Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
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Present |
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| United States |
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United Kingdom |
| Admiral Leahy |
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General Brooke |
| General Marshall |
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Air Chief Marshal Portal |
| Admiral King |
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Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham |
| General Arnold |
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Field Marshall Dill |
| Lieutenant General Stilwell |
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Lieutenant General Ismay |
| Lieutenant General Somervell |
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Admiral Mountbatten |
| Vice Admiral Willson |
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General Riddell-Webster |
| Rear Admiral Cooke |
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Lieutenant General Carton de Wiart |
| Rear Admiral Bieri |
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Captain Lambe |
| Rear Admiral Badger |
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Brigadier Sugden |
| Major General Stratemeyer |
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Air Commodore Elliot |
| Major General Wheeler |
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Brigadier Cobb |
| Major General Handy |
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Brigadier Head |
| Major General Fairchild |
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Brigadier McNair |
| Major General Wedemeyer |
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| Brigadier General Kuter |
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| Brigadier General Hansell |
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| Brigadier General Tansey |
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| Captain Doyle |
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| Colonel Roberts |
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| Colonel O’Donnell |
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| Captain Freseman |
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| Commander Long |
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Present for the Last Item Only |
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General Shang |
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Lieutenant General Lin |
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Vice Admiral Yang |
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Lieutenant General Chou |
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Major General Chu |
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Major General Tsai |
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Major General Chennault |
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Secretariat |
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Brigadier Redman |
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Captain Royal |
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Colonel McFarland |
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Commander Coleridge |
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Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
November 23, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret
Conclusions of the 127th Meeting
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 127th Meeting. The detailed record of the Meeting was also accepted subject to minor amendments.
The role of China in the defeat of Japan (CCS 405)
General Stilwell informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he had received a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stating that he did not wish any proposals for Chinese action laid before the Combined Chiefs of Staff until he had had a further consultation with the President and General Marshall.
Sir Alan Brooke said that it appeared that the operations set out in subparagraphs 2a, b, c, and d of CCS 405 were acceptable. The remaining proposals appeared unrealistic, particularly in view of the logistic difficulties which General Marshall had mentioned at a previous meeting. He could not see how Formosa could he attacked from the mainland of China without any landing craft.
Admiral Leahy said that he agreed with Sir Alan Brooke’s views. Subparagraphs 2a, b, c, and d were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff; the remaining proposals were matters for the future, requiring detailed examination, particularly in view of the serious logistic implications. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should so inform the Chinese representatives.
General Marshall reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that up till now the Generalissimo’s sole interest had been in the provision of a large United States Air Force in China and a large number of transport aircraft. He had taken each step in the direction of the formation of ground forces with reluctance. Months had passed before he would agree to the training of the Chinese troops at Ramgarrh [Ramgarh]. More months had passed before he agreed to an increase in their numbers. Negotiations with the Indian government had necessitated further delay. Yet another period had passed before the Generalissimo would agree to the habilitation of the Yunnan force. Now, for the first time, the Generalissimo had shown an active interest in and an admission of the importance of the formation and employment of Chinese ground forces. He (General Marshall) personally had confidence in the value of Chinese troops provided they were properly led. Their powers of endurance should prove immensely valuable in the type of warfare in which they were to be employed. He considered that the Generalissimo’s new proposals should be given the most careful and sympathetic consideration. These factors and the value of China once Germany had collapsed and the flow of supplies to the East had increased, should be borne most carefully in mind when considering the Generalissimo’s plan.
Admiral King pointed out that the Generalissimo’s proposals must be considered in relation to the overall plan for the defeat of Japan. He agreed with General Marshall as to the importance of the change of heart shown by the Generalissimo in his latest proposals, and felt that he should not be discouraged if it could possibly be avoided.
General Arnold mentioned the problem of the employment of some two thousand heavy bombers which would be available on the defeat of Germany. Available bases in the Aleutians, Maritime Provinces, and the Islands were all of limited capacity.
Sir Charles Portal suggested that this great force might be used against shipping.
General Arnold pointed out that the bases he had mentioned would in fact be used by heavy bombers employed against shipping. His point was that only by using them out of China could the heart of Japan itself be attacked. Attacks on Japanese oil resources and shipping, while valuable, would not produce the final result.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s views with regard to the employment of naval forces in the Bay of Bengal.
General Stilwell said he believed that the Generalissimo would be satisfied if we could guarantee naval security in the Bay of Bengal.
Sir Andrew Cunningham said that it would be right to say that we should have general control of the Bay of Bengal but he could not absolutely guarantee its complete security. He believed that the Prime Minister intended in due course to inform the Generalissimo of the British naval forces to be employed in the Bay of Bengal but felt that this information should be imparted by the Prime Minister himself and not by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Admiral Mountbatten explained that in discussing amphibious operations with the Generalissimo in Chungking, he had pointed out that it was intended to launch an amphibious operation in the spring, probably to synchronize with the Burma land operations. From the air bases made available by the amphibious operation it was hoped to be able to interfere with seaborne supplies, both through Rangoon and Bangkok. He believed that the Generalissimo was in fact interested in this action rather than in the actual provision of naval forces in the Bay of Bengal.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That the operations proposed in paragraph 2a to d inclusive, of CCS 405 are, in general, in consonance with the present concept of operations against Japan as expressed in CCS 397, Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944.
b. That the operations proposed in paragraphs 2e to h inclusive, of CCS 405 go beyond the present concept of operations in China and require detailed examination and study with particular reference to logistic difficulties.
c. That the study indicated in b above, together with an examination of the employment for the defeat of Japan of the heavy bombers that would become available when Germany has been eliminated from the war, should be included in the general study of the overall plan for the defeat of Japan now being conducted by the Combined Staff Planners.
Estimate of enemy situation, 1944 – Pacific-Far East (CCS 300/2)
Sir Alan Brooke said that there appeared to be minor discrepancies with regard to the estimate of enemy forces available, which could be discussed by the Combined Intelligence Committee. In other respects, the paper could be accepted as an estimate of the situation.
Admiral Leahy agreed with this view.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted and noted for future information the estimate of the enemy situation, 1944 – Pacific-Far East, set out in CCS 300/2.
Future operation in the Southeast Asia Command (CCS 390/1)
Sir Alan Brooke said that he noted that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not able to provide the forces necessary for CULVERIN. With regard to BUCCANEER, he would like to defer consideration of this operation until the Conference was further advanced.
Admiral Mountbatten said that the Japanese forces in CULVERIN had increased from one to three divisions. He was, however, prepared to accept a risk and to undertake Operation CULVERIN with smaller forces if this should be considered necessary. His chief concern was to be in a position to cut the Japanese lines of communication into Burma and to obtain an air base from which he could attack the Malacca Straits, Rangoon, and Bangkok. BUCCANEER, though not providing so many airfields, was approximately the same distance from Bangkok as was CULVERIN, and so offered almost equal strategical advantages; it could be undertaken with the forces now available to him. He would propose to launch BUCCANEER probably some two to three days after the launching of the land campaign in North Burma. This would disperse the Japanese air effort. The Burma operations and BUCCANEER each had a considerable effect on the other and had been planned and considered together.
After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 390/1 but agreed to suspend final decision regarding Operation BUCCANEER until later in the SEXTANT Conference in order to allow the operation to be considered in relation to the other operations to be undertaken.
Combined Chiefs of Staff – United Chiefs of Staff (CCS 406)
Sir Alan Brooke said that he would like further time to consider the proposals put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff.
General Marshall explained that the United States Chiefs of Staff had given only very brief consideration to this matter but had felt that it would be valuable to outline a possible course of action before pressure was exerted from any quarter to widen the membership of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Admiral King said that, as he saw it, the United Chiefs of Staff would consist of one representative of the Chiefs of Staff of each nation who would act as spokesman. This proposal would reduce the difficulties to their simplest possible terms if the issue were to be forced upon the United States and British Chiefs of Staff.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer action on this paper.
The present situation in the Southeast Asia Command
The Combined Chiefs of Staff then entered into a general discussion of the situation in the Southeast Asia Command.
Admiral Mountbatten, in reply to a question, explained that the grounding of a vessel carrying spare aircraft engines would result in a deficit in air lift over the “hump” for December of some 2,100 tons. The backlog thus caused had not been included in his calculations and he suggested that the Combined Planners should look into this question. His plans were not made on wide margins of safety and did not make allowance for acts of God since he realized fully that too heavy demands from his theater would have direct repercussions on the operations in other theaters. In reply to a further question, Admiral Mountbatten said that his Royal Air Force transports were being used to the full. They were not being employed in China since there were insufficient numbers to train his parachute troops and long-range penetration groups. It had been necessary for United States aircraft to fly in supplies to the British units in Fort Hertz.
General Stratemeyer asked if it was possible for the Royal Air Force to provide old bombers which were not operationally fit, for use as transport aircraft.
Sir Charles Portal said that he did not feel that worn-out aircraft, even if available, could be used for this task. Manpower also was short and the production of British bombers was a direct measure of the weight of attack on Germany.
In further discussion of the possibility of interrupting Japanese communications, Sir Charles Portal pointed out that air bombing alone could not completely stop the use of enemy ports.
Admiral Mountbatten agreed with this view but explained that he had great hopes that heavy bombing of Japanese occupied ports would result in strikes of dock labor and a resulting slowing up in the flow of supplies.
General Arnold felt that our present calculations with regard to air transport possibilities had been wrongly based on a 100 percent figure of accomplishment. This figure was never achieved, and it would be safer to “lower our sights” with regard to target figures and accept as a bonus any increase on this lower figure.
In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, Admiral Mountbatten said that the airport at Blair in BUCCANEER had a 1,650-yard runway and was capable of operating three squadrons.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the above statements.
At this point General Shang Chen, Lieutenant General Lin Wei, Vice Admiral Yang Hsuan Ch’eng, Lieutenant General Chou Chih Jou, Lieutenant [Major] General Chu Shih Ming, Major General Tsai Wen Chih and Major General Chennault entered the meeting.
Sir Alan Brooke, in welcoming the Chinese Representatives, said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were very pleased to have this opportunity to meet with them and discuss around the table plans for future operations in China. These discussions should lead to definite conclusions. Admiral Mountbatten had that morning put forward his plans and he suggested that the Chinese Representatives should ask any further questions that they might wish and put forward their own suggestions with regard to these plans.
General Chu, on behalf of General Shang Chen, explained that the Chinese Representatives had not had sufficient time to study these plans and would prefer to discuss them on the following day.
Admiral Mountbatten suggested that the Chinese Representatives should give an outline of the state of readiness of the Yunnan Force and of the detailed plans for its employment. He pointed out that the success of our efforts to open the land route to China was dependent on the successful operation of the Yunnan Force in coordination with the British attacks.
General Stilwell then outlined in detail the Chinese Forces available and their state of readiness. There were, at present, certain shortages of personnel which were being rapidly made good. The ten assault divisions would first be brought up to strength and any deficiencies in pack transport would be compensated for by the use of manpower.
With the aid of a map General Stilwell outlined the three coordinated attacks which would be made by the Yunnan force. He believed that sufficient tactical air forces were available to support these operations.
General Chennault and General Stratemeyer explained the arrangements which had been made for the coordination of the air effort with that of the ground forces.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note with interest of the above statements.
b. Agreed to meet again with the Chinese Representatives at 1530 hours on 24 November.
