Stokes: Helping Henry
By Thomas L. Stokes
…
Taft, McNutt AFL ‘boys’ in work bill fight
Green asks Senators to oppose measure
By Ned Brooks, Scripps-Howard staff writer
…
Gracie Allen Reporting
By Gracie Allen
I’ve always heard that Molly Pitcher and those pioneer women were much braver and hardier that we women today. Don’t you believe it. True, they had to fight off Indians and wolves, and they took ordeals like having babies during Indian skirmishes right in stride.
Well, we may not have the Indians to fight, but the wolves today are much faster – they have cars. And just a week or so ago a woman in Los Angeles had a baby during a traffic jam.
For your information a Los Angeles traffic jam is much more bloodthirsty than any old Indian attack, and as for fighting ability, did you read about those women in Everett, Washington? They were attending a sale of sheer stockings and the store caught on fire. Well, those women stood off the firemen until every last pair of stockings had been sold.
Molly Pitcher… huh.
Offer to buy mills is made by U.S. Steel
Provo and Fontana plants are wanted
…
Post-war job estimate held too optimistic
Economic lists basic errors in forecasts
…
U.S. State Department (February 6, 1945)
Log of the Trip
Tuesday, February 6, 1945
0800: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier departed Livadia for Washington with White House mail.
1300: Luncheon at Livadia. – The President, the Prime Minister, Mr. Cadogan, Justice Byrnes, Mr. Hopkins and Mr. Harriman. Discussions continued after lunch until 3 p. m. The Prime Minister did not return to Vorontsov, as he was due back at Livadia at 4 p. m. (1600) for another conference. Instead, he accepted the loan of the room occupied by Admiral Brown and General Watson and took a short nap at Livadia.
1615: The Third Formal Meeting of the Crimea Conference was convened at Livadia. Present were:
| For the U.S. | For Great Britain | For the USSR |
|---|---|---|
| The President. | The Prime Minister. | Marshal Stalin. |
| Mr. Stettinius. | Mr. Eden. | Mr. Molotov. |
| Admiral Leahy. | Mr. Cadogan. | Mr. Vyshinski. |
| Mr. Hopkins. | Mr. Clark Kerr. | Mr. Maisky. |
| Justice Byrnes. | Mr. Jebb. | Mr. Gousev. |
| Mr. Harriman. | Mr. Bridges. | Mr. Gromyko. |
| Mr. Matthews. | Mr. Wilson. | Mr. Pavlov. |
| Mr. Hiss. | Mr. Dixon. | |
| Mr. Bohlen. | Major Birse. |
The following preliminary statement concerning the conference was agreed on at today’s meeting for release at 1630 tomorrow (Washington time).
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mrs. Boettiger, Mrs. Oliver, Miss Harriman and Mr. Spaman made a motor trip to Sevastopol today.
1900: A Joint Chiefs of Staff courier arrived from Washington with White House mail.
2030: Dinner at Livadia. – The President, Mrs. Boettiger, Justice Byrnes, Admiral Leahy, Mr. Harriman, Miss Harriman, Mr. Early and Mr. Flynn.
This afternoon Commander Tyree, Mr. Reilly, Major Greer, Mr. Long, Mr. Holmes and Mr. O’Driscoll left Livadia by automobile for Saki. At Saki they enplaned for Cairo to complete the advance arrangements incident to the President’s forthcoming visit to Egypt.
U.S. Navy Department (February 6, 1945)
CINCPOA Communiqué No. 250
Army Liberators of the Strategic Air Force, Pacific Ocean Areas, bombed storage and barracks areas on Hahajima in the Bonins on February 4 (East Longitude Date).
On February 4 and 5, Army Liberators of the Strategic Air Force attacked targets on Iwo Jima in the Volcanos.
Fighters of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing bombed barges and buildings in the Palaus on February 4 and 5.
Marine torpedo planes destroyed a pier and buildings on Yap in the Western Carolines on February 5.
Mitchell bombers of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing bombed airfield installations and destroyed a building on Ponape in the Carolines on February 6. The attack was made through intense anti-aircraft fire. One of our aircraft was lost.
Neutralizing attacks on enemy held bases in the Marshalls were continued on February 5 by Navy search planes of Fleet Air Wing Two.
U.S. State Department (February 7, 1945)
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10:00 a.m.
Livadia Palace, USSR
Top secret
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Fleet Admiral Leahy | Brigadier General Roberts | |
| General of the Army Marshall | Brigadier General Loutzenheiser | |
| Fleet Admiral King | Brigadier General Lindsay | |
| Major General Kuter | Brigadier General Bessell | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Brigadier General Everest | |
| Vice Admiral Cooke | Commodore Burrough | |
| Major General Bull | Colonel Peck | |
| Major General Deane | Colonel Lincoln | |
| Major General Anderson | Colonel Cary | |
| Major General Hull | Captain Stroop | |
| Major General Wood | Captain McDill | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Lieutenant Colonel McRae | |
| Rear Admiral Duncan | Commander Clark | |
| Rear Admiral Olsen | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | ||
| Captain Graves |
JCS Minutes
Leningrad, February 7, 1945, 10 a.m.
Approval of Minutes of CCS 186th Meeting
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend approval of the conclusions of the Minutes of the 186th Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff and the approval of the detailed record of the meeting, subject to later minor amendments.
Utilization of the Fifteenth Air Force in Vienna-Budapest Area (JCS 1241)
Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Staff Planners had in this paper reviewed the problem of basing or staging U.S. strategic air forces in the Vienna-Budapest area and recommended that a memorandum be sent to the President requesting Marshal Stalin’s agreement to the staging of elements of the Fifteenth Air Force through airdromes in the Budapest area. He found no objections to the paper and recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve it.
General Marshall drew attention to the fact that this subject had been discussed with the Russians at the tripartite meeting on 6 February 1945, and that the President need only to hand the memorandum to Marshal Stalin without discussion.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to present to the President the memorandum in Appendix “A” of JCS 1241 enclosing the draft memorandum to Marshal Stalin, prepared in English and Russian text.
Reciprocal Agreement on Prisoners of War (CCS 777; JCS 1266/1 (ARGONAUT); JCS 1266/1 (Wash.))
Admiral Leahy said that JCS 1266/1 (ARGONAUT) was the report of an ad hoc committee which expresses agreement with the British proposal in CCS 777 and recommends a memorandum to the Combined Chiefs of Staff to this effect. He pointed out that the Acting Secretary of State in Washington had already agreed to a different method but that this problem appeared to be one for the State Department to solve and was not the concern of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He found no objection to the recommendations of the Joint Logistics Committee in JCS 1266/1 (ARGONAUT) and recommended approval.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the memorandum in the Appendix of JCS 1266/1 and directed that it be presented to the Combined Chiefs of Staff (Subsequently circulated as CCS 777/1).
Supplies and Equipment Requested by the USSR (JCS 1138/3, JCS Info. Memo 360 – MILEPOST SUMMARY)
Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Logistics Committee had reviewed JCS 1138/2 and brought up to date the status of availability of equipment to meet the requirements for operation MILEPOST. In JCS 1138/3 they recommended that the Joint Chiefs of Staff note the facts and conclusions of the report and that a copy of the paper be furnished to the Executive, President’s Soviet Protocol Committee. He recommended that JCS 1138/3 be approved.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the facts and conclusions developed in the report of the Joint Logistics Committee in JCS 1138/3 and directed that a copy of the report be furnished to the Executive, President’s Soviet Protocol Committee.
Protocol on Zones of Occupation in Germany and Administration of “Greater Berlin” (JCS 577/28)
Admiral Leahy said that the Joint Logistics Committee had recommended as the final action of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the protocol on zones of occupation in Germany and administration of “Greater Berlin,” the dispatch of the message to the Secretary of War and Secretary of the Navy contained in the Appendix to JCS 577/28. He saw no objection to the paper and recommended approval.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to dispatch to the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy the message contained in the Appendix to JCS 577/28.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zone of Limitation for British and U.S. Air Operations in Advance of the Soviet Armies
General Marshall requested General Kuter to report on the meeting of the tripartite air staffs in connection with the coordination of strategic air operations with the Soviets.
General Kuter said that the draft agreement reached had been circulated to the Chiefs of Staff informally. It had been decided not to use the term “bombline” because of the difference between the Russian, British and American definitions but to use instead, the expression “zone of limitation.” There were two items in the agreement which were not entirely satisfactory. The first was the 24-hour notice of Allied air operations required by the Soviet General Staff and second, the depth of the zone, which would be deeper than the Allied command desired. However, it was the best arrangement that could be worked out. The agreement had been changed in one respect. He had substituted the words “British and U.S.” wherever the word “Allied” occurred. He requested the approval of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In reply to a question by General Deane, General Kuter explained that the Mission in Moscow would be furnished daily information of the location of the Soviet front lines, which automatically fixed the location of the zone of limitation.
General Kuter said that the matter of Allied-Russian liaison on a lower level had also been brought up at the meeting. For the necessity of such liaison the strategic air operations to the east of Berlin which had involved bombing within an extremely short distance of the Soviet lines had been used as an example. It was suggested that the Russians consider the use of VHF communication links with the Allied planes in order that their own fighter pilots might be able quickly to receive information of German movements discovered by Allied pilots and conduct their operations accordingly. He felt that the meeting, although not entirely satisfactory on all points, would lead to further discussions in Moscow. As an additional point, no decision on the advance bomber bases in the Vienna-Budapest area had been reached.
Admiral Leahy recommended that the agreement be approved as General Kuter had requested.
After further discussion, the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the agreement for a zone of limitation for British and U.S. air operations in advance of the Soviet armies prepared by the British-U.S.-Soviet air staffs, as amended during the discussion (Subsequently circulated as JCS 1243).
Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with the Soviet General Staff
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Approved the dispatch to General Antonov of a note requesting a meeting with the Soviet General Staff at Soviet Headquarters, Thursday, 8 February, at 1500.
Report by Combined Shipping Staffs
General Somervell said that combined oil and shipping studies had been progressing. Eight of the ten points involved in the oil studies had been resolved and a paper would be circulated to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible. It had been decided to defer action on the remaining two points of difference in the oil studies.
The report of the Combined Shipping Staffs would be completed and circulated sometime during the night and would be ready for consideration by the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the meeting scheduled for 8 February 1945.
Several disturbing points had arisen. The Russians had demanded additional ships, and what was of greater concern, there was the accompanying question of cargo requirements, chiefly the item of trucks. As yet it was not known how the Russian requirements could be filled. There was also the question of a cut in British requirements. The Prime Minister was intensely concerned in this matter and was reluctant to accept any reduction in imports but would do so if necessary. It was his, General Somervell’s, view that the British import program should not be considered at this conference unless directed by the President.
In response to a question by Admiral Leahy, General Somervell explained that the necessary military shipping would be found but he felt that the Director of War Mobilization would require complete information and would wish to discuss the matter before making any final allocation.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff: Took note of General Somervell’s report on the progress of cargo shipping and oil studies.
740.00114 EW/2-545
The British Foreign Secretary to the Secretary of State
Yalta, 5 February, 1945
Secret
My Dear Secretary of State: As you know, one of the matters which we agreed should be discussed with the Russians during the present Conference is the question of concluding a Reciprocal Agreement with them about the treatment of Soviet citizens liberated by the Allied Armies in western and southern Europe and British and American nationals liberated by the Soviet forces in eastern Europe. The British Chiefs of Staff approved the draft text of such an agreement yesterday and I understand that the Combined Chiefs of Staff will be taking it [up] today. If, as I hope, the text is approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff, we shall be in a position to take the matter up with the Russians as soon as possible.
In present circumstances where the Soviet forces are overrunning the sites of British and United States prisoners of war camps very fast, and we know that a number of British prisoners of war (though not exactly how many) are in Soviet hands, and no doubt some United States prisoners of war also, it is really urgent to reach agreement with the Soviet Government on this draft Agreement during ARGONAUT. I intend therefore to ask M. Molotov for discussions to be opened between the experts of the three parties concerned at once, in order to reach agreement upon a satisfactory text.
There is one further point, however, which I should like to mention. It is clear, as SHAEF have already reported, that the only V real solution to the problem of the Soviet citizens who are likely to fall into British and American hands shortly is to repatriate them as soon as possible. For this shipping is required and we have already sent 10,000 back from the United Kingdom and 7,500 from the Mediterranean.
It seems to me that it would materially help the proposed negotiations if we could inform the Russians at a suitable moment of our plans to repatriate their citizens. From the British point of view I can say that we have found shipping to send back from the United Kingdom a further 7,000 of these men during the latter part of this month and it is hoped that we can provide further ships to take some 4,000 a month from the Mediterranean during March, April and May, even though the Soviet citizens in the southern part of France and half of those liberated in Italy are primarily the responsibility of the United States. I am however without any information on the United States plans on this. General Eisenhower has recently pressed the Combined Chiefs of Staff once again to provide two ships to take 3,000 each from Marseilles until the present large numbers have been cleared. No doubt your experts have been examining the position in the light of General Eisenhower’s telegram, and I should be very glad if you could tell me whether you will be in a position to make any statement to the Russians about the United States plans.
Whilst it is clear that the discussions should not be delayed in order that a statement can be made on the shipping position, I would be very glad to know as soon as possible whether you can give the Russians any information on the lines I hope to give him from the British point of view, since the sooner this information can be provided the better are the chances of reaching an agreement during this Conference.
Yours sincerely,
ANTHONY EDEN
740.00114 EW/2-545
The War Shipping Administrator to the Secretary of State
Yalta, February 5, 1945
Secret
Memorandum:
To: Mr. Stettinius
From: Admiral Land
Subject: MR. EDEN’S LETTER TO STATE DEPARTMENT ON U.S. PROPOSALS TO MEET RUSSIAN REPATRIATION REQUIREMENTS
-
After request by British Chiefs of Staff, U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed to use of troopships for repatriation of Russians equivalent to British assistance of 10,000 personnel lift trans-Atlantic each month, contingent upon use of overland transportation after the defeat of Germany, when redeployment will require all available trooplift.
-
Following this authorization, Eisenhower requested use of two large troopships for repatriation of large numbers of Russians on hand, this movement to be from Marseille.
-
In Washington the CMTC in the belief the British Chiefs of Staff had failed to implement the approval described in paragraph 1 above, signalled London to determine whether Eisenhower’s request had been made in ignorance of CCS decision on availability of lift.
-
Informal discussion with British personnel movement officers at CRICKET indicates that implementation had been intentionally held up because of these two factors:
(a) Type of ship required.
(b) Policy on Russian repatriation to be established. -
The type of ship referred to above involves the desire to use medium size troopships which means physical assistance by U.S. transports since British trans-Atlantic shipping is primarily of large type. This changes U.S. conception at time of original British request referred to in Paragraph 1 above when it was understood all movement would be in British ships at cost to U.S. troop movement capabilities which it was estimated could be accepted.
740.00114 EW/2-545
The British Foreign Secretary to the Soviet Foreign Commissar
Yalta, 5 February, 1945
Secret
You will remember that during the Moscow conversations of last October, I discussed with you and with Marshal Stalin the question of caring for and repatriating Soviet citizens and British subjects liberated respectively by Allied forces in the south and west and by the Soviet forces in the east of Europe.
Since then our two Governments have exchanged Drafts and on 20 January our Embassy received from your Government a redraft of a Reciprocal Agreement on this matter. We have examined this redraft and, subject to what is stated below, I am glad to say that it is generally acceptable. I understand that a similar draft was put forward to the United States Government at the same time.
In view of the integrated character of the Allied Commands in western and southern Europe, it seems to us essential that any agreement should be tripartite and cover British and United States Combined Commands. We have accordingly prepared a redraft of the text taking as basis your Government’s Draft and making some amendments to cover this point and also to cover certain other points where alterations appear to us necessary.
I have brought with me experts on this matter and I would like to suggest that it should be remitted to them and to experts of your Government and the United States Government with a view to reaching a text which is mutually satisfactory to all three Governments before this Conference breaks up.
On 20 January, your Government also presented to the British Embassy a redraft of the proposed Agreement covering the liberated Soviet citizens in the United Kingdom. This redraft is also generally satisfactory, but there are a few points on it which require clarification and amendment. I would suggest that this Agreement should also be remitted to the same British and Soviet experts, so that agreement can be reached upon it during the present Conference.
I hope very much that you will agree with these suggestions and will instruct your experts to meet their British and American colleagues at once. I feel that the conclusion of this Agreement would be a very happy result of the present Conference and would give the greatest satisfaction in our two countries where so many families are affected by them.
I have given a copy of this letter to Mr. Stettinius.
I enclose a copy of the British redraft of the Reciprocal Agreement.
His Excellency Monsieur V. M. MOLOTOV
[Enclosure]
Redraft of Soviet Government’s Draft Relating to Prisoners of War and Civilians Liberated by the Soviet Armies and Allied Armies
Article 1
All Soviet citizens liberated by forces operating under Allied Command and British subjects and American citizens liberated by the Soviet forces will, without delay after their liberation, be separated from enemy prisoners of war and will be maintained separately from them in camps or points of concentration until they have been handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities, as the case may be, at places agreed upon between those authorities.
Allied and Soviet military authorities will respectively take necessary measures for protection of camps, and points of concentration from enemy bombing, artillery fire, etc.
Article 2
The contracting parties shall ensure that their military authorities shall without delay inform the competent authorities of the other party regarding citizens or subjects of the other contracting party found by them, and will undertake to follow all the provisions of this agreement. Soviet and Allied repatriation representatives will have the right of immediate access into the camps and points of concentration where their citizens or subjects are located and they will have the right to appoint the internal administration and set up the internal discipline and management in accordance with the military procedure and laws of their country.
Facilities will be given for the despatch or transfer of officers of their own nationality to camps or points of concentration where liberated members of the respective forces are located and there are insufficient officers. The outside protection of and access to and from the camps or points of concentration will be established in accordance with the instructions of the military commander in whose zone they are located, and the military commander shall also appoint a commandant, who shall have the final responsibility for the overall administration and discipline of the camp or point concerned.
The removal of camps as well as the transfer from one camp to another of liberated citizens will be notified to the competent Soviet or Allied authorities. Hostile propaganda directed against the contracting parties or against any of the United Nations will not be permitted.
Article 3
Except in so far as the obligations set out in this article may be affected by obligations undertaken in connection with the use of UNRRA (or other agreed relief agencies) the competent Allied and Soviet authorities will do their utmost in the circumstances obtaining in any area, and from time to time, to supply liberated citizens and subjects of the contracting parties with adequate food, clothing, housing and medical attention both in camps or at points of concentration and en route, and with transport until they are handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities at places agreed upon between those authorities. The standards of such food, clothing, housing and medical attention shall so far as possible be consistent with the normal practice relating to military rank.
The contracting parties will not demand compensation for these or other similar services which their authorities may supply respectively to liberated citizens or subjects of the other contracting party.
Article 4
Either of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use such of its own means of transport as may be available for the repatriation of its citizens or subjects held by the other contracting party. Similarly each of the contracting parties shall be at liberty to use its own facilities for the delivery of supplies to its citizens or subjects held by the other contracting party.
Article 5
Soviet and Allied military authorities shall make such advances on behalf of their respective governments to liberated subjects and citizens of the other contracting party citizens as the competent Soviet and Allied authorities shall agree upon beforehand.
Advances made in currency of any enemy territory or in currency of their occupation authorities shall not be liable to compensation.
In the case of advances made in currency of liberated non-enemy territory, the Soviet and Allied governments will effect, each for advances made to their citizens or subjects necessary settlements with the governments of the territory concerned, who will be informed of the amount of their currency paid out for this purpose.
Article 6
Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting parties may, until their repatriation, be employed on work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and Allied authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with military standards and procedure.
(Redrafted) Article 6
Ex-prisoners of war (with the exception of officers) and civilians of each of the contracting Parties, may until their repatriation, be employed on a voluntary basis on work in the vicinity of their camps in furtherance of the common war effort in accordance with agreements to be reached between the competent Soviet and Allied authorities. The question of payment and conditions of labour shall be determined by agreement between those authorities. It is understood that liberated members of the respective forces will be employed in accordance with the military standards and procedure and under the supervision of their own officers. Any liberated member of the respective forces or civilian who is unwilling to perform such work will be exercised under similar supervision.
Article 7
The contracting parties shall, wherever necessary, use all practicable means to ensure the evacuation to the rear of these liberated citizens and subjects. They also undertake to use all practicable means to transport liberated citizens and subjects to places to be agreed upon where they can be handed over to the Soviet or Allied authorities respectively. The handing over of these liberated citizens and subjects shall in no way be delayed or impeded by the requirements of their temporary employment.
Article 8
The contracting parties will give the fullest possible effect to the foregoing provisions of this Agreement, subject only to the limitations in detail and from time to time of operational, supply and transport conditions in the several theatres.
740.0011 EW/1-2745: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Secretary of State
Washington, February 7 [8], 1945
Top secret
War Department has just made available message dated February 7 from Marshall which indicates that JCS on February 7 approved with certain changes British preliminary text of agreement with Soviet Union for exchange of prisoners of war and apparently also for liberated persons. (This is our message No. 27) While it is not definitely clear what preliminary British text is referred to, if it is the preliminary text included in JCS 1266, the agreement would not appear to cover the following specific points which were incorporated in the United States counterproposals forwarded to JCS staff with you:
-
Protection of Geneva Convention which we have informed Soviet Government we will accord to Soviet citizens captured in German uniform who demand such protection.
-
Soviet citizens in the United States not prisoners of war whose cases the Attorney General feels should be dealt with on basis of traditional American policy of asylum.
-
Persons liberated by United States forces no longer in their custody.
-
Question of the liberation and repatriation of other United Nations citizens.
-
Persons claimed as citizens by the Soviet authorities who were not Soviet citizens prior to outbreak of war and do not now claim Soviet citizenship.
(ALLSTATE HORSESHOE) It is felt that these questions and others referred to in JCS 1266 and 1266/1 should be brought to your attention in order that consideration may be given to them before final agreement is reached.
JCS to the President
Yalta, 6 February 1945
Top secret
Memorandum for the President
The Joint Chiefs of Staff find that it is necessary to obtain Marshal Stalin’s approval of holding a meeting with the Soviet Staff to discuss details of possible participation in the war against Japan and suggest that you speak to Marshal Stalin with the purpose of obtaining his agreement.
(Sec JCS)
The President’s Chief of Staff to the First Deputy Chief of General Staff of the Soviet Army
Yalta, 7 February 1945
Top secret
My Dear General Antonov: The U.S. Chiefs of Staff desire to meet with the Soviet Chiefs for a most secret discussion tomorrow, Thursday, February 8 at 3 P.M. at the Russian headquarters. No one to be present but the Chiefs of Staff and one interpreter, your Russian interpreter being satisfactory for our purpose.
For the U.S. Chiefs of Staff:
WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Fleet Admiral, USN