran. This withdrawal might commence as soon as the supply routes were closed. He believed that if agreement could be reached on this point it would have a good effect on world opinion and would show that the Allies were prepared to carry out the Tehran Declaration.
Mr. Molotov maintained that there were two different questions involved, i.e. those concerning the oil concessions and the withdrawal of Allied troops. With respect to the withdrawal of the troops, this question had never been placed before the Soviet Government until today. He maintained that this was a question of fulfilling the provisions of the treaty signed by Iran. If there were any need to amend this agreement the question should be studied. This would take some time.
With respect to the oil concessions, Mr. Molotov stated that he would like to make a few comments. The Soviet Government had asked Ambassador Ahi what the Iranian attitude would be to a request for concessions. Ahi’s reply had been most favorable. Kavtaradze had then proceeded to Iran to negotiate. In his first conversation with Foreign Minister Saed, the Foreign Minister had taken a favorable position. This was only natural since the granting of concessions was not only to the interests of the Soviet Union, but also to Iran. It was also in compliance with the Declaration of Tehran, since the granting of concessions would assist Iranian economy. This was the first stage of the controversy.
During the second stage the situation changed. The Iranians then stated that it would not be appropriate to carry on the negotiations. Thereupon, the Medjlis had adopted a decision to the effect that there should be no concessions during the war. Subsequently, many Iranians had stated that this decision had been adopted in too great a hurry and that it was unwise.
Why could there not be a third stage? Since the Iranians had changed their minds in one direction the Soviets saw no reason why they should not change it back to the first stage. The Soviet Government had endeavored to persuade them to do so. Kavtaradze had returned and the strong-armed methods he had used have subsided. He said that no negotiations were being carried on at the present time and that he did not believe it advisable to pay any special attention to this question now. He suggested that the matter be left alone – that it take its own course. The situation was not acute at the present time.
Mr. Stettinius pointed out that the United States had no wartime treaty with the Iranian Government. American firms had carried on negotiations for oil concessions but these had been dropped following the Medjlis decision. The firms were consequently in the same position as the Soviets. With respect to the withdrawal of troops from Iran he wished to point out that the American troops there were serving the interests of the Soviet Union in moving Lend-Lease supplies from the Persian Gulf. The United States Government was content to leave the question of oil negotiations until the end of the war. He wished fully to support Mr. Eden’s proposals regarding the withdrawal of the Allied troops.
Mr. Eden remarked that the British Government had no opposition to the granting of oil concessions to the Soviet Government.
Mr. Stettinius stated that the United States Government took the same position.
Mr. Eden pointed out that the British had also carried on negotiations with the Iranians, even before the Soviet negotiations had started. As a result of the present attitude of the Iranian Government all of these negotiations were now held in abeyance. He said that if some statement were released, as suggested by him, it might reassure the Iranians and facilitate the recommencement of oil negotiations. With respect to the renewal [withdrawal] of Allied troops, there was no need to amend the Iranian treaty which stated that Allied troops would be withdrawn not later than six months after the termination of hostilities. He felt that it would be wise to withdraw these troops as soon as the supply route was no longer necessary.
Mr. Molotov stated that he believed it might be advisable to limit the matter to an exchange of views on the subject. He offered to summon Kavtaradze to the conference to make a report on the Iranian situation.
Mr. Eden stated that he would like to think over what Mr. Molotov had said and added that he might have new suggestions to make at a forthcoming meeting.
Matthews Notes
Alupka, February 8, 1945, noon
- Austria-Yugoslav. Must agree on boundary for purpose of admin. Note.
- Bulgarian & Hungary Control: Com:
- Reparations tomorrow
- Iran. –
Oil – no dispute on Sov. to get oil from N. Persia. No obstacle on Rus. concession if & when Pers. are prepared to negotiate. We should all make it known we will not press matters further until Allied Troops withdrawn. We prepared to issue statement prepared to withdraw troops earlier pari passu – when supply route closes. Would show world prepared to carry out Teh decl.
Mol: Eden has 2 pts – different 1. Oil 2. Troops. Troops question new. If necessary to change agreement must be studied & some time needed.
Oil – What was beginning? Negot began by asking Pers. govt attitude on concess N Persia. Answer was attitude would be most favorable Dep. Com Kav went to Iran. Conversation with first position of Said & Shah both favorable. Seemed not only USSR but Persia also inter. Would be econ. assistance to Pers.
Something has changed. No time for details but Govt. said would not continue discussions Persia during war. Mejlis would not discuss. Said decision was taken in a hurry. Why not now a third phase. Why can’t Pers. govt change position again. Trying to persuade them thats all. Kav. has returned home & method which might seem strong has changed. No negot. now but reserve right to take. Why special attention now? Why not let things go their way. Situation not acute.
S. We have no treaty with Our oil concessions also advanced stage & were in same position. Supports Eden on troop withdrawal. Willing to wait till war’s end on concess.
Eden: Reiterates no oppos. to Soviet concession. Does believe some statement might reassure Pers who were frightened at one time and make negotiations easier.
On troop withdrawal no change in treaty necessary. Would help reassure Pers & therefore negot.
Mol: Thinks we should limit ourselves to an exchange of views Might bring in Kavtaradze – he is here in Crimea.
Hiss Notes
Alupka, February 8, 1945, noon
ERS see Ed. →Wire S. Am states act Immediately
For Mins
2/8 Eden Chmn
Eden: 1st World Org. q. 2 q’s referred to us
- Q. of membership of 2 or 3 reps of SU
- Time & place of conference
AH
Note to Pres
re Art VII
ERS & Ns to be invited
ERS To start at bottom of list 1st I should like take this opportunity invite our great allies to conf in US
Hope Pres didn’t shock you yester. by mentioning March I’m sure time can be arranged to fit in with convenience of Mr Mol & Mr Ed However we are very anxious to have the conf. at earliest poss. time Pers. hope could be held not later than latter part Apr.
As to matter of those to be invited you will recall at D. O. there was much talk as to the Assoc. Ns as well as the Un Ns We have come to the conclusion that taking everything into consid. it would prob. be most satis. to limit those to be invited to those who had signed Un Ns Decl & declared war on our common enemy.
As to Mr. Molotov’s reference to multiple membership for S.U. From standpoint geog. area & pop. it is my feeling this entire q. should be given very sympathetic consid. As to how it could be done immediately at the very first meeting I have not been able to determine in my own mind
In D. O. proposals we wrote in the provision each state have 1 vote. I have not yet been able to see clearly how D. O. proposals could be amended to provide for multiple participation. I wish again to refer to the Pres’ reaction yesterday to this matter when he said it was most interesting & deserved sympathetic study
Mol. Has expressed his ideas re last q. As to 1st q. like Ed. to state his views
Ed. As regards time & place. Glad to accept the invitation of the U S Govt I only want to enter 1 caveat. Mr Winant, Mr Gusev & I getting little jealous we never have anything in Lon. If Mr Mol & I go to Am for this I hope for an early meeting of For Secs in Lon
ERS Agreed
Mol Quite poss.
Ed. Invitation not ultimatum
ERS Promptly accept
Mol We also
Ed As to time have to get Ch. into line & possibly Fr. Lawyers want 10 days or so I rather think I am committed to debates in Par. before I go I would like myself 2nd half April
ERS around about Apr 15
Ed I would give it a wk more 20 something
Mol Agreed
ERS latter part April?
Mol Agreed
ERS Wanted calendar Suggested Wed Apr 25
Mol. Agrees to both
Ed We mildly prefer second (date) Easter 1st
Agreed April 25
Mol. We accept your invitation to Wash & the date of 25th
Re 3 reps Ed. Definitely sympathetic to their inclusion in Ass. We would be ready to say that at whatever is considered the approp. moment
Mol – As soon as possible
Would like deal with this q. relation to remarks of Mr S. Mr S has reminded us Pres spoke of decs of D. O. & 1 vote. Like ask 1 q. Can & Austr part of U K.
Ed – Of Brit Em
Mol & members of Ass.
The amends to Sov Const which have been accepted Feb last yr give reps rt of immed touch with for. states S U union of states. Const Enlarges rts of reps. In this sense we must develop rels with for. states, this already begun As to their pol, econ, mil importance no use proving what impor. have such reps as U,——Would be very desirable if could arrive at agt & have reach dec. today
Re Proposal made by ERS that Un Ns Decl signers & decl. of war com.
Q. which Pol should be invited
Ed Another reason settle prob.
Mol. Some Ns have no dip. rels with S U
Would like to check up exact no. of states which would take place
ERS read list
Ecuador has recently declared war but has not yet declared war
Ed: laughed
Mol If we cannot arrive at agt re membership must say so & move on to another subject
Ed: all agreed except re 2 reps.
Cad: If you call a conf. to complete D. O. work & to agree finally on the Charter I don’t see how you can exclude any of members of that conf. from the Org.
ERS: The Un. Ns meet to complete a charter & all would be members They could elect new members before 1st meeting of Ass. Trying find way Sov request can be taken before 1st meeting
Ed Un Ns could meet as met last time & could agree amongst other bus. to extend foundation members to include the 2 Sov. Reps. We should be quite ready to agree to that
Mol. Suggests amend, to Ed proposal
We must formulate this q. as he proposed & add we 3 have agreed it would be advisable to give the 2 or 3 Sov. reps. a place in the Ass.
ERS asked Ed q. – Ed restated position
ERS I am favorably impressed with what Mr Ed. has said. I did not have an oppor. of discussing this with Pres this morn. ∴ at this time imp. make any firm commit. However delighted discuss with Pres promptly & would hope & expect U S be able give favorable answer before end of day
Mol. Agreed
Ed. “
Mol We leave now q of Pol. – in hope we reach agt.
Ed. Other items to consider
ERS There are a no. of details. If we could meet tomorrow
Status of Fr., Ch. participant at DO. & must be consulted, form of invitation, how & by whom & when invitations be issued
Ed. We might set up subcom. to prepare this & report to us
ERS A. H., Gromyko, Jebb
Ed. Other items for agenda
-
Yugoslav frontier – Will put in a note on that
-
Control Coms., Bul & Hung.
Mol. Dec. re Hung. Con. Com just arrived at. Other q’s -
Iran
Agreed not try to list q’s still to come up at plenary session
Mol. when can we go on with q. of reparations?
ERS we will be prepared tomorrow to discuss Rep. further
Ed. Hope we will
Iran
Ed At Teheran we signed Decl. re Persia & each made treaties with Iran
About oil – no dispute about SU’s need for oil. No part of our pol. to prevent S.U. from obtaining oil from N. Persia Indeed Sov. Un is a natural market for N. Per. oil. We do not wish to put any obstacle in way of R’s obtaining concession if & when Persians prepared to neg. it. We should all of us make it known that we will not press matters further re oil concessions until Allied troops have been withdrawn from Persia
Ready to consider making some statement indicating we would be prepared to start withdrawal Allied troops earlier than was agreed in treaty – which was conclusion of Eur war.
Mol. 2 diff. q’s oil & Allied troops in Persia
Q of withdrawal of troops was not taken up until today in such a way. Here is q of carrying out the agt already signed by Iran. If there is a nec. to change this agt, some time needed to study
About oil – Negs. began by Rs asking Ir Amb what would be Ir. att. toward Sov concession Said sure answer would be most favorable. Then Dep. Com Kav – went to Iran & talked to Saed. 1st position of Saed quite favorable – same re Shah
Seemed quite natural not only SU but Persia interested in accord with Decl on Iran would be solid assistance to Iran
Second stage – something has changed in Iran. Not now dealing with details but Per. govt said not prepared go on with discussions & Majlis took dec. not give concessions during war. Since then have heard many times from Per. officials dec was unfortunate & taken in hurry
Why can’t there be 3rd stage – return of Per Govt to its 1st opin. If Per. Govt has changed mind in 1 direction what cant change in other dir. What objection? May reopen negs. Brit already have concessions – no inconvenience to Rs & R concession would not be to Brit
Let things go own way. Nothing acute now
ERS Just a word. For the record US has not signed a war-time treaty with Iran. Treaty was Sov-Brit-Iranian treaty. Also certain Am. oil co’s were negotiating & we too were cut short. I wish to support endorse entirely Mr. Eden’s proposal re withdrawal of troops. Only reason Am. troops are in Iran is to serve S U from standpoint supply & movement of Lend-lease.
As to oil we are perfectly contented not to resume negs. till after hostilities end.
Ed: No opposition to Sov. concession
ERS Same is true of U.S.
Ed. We were negotiationg another concession even before R negs began & now all that has come to an end as result of Per. Govts present attitude. Thought statement he proposed might reassure Persians, who were undoubtedly frightened at one time, & make negs easier
As to troops, no need amend treaty which says be withdrawn not later than 6 mos after end hostilities No diff. in Brit withdrawing earlier. Thought might begin when supply line no longer going.
Mol Offered to have Kavtoradge come
Mol. Would like to have limit selves to exch of views
Ed. to think over what Mol. said & may make new suggestions
Mol All of should think
U.S. Delegation Memorandum
Yalta, February 8, 1945
List of Items Referred to Foreign Ministers
-
Inclusion of Ukraine, White Russia and Lithuania among initial members of the Organization. (See attached paper)
-
Date and place of United Nations Conference.
-
Nations to be invited to United Nations Conference.
Emphasize membership should include all signatories of United Nations Declaration – not just the specific, listed countries which have already signed.
(See attached list)
- The policy toward Iran. (See attached paper)
[Attachment 1]
Yalta, February 8, 1945
Arguments Against Inclusion of Any of the Soviet Republics Among the Initial Members
Soviet Republics not Signatories of the United Nations Declaration:
On further thought we have become impressed with the Soviet view that the initial members of the United Nations Organization should be the signatories of the United Nations Declaration. As none of the Soviet Republics are signatories of that Declaration, Mr. Molotov’s proposal that two or three of these Republics be admitted to initial membership would be contrary to that principle.
The Question Should Be Postponed Until the Organization is Formed:
The President indicated in his remarks yesterday at the plenary session that this question should not come up until after the Organization is formed.
Mr. Molotov said yesterday at the plenary session that the Soviet Government had observed the gradual development of international relations of the British dominions. In accordance with the practice followed by the dominions, it would seem to be premature to take the action proposed by Mr. Molotov at this time. We should allow a longer time to elapse and have available more experience as to the international relations of the Soviet Republics before we consider this question.
The question is such a novel one in international relations that the other members of the Organization should have a chance to consider the question before a decision is reached.
The Soviet Republics are not Sovereign States under International Practice:
The Soviet constitution does not permit the Soviet Republics to control their own foreign policy or affairs. Other aspects of central control over the Republics are also inconsistent with the Republics being sovereign.
NOTE: India is one of the United Nations. It, too, is not independent. The Soviet representatives will probably argue that if India can be a member so should their three Republics.
The answer: India has for some period past been gradually developing international relations, and is generally regarded as having more of the attributes of separate nationhood than the Soviet Republics.
[Attachment 2]
List of Nations Which Were Invited to the United Nations Conferences at Hot Springs, Atlantic City and Bretton Woods
| United Nations | ||
|---|---|---|
| Australia | Iran | |
| Belgium | Iraq | |
| Bolivia | Liberia | |
| Brazil | Luxembourg | |
| Canada | Mexico | |
| China | Netherlands | |
| Colombia | New Zealand | |
| Costa Rica | Nicaragua | |
| Cuba | Norway | |
| Czechoslovakia | Panama | |
| Dominican Republic | Philippine Commonwealth | |
| El Salvador | Poland | |
| Ethiopia | Union of South Africa | |
| Greece | Union of Soviet Socialist Republics | |
| Guatemala | United Kingdom | |
| Haiti | United States | |
| Honduras | Yugoslavia | |
| India |
| States Associated with the United Nations in the War | ||
|---|---|---|
| Chile | Iceland | |
| Ecuador | Paraguay | |
| Egypt | Peru | |
| France – Provisional Government of the French Republic | Uruguay | |
| Venezuela | ||
| Observers | ||
| Danish Minister at Washington, attending in a personal capacity |
[Attachment 3]
Yalta, February 8, 1945
Policy on Iran
At Malta we agreed with the British on two points:
- We should urge the Soviet Government, in accordance with the spirit of the Declaration on Iran of December 1, 1943, to respect the decision of the Iranian Government to postpone negotiations for oil concessions until the termination of hostilities and withdrawal of Allied troops from Iran.
The Declaration on Iran, which was signed by the President, Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin at Tehran, expressed desire for the maintenance of Iran’s sovereignty and integrity.
- Both Governments should state that when the truck route to Russia across Iran is no longer needed, we would be prepared to begin removing our troops pari passu (i.e., at the same rate).
[Attachment 4]
Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran
December 1, 1943
The President of the United States, the Premier of the USSR, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, having consulted with each other and with the Prime Minister of Iran, desire to declare the mutual agreement of their three Governments regarding their relations with Iran.
The Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom recognize the assistance which Iran has given in the prosecution of the war against the common enemy, particularly by facilitating the transportation of supplies from overseas to the Soviet Union.
The Three Governments realize that the war has caused special economic difficulties for Iran, and they are agreed that they will continue to make available to the Government of Iran such economic assistance as may be possible, having regard to the heavy demands made upon them by their worldwide military operations and to the worldwide shortage of transport, raw materials, and supplies for civilian consumption.
With respect to the post-war period, the Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are in accord with the Government of Iran that any economic problems confronting Iran at the close of hostilities should receive full consideration, along with those of other members of the United Nations, by conferences or international agencies held or created to deal with international economic matters.
The Governments of the United States, the USSR, and the United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iran. They count upon the participation of Iran, together with all other peace-loving nations, in the establishment of international peace, security and prosperity after the war, in accordance with the principles of the Atlantic Charter, to which all four Governments have subscribed.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, noon
Livadia Palace, USSR
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Major General Kuter | Field Marshal Wilson | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | General Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Admiral Somerville | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Major General Laycock | |
| Major General Bull | Major General Holmes | |
| Major General Anderson | Lord Leathers | |
| Major General Hull | Brigadier General Loutzenheiser | |
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Jacob | |
| Captain Graves | Brigadier Cornwall-Jones | |
| Commander Coleridge |
CCS Minutes
Leningrad, February 8, 1945, noon
Top secret
Approval of the Minutes of the 186th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the conclusions of the minutes of the CCS 186th Meeting and approved the detailed record of the meeting subject to later minor amendments.
Levels of Supply of All Petroleum Products in All Theaters
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Overall Review of Cargo Shipping (CCS 746/11)
Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff had examined this paper and it was acceptable to them with one amendment. They would like to change the date referred to in the first sentence of paragraph 4b (1) (d) on Page 4 of the enclosure from 30 April to 1 April.
Lord Leathers said that this amendment would suit him personally very well if the staffs concerned could prepare the study in time.
Admiral Leahy said that the United States staffs believed this would be possible.
Sir Alan Brooke said that the British Chiefs of Staff were quite prepared to accept the first of April as a target date for the report concerned.
Continuing, Sir Alan Brooke suggested that paragraph 4b (1) of the enclosure required clarification as to the order of priority in which the tasks referred to were to be undertaken. For instance, the fixing of priorities for the continuance of the war against Japan referred to in paragraph 4b (1) (b) might well have to take place before the preparation of the combined redeployment plan or at least concurrently with it.
General Somervell explained that the tasks referred to in paragraph 4b (1) were not set out in the sequence in which they would necessarily be undertaken.
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should decide on the agencies to undertake the preparation of a combined redeployment plan, and the fixing of priority for continuance of the war against Japan. He felt that the Combined Staff Planners and the Combined Administrative Committee, in consultation, would be the best bodies to undertake this work. They would, of course, as set out in paragraph 4b (1) (c) confer with the Combined Military Transportation Committee and the appropriate shipping authorities.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved CCS 746/11, subject to the change of the date in the third line on Page 4 from 30 April to 1 April 1945.
b. Directed the Combined Staff Planners, in collaboration with the Combined Administrative Committee, to take the action outlined in paragraph 4b (1).
c. Invited the combined shipping authorities to take the action outlined in paragraph 4b (2).
Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War (CCS 777/1)
Sir Alan Brooke said there were two points the British Chiefs of Staff would like to make. With regard to Article 6, certain of the Dominion Governments had raised objections to the conclusion of an agreement whereby their prisoners of war should work for the Russians on any but a voluntary basis. He suggested therefore the insertion of the words “on a voluntary basis” after the words “They may also be employed” in the second sentence of Article 6.
As he saw it, the proposed agreement was susceptible to alteration by the State Department or Foreign Office, and all that was required was the assurance of the Combined Chiefs of Staff that they saw no objection to it in principle.
Admiral Leahy said that he had understood the Combined Chiefs of Staff should agree on the wording of the document and recommend its acceptance to the State Department and Foreign Office as a basis for discussion with the Russians.
Replying to a question by General Marshall, Sir Charles Portal explained that the Dominion Governments concerned had pointed out that their forces were enrolled on a voluntary basis and were not conscripts. For political reasons, therefore, they felt it important that such troops who might be prisoners of war, should not be made to work by the Russians except on a voluntary basis.
Admiral Leahy said the proposed amendment was acceptable.
Continuing, Sir Alan Brooke said that the second point which the British Chiefs of Staff wished to put forward was with regard to Article 8. They felt that this article introduced a new subject which had not previously been considered and might not be acceptable to the Russian authorities who might well object to agreeing that their prisoners of war falling into the hands of United States or British troops should, without their consent, be transferred by one of these powers to the other.
Admiral Leahy pointed out that such transfers might be operationally necessary.
Sir Charles Portal said that as he read it, there was nothing in the remainder of the agreement which prohibited such transfers but he regarded it as a matter more for mutual arrangement between the United States and British authorities concerned than for discussion with the Russians.
General Marshall said that he was prepared to agree that paragraph 8 should be deleted.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 777/1 subject to the following amendments:
- Article 6: In the fifth line, after “employed,” insert “on a voluntary basis.”
- Article 8: Delete this article and renumber the succeeding article as Article 8.
(Amended paper subsequently circulated as CCS 777/2.)
Equipment for Greek Forces (CCS 185th Mtg., Item 2; CCS 768/1; NAF 841)
Sir Alan Brooke reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that at their 185th Meeting, 2 February 1945, it had been agreed that the British would undertake the equipment of an additional 60,000 Greek forces upon receipt from London of certain assurances. The British Chiefs of Staff were now in a position to assure the United States Chiefs of Staff that the implementation of the proposals contained in NAF 841:
a. Would not interfere with the equipment for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe; and
b. Would not result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against United States resources.
The British would therefore go ahead with the equipping of the forces concerned. The British Chiefs of Staff would also formalize this matter by putting out a memorandum on the lines he had just mentioned.
General Marshall said that these assurances were satisfactory.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note of the assurance of the British Chiefs of Staff that the implementation of NAF 841 would not:
- Interfere with the equipment for Allied and liberated forces in Northwest Europe;
- Result in subsequent direct or indirect charges against U.S. resources.
b. Pursuant to the above, agreed to the implementation of the proposals in NAF 841.
Final Report to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 776/1)
Admiral Leahy raised the question of the preparation of the final report to the President and Prime Minister. He understood that such a report would be ready for consideration on the following morning. He understood also that the Prime Minister had suggested a plenary meeting at noon, on Friday, 9 February. He would seek the wishes of the President in this matter.
Sir Alan Brooke suggested that it might be well for the Combined Chiefs of Staff to meet an hour before the plenary meeting in order to clear any final points with regard to the report itself or any other matters which might arise.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to request a plenary meeting for 1200 hours on Friday, 9 February 1945.
b. Agreed to meet one hour prior to the plenary meeting, whatever the hour selected, to consider the final report.
Operations on the Western Front
General Marshall read out the latest information available on the course of ground and air operations on the Western Front. He felt it of particular interest to note that at the present time there were 49 Allied divisions in the line with 33 in reserve.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note with interest of the above statement.
Draft Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War as Approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Leningrad, February 8, 1945, noon
Top secret
Agreement Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by the Soviet Armies and U.S. (British) Armies
Preamble
The Government of the USSR and the Government of the United States of America (the Government of His Britannic Majesty) wishing to conclude an agreement on arranging for the care and repatriation of Soviet citizens freed by Allied troops, and for American citizens (British subjects) freed by the Red Army, through their appointed representatives, acting mutually in the authority duly and fully invested in them, have agreed as follows:
Article 1
All Soviet citizens liberated by forces operating under U.S. (British) command and American citizens (British subjects) liberated by the forces operating under Soviet command will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or U.S. (British) authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.
U.S. (British) and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.
Article 2
The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens (or subjects) of the other contracting party found by them, and will undertake to follow all the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and U. S. (British) repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens (or subjects) are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.
Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the over-all administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.
The relocation of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be notified to the competent Soviet or U.S. (British) authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.
Article 3
Except in so far as the obligations set out in this article may be affected by obligations undertaken in connection with the use of UNRRA (or other agreed relief agencies) the competent U.S. (British) and Soviet authorities will do their utmost in the circumstances obtaining in any area, and from time to time, to supply liberated citizens (or subjects) of the contracting parties with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or U.S. (British) authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall so far as possible be consistent with the normal practice relating to military rank.
The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens (or subjects) of the other contracting party.
Article 4
Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens (or subjects) held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens (or subjects) held by the other contracting party.
Article 5
Soviet and U.S. (British) military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated citizens (and subjects) of the other contracting party as the competent Soviet and U.S. (British) authorities shall agree upon beforehand.
Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.
In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and U.S. (British) Governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens (or subjects) necessary settlements with the governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.
Article 6
Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed in the management, maintenance and administration of the camps or billets in which they are situated. They may also be employed on a voluntary basis on other work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and U.S. (British) authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labor shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure.
Article 7
The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens (and subjects). They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens (and subjects) to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or U.S. (British) authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens (and subjects) shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.
Article 8
The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.