Russia moves to strengthen voice in peace
Foreign affairs autonomy for Red states seen aimed at Britain
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Americans drive several hundred miles toward Tokyo in one giant Pacific sweep
Strongest points in Jap-occupied Marshalls enveloped
By Hal O’Flaherty
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Japs occupied islands in 1914
Marshalls built up since into powerful base
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22 U.S. planes lost in flight from Gilberts
All but six of pilots saved as Corsair fighters run into storm
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Editorial: Some are counted, some aren’t
They are being counted – those young Americans on the warships, in the air, on the beaches of the Marshall Islands in this greatest of our battles with the Japs.
They are being counted – those young Americans who press forward today against the Germans’ fire, over the hills and plains of Italy, on to Rome.
Their comrades have been counted on a hundred bloody battlefields, from Attu to Bataan to Guadalcanal to Tunisia – and white crosses mark the places where they stood when they were counted.
But some of their representatives in Congress, trustees of the government for which those young men are fighting and dying, don’t want to be counted – not even at $10,000 a year.
Today the Congressmen are voting on the question of whether the Armed Forces shall be permitted to vote in the next election by state ballots or by federal ballots. But they are not deciding this issue by a record roll call, which would provide a public count of where each Congressman stands.
They are deciding it by a “teller vote,” that being a parliamentary device by which lawmakers register their will anonymously – to the end that when election time comes constituents will not know where they stood or how they were counted.
Gen. MacArthur said:
Only those who are ready to die are fit to live.
Only those Congressmen who are ready to vote in the open on the merits of this issue or any other, without weighing party considerations and the danger of political death, are fit to make our country’s laws.
Editorial: Not propaganda
There has been widespread public protest that the government used the Jap prison atrocity report for propaganda purposes. Because it was made in the midst of the Fourth War Loan Drive, many people accepted it as a horror story designed to boost bond sales.
This charge isn’t true. The report was not timed for the bond drive – that was accidental.
The Chicago Tribune had obtained and widely syndicated a story written by Lt. Col. W. E. Dyess, one of the escaped prisoners. This forced the government to reconsider its policy of withholding the story, which it could no longer enforce. We believe that the government acted wisely in making the report official, instead of permitting a portion of it to be revealed through the medium of a Chicago paper.
The Army and Navy apparently realized that publication of the story would bring shock and grief and terrible uncertainty to the families of every American soldier or sailo9r reported missing in the Pacific theater of war. Therefore it had refused to sacrifice, for propaganda effect, the feelings of those American families. When it became impossible any longer to do so, the story was released. And it was merely by chance that the release came in the midst of the War Bond drive.
But once the report was made public, inevitably and legitimately it was used as an added reason for buying bonds and for increased effort all along the home front. There is only one answer to the Jap atrocities – the retribution of complete and final Jap defeat at the earliest possible moment.
Let us get on with the job!
Editorial: The President says oh
From the St. Louis Post-Dispatch
There is some small speculation on the question whether President Roosevelt, saying “Oh: when a fourth-term resolution was presented to him, meant the expression to convey surprise, approval or dissatisfaction.
There are, of course, always the further possibilities that he intended the oh of depreciation, or the shrinking oh, or the wool-gathering oh which denotes that the speaker has not kept up with the conversation.
Possibly, also, the President intended to say “Oho,” and committed a typographical error. If he did, this would explain nothing at all, Oho being open to an equal number of interpretations. The best guess is that he meant exactly what he said, and that it was the noncommittal oh, the big round empty oh, the oh of the present non-indicative mood.
Richberg backs U.S. control of labor policies
Attorney urges post-war action to restore free enterprise
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If their jobs are waiting –
Soldier-vote issue raised in NLRB union elections
Question is whether ex-workers overseas should get ballots; Pittsburgh case is example
By Fred W. Perkins, Pittsburgh Press staff writer
Washington –
While Congress quarrels over votes for soldiers, the National Labor Relations Board is bothered by a similar problem…
Should men and women in the services vote in elections under NLRB auspices to determine collective-bargaining agents in the plants where they formerly worked, and to which they presumably will return when mustered out?
The problem is posed by two companies that demand voting rights in such elections for former employees now in the Armed Forces. In one case, the affected union opposes the company, and in the other the union has not been required to take a position.
NLRB’s record is against giving a general guarantee of voting rights to former employees overseas, its reason being the time element. It requires such elections to be completed within 30 days after they are ordered, and may of them are held within 15 days.
Before the war
Before the war, NLRB’s policy provided for absentee voting in collective-bargaining elections. This was changed soon after Pearl Harbor, because it was foreseen that the movement of troops overseas would complicate the receipt of ballots. Now, soldiers or sailors who happen to be in the vicinity when an election is held are allowed to take part in voting at their former place of employment, but no effort is made to send ballots even to servicemen still in this country.
The Botany Worsted Mills in New Jersey has objected to an election, held some weeks ago, on the ground that servicemen were not included. NLRB’s ruling is expected in a week or two.
Pittsburgh case
The other case has not yet reached Washington, still being before the regional board in Pittsburgh, Nicholas Unkovic, attorney for the Mine Safety Appliance Company, has said it will be carried to the U.S. Supreme Court unless a favorable decision is given by NLRB.
The company demands that its 655 employees in military service be allowed to participate, with the 2,700 now on the payroll, in an election to determine whether bargaining rights shall be won by the United Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (CIO). The company is also fighting to make the election company-wide, in all its 14 plants, instead of restricting it as the union desires to one plant with 200 employees at Callery, in the Pittsburgh district.
NLRB officials say there is a decided difference between political elections and collective-bargaining elections, in that public officials are elected for specific terms while in bargaining elections the result may stand only until there is a substantial change in the employer’s personnel.
A soldier coming home may find that he is “stuck” for several years with a Senator or President he doesn’t like, but if he disapproves of the union in his place of employment (and if enough others think likewise), another vote can be forced on this question.
Amos ‘n’ Andy to get along without guests
Mystic knights ‘regain control’ of program
By Si Steinhauser
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Reading Eagle (February 2, 1944)
ON THE RECORD —
Still adrift
By Dorothy Thompson
Although reluctant to belabor a point at a time when there is much to discuss, I feel compelled out of alarm and a sense of duty to return to the question of the film Lifeboat.
Whether the public as a whole shares the opinion of the hostile critics, that the film is defeatist and pours contempt upon democratic society, the past week has revealed that American opinion is certainly divided.
This week, Life devotes six full pages to stills from the film and comments:
Most people will doubtless accept Lifeboat as a good authentic account of what really happens under such circumstances… There are others, however, who profess to detect grievous sins… Their loud misgivings make it one of the most controversial movies of recent years. These critics… point out that the German submarine commander who… gets the upper hand is the only “nice guy” in the picture.
That the film is controversial is evidenced by letters to the Times apropos Mr. Crowther’s criticisms. Whereas some support the film, others share the opinion of the unfavorable critics and the most outraged of the letter-writers is a sergeant in the Armed Forces, who calls it an “example of the weasel-minded fear of clearly selling our side of the story in this worldwide war for the minds and bodies of men.”
If the controversy about the film were whether it was artistic or inartistic, or faithful to technical details of existence in a lifeboat, the matter would be unimportant. But despite the remarkably feeble excuse of the producer, Mr. MacGowan, that the film, as it were, just grew, and the theme developed as they went along, this is a political picture. The controversy in the film is between Nazism, as represented in the figure of the submarine commander, and American democracy, as represented by the other passengers in the boat. If the film creates any controversy at all over whether Nazism or American democracy is the more effective way of life, it is certainly dubious. And if some Americans think that it definitely scores up for the Nazi, its effect on an incalculable number of people, however small or however large, is that of Nazi propaganda.
But apart from its effect on domestic morale, there are other factors of serious importance. Its producers plan to export it. What will be its effect in Latin America?
On this question I have no doubt whatsoever, nor have numerous experts on Latin America with whom I have consulted. Most Latin-American countries contain great numbers of influential people who are highly prejudiced against North America. The official Nazi propaganda always refers to us as a plutodemocracy, in which the strings are pulled by a few great magnates; as a land in which the people are doped with boogie-woogie and ball games, care only for money, have no culture, and are incapable of integrated effort even in the greatest need. And this film completely supports every one of these arguments.
Just why we should be backing the Nazi description of ourselves in foreign countries is beyond my comprehension.
And imagine the effect in Britain! British visitors to America are astonished by our luxury in time of war and find it difficult to grasp the miracle of the American production system. Nearer the war and having suffered greatly, the question in their mind is: Are Americans serious about the war? And what is the state of American democracy?
Now, though the director, Mr. Hitchcock, is an Englishman, he could never have produced this film showing British passengers in this light, and gotten away with it in Britain. Compare it with Mrs. Miniver! Mrs. Miniver is a picture of an easygoing and divided society turning to a close unit and overcoming the Nazis. Lifeboat is a picture of a drifting, compassless society accepting defeat – until saved by a miracle. Is this the way we are, and the way we want to present ourselves to the world?
When I saw the film, it was followed by a newsreel featuring the face of a young American aviator who had shot down a great number of Jap planes. His face was an answer to the film. Strong, young, purposeful and humane, he, in real life, was a real American type who never could have behaved as the wretched creatures do in Lifeboat.
And since I saw the film, we have had the Army and Navy report of our prisoners of war left in the Philippines. It is a story of fortitude, endurance and pride under the most unconscionable suffering and the armies that took that were just a cross section of American men.
Pride in our country demands that we do not send this film abroad in its present form, to soil our own nest.
Völkischer Beobachter (February 3, 1944)
Der harte Kampf um die Marshallinseln
Japan verteidigt seine östliche Vorpostenstellung
vb. Wien, 2. Februar –
Mit der Eröffnung des Kampfes um die Marshallinseln hat ein neuer Abschnitt des Krieges im Pazifik begonnen. Zum erstenmal versuchen sich die Yankees an einem Punkt, der nicht zu dem von Japan in der ersten Etappe des Fernostkrieges mit raschem Zugriff eroberten Vorfeld zählt, sondern seit dem Ende des ersten Weltkriegs in der Form des Mandats zum japanischen Machtbereich gehört.
Kein Zweifel – japanische Zeitungen haben das offen ausgesprochen und auch die jüngste Erklärung des Marineministers Schimada ließ es zwischen den Zeilen durchklingen – daß im Laufe dieser Zeitspanne die Marshallinseln ganz anders ausgebaut und befestigt worden sind, als dies auf den Salomonen, auf Neupommern und den Gilbertinseln möglich war. Das zähe Ringen um diese Vorwerke Japans im Südpazifik war nur als ein Vorspiel zu bewerten, gemessen an der Bedeutung der Auseinandersetzung, die jetzt entbrannt ist.
Die Marshallinseln, die sich zwischen dem 162. und 174. Grad östlicher Länge und zwischen dem 5. und 13. Grad nördlicher Breite ausdehnen, bestehen, im Ganzen betrachtet, aus zwei Reihen von Atollen, die von Nordwesten nach Südosten verlaufen: der Rälikgruppe im Westen, der Ratakgruppe weiter östlich. Es sind insgesamt rund 350 Inseln mit zusammen etwa 400 Geviertkilometer, Nur sieben von ihnen ragen mehr als einen Meter über die höchste Flutlinie. Die Mehrzahl der Koralleneilande ist unbewohnt, und von strategischer Bedeutung sind nur die größeren Inseln, die als Stützpunkt für Luftstreitkräfte in Frage kommen. Der wichtigste Platz der ganzen Gruppe ist Dschaluit, die südliche Hauptinsel der Rälikgruppe, die auch den Hauptpfeiler der militärischen Stellung Japans auf den Marshallinseln bildet. In der Nordwestausdehnung erstreckt sich die gesamte Marshallgruppe über mehr als 1.000 Kilometer. Die gesamten Gewässer sind durch zahllose Korallenriffe für die Schifffahrt äußerst schwierig. Untiefen wechseln auf engstem Raum mit Wassertiefen zwischen 4.000 und 5.000 Meter.
Es kann als sicher gelten, daß die Yankees bereits Mitte November, als sie ihren Handstreich gegen die etwa 400 Kilometer weiter südöstlich gelegenen Gilbertinseln durchführten, den Plan hatten, im gleichen Zuge bis zu den Marshallinseln vorzustoßen. Der hartnäckige Widerstand aber, den sie bei der schwachen Besatzung von Makin und Tarawa fanden, und die gewaltigen Schiffsverluste, die sie in drei Luftseeschlachten in diesem Raume hinnehmen mußten, nötigten sie, ihre Ziele zunächst kürzer zu stecken.
Admiral Nimitz, der in diesem Abschnitt das Kommando über die Seestreitkräfte der USA führt, sah sich daher genötigt, zunächst nach der Eroberung der Gilbertinseln eine Pause von über zwei
Monaten einzuschalten, um auf den Gilbertinseln eine Absprungbasis für seine Bomber und Landjäger zu schatten. In der letzten Zeit kündigten mehrfache schwere Bombenangriffe auf die Marshallgruppe an, daß der nächste Schritt der Nimitzschen Offensive dicht bevorstand, die Japaner sind also hier durchaus nicht überrascht worden.
Wo die Yankees bei einem so weitgelagerten Ziel ansetzen würden, ließ sich freilich nicht mit Gewißheit voraussehen. Sicher war nur das eine, daß sie, getreu ihrer alten Taktik, niemals die eigentlichen Hauptziele anzugehen, Dschaluit zunächst nicht angreifen würden. Nach den Meldungen aus amerikanischer Quelle, die um 48 Stunden hinter der ersten Bekanntgabe der Japaner herhinkten, sind ihre Landungen auf den Kwadjelinninseln, im Norden der Rälikgruppe, die in sich wiederum aus einer Vielzahl von Atollen bestehen, erfolgt. Erbitterte Kämpfe sind hier im Gange. Das englische Reuters-Büro, das voreilig die Besetzung der Kwadjelinninseln durch die Amerikaner bekanntgegeben hatte, sah sich zu der „Berichtigung“ veranlaßt, die von ihm gemeldete Besetzung entspreche leider nicht den Tatsachen. Zunächst könne nur die geglückte Landung als Tatsache gelten.
An dem Landungsunternehmen sind neben starken schwimmenden Verbänden, die auch Schlachtschiffe und Flugzeugträger umfassen sollen, Landkampfeinheiten des amerikanischen Heeres und der Marine beteiligt. Die Luftwaffe der Yankees operiert nicht nur von ihren Stützpunkten auf den Gilbertinseln aus, sondern auch von Trägern. Auf eine energische Gegenwehr der Japaner dürfte sich Nimitz nach seinen Erfahrungen auf den Gilbertinseln gefaßt machen. Denn wenn auch die Marshallinseln noch über 4.000 Kilometer von Tokio entfernt und damit an sich kein strategisches Objekt von zentraler Bedeutung sind, so decken sie doch als östlicher Vorposten die Karolinengruppe, wo die japanische Schlachtflotte bei der Insel Truk ihren Hauptliegeplatz besitzen soll.
Daß die Yankees unter diesen Umständen nicht mit schnellen Erfolgen rechnen, ging sogar aus einer Erklärung Roosevelts hervor, der auf seiner täglichen Pressekonferenz über die Kämpfe auf den Marshallinseln befragt wurde. Er warne vor übertriebenem Optimismus – so schloß er seine Mitteilungen, die mit der kühnen Feststellung begonnen hatten, es sei „das Ziel der Alliierten, die Japaner aus Burma, Insulinde und der Malaiischen Halbinsel zu vertreiben, um bis nach Tokio vorzudringen.“ Also ein für ihn typisches Gemisch von Bluff und Skepsis, aus dem der Durchschnittsyankee natürlich in erster Linie die großsprecherische Ankündigung des Marsches nach Tokio heraushört – und im Hinblick auf die näherziehenden Wahlen auch heraushören soll.
Die Frage ist nur, ob er nicht durch den Verlauf der Kämpfe auf den Marshallinseln die gleiche Ernüchterung erfahren wird, die ihm der festgefahrene Inselkrieg auf Bougainville, auf Neupommern und Neuguinea ohnehin zur Genüge bereitet.
U.S. State Department (February 3, 1944)
Generalissimo Chiang to President Roosevelt
Chungking, 3 February 1944
Secret
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
I appreciate your desire to open the Ledo Road, a desire which is also my great concern since it is only thru the opening of this land route that China may quickly obtain the heavy equipment much needed by her Army. You doubtless recall that at Cairo I reiterated and emphasized the fact that I am ready to send the Yunnan troops into Burma at any moment that large scale amphibious landing operations can be effected at strategic points.
I stand ready to adhere to this decision, and hope that we can carry out operations even before November of this year, which date you mentioned as possible and probable for the diverting of the amphibious equipment to Burma.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
U.S. Navy Department (February 3, 1944)
CINCPAC Communiqué No. 29
Our forces have captured Namur and several adjacent islands.
Resistance continues on Kwajalein Island, but we have landed troops and mechanized equipment in force and are proceeding with the annihilation of the enemy.
Press Release
For Immediate Release
February 3, 1944
British and American destroyers account for another U-boat
Close cooperation between the British destroyer HMS CALPE (L71) and the United States destroyer USS WAINWRIGHT (DD-419) resulted in the destruction of a German U-boat recently, in the Mediterranean.
Earlier, Allied aircraft had conducted a search for 36 hours which was credited with materially hampering the submarine’s activities.
There was relative calm, after the tumult of gun battle, for at the actual sinking not a shot was fired – and the Commanding Officer of the WAINWRIGHT abandoned his plan to ram the U-boat, when he saw that it was in its death throes.
A white sea serpent was painted on either side of the German craft’s conning tower, but beyond that, there was no identification mark visible.
Cdr. Walter W. Strohbehn (USN), 36, 904 West 6th St., Davenport, Iowa, Commanding Officer of the WAINWRIGHT, reported to Adm. Ernest J. King (USN), COMINCH, that 36 hours of harassing the U-boat received from the constant air search accounted for the submarine’s slow speed and sluggish evasive maneuvers. Cdr. Strohbehn complimented the U.S. Army Air Forces for its part in keeping the submarine hampered.
The CALPE made a sound contact with the submarine at 8:16 a.m. From then on, the surface hunt went forward persistently, as eyes and ears were alert for the German craft.
About 2:47 p.m., the submarine surfaced, under the unremitting depth charge attacks by the British and U.S. destroyers. The U-boat was engaged by gunfire, but the battle waned when it was observed that the undersea craft was about to sink. The Commanding Officer of the U.S. destroyer planned to ram the submarine, but abandoned this, when it was observed that the U-boat was doomed.
The submarine sank at 3:08 p.m.
Cdr. Strohbehn wrote in his official report that it was “a pleasure to work with” the British warship. He declared:
She turned in a polished performance, always being in the proper place, always being ready and she was quick to grasp the intentions of this ship.
The Commander of the U.S. Destroyer Squadron to which the attacking U.S. vessel was attached – Capt. James P. Clay (USN), 43, 3060 Porter St., Northwest, Washington, DC – attributed the victory over the German craft to the fine teamwork between the British and U.S. warships – despite the fact that no prior joint drills had been held.
The British Admiralty officially extended its congratulations for the sinking of the enemy craft. The Commanding Officer of the CALPE was LtCdr. H. Kirkwood, RN.
VAdm. Henry K. Hewitt (USN), COMNAVNAW, likewise complimented those who took part in the destruction of the U-boat.