Substantial quantity of canned goods made available for holidays as war needs ease off
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‘Anti-inflation psychology’ is stressed since limits on income levies ‘substantially reached’
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WLB hint of further legal sanctions draws fire of brotherhood editor; District 50 takes a hand
By Fred W. Perkins, Pittsburgh Press staff writer
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Football technique developed as replacements get training by thrusts into Nazi lines
By William H. Stoneman
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Tokyo began in 1931 to apologize to U.S. while continuing policy of aggression, State Department documents show
By Merriman Smith, United Press staff writer
Washington – (Nov. 20)
A documented story of 10 years of Japanese duplicity in foreign affairs and faked friendship toward this country, was made public tonight by the State Department in another edition of papers relating to the foreign relations of the United States.
“The Japanese government regrets… exceedingly” was the constant refrain in official communications from Tokyo to Washington from 1931 until Dec. 7, 1941, when the Japanese used bombs on Pearl Harbor as substitutes for their well-worn platitudes of diplomacy.
The 1931-1941 record of relations with Japan contained 691 documents, most of them complaints by the U.S. government against acts of Jap aggression. In their answers the Japs almost always apologized.
Mukden incident first
The story began with a report from the U.S. Minister in China Sept. 19, 1931, that Japanese soldiers had attacked and surrounded Mukden in the first overt step of the Jap plot to seize Manchuria.
The last document in the 10-year record was dated Nov. 25, 1941, when Ambassador Joseph C. Grew reported from Tokyo that there was a strong implication that Jap officials were ignoring American reports on Japanese interference with U.S. interests in the Far East.
Consistently the Japs complained that their true intentions in the Far East were misunderstood.
Understood by Hull
The record showed, however, that Secretary of State Cordell Hull had what later proved to be an accurate understanding of their plans. The Secretary was disclosed to have told a foreign diplomat Sept. 21, 1938, that:
Since August a year ago, I have proceeded here on the theory that Japan definitely contemplates securing domination over as many hundreds of millions of people as possible in Eastern Asia and gradually extending her control through the Pacific Islands to the Dutch East Indies and elsewhere, thereby dominating, in practical effect, that one-half of the world; and that she is seeking this objective by any and every kinds of means; that at the same time I have gone on the theory that Germany is equally bent on becoming the dominating colossus of continental Europe.
Confusing in beginning
Japan’s early moves in Manchuria appeared confusing to American diplomats in the Far East, judging from their notes to the State Department at the beginning of Japan’s campaign of territorial expansion at the expense of China.
On Sept. 22, 1931, the U.S. Chargé d’Affaires in Tokyo told this government he was “inclined to think” that the Japanese Foreign Office and other branches of the government were “genuinely surprised” by the Jap Army action at Mukden.
On the same day, however, the U.S. Minister to China reported to Secretary of State Henry L. Stimson that he thought the forceful occupation of southern Manchuria was “an aggressive act long planned and one decided upon most carefully and systemically put into effect,” and that signatories of the Kellogg Treaty should so construe the incident.
Bitter U.S. complaints
In the period of early Jap attacks on Shanghai, the record was full of bitter U.S. complaints against violations of American interests and of equally eloquent assurances from the Jap Foreign Office that there was no intention whatsoever of interfering with the rights or interests of any foreign power in that area.
Then followed the record of Jap withdrawal from the League of Nations and her military and economic penetration of China, always to the tune of complaints from the U.S. and excuses and explanations by the Japs.
The report contained a special section on the Jap bombing of the U.S. gunboat Panay on the Yangtze River in December 1937. After that incident, which the Japs said happened by mistake, Japanese Foreign Minister Kōki Hirota expressed:
…the fervent hope that the friendly relations between Japan and the United States will not be affected by this unfortunate affair.
Apartment houses, city dumps provide steady supply of unbroken whisky containers
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Col. Romulo stresses need for Pacific Charter
By Sidney B. Whipple
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Völkischer Beobachter (November 22, 1943)
Die kleinen Staaten zählen überhaupt nicht mehr
Stockholm, 21. November –
Die Bereitschaft Englands und der USA, Europa im Falle ihres Sieges völlig Moskau auszuliefern, wird in einer offiziösen Londoner Verlautbarung wieder bestätigt. Der Gedanke europäischer Staatenbünde habe durch die Moskauer Beschlüsse jede Daseinsberechtigung verloren, heißt es in einem offiziösen Kommentar, der in London ausgegeben wurde. So wird betont:
Es besteht keine Veranlassung, daran zu zweifeln daß die britische Regierung mit der USA.- und der Sowjetregierung in einer Angelegenheit, die offenkundig ein Kardinalprinzip der gemeinsamen Politik darstellt, übereinstimmt.
Der Kommentator stellt dann im einzelnen fest: Der mit den Emigrantenkomitees in London gefaßte Plan eines tschechisch-polnischen Bündnisses sei zusammengebrochen ein von der Ostsee bis zum Mittelmeer reichender Block sei – so meint London – eine Utopie, die überhaupt nicht ernsthaft diskutiert zu werden brauche, für einen Balkanbund bestehe keine gemeinsame Basis, ein skandinavischer Block, der Finnland einschließe, würde auf den Widerspruch der Sowjets stoßen. Die Iswestija habe autoritativ und ausführlich den Standpunkt des Kreml dargelegt, daß er nach einer völligen Entwaffnung Deutschlands jeden europäischen Block als eine gegen die Sowjetunion gerichtete Koalition betrachten würde.
Unterstrichen wird die über den britischen Nachrichtendienst verbreitete Stellungnahme der Downing Street durch einen Bericht, den sich die Londoner Times am Samstag von ihrem Washingtoner Korrespondenten kabeln ließ. Dieser meldete, daß die Kongreßrede Cordell Hulls den Anhängern europäischer Blockideen jede Hoffnung auf eine Unterstützung der USA. geraubt habe. Jeder nordische Bund der skandinavischen Staaten, jeder Balkanbund, aber auch jeder westeuropäische Block falle in die Kategorie der Sonderabkommen, die in den Moskauer Beschlüssen abgelehnt worden seien.
Churchills ‚Beruhigungsplan‘
Bis zur Moskauer Konferenz haben die Engländer betont mit dem Plan agitiert, die Staaten zwischen Eismeer und Schwarzem Meer müßten sich in verschiedenen Gruppen organisieren und eine Art Zwischeneuropa bilden, das mit englischer und amerikanischer Hilfe ein Eigenleben zwischen der deutschen Mitte des Kontinents und der Sowjetunion führen könne. Als Churchill im vorigen Jahr in Adana mit den türkischen Staatsmännern zusammentraf, entwickelte er dort zur Beruhigung der Türkei dieses Projekt sehr ausführlich. Es ist seitdem in englischen Zeitschriften immer wieder behandelt worden. In Moskau haben dann Briten und Amerikaner in aller Form auf diese Kombination verzichtet, den Bolschewisten diese gesamte Zone als Sicherungsgürtel praktisch preisgegeben und damit die Bolschewisierung ganz Europas hingenommen. Dieser Rückzug wurde dadurch beschönigt, daß man einen Europaauschuß vorsah, in dem die drei Todfeinde des Abendlandes gemeinsam über dessen Schicksal bestimmen sollen.
Mit dieser Schaumschlägerei sucht man jetzt auch die Befürchtungen der kleinen Nationen zu beschwichtigen, daß sie Moskau zum Fraß vorgeworfen werden. Amerikanische Kommentare versteigen sich sogar zu der albernen Behauptung, selbst im Falle einer Besetzung der Nachbarstaaten der Sowjetunion durch die Bolschewisten werde das letzte Wort nicht gesprochen sein. Der politische Instinkt der betroffenen Völker wird also so gering eingeschätzt, daß man ihnen nicht einmal zutraut, die wahren Absichten Moskaus und seiner Spießgesellen zu durchschauen.
Wenn schon Stalin durch die Moskauer Abmachungen in breitester Form Gelegenheit gegeben worden ist, über die’ innerpolitischen Verhältnisse der Gebiete mitzureden, die von den Engländern und Amerikanern besetzt worden sind, wenn er dort und für die Emigrationen klipp und klar die Errichtung von Volksfrontregierungen verlangt und seine Partner sich diesem Ersuchen fügen, so ist es eine geradezu kindische Vorstellung, daß er auf die Bolschewisierung von Ländern verzichten würde, die er selbst zu erobern vermöchte.
Über die Zukunft dieser Länder aber wird allerdings weder die Sowjetunion entscheiden noch London oder Washington, sondern allein die Ostfront, die sie vor dem Einbruch der Bolschewisten schützt und damit ihr Eigenleben gegenüber den Ausrottungsplänen der Sowjets sichert.
Einige Emigrantenausschüsse in London haben bereits das Wohlwollen der Verbündeten Stalins dadurch verscherzt, daß sie sich nicht dem geforderten Volksfrontschema anpassen wollten. Mihailowitsch mußte dem bolschewistischen Partisanenhäuptling Tito weichen, und Georg von Griechenland ist bereits bedeutet worden, daß er den Sowjets nicht genehm sei – und infolgedessen auch England und Amerika nicht. In Nordafrika und in Süditalien macht sich der kommunistische Einfluß immer breiter.
Besondere Beachtung verdient in diesem Zusammenhang auch ein Reuter-Bericht aus Moskau über den bevorstehenden Besuch des Bankrotteurs Dr. Benesch, der dort einen Vertrag „nach den Richtlinien des anglo-sowjetischen Vertrages“ abschließen will. Benesch wird dabei folgendes Zeugnis ausgestellt:
Es ist wahr, daß Doktor Benesch der Staatschef einer Emigrantenregierung ist, doch ist ebenso sicher, daß er bei der Unterzeichnung des Vertrages dies im Geist seiner Landsleute tut, von denen viele in der Sowjetarmee kämpfen. Benesch und seine Freunde sind erwiesene Demokraten.
Mit anderen Worten: Benesch wird im Kreml mit Recht als ein erprobter Schrittmacher des Bolschewismus angesehen, den man als Agenten sehr gut gebrauchen kann, bis man ihm zum Schluß den Genickschuß gibt.
Zugleich beweist aber der Vertrag, den er mit Moskau abschließen will, daß sich die sowjetischen Herrschaftsansprüche auf ganz Europa erstrecken, womit sich London in diesem Fall wieder ausdrücklich einverstanden erklärt, nachdem es früher Benesch von der Reise nach Moskau wiederholt dringend abgeraten hat.
rd. Lissabon, 21. November –
Der Einfluß des Gangstertums auf die politischen Parteien der USA ist bekannt. Oft schon haben die Gangster bei der Wahl amerikanischer Bürgermeister und Gouverneure eine entscheidende Rolle gespielt und ihre Kandidaten in die gesetzgebenden Körperschaften geschickt. Sie sind sogar in der Lage, die Ernennung von Richtern des höchsten amerikanischen Staatsgerichtshofes, selbst gegen die Opposition der Regierung, zu erreichen.
Das zeigt ein politischer Skandal größten Ausmaßes, der gegenwärtig die amerikanische Öffentlichkeit beschäftigt. Wie die bekannte USA.-Zeitschrift Time enthüllt, ist es einem der führenden Gangster Amerikas, Frank Jotello, gelungen, „seinen Mann,“ einen kleinen Stadtrichter aus Manhattan namens Thomas Aurelio, mit Hilfe der Demokratischen Partei Roosevelts zum Mitglied des höchsten USA.-Gerichts zu machen. Jotello hatte durch Beeinflussung der demokratischen Wahlmaschine bereits vier seiner Freunde zu Distriktsführern der Demokratischen Partei gemacht und kontrollierte damit einen erheblichen Teil Neuyorks. Diese von ihm abhängigen Politiker mußten dafür sorgen, daß Aurelio als Kandidat für die höchste Richterwahl aufgestellt wurde und die Zustimmung der Demokratischen Partei erhielt, trotzdem die Regierung für einen anderen Anwärter war.
Bei einer Untersuchung stellte sich heraus, daß Aurelio seinem Gangsterprotektor als Dank für die Sicherung seiner Kandidatur eine „nie erlöschende Dankbarkeit“ geschworen habe. Es wurde weiter in aller Öffentlichkeit bekannt, daß Jotello der Führer eines großen Bootleggerringes war und eine weitreichende Schwarzhandelsorganisation leitet.
Gefördert von den Parteien
Er ist bereits als Wettschieber verhaftet gewesen, zahlreicher anderer Betrügereien überführt worden und hat bereits Gefängnisstrafen hinter sich. Trotzdem er über ein Rieseneinkommen verfügt, ein großes Haus führt, stadtbekannt ist und Unsummen an seine demokratischen Freunde verteilt, hat er, wie Time ausdrücklich hervorhebt, in den letzten Jahren nicht einen Pfennig Steuern bezahlt. Er steht auch noch heute mit den berüchtigten Spitzengangstern Al Capone, Trigger Mike, Dutch Schultz und anderen in Verbindung.
Angesichts dieser durch die ganze USA.-Presse gehenden Enthüllungen rückten selbst seine demokratischen Freunde offiziell von Aurelio und seinem Protektor ab. Die Demokratische und die Republikanische Partei waren gezwungen, für die Wahl zum Staatsgerichtshof neue Kandidatenanwärter aufzustellen. Diese konnten jedoch nicht gewählt werden, da sich die Parteien gegenseitig Schwierigkeiten machten. Hinter den Kulissen aber einigte man sich dann wieder auf den von der ganzen USA.-Öffentlichkeit abgelehnten Gangstergünstling und wählte ihn tatsächlich für den Neuyorker Wahlbezirk zum Mitglied des Staatsgerichtshofes, des höchsten amerikanischen Gerichts, wo er durch seine Amtseigenschaft einen großen Einfluß auf das gesamte Rechtsleben auszuüben imstande ist. Mit fatalistischer Gelassenheit fügt Time hinzu:
Ein höchster USA.-Richter ist damit nicht durch die Hunderttausende von Stimmen der gesetzgebenden Wählerschaft, sondern durch den Befehl eines Gangsters vorgeschlagen, gewählt und bestätigt worden.
Und trotz aller öffentlichen Enthüllungen bleibt der Schwarzhändler, Bootlegger, Wettfälscher und Betrüger Jotello einer der mächtigsten Männer Neuyorks, den keine Partei anzutasten wagt.
Als einziges bisheriges Ergebnis der wochenlangen Beratungen der UNRRA (sogenannte „Alliierte Hilfs- und Wiedergutmachungskommission“) kündigte der Generaldirektor der UNRRA, Herbert H. Lehman, eine Aktion zur Sammlung von „alten abgelegten Kleidungsstücken für Europa“ an. Die abgelegten Kleidungsstücke sollen in dem von den Westmächten besetzten Gebiet Süditaliens verteilt werden.
Offenbar wollen die Nordamerikaner damit der Bevölkerung des „befreiten“ Gebietes zeigen, wie „ernst“ sie es mit ihren großartigen Versprechungen, Europa ein Zeitalter in „Wohlstand und Überfluss“ zu bringen, meinen. Allerdings können alte Kleider nicht als Ersatz für Nahrungsmittel dienen. Die „Befreiten“ werden also weiterhungern müssen, da die Vorräte fast durchwegs von den Truppen der Westmächte beschlagnahmt worden sind.
dnb. Tokio, 21. November –
Parallel mit den Luftangriffen in den Gewässern der Insel Bougainville werden die heftigen Land- und Luftkämpfe auf Neuguinea fortgesetzt. Von Störeinflügen bis zu Masseneinsätzen von 200 oder mehr Maschinen versuchen die Amerikaner die Mißerfolge in den Bodenkämpfen durch den Versuch auszugleichen, militärische Anlagen zu zerstören. Aber auch die Japaner werfen in steigendem Maße ihre Luftwaffe in den Kampf.
So griffen japanische Heereslufteinheiten in der Zeit vom 6. bis 9. November nicht weniger als sechsmal die feindlichen Stellungen im Gebiete des Markhamflusses an. In derselben Zeit wurden durch japanische Jäger und Flak insgesamt 179 feindliche Maschinen abgeschossen oder zerstört. Trotz dieses Verlustes scheinen die Amerikaner alles daranzusetzen, im Gebiet von Ostneuguinea eine Entscheidung herbeizuführen, die ihren Flotteneinheiten in den Salomonen versagt geblieben ist. Aber selbst Masseneinsätze, wie zum Beispiel am 13. und 15. November, als 270 Flugzeuge Madang angriffen, scheiterten an der Flugtechnik der japanischen Jäger, die den Feind immer wieder zum Kampf stellten.
Wie bereits gemeldet wurde, waren japanische Angriffe auf feindliche Stellungen von vollem Erfolg begleitet. In dem Angriff auf Marawasa am Markhamfluß am 15. November wurden von japanischen Heeresflugzeugen 17 Maschinen abgeschossen und 5 am Boden in Brand geworfen. Weiterhin wurden in Luftkämpfen im Gebiet von Finschhafen am 19. November von ungefähr 15 Flugzeugen 12 abgeschossen, während 4 Landungsboote versenkt und 1 beschädigt wurden. Von diesem Unternehmen konnten alle japanischen Flugzeuge zum Stützpunkt zurückkehren.
In Militärkreisen Tokios wird es als ein Zeichen der Nervosität im Feindlager aufgefaßt, daß Berichte in die Welt gesendet werden, wie der von Melbourne, in dem behauptet wird, japanische Flugzeuge hätten „den amerikanischen Stützpunkt Wewak“ angegriffen. Wewak, so betonen diese Kreise, ist nach wie vor fest in japanischen Händen, und feindliche Versuche, die Welt glauben zu machen, die Japaner seien aus dieser Stellung herausgedrängt worden, sind als kindisch zu bezeichnen.
Vier Kriegsfahrzeuge versenkt
Wie Domei von einem japanischen Stützpunkt im Südpazifik meldet, haben Verbände der japanischen Heeresluftwaffe in Neuguinea bei einem Angriff auf Finschhafen am Nachmittag des 19. November vier feindliche Kriegsfahrzeuge versenkt und ein anderes schwer beschädigt.
Im Luftkampf schossen die Japaner von 15 Feindjägern, die anzugreifen versuchten, 12 ab. Alle japanischen Flugzeuge kehrten unbeschädigt zu ihrem Stützpunkt zurück.
U.S. Navy Department (November 22, 1943)
Our troops have improved their positions on Tarawa and Makin Atolls, but are still encountering considerable enemy ground resistance. We have landed on Apamama Atoll. Liberators heavily bombed the airdromes area at Nauru Island on November 20 (West Longitude Date) and on November 21, Army Liberators continued diversionary attacks in the Marshalls. The Central Pacific operations are being directed by VAdm. Raymond A. Spruance, USN. The amphibious forces are under command of RAdm. Richmond Turner, USN. Landings were made on Tarawa by the 2nd Marine Division in command of Maj. Gen. Julian C. Smith, USMC; those on Makin by troops of the 27th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj. Gen. Ralph Smith, USA. Maj. Gen. Holland McT. Smith, USMC, is in command of the landing forces.
U.S. State Department (November 22, 1943)
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| General Marshall | Major General Chennault | |
| Admiral King | Major General Wedemeyer | |
| General Arnold | Major General Deane | |
| Ambassador Winant | Brigadier General Kuter | |
| Assistant Secretary of War McCloy | Brigadier General Hansell | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | Captain Burrough | |
| Lieutenant General Stilwell | Captain Doyle | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Colonel O’Donnell | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Colonel Ferenbaugh | |
| Rear Admiral Bieri | Colonel Timberman | |
| Rear Admiral Badger | Colonel Smith | |
| Major General Stratemeyer | Colonel Bessell | |
| Major General Wheeler | Colonel Hammond | |
| Major General Handy | Colonel Todd | |
| Major General Fairchild | Commander Long | |
| Major Chapman | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Captain Royal | ||
| Colonel McFarland |
November 22, 1943, 11 a.m.
Secret
General Marshall said there was no formal agenda for the meeting which had been called principally for the purpose of hearing the views of Ambassador Winant, Ambassador Harriman and the representatives of the various theaters present as to the current situation in their particular areas. He said that the British Chiefs of Staff had proposed a meeting of the Combined Chiefs of [at?] 1500 hours in order to consider the matter of the procedure to be pursued during the conference and inquired if there were any objections on the part of the U.S. Chiefs to this proposal.
The U.S. Chiefs of Staff agreed to meet the Combined Chiefs of Staff at the hour indicated.
General Marshall then invited Ambassador Winant to express his views as to the state of mind of the British with respect to the current situation.
Ambassador Winant said that he found it difficult to give an accurate picture of British thinking with reference to a purely military conference, the need of which the British had felt some weeks ago. He pointed out that his statements would not in any way present his personal opinions but would indicate British opinion as he saw it. He said that the British felt the position of the United Nations was not sufficiently fluid to take advantage of the victories gained in Italy. These had resulted in the opening up of Mediterranean areas which offered to the Allies an opportunity for profitable action, if seized promptly, and which might assist in getting Turkey into the war. He said that Mr. Eden had differed with the Russian information [inclination?] to bring pressure to bear on Turkey and thought that a slow approach to her entry into the war was much better, and he had been able to persuade Mr. Molotov to accept this view.
Ambassador Winant said that he had recently had a talk with Admiral Sir Andrew Browne Cunningham, the British First Sea Lord. He had been impressed with Admiral Cunningham’s knowledge of the personalities who command Turkish policies and felt strongly that a conference with him would prove fruitful.
Mr. Winant said that in his opinion the British had no intention of diverting the means available for action in Burma. With reference to OVERLORD, he thought that the British had no idea of abandoning the operation but that they did oppose a fixed date for it. It is the British view that it was not possible to fix far in advance the psychological moment for launching an attack on the Continent and they feared that through the action of the British and U.S. military staffs they had signed a contract, the terms of which took precedence over subsequent changes in the military situation. He felt that the British were genuine in their desire to build up OVERLORD and that the principal difference in opinion as between them and the U.S. was as to timing. He pointed out that OVERLORD lacks a commander and that this lack was adding to the difficulties of the commander of the American forces in England. He said that the British were very anxious to employ fully the resistance possible to be developed among the unorganized forces in the Balkans. He felt that this was sufficient to warrant the expenditure of some means. With respect to Italy, he felt they do not want to advance as far as the Po Valley but only to go far enough to take Rome and secure the airfields in that area. They are of the opinion that day and night bombing is having tremendous effect in Germany in the destruction of bottleneck industry. They feel that this bombing has neutralized 17 cities and they hope that a comparable success will continue.
In answer to a question from Admiral King, Mr. Winant stated that the British feel that Russia wants Turkey in the war now and not later. He had been told by Mr. Eden that it was the Prime Minister’s opinion that Marshal Stalin is chiefly interested at the present moment in stretching German resources and that his interest in a second front was not nearly so great as it had been. He was still interested in vigorous action against the Germans but was not so much concerned as to the particular area in which it was brought to bear.
General Arnold inquired as to the British view on the possibility of carrying on operations in the Balkans without interfering with scheduled operations.
Mr. Winant replied that the British feel that it can be done without much cost by the employment of what he termed bush-league tactics in the Eastern Mediterranean. He said that the Prime Minister had been considerably upset by the British defeat in the Dodecanese although British military men thought that the Prime Minister’s view was considerably out of perspective.
Mr. Winant said that the British feel that they are supreme on the sea and that the British and the U.S. are supreme in the air but that the German is still superior to both in ground operations. Their ground operations in the Dodecanese had confirmed the Prime Minister’s views in this regard.
With reference to cross-channel operations he said that the British were disturbed now not so much by the difficulties of landing as by those to be encountered during the first 60 days. They were impressed with the excellent communications which ran from east to west and doubted that by bombing alone it would be possible to prevent the Germans from bringing up sufficient reinforcements to put the issue gravely in doubt.
Mr. Winant reiterated that the British are still behind the OVERLORD operation but wish to be sure that German resistance is properly softened before undertaking the actual landing operation.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshall Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | General Riddell-Webster | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Captain Lambe | |
| Rear Admiral Bieri | Brigadier Sugden | |
| Rear Admiral Badger | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Major General Handy | Brigadier McNair | |
| Major General Fairchild | ||
| Brigadier General Hansell | ||
| Brigadier General Kuter | ||
| Brigadier General Tansey | ||
| Captain Doyle | ||
| Colonel Roberts | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Redman | ||
| Captain Royal | ||
| Colonel McFarland | ||
| Commander Coleridge |
November 22, 1943, 3 p.m.
Secret
Admiral Leahy suggested, and the Combined Chiefs of Staff agreed, that General Sir Alan Brooke should take the Chair at the meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at SEXTANT.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the future work of the Conference, with particular reference to the necessity for considering operations in the Far East as early as possible.
Sir Hastings Ismay said that he understood it was likely that the President and Prime Minister would hold a plenary session with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek at 1700 on Tuesday, 23 November, and that it had been suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should meet with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on Wednesday, 24 November.
General Marshall read out to the Combined Chiefs of Staff a brief memorandum prepared by General Stilwell giving the Generalissimo’s views of future operations in the Chinese Theater. He suggested that the United States and British Chiefs of Staff should separately study this memorandum on the following morning and that the Combined Chiefs of Staff collectively should consider it at 1430 on Tuesday, 23 November. These proposals were accepted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It was also agreed that the Generalissimo and his principal advisers should be invited to be present at the Combined Chiefs of Staff meeting at 1530 on Tuesday, 23 November.
At the suggestion of Admiral Leahy, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed that the procedure to be used at SEXTANT should follow the lines of that used at the QUADRANT Conference, with specific reference to the recording of decisions, the approval of minutes, and the reports to the President and Prime Minister.
Sir Alan Brooke explained that the British proposals set out in CCS 404/1 were designed to enable the Combined Chiefs of Staff to study at the earliest possible opportunity operations affecting the Chinese Theater. They could then turn to operations in Europe in order that if possible they should have fully considered these before meeting the USSR representatives.
Admiral King said he felt that the British agenda was acceptable as an outline into which the details suggested by the United States Chiefs of Staff could be fitted.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the proposals for the main subjects for discussion on the SEXTANT agenda as set out in paragraph 2 of CCS 404/1.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the arrangements for EUREKA.
General Marshall said that he felt the Combined Chiefs of Staff should consider the question of their relationship both during the Conference and in the future, with the military representatives of the USSR and China. This seemed particularly important in view of the recent Four-Power agreements concluded in Moscow. There had already been an intimation from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek that he would welcome an invitation for a Chinese military representative to sit with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. It might facilitate the development of good faith and mutual understanding with the USSR and China if each were invited to have a representative present with the Combined Chiefs of Staff. However, he thought that this should be based on a well-thought-out scheme, rather than on day-to-day decisions. There might be certain advantages in having the Soviet representatives attend at least some conferences in order that they could appreciate the difficulties of a worldwide war on every front in comparison with their own and China’s highly localized operations.
Admiral King said that the question raised a basic problem in that it might lead to the permanent expansion of the Combined Chiefs of Staff into a Four-Power body. It was pointed out that it would be impossible for the Chinese and the Soviet representatives to sit at the same table since they were not engaging the same enemies, nor could the Soviet representatives attend deliberations of the Combined Chiefs of Staff dealing with the war against Japan.
Admiral Leahy suggested that the Chinese and Soviets should, during the present Conference, be invited to be present only when the Combined Chiefs of Staff were discussing the problems of the particular fronts in which each was interested. With regard to the Soviets, it would of course most certainly be necessary, when a Western Front was opened, that our action should be coordinated with theirs and that the delegates attending meetings for this purpose should be able to speak with full authority.
Sir Charles Portal pointed out that this would be equally true if Turkey was brought into the war and operations in that area were undertaken.
Sir Hastings Ismay said that at Moscow it had been clear that the Soviet representatives did not realize that the machinery of the Combined Chiefs of Staff was in continuous operation. They would, he thought, expect to be invited only to Conferences such as QUADRANT or SEXTANT, but not to attend all the meetings at these Conferences. There had been no signs of their suggesting permanent representation with the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
There was general agreement that, subject to further consideration, the best procedure would be for the Chinese and Soviet Representatives to be invited to attend only those meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff at which matters concerning the fronts in which they were interested were under discussion. At EUREKA, however, it would obviously be necessary for the Soviet representatives to attend all meetings held.
Without discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the overall strategic concept and basic undertakings as set out in CCS 380/2.
Cairo, 22 November 1943
Secret
CCS 404
Agreement as to conference procedure.
Overall Objective; Overall Strategic Concept for the Prosecution of the War; Basic Undertakings in Support of Overall Strategic Concept.
European-Mediterranean
a. Estimate of the enemy situation.
b. Report on the Combined Bomber Offensive.
c. Report on anti-U-boat operations.
d. Report on status of development of facilities in the Azores, air and naval.
e. Readiness report on OVERLORD, RANKIN, and JUPITER.
f. Report on Mediterranean operations, including the Middle East.
g. Plans for U.S.-British-USSR military collaboration.
h. Specific operations for the defeat of Germany and her Satellites, 1943-44.
i. Policies with respect to military considerations in dealing with neutral, liberated and occupied countries, including agreement as to division of responsibility between the United Nations.
a. Estimate of the enemy situation, 1944, Japan (giving consideration to Russian and Chinese intentions).
b. Short-Term Plan for the defeat of Japan.
c. Report on the general situation in the Southeast Asia Command.
d. Report on operations in China.
e. Report on Pacific operations.
f. Transfer of United Nations efforts to the defeat of Japan upon the defeat of Germany.
g. Specific operations for the defeat of Japan, 1944, including amphibious operations in Southeast Asia.
Relation of resources to plans.
Final report to President and Prime Minister.
Preparation and approval of any directives arising from conference decisions and of any reports to other Allies.
Discussion as to the next conference.
Cairo, 22 November 1943
Secret
CCS 404/1
We have considered the Agenda for SEXTANT proposed by the United States Chiefs of Staff (CCS 404) and while we have no specific objections to the subjects set out in their memorandum, we suggest that a more simple agenda would meet the case.
We, therefore, propose that the main subjects for discussion should be as follows:
I. Reaffirm Overall Objective, Overall Strategic Concept and Basic Undertakings (CCS 319/5, paragraphs 2-5 and paragraph 6, as subsequently amended by agreement between Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS 380/2))
II. Southeast Asia Operations
III. OVERLORD and the Mediterranean
IV. The War Against Japan
V. Progress Reports
Discussion of the above main subjects would include the introduction of most, if not all, of the points put forward in the American agenda. The arrangements for dealing with the detailed subjects would, however, be made from day to day.
It will be noted that Southeast Asia operations have been placed second on the list, in view of the intention to bring the Generalissimo and Admiral Mountbatten into the discussions at the earliest stage.
It is thought that the Progress Reports should be left to the end of the Conference when the main items have been disposed of. This procedure will not, of course, preclude points being raised for discussion when the Progress Reports are taken.
A. F. BROOKE
C. A. PORTAL
A. B. CUNNINGHAM
Cairo, 22 November 1943
Secret
CCS 405
At QUADRANT an outline plan for operations against Japan was presented in Annex “I” to CCS 319/2. These operations culminated in an invasion of Japan sometime after 1947.
The question at hand which concerns the China Theater is “what operations can be mounted from China which will have the greatest effect on the course of the war in the Pacific?” This question can be answered as follows:
a. Assist SEAC in operations against North Burma – current.
b. Develop land route to China and improve internal communications – current.
c. Continue to train and improve combat effectiveness of Chinese Army – current.
d. Initiate intensive bombing of Japan by VLR bombers – early 1944.
e. Recapture Canton and Hong Kong – November 1944-May 1945.
f. Carry out intensive bombing of Formosa and PI, deny use of Straits of Formosa and South China Sea to Japan and furnish land-based air support to any U.S. Navy activities in these areas – October 1944
g. Attack Formosa if required – May 1945-November 1945.
h. Offensive operations towards Shanghai – November 1945.
The above operations are tactically and logistically feasible. The cost is low. There is no competition with other theaters for specialized equipment and there is no conflict with operations projected by other theaters. These operations will:
(1) Provide greatest aid possible to other theaters, and
(2) Out down QUADRANT timetable for final defeat of Japan by one to two years.
Requirements:
a. One U.S. Infantry Division in India by March 1944. Two additional divisions about a month apart thereafter (these to be definitely earmarked for China Theater).
b. Continuation of supply program from U.S. for equipping Chinese troops.
c. Setting up India as a base for both China and Southeast Asia Theaters. All U.S. troops now in India except those necessary for operation of the Communication Zone to be moved to China after recapture of North Burma.
740.0011 PW 1939/12–3143
Cairo, November 22(?), 1943
The mission of the South East Asia Command is to defeat the enemy in and presumably occupy former British and Dutch colonies and Thailand. French Indochina may later be included.
Insofar as we participate in SEAC operations, we become involved in the politically explosive colonial problems of the British, Dutch and possibly French. In so doing, we compromise ourselves not only with the colonial peoples of Asia but also the free peoples of Asia, including the Chinese. Domestically, our Government lays itself open to public criticism – “why should American boys die to recreate the colonial empires of the British and their Dutch and French satellites?” Finally, more Anglo-American misunderstanding and friction is likely to arise out of our participation in SEAC than out of any other theater.
By concentrating our Asiatic effort on operations in and from China, we keep to the minimum our involvement in colonial imperialism. We engage in a cause which is popular with Asiatics and the American public. We avoid the mutual mistrust and recrimination over the colonial question, potentially so inimical to harmonious Anglo-American relations.
General Stilwell has submitted a plan for increased American effort in the China theater. It envisages, among other things, the recapture of Canton, Hong Kong and Shanghai and a possible attack on Formosa. He proposes to use American and Chinese forces to accomplish this. The Chinese welcome this plan. It gives them something to fight for. They have slight interest in entering Burma, Thailand and French Indochina for only the territorial benefit of the British and the French. But their own territory and Formosa (which they claim) provide a real incentive.
The Chinese Army is great in size. But it is relatively untrained and generally corrupt. However much of the Generalissimo and his Army may in principle wish to assume the offensive, they cannot effectively do so excepting under firm American guidance. American leadership can concretely be exercised only as General Stilwell is given bargaining power, for the Chinese are sharp, practical traders. All aid and concessions to China must therefore be made in consultation with and through General Stilwell.
It is not proposed that with a concentration of effort on the China theater we should forthwith turn our backs on SEAC. In cooperation with SEAC we need to retake North Burma immediately and so reopen a land route to China. But after the recapture of North Burma, there comes a parting of the ways.
The British will wish to throw their main weight southward for the repossession of colonial empire. Our main interest in Asia will lie to the East from whence we can strike directly and in coordination with other American offensives at the center of Japan’s new Empire.
Cairo, 22 November 1943
Secret
JCS 606
The following paragraph, from a radio from General Deane to General Marshall, is submitted by General Marshall to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their consideration:
I suggest that the Joint Chiefs of Staff put the Russians on the defensive at once by having some request to make of the Russians. I think it is important that we are not put in a position of doing all the explaining. You might include the following subjects: built [sic] bases; improved communications and interchange of weather; shuttle bomber bases, and coordination of timing reference OVERLORD.
F. B. ROYAL
A. J. McFARLAND
Joint Secretariat