Meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 9:30 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| Admiral Leahy | ||
| General Marshall | ||
| Admiral King | ||
| General Arnold | ||
| Ambassador Harriman | ||
| Lieutenant General Somervell | ||
| Vice Admiral Willson | ||
| Rear Admiral Cooke | ||
| Rear Admiral Bieri | ||
| Rear Admiral Badger | ||
| Major General Handy | ||
| Major General Fairchild | ||
| Major General Deane | ||
| Brigadier General Kuter | ||
| Brigadier General Hansell | ||
| Brigadier General Tansey | ||
| Brigadier General Whitten | ||
| Captain Burrough | ||
| Captain Doyle | ||
| Colonel Bessell | ||
| Colonel Smith | ||
| Colonel Roberts | ||
| Captain Freseman | ||
| Commander Long | ||
| Major Chapman | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Captain Royal | ||
| Colonel McFarland |
Joint Chiefs of Staff Minutes
November 24, 1943, 9:30 p.m.
Secret
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At General Marshall’s request, Ambassador Harriman expressed his views of the present attitude of the Soviets and their possible reaction to the proposals recommended by the Joint Strategic Survey Committee. He said there was no indication that the Soviets will advance any specific strategical plan at the coming Conference. This, he thought, was due to their complete absorption in the war. The only proposals that they had put forward in the Moscow Conference were with reference to the entrance of Turkey and Sweden in the war and these had political as well as military implications.
As Ambassador Harriman saw it, immediate Soviet interest was focused on the reduction of the German forces by whom they were opposed. He did not believe that the Soviet Staff would be agreeable to any discussions until Marshal Stalin had met with the President and Prime Minister and some basic policies had been agreed upon. He thought it would be unfortunate if the Soviet Representatives were given the impression that the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff were arriving at the Conference with anything approximating a cut and dried plan. He felt that the attitude of the Combined Chiefs of Staff should be characterized by perfect frankness and a willingness to weigh thoughtfully any proposals made by the Soviets. They do not like fait[s] accomplis and will appreciate being consulted in connection with the plans of the U.S. and the British. While the reasons therefor were not clear, he was convinced that the Soviets were under tremendous pressure to end the war quickly. They appeared confident that a second front would be established; Marshal Stalin had already communicated this to the Russian people and had indicated to them that it would not be long in coming.
Ambassador Harriman said that our strategy had never before been presented so clearly to the Soviets as it had been by General Deane and General Ismay at the Moscow Conference. This had had an extremely satisfactory effect. The Soviets had asked many questions but these questions were not critical. He pointed out that no promises had been made to the Soviets but they had been given the outline of the plans for OVERLORD and were being kept informed as to the progress of the buildup. It has been difficult for the Russians to understand why two nations of the strength of the United States and Great Britain have been unable to contain more German forces than they have. He suggested that in the coming Conference, the Chiefs of Staff adopt an attitude of patience and afford the Soviet Representatives ample opportunity to ask questions. Our experience with them has already proved that a frank and sympathetic explanation goes far towards removing suspicion.
Ambassador Harriman thought that the Soviets had every intention of joining the U.S. and the British in the war against Japan as soon as Germany had capitulated. They fear, however, a premature break with Japan and placed great value on the substantial amount of supplies which they are now receiving through Vladivostok. He reiterated that the pressure on the Soviet Government to end the war could not be overemphasized.
He thought, that the Chiefs of Staff, in their Conference with the Soviets, should place their sights high and should make unequivocal demands for what they wanted from them. He hoped that the question of Russian participation in the Japanese war would be raised either by the President or by the Chiefs of Staff and indicated that it would be well to point out and to emphasize any advantages which the Soviets would receive from such participation. One difficulty which he foresaw was the Soviet fear that information of the discussions might reach the Japanese and thus provoke a break with them before the Soviets are ready.
General Deane stated that his views accorded substantially with those expressed by Ambassador Harriman except perhaps with respect to the degree of emphasis placed on the Russian desire for a second front. He thought that the Soviets viewed the second front more in the nature of desirable insurance than as an immediate necessity. As he saw it, their particular interest at the moment is focused on the assistance necessary to relieve the immediate pressure on them rather than on the opening of a second front.
In reply to a question by General Arnold as to the Soviet attitude towards operations in the Aegean Sea, Ambassador Harriman said the Soviets had made no proposals as to what we should do. They stated only the results they desired and left the details to us. They were interested, however, in the reasons underlying our actions. He thought, therefore, that if there was to be an alternative to the cross-Channel operation, that it should be explained to the Soviets very frankly. If OVERLORD were to be abandoned, however, in his opinion, it would have to be replaced by an operation equally offensive in nature.
In reply to a question from Admiral Leahy he said that it was his impression that the Soviets were likely to demand immediate action to relieve the pressure on them.
General Deane agreed with this, but said that he did not believe the Russians would propose the specific action to be taken. He said that the Soviets were appreciating for the first time the real effect of the bomber offensive on their operations. Marshal Stalin had mentioned it twice to him and it had been mentioned by several others. The effects had been confirmed by reports from prisoners of war. However, he thought it would not be wise to overemphasize this as it had been exploited rather fully already.
Ambassador Harriman said that the Soviet Government was now telling the people that they have strong Allies who are fighting hard. In his opinion they were trying to impress them with the idea that the war has proceeded to a favorable point and progress is being made towards its successful completion. He said that the Soviets are blunt themselves and understand bluntness. He had no fear for any basic misunderstanding or any break with them as a result of the coming Conference. He was sure that we had their confidence.
Admiral Leahy expressed his appreciation and the appreciation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the very informative summary presented by Ambassador Harriman…
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