They lead their men into the slaughter, and then give themselves up without battle
By Ira Wolfert
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Liège, Belgium – (Sept. 8, delayed)
Rumors are widespread in Germany that Adolf Hitler is dead, according to Belgians who have escaped from concentration camps in the Reich.
‘The voice’ talks about ‘jerks’ in filmland as he announces he’s through with movies
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For a man who is supposed to know nothing about foreign policy – to hear some of the fourth-termers talk – Mr. Dewey did pretty well in his Louisville speech Friday night.
Certainly, there was much more meat in it than in the evasive generalities which Mr. Roosevelt gives off so airily on those rare occasions when he breaks his habit of secret diplomacy.
Is such a comparison unfair to the President because he, at the moment, is carrying the responsibility of international negotiations and the Republican candidate is not? We don’t think so. Mr. Churchill has no hesitation in telling the British people what is British policy and, indeed, Allied policy. In this democracy should the people have less information about, or control of, official policy than in Britain?
Since the Dewey address in Louisville there is more hope of smoking the President out of his secrecy to approximate, if not match, his opponent’s frankness. If that happens, all Americans will be indebted to Mr. Dewey for a great public service. Because the Rooseveltian habit of fixing things up with Winnie and Joe behind a Tehran screen or over the personal phone – and never reporting to the American public – is one of the gravest dangers today to open covenants openly arrived at.
This is not the first time Mr. Dewey and the Republicans have prodded the administration toward a more enlightened foreign policy. The Republican Mackinac Declaration, in favor of American participation in an effective international organization for peace and security, forced the Roosevelt hand which for months had blocked Congressional action. Just as that incident, and the GOP platform and Dewey acceptance speech robbed the fourth-termers of their fake “isolation” issue, so Mr. Dewey on Friday night proved that he and his associates, far from being amateurs, have a thorough knowledge of foreign affairs.
Mr. Dewey’s foreign policy is genuinely international – and realistic. He is for continued cooperation among the big powers to enforce a peace of non-aggression on the Axis, and an international organization for the long haul.
But he is much more specific than the President on what to do with Germany, and about open diplomacy, and the rights of small nations, and the necessity of any lasting peace restraining the victors as well as the vanquished in the years to come.
The most striking difference between the Dewey policy and what little is known of the Roosevelt policy is the Republican candidate’s emphasis on the fact that building peace is not only a matter of treaties and organizations. It is a continuous, constructive process of creating a healthy world, politically and economically. He wants an American leadership that neither dictates to others nor keeps them on a Yankee dole. In this, his foreign policy is an inseparable part of his domestic policy, so different from that of “the Washington wasters” as he calls them:
To hear them talk Uncle Sam must play the role of the kindly but senile old gentleman, who seeks to buy the goodwill of his poor relations by giving away the dwindling remains of his youthful earnings. That is no lasting way to win friends or to influence people. Goodwill cannot be bought with gold. It flows to the man who successfully manages his own affairs, who is self-reliant and independent, yet who is interested in the rights and needs of others.
What has the fourth-term candidate to say to that?
By Thomas L. Stokes, Scripps-Howard staff writer
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By Fred W. Perkins, Press Washington correspondent
Washington –
The general hope is that indefinitely after the war there will be a job for every man and women who wants a job, including the returned veterans. The political importance of the question is shown by the main theme of Governor Thomas E. Dewey’s opening campaign speech, when he portrayed the Republican Party as best able to produce and maintain the private industrial activity necessary for full employment.
But support economic conditions so shape themselves, no matter who wins the election, that dismissals from industry will become seriously numerous? What will be the fairest way of choosing the workers who will have to leave private employment and depend for a while at least upon whatever form of public works or public unemployment compensation that may be provided?
Discussion has started here, but has not reached the stage of official public comment, on the possibility of adapting to industry the rating system that the War Department announces it will use in selecting the men (not officers) to be discharged first from the Army after the defeat of Germany.
Army credits
Priority of separation from the Army (for men who want to be separated) will be determined by the number of points the veteran can compile for himself from the following four factors:
SERVICE CREDIT: Based upon the total number of months of Army service since Sept. 16, 1940.
OVERSEAS CREDIT: Based upon the number of months served overseas.
COMBAT CREDIT: Based upon the first and each additional award to the individual of the Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, Legion of Merit, Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Soldier’s Medal, Bronze Star Medal, Air Medal, Purple Heart and Bronze Service Stars (battle participation stars).
PARENTHOOD CREDIT: Which gives credit for each dependent child under 18 up to a limit of three children.
The fairness of this scheme is attested by the War Department’s statement that:
Opinions expressed by the soldiers themselves became the accepted principles of the plan. As finally worked out, the plan accepted by the War Department as best meeting the tests of justice and impartiality will allow men who have been overseas and men with dependent children to have priority of separation. Ninety percent of the soldiers interviewed said that that is the way it should be.
Could such a plan be adapted to the unwelcome task (supposing that it becomes necessary) of choosing the men and women to be separated from the production end of the war machine? Some who have studied the subject think it could be, but with the No. 1 essential requirement that it would have to be applied without suspicion of unfairness, and with complete and unselfish cooperation from management and the representatives of labor.
It has been suggested that it might be a good subject for investigation by the labor-management organization which has functioned in the War Production Board, with local branches in several thousand war-production plants. Another suggestion is that to be fully effective the plan would have to be applied nationally in industry.
This for industry?
The job preference of a civilian worker might be evaluated on such factors as the following:
There might be, in addition to the merit factors, some of demerit – for instance, in the individual’s record on unexcused absenteeism.
It is generally agreed that the plan could not be expected to work without a higher degree of sympathetic cooperation between management and the unions than apparently now exists in some important industries. It would requite a completely different atmosphere from that repotted in some industrial centers which fear that the end of the war in Europe will mean a resumption of domestic warfare between labor organizations and employers.
Pertinax tells men behind disaster
By John D. Paulus
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Tells story of country’s contribution to European civilization in ‘human’ book
By George Witte
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Negro actors give play more than it deserves
By Howard Barnes
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Post-war period to see vast changes in motion pictures
By Hedda Hopper
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Noted European radio manager says hungry nations follow rabblerousers
By Si Steinhauser
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$1.5 billion cut from valuation
By Elmer C. Walzer, United Press financial editor
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Washington – (Sept. 9)
J. David Stern, publisher of The Philadelphia Record, predicted after a conference with President Roosevelt today that the Chief Executive would carry Pennsylvania in November.
Looks to session of Roosevelt, Churchill
Lansing, Michigan (UP) – (Sept. 9)
Governor Thomas E. Dewey, carrying his campaign for the Presidency into his native Michigan, said tonight that he expected to be kept “fully informed” on conversations between President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill as a step toward maintaining a nonpartisan approach to international security.
The Republican presidential nominee made the statement at a press conference shortly after he arrived from Louisville, Kentucky, where last night he called for nonpartisan discussion of plans for preventing future wars.
Private discussion
His remarks were prompted by a reporter who said his newspaper was going to suggest that Mr. Dewey attend a meeting between the President and Mr. Churchill expected to take place soon at Québec.
“Well,” Mr. Dewey said, “I never invite myself to private discussions.”
The New York Governor declined to say whether he interpreted an agreement between Secretary of State Cordell Hull and John Foster Dulles, Mr. Dewey’s foreign affairs advisor, to mean that the GOP candidate would participate in such a conference as the planned Roosevelt-Churchill meeting.
Information promised
He said:
All I can say is the understanding between Hull and Dulles has been stated that Dulles is to be kept fully informed as to the progress of negotiations for the formation of a world organization and for sanctions to be imposed upon the defeated powers.
Another questioner asked:
Assuming the Québec Conference is chiefly in regard to strategy and military operations, do you think in view of a possible change of administrations that the possible new administration should be kept informed of such broad strategy as will come up?
Mr. Dewey replied:
It is to be hoped the war with Germany will be over long before the next administration takes office Jan. 20, and that the progress of the Japanese war will be so far along that any plans made will be well advanced, if not completely executed, before Jan. 20.
To visit mother
After a round of conferences with political leaders and representatives of various other groups here, Mr. Dewey will go to Owosso, his birthplace, and will spend the weekend with his mother, Mrs. George M. Dewey.
The Governor will leave Owosso tomorrow to resume a campaign trip across the country that will be marked with major political talks at Seattle, Portland, San Francisco, Los Angeles and Oklahoma City before he returns to Albany Sept. 28.
U.S. State Department (September 10, 1944)
Top secret
CCS 654/6 (OCTAGON)
Washington, 10 September 1944
Reference: CCS 654/2 and 654/4
The British Chiefs of Staff suggest that it would save time if a tentative programme and time-table were agreed before the Conference commences.
They suggest that every effort should be made to complete our business by Saturday, 16 September, leaving Sunday, 17 September, as a possible spare day.
They suggest the following tentative programmes:
I. Tuesday, 12 September.
War against Germany.
(a) Situation report from SHAEF and SACMed.
(b) CIC report on the enemy situation in Europe.
(c) General Eisenhower’s future plan of campaign.
(d) General Wilson’s plan of campaign.
II. Wednesday, 13 September.
(e) Prospect of re-deployment of forces from European theatre for war against Japan.
(f) Situation report on the Pacific and from SACSEA.
(g) CIC report on enemy situation in the Pacific.
(h) Strategy for the defeat of Japan.
III. Thursday, 14 September.
(i) British participation in the Pacific in the war against Japan.
(j) Future operations in South East Asia.
IV. Friday, 15 September.
(k) Continuation of discussion of items listed in III above.
(l) Further consideration of the re-deployment of forces from the European theatre for the war against Japan.
(m) Possible Russian participation in the war against Japan.
V. Saturday, 16 September.
(n) Control of Strategic Bomber Force.
(o) Zones of occupation – provision of forces.
(p) Machinery for Inter-Allied coordination in Moscow.
Top secret
London, 10 September 1944
1005. Winant to President Roosevelt.
The following three messages have been received from Clark Kerr of the British Embassy Moscow today, the first two this morning and third this noon. They have been forwarded to the Prime Minister and have just been given to me by Eden. The British Chiefs of Staff have met and telegraphed General Eisenhower explaining the situation and asking that he plan an air mission to carry supplies to the people of Warsaw. I understand that copies of this cable have been forwarded to General Spaatz, to the British Military Mission in Moscow and to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
The three messages follow in the order of their receipt.
Number 1 begins:
My immediately preceding telegramIn his covering letter M. Molotov goes on to refer to letter which I sent him after discussion with head of air section of Military Mission on receipt of your telegram No. 2743. He repeats that there has been no occasion on which Soviet Government refused to give assistance to damaged British or American aircraft. “It could not have been otherwise in view of the friendly relations between our two countries. It should however be borne in mind so far as the Warsaw area is concerned that uninterrupted fighting is going on with the Germans on land and in the air and that the unexpected appearance on that front of aircraft which do not belong to the Soviet Air Forces might cause sad misunderstanding to which I draw your attention.”
Message number 2 begins:
Your telegram No. 2855Mr. Molotov has asked me to convey the following reply to His Majesty’s Government (begins):
Message of Soviet Government in reply to message of British Government of September 5, 1944
The Soviet Government on September 5 received a message from British Government on the question of Warsaw.
The Soviet Government has already informed the British Government of their opinion that members of Polish Émigré Government in London are responsible for Warsaw adventure undertaken without the knowledge of Soviet Military Command, and in violation of the latter’s operational plans.
The Soviet Government would like an unprejudiced commission to be organized with the object of ascertaining exactly by whose order the rising in Warsaw was undertaken and who was to blame for the fact that Soviet Military Command was not informed thereof in advance. No command in the world, neither British nor American, can tolerate the fact that a rising is organized in a large city opposite the front line of its troops without the knowledge of that command and contrary to its operational plans. Of course, Soviet Command cannot be an exception. Undoubtedly if before the Warsaw rising Soviet Command had been asked about the desirability of organizing a rising in Warsaw at the beginning of August, the Soviet Command would have advised against such an attempt because the Soviet troops who had advanced fighting for over 500 kilometres and were in a state of fatigue were not at that time prepared to take Warsaw by storm bearing in mind that the Germans had at that time transferred their tank reserves from the west to the Warsaw area.
Nobody will be able to reproach Soviet Government with the allegation that they rendered inadequate aid to the Polish people including Warsaw. The most practical form of help is active military operations of the Soviet troops against the German invaders of Poland and the liberation of more than one fourth of Poland. All this is the work of the Soviet troops and of the Soviet troops only who are shedding their blood for the liberation of Poland. There is again the hardly effective form of help to Warsaw people namely the dropping of weapons, medical stores and food from aircraft. We have several times dropped both weapons and food for Warsaw insurgents but we have each time received information that the load dropped had fallen into the hands of the Germans. However, if you are so firmly convinced of the efficacy of this form of assistance and insist upon Soviet command organizing jointly with British and Americans such aid, the Soviet Government are prepared to agree to it. However, it is necessary to render this aid in accordance with a pre-arranged plan.
As regards your attempt to make Soviet Government in any degree responsible for Warsaw adventure and for the sacrifices of the Warsaw people, the Soviet Government cannot regard this otherwise than as a wish to shift responsibility “from a sick head to a clear one.” The same must be said on the point that the Soviet Government’s position in the Warsaw question is apparently contrary to the spirit of Allied co-operation. There can be no doubt that if the British Government had taken steps to see that the Soviet Command had been warned of proposed Warsaw rising in good time, then events in Warsaw would have taken a totally different turn. Why did the British Government not find it necessary to warn the Soviet Government of this? Was it not a repetition of what happened in April 1943 when Polish Émigré Government, in the absence of resistance on the part of the British Government, came out with their slanderous statement hostile to USSR about Katyn? It seems to us that the spirit of Allied collaboration should have indicated to the British Government a different course of action.
As regards public opinion in various countries the Soviet Government express their complete confidence in the fact that true statement of the facts regarding events in Warsaw will give public opinion every reason unconditionally to condemn the authors of Warsaw adventure and correctly to understand the position of the Soviet Government. It would only be necessary to try to enlighten public opinion thoroughly about the truth of the events in Warsaw.
Message number 3 begins:
My telegram No. 2379. Following for Secretary of State. Personal.This is an unexpected and remarkable climb down. That it is tucked away in the middle of a preposterous Pi-Jaw is true to Kremlin form. They are still not grown up enough to come clean when they know they have made a bad mistake. It would I think be imprudent in us to let any natural inclination to counter all verbiage divert us from this most important if belated surrender. I suggest that in the belief that there may be still in Warsaw something to save, that most immediate instructions be sent to British and American Military Missions to arrange co-operation that is now offered. The whole thing seems to me to give fresh hopes of a settlement with Poland.
I am in touch with United States Ambassador.
740.0011 EW/9–1044: Telegram
Moscow, September 10, 1944
Secret
US urgent
3413
Secret for the President and the Secretary from Harriman.
The British Ambassador has shown me a message from the Soviet Government which he has been asked to transmit to his Government in answer to the War Cabinet’s message regarding aid to Warsaw. You will undoubtedly receive this in full. Briefly, however, after a lengthy recital of the circumstances and a statement that the really effective aid will come from the advance of the Red Army, the message states in paraphrase as follows:
In addition, there is the form of assistance to the people in Warsaw which can hardly be considered effective; namely, the dropping by airplane of weapons, food and medical supplies. We have dropped both weapons and food for the insurgents in Warsaw on several occasions, but each time we have received information that these supplies have fallen into German hands. If you are so firmly convinced, however, of the efficacy of this form of assistance and if you insist that the Soviet Command organize jointly with, the Americans and British such aid, the Soviet Government is prepared to agree to it. It will be necessary, however, to render this aid in accordance with a prearranged plan.
The message ends by implying that the British were partly to blame for the fact that the Soviet Command was not informed in advance of the Warsaw uprising. Reference is also made to British failure to prevent the Poles from their action in connection with the Katyn incident.
This message is obviously an extremely shrewd statement for the record, and places the responsibility now on the British and us for the decision whether the dropping of supplies should be attempted at this late date. I have no recent information as to the size of the area still held by the Insurgents in Warsaw and whether it is practicable to parachute supplies from a sufficiently high altitude to avoid unconscionable losses to our flyers. I assume urgent instructions will be given General Deane or myself on what our position now is and whether or not negotiations with the Red Army staff are to be entered into to render aid.
HARRIMAN
740.0011 EW/9–1044: Telegram
London, September 10, 1944
Mr. President: The reports which the Polish Government receive from Warsaw show that the situation is desperate and that the fight against the overwhelming German power may cease at any moment, unless sustained from outside.
Our urgent appeals for a large-scale operation which would combine the bombing of German concentrations with the dropping of supplies at [to?] the home Army in Warsaw are still under consideration by the British Government and no decision has been taken so far. This decision if favorable may come too late.
I therefore beseech you Mr. President and you Mr. Prime Minister to take a bold and immediate decision which could save Warsaw and its inhabitants from total destruction and at the same time give new hope to millions of Poles to whom the fight in Warsaw is a symbol of Poland’s will to live.
I also feel obliged to stress that should the Warsaw rising be crushed by the Germans without a last-minute attempt at succour from Poland’s mighty western allies, the tragedy of Warsaw may cast a deep and lasting shadow on the Polish nation’s attude towards its traditional friends. I beg you to weigh this in your minds, Mr. President and Mr. Prime Minister, when taking your decision at this fateful hour.
ST. MIKOŁAJCZYK
London, September 10, 1944
The Soviet Government, having now agreed to collaboration in the so urgent matter of aid to Warsaw, I appeal to you, Mr. President, to issue a directive to General Dwight D. Eisenhower for immediate air operations in support of the defenders of Warsaw.
Should the Soviet Government begin to discuss the plan of aid and raise reservations, so much time would elapse that it might be too late to save Warsaw.
STANISLAW MIKOŁAJCZYK