America at war! (1941–) – Part 4

americavotes1944

Every member a political orator –
Whoop it up verbally, CIO-PAC tells union men

Organization pamphlet would have every member carry soapbox as well as lunchbox
By Robert Taylor, Press Washington correspondent

Washington –
Every union member can be a public speaker – and a force in this year’s election campaign – with the aid of the CIO Political Action Committee’s latest publication, a handy little “Speakers Manual” complete with directions and illustrations.

So don’t be surprised if the man who works next to you suddenly begins making like an orator, with or without sound effects. The book tells him how to go about whipping his speech into shape and then advises him to “practice it on yourself while at work.”

It says:

Think of yourself as a member of your audience, listening to yourself critically. At your work bench, in the field, or wherever you work, glance at your watch, get started, go through your speech mentally from beginning to end, then look at your time again.

Gives readers facts

The book advises the CIO’s 5,300,000 members, who are now being asked for voluntary contributions of $1 each for the PAC campaign, that “any normal grownup with sufficient self-reliance” can make a speech and the PAC needs speakers and discussion leaders.

It not only tells how to make a speech or lead a discussion, but also gives readers the facts to be spoken, or discussed, under such headings as “jobs for all after the war, the cost of living, registration and voting, taxation and inflation,” and others.

The section entitled “Achievements under the Roosevelt Administration” lists gains in labor, social security farming housing, conservation, financial and national security fields, and leads up to the only declaration in favor of a candidate in the book.

Because of these achievements, and because we have faith that under his leadership, we will be able to obtain the objectives to win the war and to secure the peace, we urge the nations to elect Frankin Delano Roosevelt, for another term in office…

One of a series

The manual is one of a series designed to instruct newly-active political workers recruited from union ranks. One of them tells how to ring doorbells in What Every Canvasser Should Know. Another tells how to arrange and make radio talks and the third angles for the feminine vote with A Woman’s Guide to Political Action.

americavotes1944

‘Friends of Democracy’ rap Gerald Smith

New York (UP) –
Friends of Democracy, in a pamphlet signed by president Rex Stout and national director L. M. Birkhead, yesterday attacked Gerald L. K. Smith, America First Party leader who, it said, has worked out a dangerous pattern for “revolution from the right.”

The pamphlet asserted:

Smith cannot be dismissed as a mere rabblerouser. He is becoming a real power, a real menace to our free institutions. For he does not speak only for the rabble and the crackpots. He is also financed and supported by misguided industrialists to whom he has sold the idea that Roosevelt is more dangerous than Hitler and that Willkie is indistinguishable from Stalin.

Millett: ‘Lucky’ girls draw sneers

And they have their troubles
By Ruth Millett

Brownies will stagger home still in lead

Carriers seen conservative in financing

Magazine refutes ‘ancient charge’

americavotes1944

Guffey for labor as full partner

Senator speaks at Bristol CIO rally

Bristol, Pennsylvania –
The Democratic Party must “take labor into partnership” throughout the county, U.S. Senator Joseph F. Guffey told a meeting of members of the CIO United Auto Workers here yesterday.

Mr. Guffey said:

I call for a full, fair and free partnership between all of labor, organized and unorganized, and the Democratic Party, a party which is nationwide and not the property of any section group.

That is what has begun to happen, even in the South where labor recently has won important elections and removed from the national scene certain elderly or loudmouthed politicians who curried favor with the Northern absentee owners of Southern wealth by labor-baiting and abusive investigations.

Absentees are mentioned

Mr. Guffey specifically mentioned Senator “Cotton Ed” Smith of South Carolina, Congressman Joe Stearns of Alabama and Congressman Martin Dies of Texas, all Democrats, among those who “will no longer be with us in Washington.”

The renomination of Democratic Senators Lister Hill in Alabama and Claude Pepper in Florida in this year’s primaries Mr. Guffey interpreted as evidence that “floods of Republican money were unable to halt the march of labor and of liberalism in the new South.”

He said:

This is possible because labor is organizing politically and is taking the road of political action nationally. The fight will not be over quickly, nor will it be easy.

The Republican Party still contains plenty of men like Sewell Avery of Montgomery Ward who hate labor, and plenty of men like Joe Grundy, who wish to plunge us into high tariff bankruptcy. The party that stole the election of 1876 from Tilden, the party that counted out Bryan in the election of 1896, the party that gave us Harding and the Ohio gang in 1920 is still doing business at the same old stand and will stop at nothing to win the election.

Mr. Guffey said if the Republicans win “your hours of labor, your rates of pay, your very right to organize would go down like a house of cards before the avalanche of greed, or reaction and revenge.”

Reading Eagle (August 28, 1944)

Dorothy Thompson1

ON THE RECORD —
How Joan of Arc again points way to liberty

By Dorothy Thompson

When Gen. Charles de Gaulle raised the Cross of Lorraine, he may have thought of Joan of Arc, not as the Saint, but as the first European military leader to have organized a people’s war. Joan, a peasant girl and born democrat, lived in a feudal age, and the French nobility, who led, not national armies but their own, had lost province after province to the English, also led by feudal lords. They had fought, in the manner of their age, battles of cavaliers, exchanging captured noblemen for ransoms, thinking of their own interests, not of a “cause,” with victors and vanquished coming to terms immediately after the battle.

Joan was the first European nationalist. Her voices had told her that a country belonged to the people who spoke its language and tilled its soil, and had thus been created by God as a common family. Thus, in defending God’s creation they were fighting for God.

Joan’s greatest contribution to the deliverance of France was this creation of a popular faith, for which the common people would fight, because they instinctively felt it was true. That it was highly revolutionary, Joan herself was not aware; to her it was simply revelation and common sense. But the authorities who ruled that world knew full well that it was revolutionary and church and state collaborated to her doom.

Her second contribution was the discovery that the form of warfare was outdated. She had no more respect for the French military than Gen. de Gaulle had for Gamelin. She was a military genius, and this combination of what was then modern war a fanatical faith to raise the masses made her victorious.

I recalled these things about Saint Joan, as sitting on a remote Vermont farm, I turned, for hours, radio dials to the shortwave stations of the whole world and heard nothing but the Marseillaise, French songs, French military marches, French tributes – from London, from the Belgian Congo, from Cuba, from Brazil – realizing that in the rising of the people of Paris this war had reached its highest point. The excitement that swept the world was not only joy in the recovery of Paris, but joy in the vindication of humanity, and in the courage, shrewdness, and sheer ability, of the common man. somewhere in the shadows, I thought I heard a woman’s rough voice, chuckling, “I told you, boys, that’s the way! Have the people with you, and you’ll win.”

The French Committee of Liberation has organized and fought a revolutionary war. He had the allied armies, and without them the underground war could hardly have succeeded. But without the revolutionary war, the march into Paris would have been merely the reconquest of a great city, and not the revival of the French nation and a signal to the world.

In fact, the war of the armies and the war of the people were separated in the great moment. After the victory in Normandy, Gen. Eisenhower had a choice: to march on Paris, or turn north in pursuit of the German armies, seeking to destroy their military power. From a military viewpoint, Eisenhower made the right choice. As strategy Paris was secondary. Afterward Paris could be invested as a matter of course.

But in the life of a people there are no matters of course. Joan knew that. You must strike when the anvil is hot. You must strike when the spirit of the people is mounting to crescendo. De Gaulle and the Parisians knew what Joan knew. They did not wait for the cheapest moment. They took the appropriate moment.

And what a feat of organization! To command an army in the field is one thing. To command a ragtag and bobtail army, organized underground by stealth, uninformed, in hiding in homes, factories, and offices, consisting of the most disparate elements – ex-officers, students, college professors, and, in the mass, industrial workers, all under the eyes of the Gestapo and under the heels of an army of occupation; to give the order: Fight! And they fight! That is a miracle of organization and intelligence.

And the Germans? Nothing is more terrifying than the rising of masses. Once it starts it has the power of an eruption of nature. It has a primitive hostility that creates a panic no army can spread. The spontaneity of its actions makes it impossible to prepare cool countermeasures. The psychological surprise adds to the terror. One must remember that these hundreds of thousands of Parisians have been working under German eyes for four years, seemingly harmless. The police – they had been carrying out the German orders if not enthusiastically, then properly. And suddenly they all turn around and show one common visage of fearless wrath.

In a few hours, the Germans learned the first lesson in their reeducation process. In any critical moment, all power over the subjected depends on the willingness of the subjected. In the face of a united unwillingness, power cracks and flees in horror and terror.

americavotes1944

pegler

Pegler: Thomas the missionary?

By Westbrook Pegler

New York –
No good purpose could be served by the visit of R. J. Thomas and other American professional unioneers to the zone of war in France and the ulterior purpose is plain.

Certain New Deal gauleiters went abroad to take the heat off the soldiers’ resentment against strikes and slowdowns and the extortion of hundreds of millions of dollars from construction workers. They want those soldier votes for their candidate. They have another purpose – to soften up the soldiers for exploitation by the unions when they come back.

The choice of Thomas as one of the missionaries to an angry fighting army is the most significant selection. This man’s union, the United Auto Workers, having nowadays about one million head within its corrals, 90 percent of them either unwilling or uncomprehending captives, has a particularly bad record. It was the union in the memorable Allis-Chalmers Communist shutdown near Milwaukee in the days of the Hitler-Stalin alliance. Again, it was the union responsible for the North American Aviation blockade at Inglewood, California, which was broken only by troops of the regular Army. Neither one was a membership strike. They were Communist insurrections.

The object in both cases was to prevent the conversion of this nation’s industry from peace to war and thus to assure Britain’s defeat, as she stood alone against the Nazis. The Communists planned the dissolution of the United States into a mobocracy, under external force from triumphant Nazis and internal Communist force. After that Communist dictatorship was to come. The plan changed on June 22, 1941, when Hitler double-crossed his ally and the war became, in the view of Mr. Thomas’ Communist colleagues, a crusade for freedom in which we were welcome to participate. The Communists even berated us for not being able to send equipment to Russia in larger quantities, a failure which was largely their own doing.

The soldiers in France are too busy with more urgent matters to inform themselves that two of the more detestable Communist saboteurs involved in these two jobs have, ever since, enjoyed deferments in the draft on the ground that as professional unioneers they are essential to the war effort on the home front. It is doubtful that Thomas will remember to tell them that, or that he will explain the more spiritual aspect of CIO-unionism as propounded by his valued colleague, one Posner, known as Thomas de Lorenzo, who said that if it came to a question of sacrificing some advantage for Mr. Thomas’ union or sacrificing the life of an American flier, he would let the flier die. The question was one of deliberately retarded production of fighting planes for the Navy. And so deep was the position occupied by Thomas and De Lorenzo, under the political patronage of the Commander in Chief, that even Frank Knox, then secretary of the Navy, kept silent.

They were blasted out only when a subordinate in the Navy department privately appealed to certain members of the press to publicize this sector of labor’s gains under the New Deal. But it is incorrect to say that they were blasted out. The one called De Lorenzo got a vote of confidence from his subjects, who otherwise might have suffered from epidemic broken-leg, and brother Roosevelt’s government, forced to offer some rebuke, chose the mildest possible way. He got 30 days and a $500 fine for giving false data on a government questionnaire, but nothing for the sabotage. He may never serve the 30 days and the union may pay the fine.

This is the boldest political mission yet sent to the troops. The President’s own forays have the color, if not the exact odor, of legitimacy. Mrs. Roosevelt, after all, did go through the masquerade of wearing a Red Cross habit on her roundabout visit to her political protégé, Joe Lash, on Guadalcanal. But the union politicians have no such excuse or disguise for a mission which is purely political. They go as advocates of the fourth term and of all Roosevelt’s works and purposes. The immediate object was to deceive the troops by propaganda to which men so far from home and so preoccupied could not have the answers.

“This strike talk is purely propaganda,” said one of them.

That there have been more than 10,000 strikes in war plants since Pearl Harbor is well known at home, but the troops can’t know that. And even we, at home, can’t know the whole truth, because the Roosevelt Labor Department keeps the statistics and, being an accomplice, naturally will not squeal and implicate itself.

U.S. State Department (August 28, 1944)

Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State to President Roosevelt

Washington, August 28, 1944

Subject: PROGRESS REPORT ON DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS – SIXTH DAY

Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee
The Committee continued to discuss the topics of which consideration had been begun last Friday.

a) Expulsion and withdrawal of members
Ambassador Gromyko stated that the tentative opinion of the Soviet group now is that the proposal made by the British last Friday for suspension of the privileges of membership should be regarded not as a substitute for the Soviet proposal for expulsion but as a proposal for action in addition to expulsion.

b) Composition of the Council

  1. POSSIBLE PERMANENT SEAT FOR BRAZIL: In response to a question by Ambassador Gromyko, we indicated that at some later stage of the discussions we may wish to propose that there be added to the number of permanent members of the Council some one of the Latin American countries. We mentioned Brazil specifically, in reply to another question by Ambassador Gromyko. Sir Alexander Cadogan said that he would inform his Government, commenting that he doubted if they had contemplated the possibility of such a proposal. He thought that if the number of permanent seats were increased beyond five there would be considerable difficulties. The Russians want only five permanent seats.

  2. STATUS OF FRANCE: There appeared to be general agreement upon the desirability of a permanent seat being reserved for France, regardless of whether or not a government of France has been formally recognized by the time the Organization is formed.

  3. NUMBER AND TENURE OF NON-PERMANENT MEMBERS: There seemed to be general agreement that there should be six non-permanent members and there was tentative agreement, ad referendum, with the Soviet proposal for a two-year term.

c) Vote of permanent member involved in a dispute
We stated that we had come to the conclusion that a state involved in a dispute should not vote on matters affecting that dispute and that this rule should apply to all members. There ensued a full discussion in which we explained carefully the reasoning which had led us to our present position in which we were strongly supported by the British. The Soviet representatives stated that they considered our proposal to be in violation of and a “retreat” from the basic principle that major decisions of the Organization should be arrived at on the basis of unanimity among the great powers. They maintained their prior position that a special procedure should be worked out to govern instances in which one of the states having a permanent seat may be involved in a dispute and indicated that a specific Soviet proposal on this might be forthcoming later.

d) Initial membership of the Organization
We discussed this topic at the request of Ambassador Gromyko and there appeared to be general agreement with our proposal that initial membership would include the United Nations and associated nations.

Ambassador Gromyko then said that all of the 16 Soviet republics should be included among the initial members of the Organization. Sir Alexander Cadogan said that he had no comment on the Ambassador’s statement at this stage but he remarked that he believed his Government will have to talk to the Soviet Government about the general question of the international status of the Soviet republics. We said that we would have to think about the Ambassador’s statement.

Meetings of New Formulation Groups
Pursuant to arrangements arrived at in Friday’s meeting of the Joint Steering Committee, small formulating groups of the Organization Subcommittee and of the Security Subcommittee met this afternoon to draw together the work which has been done by these Subcommittees and to put this work into form suitable for approval by the Joint Steering Committee.

ES

Lot 60–D 224, Box 56: D.O./Conv.A/JSC Mins. 1–12

Informal minutes of Meeting No. 6 of the Joint Steering Committee

Washington, August 28, 1944, 11:00 a.m.
[Extracts]
Present: Sir Alexander Cadogan and Mr. Jebb of the British group;
Ambassador Gromyko, Mr. Sobolev, and Mr. Berezhkov of the Soviet group;
Mr. Stettinius, Mr. Dunn, and Mr. Pasvolsky of the American group.
Mr. Hiss also present, as secretary.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Committee then proceeded to a consideration of topic 3 (Composition of the Council). Ambassador Gromyko inquired whether the American group had as yet formulated its view on the question of the number of permanent and of non-permanent seats. Mr. Stettinius replied that the initial American position had favored provision for four permanent seats and seven non-permanent seats, thus making a total of eleven seats on the Council. Mr. Stettinius went on to say that the later American opinion had been to add France as a fifth permanent member. He said that he wished to point out at this time that, at some later time, the American group may wish to discuss a possible sixth additional permanent seat on the Council for one of the Latin American countries.

Ambassador Gromyko inquired which one of the Latin American countries the American group had in mind. In reply, Mr. Pasvolsky said that we had thought that perhaps Brazil might be given a permanent seat. Mr. Sobolev inquired at what point of time Brazil should be added. Mr. Stettinius stated that the American group is not at present making an actual proposal as to Brazil and is, therefore, not suggesting any particular time for such an addition to the number of permanent seats.

At Mr. Stettinius’ request, Mr. Dunn explained that because of the extremely important place which Brazil occupies in the relations between this Hemisphere and the rest of the world the American group has felt that it might like to bring that question up at some later time. Ambassador Gromyko inquired whether it was contemplated that reference to Brazil would be included in the agreed recommendations resulting from the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations. In reply, Mr. Stettinius said that provision might be made in the agreed recommendations that a place should be reserved for France and for one of the Latin American countries. Ambassador Gromyko pointed out that the Soviet group considers it necessary to underline that it is in favor of limiting the permanent members of the Council to the representatives of four powers and later of five powers including France.

The discussion then turned to the question of how many non-permanent members should have seats on the Council. It was stated by the American representatives that in the American view there might perhaps be six permanent members and six non-permanent members, or again, provision might be made for six permanent and for five non-permanent members. Mr. Pasvolsky stated that if the tenure of the non-permanent members should be lengthened to two years, it would seem desirable to have a divisible number of non-permanent members so that an equal number could be elected each year. Sir Alexander Cadogan said that he, too, thought it advisable to have six elected members on the Council in order to insure the election of an equal number each year.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

After further discussion there appeared to be general agreement that it would be desirable to provide for at least five permanent members including France and six non-permanent members. It was made plain that if France did not have a generally recognized government at the time of the initiation of the Organization a permanent seat should nonetheless be reserved for France. Sir Alexander Cadogan said that he would wish to reserve his position as to whether the Council should undertake to determine when France had a responsible government. He pointed out that perhaps the three Governments might wish to decide this question for themselves before action on that subject was taken by the Council. He said that he has had fairly clear indication that his Government feels that the earlier France can be brought in, the better.

The Committee then proceeded to discuss the question of the tenure of non-permanent members. There seemed to be tentative agreement on an ad referendum basis that perhaps a two-year term, as proposed by the Soviet group, would be desirable. Sir Alexander Cadogan emphasized that he could not give final approval to a two-year term because he has been asked to press for a three-year term. He was willing, however, to let the appropriate formulation group go ahead with the drafting of a provision providing for a two-year term.

The Committee then briefly discussed once more the question of expulsion of members, and Ambassador Gromyko restated the Soviet position that a provision for expulsion should be included in the basic document. He added that the Soviet group is studying the question of whether or not a provision for suspension should be included in addition. There seemed to be general agreement that the appropriate formulation group might profitably draw up a tentative provision for suspension, this provision to be brought before the Steering Committee for examination.

The Committee then discussed topic 6 (Should parties to a dispute vote?). Mr. Stettinius said that the American group has come to the conclusion that a “guilty” party should not vote in its own case, no matter who that party might be. It was indicated that on this point the British and American groups are in agreement. Ambassador Gromyko said that his group is of the opinion that some special procedure should be worked out to cover cases in which one of the great powers is touched by a dispute. He said that his group had not considered the question of what that procedure should be in as much as they had anticipated, on the basis of the American document, that the American group might bring forward a proposal providing for such a special procedure. In response to a question by Sir Alexander Cadogan, Ambassador Gromyko said that his group might be able to propose such a special procedure at some time during the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations, if it should have worked out something along these lines before the conclusion of these Conversations.

Sir Alexander observed that this is a most important subject. He said that if it is not made clear that great powers which are parties to a dispute cannot vote, the small powers and the great powers will have been put upon a very different footing. He said that without such a provision the great powers would even be able to prevent the Council from considering disputes in which they were parties. This result would be recognized at once when the plan was made public and there would consequently be the greatest difficulty in obtaining general acceptance of the proposed plan. He said that he wished to emphasize that this was the biggest problem with which we are faced and that unless some way out is found great difficulties can be foreseen.

Ambassador Gromyko said that in his opinion the large countries should have a special position consonant with their responsibilities, and again referred to the need of devising a special procedure.

Mr. Pasvolsky then stated that after prolonged consideration the American group had come to the conclusion that it could not devise a satisfactory special procedure to meet this situation. He said that the American group feels so confident that this country will not wish to use force on a unilateral basis that it is willing to recommend that the United States should put itself on the same plane as all other nations of the world in regard to the settling of disputes. He said that the American group had felt that if the United States were ever to conclude that it was not willing to listen to the Council in the event of a dispute in which it might be involved such a conclusion would be practically tantamount to a decision that the United States was ready to go to war with all the rest of the world. He said that the American group could not imagine such a development taking place and it therefore believes that any risks involved in its proposal are outweighed by the advantage of strengthening the Organization by a provision that in this respect all countries be placed on the same footing. Mr. Pasvolsky went on to say that one question in particular had given concern to the American group, namely, what would be the situation if the Organization should undertake to consider questions which under normal rules of international law are reserved to domestic jurisdiction. He said that it was recognized by the American group that some safeguarding formula covering this point will have to be worked out. He said that he feels confident that it can be worked out. He added that there had been another question of detail, i.e., whether the Council could call upon any party to a dispute to furnish forces. He believed that this, too, can be worked out.

The American representatives emphasized that they would, of course, be glad to consider any formula the Soviet group might propose, although they themselves had not been able to find one. Ambassador Gromyko said that if his group developed anything on this during the course of the conversations, he would inform the other groups.

Mr. Sobolev then asked whether the American and British position does not violate the basic principle that every decision must be taken jointly by the four great powers. Mr. Pasvolsky pointed out that in the American document the principle of unanimity of the four powers had been set forth but it had been made subject to two subsequent paragraphs. The first of these paragraphs had provided that any power could voluntarily abstain from voting but would nevertheless be bound by the vote taken. He said that this provision had been designed to meet a situation in which a country had no objection to certain action being taken but did not wish to go on record as favoring such action. This provision does not impair the basic principle of unanimity, he said. Mr. Pasvolsky then said that the second paragraph to which he had referred set forth the need of finding some way in which to meet a situation in which one of the four big powers may be involved in a dispute. He pointed out that the American document had put that question in the same category as the question of voluntary abstention from voting. He said that the American group had started with the idea of unqualified unanimity, but had concluded that this would be injurious to the success of the Organization. The American group had reached its conclusion as a result of very full consideration in the course of which attention had been given to the attitude of the American people.

It was brought out that the American and British positions are in accord with the practice of the League.

Ambassador Gromyko stated that he felt that, generally speaking, the American proposal would be a retreat from the principle of unanimity. Mr. Pasvolsky observed that some members of the American group feel, on the contrary, that it would strengthen the principle in its essential aspects. Sir Alexander Cadogan observed that, in any event, any other decision would detract from other important principles of justice and equity.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

There was then some discussion of the question of the initial membership of the Organization.…

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

…It was made clear that the American proposal includes not only the initial signatories of the United Nations Declaration and those countries which have subsequently adhered to that Declaration, but also a few additional countries which have broken relations with Germany and are cooperating in the war effort. It is these latter countries which are covered by the term “Associated Nations”.

It was agreed that a tentative list for purposes referred to above should be drawn up in the appropriate formulation group.

At this point Ambassador Gromyko stated that all of the sixteen Soviet Republics should be included among the initial members of the Organization. Sir Alexander Cadogan said that he had no comment to make on this point at this stage, but that he felt that his Government will have to discuss with the Soviet Government the question of the international status of the Soviet Republics. The American representatives said that they will have to think about Ambassador Gromyko’s proposal.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Lot 60–D 224, Box 59: Stettinius Diary

Extracts from the personal diary of the Under Secretary of State

Sixth Day, Monday, August 28, 1944

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5:00 Meeting with the President
I went directly from the airport to the White House, arriving at 4:45. I found Mr. Hull still with the President and asked General Watson to announce my arrival. They asked me, however, to wait for a few moments. Unfortunately, by the time I was shown in, Mr. Hull had left. The President was alone and in a relaxed mood. I told him I could cover my business in five minutes but he raised various questions and I stayed with him from 5:02 until 5:50. I first presented him with our summary memos covering the proceedings for the fifth and sixth days. He glanced over these and seemed satisfied and said he would read them carefully tonight. He made the observation that these were an excellent record for him to have covering the conversations for the future. He asked me what open items were of the most importance which I would like to take up with him at the time. I mentioned:

  1. The status of France and told him of the private indication I had had that Sir Alexander might request at an early date that France be given a seat immediately. The President said he could not agree to this but was perfectly willing to have a seat reserved for France on an “if and when” basis that France had a government justifying it, and if and when the council duly elected France to take her place at the table on a permanent basis. He expressed the hope that I could work out some general language on this which would leave the matter flexible.

  2. Brazil. I reported to the President that we had raised the question of a permanent seat for Brazil this morning and both the British and Soviets attitudes had been negative. I expressed the opinion that if he wishes us to press this hard now it would be more difficult. The President considered this carefully and finally said personally he would be willing on the initial draft not to name Brazil but that he wished a general provision incorporated in the proposals which would leave the door open so that he, possibly working with the Prime Minister and Stalin at a later time, could bring this up with them before the organization was actually launched.

  3. X Matter. I then informed the President of the raising by the Russians of the X matter. The President said “My God,” and went on to instruct me to explain to Gromyko privately and personally and immediately that we could never accept this proposal. He said to tell the Ambassador this might ruin the chance of getting an international organization approved by the United States Senate and accepted publicly in this country. He then drew a comparison between the organization in this country and the Soviet Union and the British Empire and the possibility of creating new Dominions in the Empire out of colonies, islands, etc., and that I should spell all of this out for Gromyko. I promised to do so immediately and added that at a later date we might ask him to communicate with Stalin.

  4. Votes of members involved in a dispute. I explained again our position that members of the council who are parties to a dispute should not be allowed to vote on matters affecting that dispute and that the British stated this view but the Soviets feel it violates the principle of unanimity of the Big Four. The President reiterated he felt our position was entirely correct and that we must not depart from it. He asked me to explain to Gromyko that this was a matter on which we would have to be consistent and that we hoped his government would find it possible to agree with us.

  5. General. (Mr. Hopkins joined the meeting at this point) I inquired if his plans of meeting the Prime Minister were sufficiently definite for him to indicate whether he wished us to prepare any special notes for him covering the security conversations to take with him. He said he would like to have such a memo prepared but that he would not take the initiative in discussing the international organization with the Prime Minister but that he should be briefed in case the Prime Minister brought it up. He intimated he expected his conversation with the Prime Minister to relate chiefly to military matters.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

  1. Expulsion and Suspension. I said the British supported our view that it should not be included in the document but that the Russians were insistent that it contain such provisions. The President said he thought that would be a mistake and that he hoped we would win our point.

  2. Location. The President then inquired whether we had discussed location. I told him only privately to date in informal discussions. He said he had been thinking more about this and continued to hope we would agree on the assembly meeting in different places “from hemisphere to hemisphere,” and that the council should have two locations, one in the Azores and the other in the Hawaiian Islands.

At this point I expressed the view it would be a mistake to separate the secretariat from the permanent headquarters of the council. I said the secretariat might consist of a couple of thousand of people and that to have them somewhere on the mainland with the council located on an island just would not be practical. I also said we were afraid his suggestion of having the secretariat located in America would not be acceptable to the other nations. At this point I spoke in favor of Geneva, pointing out that the climate was good, facilities excellent, it was readily accessible to the European countries and that the only bad feature was the bad name of the League, suggesting that if it were not for that, I believed he would agree to it without question. The President said he would not object to the permanent secretariat being located there but that he would object strongly to the assembly or the council having official meetings there. I got the impression from what he said that if it was thought advisable, he could be persuaded to have the place of operations of the council in Geneva if it held its meetings elsewhere. He then spoke definitely of the Island of Flores in the Azores and I told him I would have a map prepared showing its location and containing information as to its climate, its port facilities, etc. I promised to do likewise for the small island of Niihau in the Hawaiian group which the President described as the most interesting and heavenly spot he knew of on earth and which he said would be magnificent for a permanent seat of the executive meetings of the council. In the meeting the President could not recall the name of this island but stated it was northwest of Oahu and that it was owned by an old sugar family. The President then spoke of the Black Hills, saying it was 400 miles in every direction from civilization; that there were two good hotels and trout streams available and that it would be a magnificent place for the council to meet.

  1. Name. The President then inquired if we had reached a decision on a name. I replied that we had not discussed this formally but would do so, but that I did not feel we would have any difficulty in putting over the name “The United Nations.”
740.0011 EW/8–2844

Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Southern European Affairs

Washington, August 28, 1944

Memorandum for the President

Subject: THE AMERICAN POSITION AS REGARDS AN EVENTUAL ALLIED OCCUPATION OF ROMANIA, HUNGARY AND BULGARIA

The Department understands that the decision has already been taken that American ground forces are not to participate in operations in the three satellite countries of Southeastern Europe. There have been, of course, considerable air force operations, under the Mediterranean command, probably the greater part of them conducted by American planes. In the case of Romania, General Wilson has now ordered more intensive air operations, in the light of the events of the last few days, and these may now or at a later stage involve airborne troops, but we are not informed that any American personnel are being used. It seems to be, however, our basic military policy not to use U.S. forces in Balkan operations.

The OSS does, however, have teams ready, or in process of organization, for use in these countries, chiefly for intelligence but also for special operations.

As regards occupation, the documents to be used as the basis for terms of surrender, and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provide for Allied occupation, but it is understood that our military policy is not to use American forces as a part of the army of occupation.

It is supposed that American missions will go into each of the countries after surrender. These missions will have political, military and technical functions. The Department has not been informed of the Army’s plans for assigning military personnel for this work.

As regards civil affairs in the Balkans, it has been decided that the United States will participate in relief and rehabilitation work in the military period, but this, so far, has been planned only for “liberated” territory; namely, Greece, Yugoslavia and Albania, and not for the satellite states.

The terms of surrender contemplate, however, the utilization of the resources or supplies which may be available in the satellite countries and useful to the Allies in the prosecution of the war. Technical personnel in the form of Allied missions will be necessary for the administration of this program. This has been in discussion with the FEA. The present disposition is not to send American personnel into the countries for this purpose. This would be in line with the general policy to hold to a minimum actual American participation both in the operations stage and the occupation state [stage?].

Völkischer Beobachter (August 29, 1944)

Militärischer Größenwahn in den USA –
Macht- und Blutrausch der Juden

Der Kampf um die Seine

Hinter den Invasoren das Chaos –
Frankreich unter den Stiefeln seiner ‚Befreier‘

Innsbrucker Nachrichten (August 29, 1944)

Anhaltend schwere Kämpfe in West und Ost

Stützpunkte in Paris der Übermacht erlegen – Sowjetangriffe bei Baranow, Ostrow und Dorpat zerschlagen

dnb. Aus dem Führerhauptquartier, 29. August –
Das Oberkommando der Wehrmacht gibt bekannt:

An der unteren Seine wurde die Masse unserer Truppen auf das Nordufer des Flusses zurückgenommen. Nachdrängender Feind blieb im Abwehrfeuer liegen. Vorstöße des Gegners aus seinen Brückenköpfen nordwestlich Paris heraus wurden zum Stehen gebracht. Unsere Stützpunkte in der Stadt sind nach tagelangem schwerem Kampfe der feindlichen Übermacht erlegen, östlich Paris hat der Gegner nunmehr auf breiter Front nach Norden eingedreht, um über die Linie Châlons–Château Thierry in unsere Südflanke zu stoßen. An der Marne sind heftige Kämpfe mit den feindlichen Vorhuten entbrannt.

Die Besatzung von Marseille leistet im Hafen, auf engem Raum zusammengedrängt, dem Feind weiterhin tapfer Widerstand.

Im Rhonetal setzten sich unsere Truppen befehlsgemäß nach Norden ab.

Ein Verband schwerer Kampfflugzeuge führte in der vergangenen Nacht einen zusammengefassten Angriff gegen den feindlichen Stützpunkt Melun südöstlich Paris.

Im Seegebiet nördlich Le Havre versenkten Sicherungsfahrzeuge nach hartem Gefecht mit einem von Zerstörern und Schnellbooten gesicherten Kreuzer ein feindliches Schnellboot. Ein eigenes Boot ging hierbei verloren, zwei andere wurden beschädigt.

Durch besondere Kampfmittel der Kriegsmarine wurden vor der südfranzösischen Küste erneut ein feindliches Artillerieschnellboot und ein Bewacher sowie eine kleinere Einheit nicht erkannten Typs versenkt.

London und seine Außenbezirke liegen weiterhin unter dem Feuer der „V1.“

In Italien setzte der Feind seine starken Angriffe im adriatischen Küstenabschnitt während des ganzen Tages fort, konnte aber in den verlustreichen Kämpfen nur wenig Boden gewinnen.

In Rumänien kämpfen unsere Verbände beiderseits des unteren Pruth weiter gegen den von allen Seiten anstürmenden Feind. Südwestlich des unteren Sereth fiel Buzau nach hartem Kampf in die Hand der Sowjets. 27 feindliche Panzer wurden hierbei abgeschossen. Im Südteil der Ostkarpaten sind im ungarischen Grenzgebiet heftige Kämpfe deutscher und ungarischer Truppen gegen vordringende sowjetische Kampfgruppen im Gange.

Von den Waldkarpaten bis zum Finnischen Meerbusen kam es gestern nur im Weichselbrückenkopf westlich Baranow, im Raume westlich Ostrow, nordwestlich Modohn und im Raume von Dorpat zu größeren Kampfhandlungen. In diesen Abschnitten wurden feindliche Angriffe zerschlagen und die Sowjets an mehreren Stellen im Gegenangriff zurückgeworfen. Nur vereinzelt gelang ihnen geringer Bodengewinn.

Nordamerikanische Bomber griffen mehrere Orte im Großraum von Wien und in Ungarn an. Vorstöße feindlicher Jagdflieger richteten sich außerdem gegen westdeutsches Gebiet.

In der Nacht warfen einzelne britische Flugzeuge Bomben auf Städte im Rheinland und in Westfalen.

Luftverteidigungskräfte schossen 15 feindliche Flugzeuge, darunter 13 viermotorige Bomber, ab.

Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (August 29, 1944)

Communiqué No. 143

Allied forces which crossed the SEINE at TROYERS have reached a point approximately 15 miles northeast of the town, and another crossing has been made several miles to the north. Other elements are in the immediate vicinity of ARCIS-SUR-AUBE.

Troops advancing north and east below the MARNE have reached MONTMIRAIL. LA FERTÉ-SOUS-JOUARRE has been liberated. Forces north of the river have advanced to within six miles of CHÂTEAU-THIERRY. North of MEAUX, Allied armored units have reached CUVERGNON, 14 miles from the MARNE, in a rapid advance against light resistance.

The bridgeheads over the SEINE below PARIS, at MANTES-GASSICOURT, VERNON and PONT-DE-L’ARCHE have all been extended. Varied enemy resistance was encountered on the north side of the river near MANTES-GASSICOURT. Our forces in the two other bridgeheads have made good progress. Another bridgehead east of LOUVIERS has now been established. Our troops are firmly along the general line of the SEINE and the only ground south of the river remaining in the enemy hands is in the loop between ELBEUF and the sea.

In BRITTANY, Allied forces closing in on BREST from three sides continue to make slow, steady progress against heavy opposition.

Our long-range fighters, operating well ahead of the advancing Allied armies, carried out low-level attacks on road, rail and water communications in northeastern FRANCE, BELGIUM, HOLLAND, LUXEMBOURG, and western GERMANY. Extensive destruction was wrought, including some 320 locomotives, 279 railway cars, and three ammunition trains. Many barges were damaged, two railway marshalling yards were attacked and 17 enemy aircraft were destroyed in combat, in addition to some on the ground. Twenty-three of our long-range fighters are missing.

The area between the SEINE and the SOMME was swept by our close support fighters and fighter bombers. There were fewer targets but much damage was inflicted on road transport.

Fuel dumps at HAM, DOULLENS and south of AMIENS were the principal targets for medium and light bombers and a successful attack was carried out on an ammunition dump in the FORÊT DE L’AIGLE near COMPIÈGNE. The SEINE ferry at DUCLAIR was also raided and great destruction was caused to barges and massed vehicles.

Small groups of enemy shipping off the PAS-DE-CALAIS were attacked by our coastal aircraft yesterday
morning and some vessels were left ablaze.

Yesterday evening, heavy bombers attacked shipping at BREST and a battery on the island of CÉZEMBRE near SAINT-MALO.

Last night, low-level attacks from the battlefront to STRASBOURG were continued by our light bombers. Targets included marshalling yards near METZ, rail installations at CHARLEVILLE, ABBEVILLE, ARRAS and DOULLENS, a large horse-drawn convoy at LAON, and other road transport.

U.S. Navy Department (August 29, 1944)

CINCPAC Press Release No. 536

For Immediate Release
August 29, 1944

The airfield at Iwo Jima in the Volcano Islands was bombed on August 27 (West Longitude Date) by 7th AAF Liberators. Moderate anti-aircraft fire was encountered. During the night of August 26‑27, a single Liberator of the 7th AAF bombed Iwo Jima, encountering no opposition.

Pagan Island in the Marianas was attacked on August 27 by 7th AAF Liberators and in a separate strike on the same day was bombed and strafed fighter planes. Buildings and gun emplacements were the principal targets. Alamagan Island was also bombed on August 27.

Yap Island in the Western Carolines was attacked on August 27 by a single 7th AAF Liberator. Meager anti-aircraft fire was encountered.

Further neutralization raids against enemy positions in the Marshalls were conducted by Dauntless dive bombers and Corsair fighters of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing on August 27.

On August 26, Liberators of the 11th AAF bombed Paramushiru in the Kuril Islands, starting several fires.

The Pittsburgh Press (August 29, 1944)

CHÂTEAU-THIERRY CAPTURED
Patton drives mile an hour

Soissons also falls in Yank race toward Belgium and Germany
By Virgil Pinkley, United Press staff writer

Big Three agreed on principles of peace plan

New world league is basic proposal