Steele: China’s ordeal
By A. T. Steele
…
Ancient fort put into use by Germans
Dry, 15-foot moat surrounds citadel
By Robert Richards, United Press staff writer
…
Henry: Former boxer is leader of French Patriot unit
Marcel Thil now a wealthy coal merchant; Yank rescues wife of millionaire
By Thomas R. Henry, North American Newspaper Alliance
…
‘Occupied, but not conquered’ –
Shapiro: Burgomaster of Brussels defied German invaders
By L. S. B. Shapiro, North American Newspaper Alliance
…
U.S. State Department (September 11, 1944)
Lot 60–D 224, Box 55: DO/PR/18
Memorandum by the Under Secretary of State (Stettinius) to the Secretary of State
Washington, September 11, 1944
Subject: PROGRESS REPORT ON DUMBARTON OAKS CONVERSATIONS – NINETEENTH DAY
Meeting of the American Group
The only meeting held today was the regularly scheduled meeting of the American group. This meeting was continued in the afternoon in order to complete consideration of the revisions made in the draft proposals at the meeting on Saturday of the Joint Steering Committee.
Meeting of the Joint Steering Committee
The Joint Steering Committee did not meet owing to the fact that the Soviet group had not yet received instructions from its Government which would permit further consideration of the bracketed sections of the draft proposals. A meeting of the Joint Steering Committee has been scheduled for Tuesday, at 11:15 a.m.
Lot 60–D 224, Box 59: Stettinius Diary
Extracts from the Personal Diary of the Under Secretary of State
Nineteenth Day, Monday, September 11, 1944
Midnight Telephone Conversation with Gromyko
At midnight Gromyko phoned me at home. He was in a good humor and said he had had a good day of rest on Sunday. He then said that we must finish our conversations with them before we start with any other country and said we had agreed to this on Saturday. I replied that he was entirely correct and asked if anything had appeared to make him feel we were planning to do otherwise. He said, “No, nothing has happened.” My answer apparently completely satisfied him. I was mystified, however, by his calling at this hour to make this point, fearing something might have appeared in the press or radio, as a result of taking the Chinese to Virginia, which had made him apprehensive. He then said he expected there would be a little delay in his hearing from home but that it would be unfair to consider this was caused by the Soviet Union, because we were partially responsible for having made so many changes in the text, which his Government would have to study. I did not press the Ambassador to try to pin him down as to exactly when he thought he would have the final instructions from his Government. He inquired whether we would meet today and I said I did not think we could accomplish much until either he or Sir Alexander had something to report. He replied jokingly “Or you have something to report.” It was left that we would not call a meeting but would check with each other during the morning.
Telephone Conversation with Mr. Hull
I called Mr. Hull at 9:00 o’clock. First I spoke to Mrs. Hull and described to her our Sunday trip to Virginia. Then I told the Secretary about Gromyko’s midnight call. I told him that, as I saw it, all we could do at the moment was to stand by and await developments.…
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Meeting with Sir Alexander
I had a private talk with Sir Alexander immediately after lunch. He raised with me the great importance to him of returning to the United Kingdom by the end of this week. In view thereof, he urged us to start with the Chinese immediately and asked if I would have any objections if he spoke frankly to Gromyko about it this afternoon. I, of course, assured him that I would not.…
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Log of the President’s Visit to Canada
Monday, September 11
The trip north was uneventful. We crossed the International Border into Canada at Rouse’s Point at 12:30 a.m. An hour later, at Delson, Quebec, we were joined by a detail of four Royal Canadian Mounted Police who were to accompany us to Quebec and later accompany us from Quebec back to the Canadian Border at Rouse’s Point. These Mounties were Inspector Savoi, Corporal Hudon and Constables Bradley and McArthur.
Our train arrived at Quebec – at the Wolfe’s Cove station which is on the banks of the St. Lawrence River just below the Plains of Abraham – at 9:00 a.m. Our train was placed in position for our detraining at once but our arrival was not immediately announced as the President desired to wait here until the arrival of the Prime Minister’s train.
The weather at Quebec, as described by the local press, was “typically fall sunny weather” – clear, cool and most invigorating.
The Governor-General of Canada (the Earl of Athlone), Her Royal Highness Princess Alice (the Countess of Athlone) and the Right Honorable Mackenzie King (the Prime Minister of Canada) called on the President on his train at 9:45 a.m. to welcome him and Mrs. Roosevelt to Canada and Quebec.
The President had left his train at 9:50 a.m. and was seated in his automobile, with the Governor-General, Princess Alice and Prime Minister King standing nearby, when Prime Minister Churchill’s train pulled up alongside our train at Wolfe’s Cove at exactly 10:00 a.m. Prime Minister King went aboard the train to welcome Prime Minister Churchill and a few minutes later, at 10:05 a.m., Prime Minister Churchill and his party left their train, and together with Mr. King, walked over to the President’s automobile where most enthusiastic greetings were exchanged and the cheers of the crowd gathered at the station acknowledged in their typical manners. By now the official welcoming committee had been swelled by the arrival of Major General Sir Eugene Fiset, the Lieutenant Governor of Quebec, and Lady Fiset; the Honorable Maurice Duplessis, the Premier of Quebec; the Honorable C. G. Power, Canadian Minister of Air; Mr. St. Laurent, Minister of Justice for the Province of Quebec; Mr. Borne, Mayor of the City of Quebec; and Lieutenant General J. C. Murchie, Chief of Canadian General Staff.
In the Prime Minister’s party were Mrs. Churchill; Lord Moran, the Prime Minister’s Private Physician; Lord Leathers, British Minister of [War] Transport; Lord Cherwell, British Paymaster General; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, First Sea Lord; Field Marshal Sir Alan F. Brooke, Chief of Imperial General Staff; Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Charles Portal, Chief of Air Staff; General Sir Hastings L. Ismay, Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister as Minister of Defense; and Major General R. E. Laycock, Chief of Combined Operations. The Prime Minister was wearing a blue uniform – the uniform of an Elder Brother of Trinity House, ancient London pilotage corporation.
After the exchange of greetings at the train, the combined groups motored to the Citadel. The President and the Governor-General were in the first automobile; Her Royal Highness Princess Alice, Mrs. Roosevelt and Mrs. Churchill in the second; and Prime Ministers Churchill and King were riding in the third car. Their parties followed in a long procession that wound up the steep hill to and across the Plains of Abraham above Wolfe’s Cove and on to the Citadel.
The President and Prime Minister Churchill arrived at the Citadel at 10:25 a.m. Here the President was officially received in Canada. A composite guard of honor of approximately one hundred and fifty men, made up of equal detachments of Royal Canadian Navy, Army and Air Force personnel, was drawn up on the parade ground. This guard was under the command of Lieutenant J. C. Eastman, RCNVR, of the HMCS Montcalm. On the President’s arrival on the parade ground, the Royal Twenty-Second Regiment Band, under the direction of Lieutenant Edwin Belanger, played our national anthem, the guard of honor presented arms and our colors were hoisted at the Citadel alongside the British and Canadian colors. No honors were rendered the Prime Minister at this time. On completion of honors for the President, the Prime Minister got out of his car, walked over to the President’s car and the officer in charge of the guard – Lieutenant Eastman – was called up and presented to the President and to the Prime Minister. News photographers and members of the press – some one hundred strong – were present for the ceremonies at the Citadel.
From the parade ground the President went directly to the Governor-General’s summer residence within the Citadel grounds. Here he left his automobile and entered the house. The Prime Minister, Mrs. Churchill, Mrs. Roosevelt, and various other members of the official groups who were remaining at the Citadel left their cars at the parade ground and walked to the nearby residence of the Governor-General. Other members of the combined party left the Citadel at this time for the Chateau Frontenac Hotel where they were quartered during our visit to Quebec.
The President, Mrs. Roosevelt and Admiral Leahy were guests of the Governor-General and Princess Alice at their summer home within the Citadel during our stay at Quebec. The same quarters occupied last year were again assigned the President’s party. The Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill were likewise guests of the Governor-General and Princess Alice. The Citadel was guarded by its regular garrison augmented by Royal Canadian Mounted Police and our Secret Service men. The special anti-aircraft protection afforded last year was not provided as it was not considered necessary this year.
The President had been preceded to Quebec by the other members of our Joint Chiefs of Staff – General George C. Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army; Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander in Chief, U.S. Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations; General Henry H. Arnold, Commanding General, Army Air Forces; Brigadier General Andrew J. McFarland, Secretary; and Captain Edwin D. Graves, Jr., USN, Deputy Secretary – and their staffs of planners.
On our arrival at the Citadel, we found Colonel Richard Park Jr., USA, Captain Boyce Price, USA, and Lieutenant Ogden S. Collins Jr., USNR, who had come to Quebec in advance of us and had set up a map room for the President at the Citadel. The same room was used as was used for this purpose during the 1943 Quebec Conference. The Prime Minister had his own map room at the Citadel, with Captain Pim, RNVR, in charge and assisted by Lieutenant Colonel Hughes-Reckett, Lieutenant Commander Murray, RNVR, and Flight Officer Lyttleton.
Major DeWitt Greer’s Signal Corps crew had the communications set-up functioning on our arrival at the Citadel, so that the President was never out of instantaneous touch with the White House. War and governmental reports for the President had come to him by radio while on the train en route from Washington to Quebec. At the Citadel we had our own telephone exchange, called “Amco.” At the Château the U.S. Army maintained a private telephone exchange, called “Victor.” Both exchanges had direct wire service to Washington and the White House. Direct telegraph wire service was also available between the Citadel and the White House.
The Chateau Frontenac Hotel had been requisitioned by the Canadian Government for the duration of the conference, as it was in 1943, and all conference representatives of the three nations – Canada, Great Britain and the United States – were quartered and subsisted there as guests of the Canadian Government. The hotel was closed to the general public and was policed by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. A part of the hotel opening on the Terrace was closed off from the remainder of the hotel and was used as Conference Press Headquarters and telegraph room.
The Official Conference Headquarters and conference rooms were in the Chateau Frontenac and it was there that the various Staffs met daily for conferences. Plenary reports by the Combined British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff were made to the President and the Prime Minister at the Citadel.
Secretary Early, Mr. A. D. Dunton, of the Canadian Press Bureau, and Mr. R. J. Cruikshank of the British Ministry of Information held a joint press conference at Conference Press Headquarters at 11:30 a.m. More than 150 newsmen, representing the world’s press, were present. Daily press conferences were held here by these spokesmen of the Canadian, British and United States governments.
The President, the Prime Minister, Mrs. Roosevelt, Mrs. Churchill and Prime Minister Mackenzie King were luncheon guests of the Governor-General and Princess Alice at the Citadel at 1:30 p.m.
After lunch the President visited his map room in the Citadel. He was joined there by Prime Minister Churchill for a review of the latest war news. Before leaving Washington, the President had directed the map room to prepare charts, organization tables and graphs in order to demonstrate quickly the tremendous size of our naval force now stationed in the Western Pacific, with statistics giving an outline of the enormity of the logistics problem. This preparation was made in order that from the very beginning of discussions at Quebec there should be a common understanding of the naval problems and the difficulties of supply. With the help of the charts the President outlined the problem to the Prime Minister.
During the afternoon the Honorable Ray Atherton, United States Ambassador to Canada, called on the President.
At 8:30 p.m., the President and Mrs. Roosevelt attended a viceregal dinner at the Citadel as guests of the Governor-General and Her Royal Highness Princess Alice. The guest list also included Prime Minister and Mrs. Churchill; Prime Minister Mackenzie King; Cardinal Villeneuve; Right Reverend Philip Carrington, Anglican Archbishop [Bishop] of Quebec; Premier Duplessis of Quebec; Honorable Ray Atherton and Mrs. Atherton; Admiral William D. Leahy; Admiral E. J. King; General George C. Marshall; General H. H. Arnold; Honorable Stephen T. Early; Lieutenant General B. B. Somervell, Commanding General, Army Service Forces; Rear Admiral Wilson Brown; Vice Admiral Ross T. McIntire; Major General Edwin M. Watson; Miss Malvina Thompson; Right Honorable Malcolm Mac-Donald, United Kingdom High Commissioner to Canada; Admiral of the Fleet Sir Andrew B. Cunningham; Field Marshal Sir Alan Brooke; Marshal of the Royal Air [Force] Sir Charles Portal; Major General R. Laycock; General Sir Hastings L. Ismay; Field Marshal Sir John Dill, Chief of the British Joint Staff Mission to the United States; Admiral Sir Percy Noble; Lieutenant General G. N. Macready; Air Marshal Sir William Welsh; Lord Cher well; Commander C. R. Thompson, Naval Aide to the Prime Minister; Mr. John Martin, Secretary to the Prime Minister; Sir Eugene Fiset, Lieutenant-Governor of Quebec, and Lady Fiset; Dr. E. H. Coleman, Canadian Under-Secretary of State; the Canadian Chiefs of Staff Air Marshal R. Leckie, Lieutenant General J. C. Murchie, and Vice Admiral G. C. Jones; Major General Maurice Pope, Military Aide to Prime Minister King; and Colonel D. B. Papineau, Aide to Prime Minister King.
After the dinner the President turned in.
Völkischer Beobachter (September 12, 1944)
Eisenhower dampft englischen Siegesrausch –
Deutscher Widerstand wird immer härter
Wir werden uns mit allen Mitteln gegen die geplante Ausrottung zu wehren wissen
…
Führer HQ (September 12, 1944)
Kommuniqué des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht
Im Westen scheiterten feindliche Angriffe bei Brügge, Gent und nördlich Antwerpen. Ein feindlicher Brückenkopf über den Albertkanal nordwestlich Hasselt wurde zerschlagen. Schwacher Feind hält sich noch auf dem Nordufer. Nördlich Hasselt konnte der Gegner mit starken Infanterie- und Panzerkräften in Richtung Eindhoven Vordringen. Gegenangriffe sind angesetzt. Besonders heftig waren die Kämpfe östlich und südöstlich Lüttich und im Raum von Metz, wo unsere Truppen den vordringenden Angriffsgruppen des Feindes erbitterten Widerstand leisteten. Südlich Nancy wurden bei einem erfolgreichen Angriff mehrere hundert Gefangene eingebracht. Starker feindlicher Druck von Süden gegen Vesoul hält an.
In den beiden letzten Tagen wurden an der Westfront über 100 feindliche Panzer abgeschossen.
Die Besatzungen von Dünkirchen und Le Havre behaupteten sich gegen starke feindliche Angriffe. Westlich Brest hält sich bei Le Conquet noch eine eigene Kräftegruppe unter Führung des Oberstleutnants Fürst in vorbildlicher Standhaftigkeit. Die Festung selbst liegt unter schwerem feindlichem Feuer. Die Besatzung von Lorient vernichtete bei erfolgreichen Ausfällen feindliche Munitions- und Versorgungslager.
In der seit zwei Wochen fortdauernden großen Abwehrschlacht an der adriatischen Küste haben unsere Truppen dem an Menschen und Material weit überlegenen Feind bei seinen vergeblichen Durchbruchsversuchen immer wieder schwerste Verluste beigebracht. Unter dem Eindruck dieser grollen Ausfälle führte der Gegner dort am vergangenen Tage nur mehr schwächere örtliche Vorstöße, die abgewiesen wurden.
Im rückwärtigen italienischen Frontgebiet wurden zahlreiche Bandenlager zerstört, über 750 Banditen im Kampf niedergemacht und gegen 500 Gefangene eingebracht.
Im Süden Siebenbürgens und in den Ostkarpaten wurden feindliche Angriffe durch sofortige Gegenstöße unserer Truppen abgewiesen oder aufgefangen.
Bei Sanok und Krosno hält der schwere Abwehrkampf an. Der angestrebte Durchbruch blieb dem Feind versagt.
Östlich Warschau und nordöstlich Ostrolenka leisteten unsere Divisionen gegenüber erneuten heftigen Angriffen der Bolschewisten zähen Widerstand und vereitelten auch hier die sowjetischen Durchbruchsabsichten.
Von der übrigen Ostfront werden keine größeren Kampfhandlungen gemeldet.
Durch die Tagesangriffe anglo-amerikanischer Fliegerverbände gegen west- und mitteldeutsches Gebiet wurden besonders die Städte Hannover, Magdeburg und Eisenach betroffen.
In der Nacht war Darmstadt das Ziel eines britischen Terrorangriffes. Einzelne feindliche Flugzeuge warfen wieder Bomben auf Berlin.
Im Verlauf erbitterter Luftkämpfe sowie durch Flakabwehr verlor der Feind nach bisher vorliegenden Meldungen 133 Flugzeuge, darunter 104 viermotorige Bomber.
In den schweren Kämpfen bei Krosno hat sich das Grenadierregiment 309 unter Führung von Major Sinram bei der Verteidigung eines wichtigen. Eckpfeilers hervorragend geschlagen.
In der Schlacht am unteren Narew zeichneten sich die hessisch-thüringische 129. Infanteriedivision unter Führung von Generalmajor von Larisch und die württembergische 5. Jägerdivision unter Führung von Generalleutnant Sixt durch Standfestigkeit und Angriffsschwung besonders aus.
Supreme HQ Allied Expeditionary Force (September 12, 1944)
Communiqué No. 157
Allied troops have crossed the LUXEMBOURG-GERMAN frontier, and to the south, we have established contact with our forces advancing from southern FRANCE.
In the MOSELLE Valley, we are continuing to meet stubborn resistance along the river.
Further north, troops which made the crossing of the GERMAN frontier in force are now in the area northwest of TRIER. Earlier forces which liberated the city of LUXEMBOURG had encountered enemy delaying acting northeast of MERSCH.
In the ARDENNES, gains have been made in the vicinity of GASTOGNE.
Advances south of LIÈGE have taken our troops across the road between HARRE and AYWAILLE, Ten miles east of LIÈGE we have occupied HERVE after encountering scattered enemy resistance. We have also reached JUPRELLE on the LIÈGE–TONGRES road.
The bridgeheads over the ALBERT CANAL have been enlarged in spite of stubborn enemy resistance.
East of GHENT, we have liberated LOKEREN and SAINT-NICHOLAS.
U.S. Navy Department (September 12, 1944)
Communiqué No. 542
The submarine USS GUDGEON (SS-211) is overdue from patrol and presumed lost.
Next of kin of casualties have been informed.
CINCPAC Press Release No. 554
For Immediate Release
September 12, 1944
Carrier aircraft of the Pacific Fleet attacked enemy defenses in the Palau Islands on September 10 and 11 (West Longitude Date). On September 11, the islands were shelled by battleships and cruisers. One hundred and twenty tons of bombs were dropped by aircraft on buildings, gun positions, and coastal defenses at Babelthuap, Peleliu, and Angaur Islands. On September 10, a small cargo ship near the islands was sunk by bombing and strafing, and another was damaged. More than 150 rockets were fired at defensive positions during the two days, and numerous ground installations were strafed.
A single plane bombed the airfield at Iwo Jima on the night of September 10.
Pagan Island was a target for our aircraft on September 10. Rockets were launched at buildings and gun emplacements. Anti-aircraft fire ranged from meager to intense.
Seventy‑two tons of bombs were dropped on Truk by Liberators of the 7th AAF on September 10. Five or six enemy aircraft attempted interception. One enemy aircraft was destroyed and one was damaged. Anti-aircraft fire varied from meager to intense. Minor damage was inflicted on three Liberators.
On the same day, enemy-held positions in the Marshalls were subjected to further neutralization raids. Corsairs of the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing bombed bivouac areas on Jaluit and Maloelap Atolls. Corsairs and Dauntless dive bombers attacked Mille, encountering moderate anti-aircraft fire.
U.S. State Department (September 12, 1944)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, noon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | Field Marshal Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Marshal of the Royal Air Force Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | General Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | Admiral Noble | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Rear Admiral McCormick | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Major General Handy | Major General Laycock | |
| Major General Fairchild | ||
| Major General Kuter | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General McFarland | Major General Hollis | |
| Captain Graves | Brigadier Cornwall-Jones | |
| Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff minutes
September 12, 1944, noon
Top secret
Chairmanship of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Leahy said that the United States Chiefs of Staff would be glad if Sir Alan Brooke would take the Chair at the forthcoming series of meetings.
Sir Alan Brooke thanked Admiral Leahy for this proposal which he would be glad to accept.
Personnel shipping
Sir Alan Brooke said that he felt that the problem of the use of personnel shipping after the defeat of Germany should be examined during the Conference. There would be heavy calls for personnel shipping both for the transfer of U.S. troops other than occupational troops from Europe to the United States or the Pacific, as well as for the reorientation of British forces to the Far East. In addition, the New Zealand and South African divisions and certain Canadian forces now in Europe would have to be returned to their homelands. He suggested that the experts should be instructed to examine this problem to see how best it could be met.
Admiral Leahy said that he could see no objection to this review but it would be impossible to reach any decisions during the Conference.
Sir Charles Portal, in agreeing with Admiral Leahy, said that he felt that the scope of the problem should be examined.
General Somervell stated that he had only one shipping expert at present at OCTAGON but agreed with a proposal made by Sir Alan Brooke that he should discuss this matter with Lord Leathers.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Invited General Somervell to confer with Lord Leathers on this matter.
Agenda and hour of meeting
At the suggestion of Admiral Leahy, the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to meet daily from 1000 to 1300.
b. Approved the program for the Conference as set out in CCS 654/6, subject to the transfer of the items for Saturday, 16 September, to Tuesday, 12 September. (Approved program subsequently circulated as CCS 654/7.)
Situation report from SCAEF (Scaf 78)
Sir Alan Brooke said that, while agreeing in general with General Eisenhower’s appreciation (Scaf 78), the British Chiefs of Staff felt that sufficient emphasis had not been laid on two points: firstly, the importance of securing sea communications and the ports of Antwerp and Rotterdam, and secondly, the importance of a strong attack being launched on the northern flank. General Eisenhower in his telegram had spoken of three possible routes of advance into Germany. In his (Sir Alan Brooke’s) view the most important was the northern route of attack which should be strengthened as much as possible, the remaining two routes being retained as alternatives. The most energetic efforts should be made to secure and open the port of Antwerp as a valuable base for future operations on the northern flank. In order to open the sea approaches to Antwerp, it seemed desirable to stage an airborne operation to capture the islands at the mouth of the Schelde.
General Marshall said that in view of the apparent massing of German forces on the islands guarding the port of Antwerp, and the lack of cover which existed on the ground, it appeared that a more profitable operation would be the bombing of enemy positions rather than an airborne operation.
Sir Alan Brooke felt that bombing alone would not achieve the required results and occupying forces would have to be introduced.
Sir Alan Brooke presented a draft reply to Scaf 78 approving General Eisenhower’s proposals and pointing out the advantages of the northern line of approach into Germany as opposed to the southern and the necessity for opening up the northwest ports, particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam.
After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the dispatch to the Supreme Commander, Allied Expeditionary Force of the draft telegram proposed by the British Chiefs of Staff. (Subsequently dispatched as Facs 78).
Situation report from the Mediterranean (Medcos 181 and Naf 774)
Admiral Leahy presented a statement of the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff with reference to the future role of the Fifth Army and of the Twelfth and Fifteenth Air Forces (CCS 677).
General Marshall said that a message had just been received from the U.S. Military Attaché in Switzerland to the effect that a German withdrawal of forces in northern Italy had already begun. If this was so, it would seem that, of the two situations envisaged by General Wilson in Part II of Naf 774, situation “a” would be ruled out unless the Allied armies could drive ahead with great speed, and situation “b” would exist, that is, there would be no possibility of another major offensive till the spring.
Sir Alan Brooke said that as he visualized it, if the Allied armies could break through to the Plains the enemy forces remaining in northwest Italy would be badly placed. A threat to Verona would cut off these forces and might result in their retirement to the westward and later the retirement of the German forces in northeast Italy back to the Alps. It was to be hoped that a large number of these eastern forces could be broken up. The attack by the Fifth Army was planned to take place on 13 September and a successful advance north of Florence might well result in driving the enemy forces back to the Po and Piave.
The indications were that the enemy was attempting to withdraw forces from Greece and Yugoslavia, though there was some doubt whether he could succeed in getting them out through bad lines of communications threatened by the Bulgarians, Marshal Tito’s army and the Greeks. The enemy might, however, get some forces out and it appeared that he was likely to endeavor to hold a line running through Yugoslavia. In such an event the enemy might be reduced to covering the Ljubljana Gap and endeavoring to hold a line through Yugoslavia and Istria. In these circumstances any withdrawal of forces from the Fifth Army would be most regrettable.
General Marshall said that it was not the intention to weaken the Fifth Army at the present time.
Continuing, Sir Alan Brooke said that the forces to be maintained in Italy might later be limited by logistics and terrain, He saw, however, great advantages in a right swing at Trieste and an advance from there to Vienna. However, if German resistance was strong, he did not visualize the possibility of our forces getting through to Vienna during the winter. Even so, the seizure of the Istrian Peninsula would be valuable as a base for the spring campaign or as a base from which our forces could be introduced into Austria in the event of Germany crumbling. It had not only a military value but also political value in view of the Russian advances in the Balkans.
In view of the possibility of amphibious thrusts on the Istrian Peninsula, Sir Alan Brooke asked the United States Chiefs of Staff their intention with regard to the U.S. landing craft now operating in support of DRAGOON.
Admiral King said that these craft were earmarked for other operations but no orders had been issued for their withdrawal. He too had in mind the possibility of amphibious operations in Istria. Naval forces on the other hand were in course of withdrawal for rehabilitation.
Unless a decision to mount an amphibious operation were taken soon the landing craft would lie idle, though required for operations in other parts of the world, for instance, against Rangoon.
In reply to a question by General Marshall, Sir Alan Brooke said that General Wilson was planning now for an amphibious operation and the picture should be much clearer in a short time, particularly if the German forces withdrew from north Italy.
There was general agreement that a decision with regard to the launching of an amphibious operation should be made by 15 October.
General Marshall said that if operations in the Alps were undertaken in winter there was available the PLOUGH Force now in south France and the necessary sleds are obtainable.
Referring to the views of the United States Chiefs of Staff on the future role of the Fifth Army, Sir Charles Portal said that he felt that primary emphasis should be laid on the securing of a victory in Italy. As he saw it, the possible withdrawal of units of the Fifth Army to France would be dependent on the successful outcome of the campaign in Italy.
Admiral Leahy asked if it was Sir Charles Portal’s thought that these forces should be retained in Italy if General Eisenhower was in need of them in France.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that it was a question of short-term as opposed to long-term advantages. The important point as he saw it was to prevent the German troops getting away in north Italy if it could be avoided.
Admiral Leahy said it was not the intention to withdraw troops from the Fifth Army unless the German troops withdrew.
Sir Charles Portal said that he would point out that the withdrawal of forces from an army had a greater effect on that army than the actual number of formations withdrawn, since such withdrawals had a discouraging effect on the morale of the command and of the army itself.
Admiral Leahy reemphasized that the United States proposal was contingent on the destruction or withdrawal of a large part of the German Army.
General Marshall said that there was no intention in the mind of the United States Chiefs of Staff to effect the withdrawal of forces from Italy at the present time.
Admiral King confirmed that an option on the U.S. landing craft now in the Mediterranean could be retained provided a decision was reached by 15 October.
In reply to a question by Sir Alan Brooke, General Marshall confirmed that while there was no intention of moving major units of the Fifth Army at the present time, small individual units (i.e., the Japanese battalion) might be withdrawn.
After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed that no forces should be withdrawn from Italy until the outcome of General Alexander’s present offensive is known.
b. Agreed that the desirability of withdrawing formations of the United States Fifth Army should be reconsidered in the light of the results of General Alexander’s present offensive and of a German withdrawal in northern Italy and in the light of the views of General Eisenhower.
c. Agreed to inform General Wilson that if he wishes to retain for use in the Istrian Peninsula the amphibious lift at present in the Mediterranean, he should submit his plan therefor to the Combined Chiefs of Staff as soon as possible, and not later than 15 October; and took note that the British Chiefs of Staff would prepare a suitable message for consideration.
Combined intelligence report on the situation in Europe (CCS 660/1)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the estimate contained in CCS 660/1.
Command of DRAGOON forces (CCS 674)
Admiral Leahy presented a draft telegram to General Eisenhower approving his proposals in Scaf 77 (CCS 674/1).
Sir Charles Portal drew attention to a telegram (FX 28818) from General Wilson to General Devers, inquiring as to how soon General Devers’ communications with General Eisenhower would be sufficient to permit General Eisenhower to assume command.
It was generally agreed that this matter must be left to the commanders concerned and that General Eisenhower’s proposal to assume command of DRAGOON forces on 15 September would have taken account of this factor.
General Marshall said that while General Eisenhower had been anxious that General Devers should set up his headquarters and be able to take over the lines of communications, logistic problems and civil affairs, he also wished General Patch to continue in charge of the present battle. Undoubtedly additional U.S. troops would be transferred at a later date to General Patch from the center group of armies and further American divisions would join him through the port of Marseilles. At that time the 6th Army Group could be conveniently split, General Patch assuming command of the United States forces and the French forces forming an army of their own.
Sir Alan Brooke said that there was one point he would like to make. He hoped the setting up of a large headquarters by General Devers would not unduly deplete General Clark’s staff organization.
General Marshall reassured Sir Alan Brooke on this point. General Devers’ staff had been formed for some time in Corsica and General Clark’s forces would not be affected.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to dispatch to General Eisenhower and General Wilson the message proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff in CCS 674/1. (Subsequently dispatched as Facs 76 and Fan 413, respectively.)
At this point the Combined Chiefs of Staff recessed until 1430.
The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army to the Chief of the Military Mission in the Soviet Union
OCTAGON, 12 September 1944
OCTAGON 10
Top secret
Priority
For Deane from Marshall information War Department TopSec.
Condition of Polish patriots in Warsaw so critical that urgent action essential. In order to take advantage of Soviet agreement for aid desire that you in conference with representatives from Spaatz’ headquarters and from RAF prepare plan without delay and secure coordination of Soviet authorities as to arrangements and details of operation.
Plan must take into consideration present location of patriots so as to insure maximum amount of supplies being dropped to patriots rather than to Germans. Risk to airmen must be kept to minimum while endeavoring to secure maximum relief of patriots. Spaatz and Portal have been given copy of this message and will send names of representatives to you. Spaatz has been instructed to contact you re clearance for plane into Russia, details as to destination and other operational information. Present condition of Polish patriots in Warsaw such that delivery of supplies must be accomplished at earliest possible date.
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union
Washington, 12 September 1944
Top secret
Priority
Top secret for Ambassador Harriman from Secretary Hull. WH Number 63.
The President has directed General Marshall to send immediate instructions to Deane to explore with the appropriate Soviet military authorities in conjunction with his British military colleagues the urgent possibility of utilizing the Soviet offer to cooperate in assistance to Warsaw. (Your 3413, September 10.) The President likewise desires that you lend every support to Deane’s efforts and you should inform Molotov that this Government is prepared to do its utmost towards working out jointly with the British and the Russians the question of immediate aid to the Warsaw garrison. While it is of course possible that this Soviet decision comes too late if the physical situation of the garrison in Warsaw has been so reduced as to make the dropping of supplies impractical, that is a factual question which will emerge in the negotiations for the actual despatch of aid.
From the political point of view, we feel that it is of the highest importance that there should be no hesitation on our part in initiating the implementation of the Soviet promise, in order to avoid any possibility of our being blamed in the event that the aid does not arrive in time. This is particularly important since the President today received a further urgent appeal from Premier Mikołajczyk for assistance to the Warsaw garrison.
HULL
740.0011 EW/9–1244
JCS to the Secretary of State
Quebec, 12 September 1944
Top secret
My Dear Mr. Secretary: With reference to your letter of 9 September regarding Norway, it will be noted from the enclosed copies of messages to General Deane that the Joint Chiefs of Staff have instructed him as indicated in the third paragraph of your letter.
Sincerely yours, For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
A J McFARLAND
Brigadier General, USA
Secretary
[Enclosure 1 — Telegram]
CCS to the Chiefs of the United States and British Military Missions to the Soviet Union, temporarily at London
Washington, 30 August 1944
Top secret
Occupation of Norway under RANKIN conditions is subject. (TopSec to Generals Deane and Brocas Burrows for action personally on return, repeated to ETOUSA for British Chiefs of Staff for information, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.)
Combined Chiefs of Staff consider it advisable to open early military conversations with Soviet General Staff through you.
You should bear in mind that our object is to re-establish the legal Norwegian Government in full control as early as possible after the German withdrawal.
Plans for occupying Norway under RANKIN “B” and “C” conditions are as follows:
- RANKIN “B” (Organized German withdrawal from Norway). To occupy in initial stages any two of following:
(a) Finnmark (Hammerfest and Kirkenes).
(b) Tromsö or Narvik.
(c) Trondheim.
Subsequently Stiavanger and Bergen, Christiansand (S) and Oslo would be occupied as forces became available.
- RANKIN “C” (German unconditional surrender and cessation of organized resistance in northwest Europe). To occupy first southern Norway and then send, if required, a force with a Norwegian detachment to eastern Finnmark. Norwegians however, are anxious for Finnmark to be reoccupied as soon as possible. It might therefore be desirable to send to Finnmark area Norwegian warship with some Norwegian troops immediately after RANKIN “C” conditions arise. SCAEF is being instructed to consider the possibility of this.
It should be made clear to Soviets that since above plans for RANKIN “B” depend on the method of German withdrawal they are provisional. Soviets should be informed that we appreciate that they may already have plans for following up a German withdrawal through Finnmark. You should therefore invite Soviets to concert their plans with ours using the following points as basis:
(a) Necessity for harassing enemy during his withdrawal;
(b) Advantages of stimulating Norwegian resistance by sending in Norwegian forces as early as possible;
(c) Desirability of establishing a naval base in northern Norway for escorts protecting convoys to Russia.
You should ask the Soviets if they have any objection to participation by Norwegian Military Attaché in your conversations.
[Enclosure 2 — Telegram]
CCS to the Chiefs of the United States and British Military Missions to the Soviet Union, temporarily at London
Washington, 30 August 1944
Top secret
In connection with our immediately preceding signal, following is background for your personal information only. (TopSec to Generals Deane and Brocas Burrows for action personally on return, repeated to ETOUSA for British Chiefs of Staff for information, from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.)
No agreement exists with the Russians acknowledging that Norway is a British/American sphere of operations. Although it is to our advantage for the Russians to harass a German withdrawal as we have insufficient forces to do this ourselves our long-term requirement is to ensure that they should not permanently occupy Norwegian territory in view of potential threat to North Atlantic trade routes, Iceland and the northern approaches to the North Sea. Our purpose must be therefore to avoid any clash with the Russians in Norway and yet to safeguard our long-term interests.
Combined Chiefs of Staff have no evidence that the Russians intend to establish themselves in Finnmark but it is felt that it would be desirable to arrange as far as possible for a joint occupation by Russian, Norwegian and British forces rather than by a purely Russian force. Nevertheless, if the Russians enter Norway during the course of operations against the Germans it is considered undesirable for us to intervene since a Russian/Norwegian civil affairs agreement has been concluded which covers this contingency.
[Enclosure 3 — Telegram]
JCS to the Chief of the Military Mission in the Soviet Union
Quebec, 12 September 1944
Top secret
British Chiefs of Staff agree that it is undesirable to postpone any longer the discussion of the occupation of Norway under RANKIN conditions and the Foreign Office has sent Ambassador a political background to explain to Brinckman. You should now open conversations outlined in War 89077 of 30 August.
It is important that you communicate to the Soviets the fact that the plans for occupying Norway under RANKIN were prepared some time ago, that you may dispel any possible Soviet suspicion that they have been recently improvised to counter possible entry of Soviet forces into northern Norway.
Note by the Secretaries of CCS
Quebec, 12 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 654/7
Program for the OCTAGON Conference
Reference: CCS 172nd Meeting, Item 3
In their 172nd Meeting the Combined Chiefs of Staff approved the following program for the OCTAGON Conference:
I. Tuesday, 12 September
(a) Control of Strategic Bomber Force.
(b) Zones of occupation – provision of forces.
(c) Machinery for Inter-Allied coordination in Moscow.
(d) Situation report from SHAEF and SACMed.
(e) CIC report on the enemy situation in Europe.
(f) General Eisenhower’s future plan of campaign.
(g) General Wilson’s plan of campaign.
II. Wednesday, 13 September
(h) Prospect of redeployment of forces from European Theater for war against Japan.
(i) CIC report on enemy situation in the Pacific.
(j) Situation report on the Pacific and from SACSEA.
(k) Strategy for the defeat of Japan.
III. Thursday, 14 September
(l) British participation in the Pacific in the war against Japan.
(m) Future operations in Southeast Asia.
IV. Friday, 15 September
(n) Continuation of discussion of items listed in III above.
(o) Further consideration of the redeployment of forces from the European Theater for the war against Japan.
(p) Possible Russian participation [in] the war against Japan.
A. J. MCFARLAND
A. T. CORNWALL-JONES
Combined Secretariat
Memorandum by the USCS
Quebec, 12 September 1944
Top secret
CCS 674/1
Assumption of command of “DRAGOON” forces by SCAEF
The United States Chiefs of Staff recommend that the following message be sent to SCAEF and SACMed at once:
Effective 15 September SCAEF will assume command of DRAGOON forces according to plan recommended in Scaf 77.
CCS to SCAEF
Quebec, 12 September 1944
OCTAGON 16
Top secret
Priority
TopSec to SHAEF France for Eisenhower, Facs 78 from the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the proposals set out in Scaf 78.
In transmitting this approval, the Combined Chiefs of Staff draw your attention:
a. To the advantages of the northern line of approach into Germany, as opposed to the southern. They note with satisfaction that you appear to be of the same mind.
b. To the necessity for opening up the northwest ports, and particularly Antwerp and Rotterdam, before the bad weather sets in.