Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt and Churchill, noon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Admiral Leahy | Foreign Secretary Eden | |
| General Marshall | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| General Arnold | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Field Marshal Dill | ||
| General Ismay | ||
| Major General Laycock | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Hollis |
McFarland minutes
September 16, 1944, 10:15 a.m.
Top secret
Report to the President and Prime Minister
At the request of the President, Admiral Leahy read out the report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the President and Prime Minister (CCS 680/1) paragraph, by paragraph. A number of amendments were proposed and agreed to. These are incorporated in the final report (CCS 680/2).
In addition to the agreed amendments, comments on the report were made as follows:
Operations in Italy
a. Paragraph 11
The Prime Minister suggested that the alternative developments in the operations in Italy postulated by General Wilson were rather too rigid. There might be many shades between the rout of General Kesselring’s forces and the ability of the Germans to effect an orderly withdrawal. Paragraphs 11a and b would present a better-balanced estimate if paragraph 11b was amended to read “b. Kesselring’s Army will succeed in effecting an orderly withdrawal, in which event it does not at present seem possible that we can do more than clear the Lombardy Plains this year. Unless the enemy’s resistance is markedly reduced, difficult terrain and severe weather in the Alps during the winter would prevent another major offensive until spring 1945.”
b. Paragraph 12
The Prime Minister asked that the precise implication of the statement “that no major units should be withdrawn from Italy until the outcome of General Alexander’s present offensive is known” might be made perfectly clear. For example, it would be quite unacceptable if paragraph 12a was intended to cover an offensive only as far, say, as the Rimini Line. He assumed that the offensive contemplated would include domination of the Valley of the Po.
General Marshall said it was his understanding that General Alexander’s present offensive included invasion of the Valley of the Po.
Admiral Leahy agreed.
c. Paragraph 12c
The Prime Minister expressed his appreciation to Admiral King for his offer to provide an amphibious lift for possible operations against the Istrian Peninsula.
Admiral King said that after taking part in operations in the Adriatic, these landing craft would be required to proceed to the Southeast Asia Theater for DRACULA. It was therefore of the greatest importance that General Wilson should submit his plan for the Istrian operation and a decision be taken not later than 15 October. He pointed out that there were certain other craft now in the Mediterranean which were urgently required for the Pacific.
The Prime Minister agreed that it was of the utmost importance that the matter be settled promptly.
General Laycock confirmed that the additional craft referred to by Admiral King would not be wanted for the Istrian operation.
Overall objective for the war against Japan
d. Paragraph 21
The Prime Minister said he thought it quite possible that a heavy, sustained and ever-increasing air bombardment of the Japanese cities might cause Japan to capitulate. People could stand heavy bombardment only so long as they could hope that sooner or later it would come to some endurable end. There could be no such hope for Japan and all they could look forward to was the prospect of an ever-increasing weight of explosive on their centers of population.
e. Paragraph 23
With reference to the term “the opening of a seaway to China,” the Prime Minister said that he assumed this meant the seaway from the United States. He did not contemplate a sea route being opened from the south, for example, through the Sunda Strait.
Admiral King agreed with the Prime Minister’s interpretation on this point.
f. Paragraph 26
The Prime Minister said that the Canadian Government was anxious for some assurance in principle that their forces would participate in the main operations against Japan. The Canadian Government would prefer that their forces should operate in the more northerly parts of the Pacific, as their troops were unused to tropical conditions.
It was agreed that a paragraph accepting Canadian participation in principle should be inserted in the report. (See paragraph 27)
General Arnold pointed out that the necessity for securing suitable bases for all the forces that would be operating in the Pacific might require employment of Canadian forces in the tropics.
g. The discussion then turned to the operations in Southeast Asia, with particular reference to Operations CAPITAL and DRACULA. As regards CAPITAL**, the Prime Minister** said that, while he accepted the obligation of securing the air route and attaining overland communications with China, any tendency to overinsure in this operation would have the effect of ruling out DRACULA, which he and the British Chiefs of Staff were particularly set on carrying out before the monsoon of 1945.
h. At this point the Prime Minister read out a note on the provision of forces for Dracula (see Annex I) in amplification of which he made certain suggestions about the timing of the movements of forces from the United States. If the United States authorities could see their way to assisting the operations in Burma with one or two divisions it would be better to move two divisions from the later schedules of the United States Army transportation to Europe than to take two divisions from General Montgomery’s Army which was now actually fighting. This would bring additional troops more rapidly into action against the Japanese without withdrawing any of those already fighting in Germany. He did not ask for a decision on these proposals there and then but asked if the United States Chiefs of Staff would examine his suggestion.
General Marshall undertook to examine the Prime Minister’s proposals. He said, however, that there was only one light division available and this had been reorganized and allocated to the European Theater at the special request of General Eisenhower. Every division in the United States was already allocated either to General Eisenhower or to the Pacific. The last divisions for the European Theater of Operations were scheduled to sail either the last week in January or the first week in February. The only way of providing United States divisions for Burma was by taking them from approved allocations. In this connection he said General Stilwell was desirous of having an American division assigned him; in fact, he wanted two if he could get them.
i. Continuing, General Marshall said that he had recently learned of an impression that the increase in the requirements for DRACULA had been brought about by pressure from United States authorities. After a thorough inquiry he had found that this impression was groundless. No United States authorities had advocated any such increase.
At the President’s request, General Marshall outlined certain developments with regard to the Chinese forces. The Generalissimo contemplated withdrawing the “Y” Force across the Salween unless General Stilwell advanced on Bhamo with the Ledo Force. No replacements had been provided for the Salween Force, which had now dwindled to 14,000 men. A note had been sent by the President to the Generalissimo pointing out the consequences of the proposed action and stating that the Generalissimo must accept full responsibility therefor.
Redeployment of forces after the end of the war in Europe
j. Paragraph 30
The Prime Minister pointed out that our shipping situation would be greatly eased after the defeat of Germany by the cessation of the convoys. Lord Leathers had said that we should be able to get an additional lift of between 40 and 50 percent. The ships would be faster on passage with a much quicker turn-round at the terminal ports.
Allocation of zones of occupation in Germany
k. Admiral Leahy said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed on a provisional demarcation of zones of occupation in Germany. The details and implications would be required to be worked out by the experts. [An addition to the report which covered this matter (CCS 320/27) was read out and agreed.]
ANNEX I: Directive to Supreme Allied Commander, Southeast Asia
l. Admiral Mountbatten’s directive was agreed, subject to certain minor amendments.
The Conference: Instructed the Secretaries to revise the report in the light of the amendments approved by the President and Prime Minister and to circulate it as an approved document.
Location of the Central Tripartite Control Commission in Germany
The President inquired whether any suggestions had been put forward for the location of the Central Tripartite Control Commission in Germany. Was this to be in Berlin or elsewhere?
Mr. Eden said that this question was under examination by the European Advisory Commission. From the administrative point of view Berlin seemed to be the best place.
Communication of the results of “OCTAGON” Conference to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek
The Prime Minister said that he would like to add to the communication to Marshal Stalin a word on the political dangers of divergencies between Russia and the Western Allies in respect of Poland, Greece and Yugoslavia.
The President said that as the communication was purely military in character and purported to give the results of the OCTAGON Conference, he thought it would be better if political matters were omitted.
The President and Prime Minister approved the terms of the communications to Marshal Stalin and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek as set out in Enclosures “A” and “B” respectively of CCS 681/2.
Release of information on “MULBERRY”
The Prime Minister said that it had been suggested to him that the time had now come when information could be released to the press about MULBERRY. The development of the artificial harbors had been largely a British enterprise and he would naturally have liked to let the public know about them as soon as the information could safely be released. He had now been informed, however, that Admiral King thought that the release of information about MULBERRY might be helpful to the Japanese and might not permit full advantage being taken of these inventions in the war against Japan. The Prime Minister said he fully accepted Admiral King’s view and there would consequently be no release of information to the public about MULBERRY at present.
“OCTAGON” Communiqué
The Conference: Agreed on the terms of a communiqué to be issued to the Press that same afternoon (see Annex II).
