Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Mrs. Oliver | |
| Commander Thompson | ||
| Mr. Martin |
The Prime Minister’s private secretary to the President’s special assistant
Cairo, November 23, 1943
Secret
Mr. Hopkins. (Private)
Colonel Warden asked me to send you this telegram to see. Could you please let me have it back.
J. M. MARTIN
[Enclosure]
The British Minister in Saudi Arabia to the British Foreign Office
Jedda, 15 November 1943 SecretWar Cabinet Distribution – Repeated to Minister of State Cairo.
475. My telegram No. 455.Ibn Saud has sent me a message from Mecca to the effect that United States representative in Jedda asked him the following questions on November 13.
(1) Has Saudi Arabian Government asked His Majesty’s Government for arms?
(2) If so when did they make their request to His Majesty’s Government?
(3) What arms did Saudi Arabian Government ask for?
(4) Has anything been promised by His Majesty’s Government?
(5) What has arrived?
(6) Are arms being supplied by His Majesty’s Government as a gift or against payment?
(7) Did His Majesty’s Government offer to supply arms or did the question arise out of a demand from Saudi Arabian Government?
Ibn Saud informed my United States colleague that His Majesty’s Government had promised to supply 50 light reconnaissance cars but that none had arrived to date. He did not know if payment was expected or whether they were being supplied under Lease Lend in accordance with the list of Saudi Arabian arms requirements submitted to His Majesty’s Government by Saudi Arabian representative in London for supply under Lease Lend.
I feel my United States colleague’s action in putting these questions to Ibn Saud is unfortunate as it would appear to show 1) a lack of collaboration between His Majesty’s Government and United States on this question and 2) United States distrust of any information given them by His Majesty’s Government.
I venture to suggest that we should come to some agreement with United States over the quantities of war material to be supplied to Saudi Arabian Government as soon as possible and inform Ibn Saud accordingly.
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| General Marshall | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| Admiral King | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| General Arnold | Field Marshall Dill | |
| Lieutenant General Stilwell | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | General Riddell-Webster | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Lieutenant General Carton de Wiart | |
| Rear Admiral Bieri | Captain Lambe | |
| Rear Admiral Badger | Brigadier Sugden | |
| Major General Stratemeyer | Air Commodore Elliot | |
| Major General Wheeler | Brigadier Cobb | |
| Major General Handy | Brigadier Head | |
| Major General Fairchild | Brigadier McNair | |
| Major General Wedemeyer | ||
| Brigadier General Kuter | ||
| Brigadier General Hansell | ||
| Brigadier General Tansey | ||
| Captain Doyle | ||
| Colonel Roberts | ||
| Colonel O’Donnell | ||
| Captain Freseman | ||
| Commander Long | ||
| Present for the Last Item Only | ||
| General Shang | ||
| Lieutenant General Lin | ||
| Vice Admiral Yang | ||
| Lieutenant General Chou | ||
| Major General Chu | ||
| Major General Tsai | ||
| Major General Chennault | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Redman | ||
| Captain Royal | ||
| Colonel McFarland | ||
| Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
November 23, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret
Conclusions of the 127th Meeting
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted the conclusions of the 127th Meeting. The detailed record of the Meeting was also accepted subject to minor amendments.
The role of China in the defeat of Japan (CCS 405)
General Stilwell informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff that he had received a message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek stating that he did not wish any proposals for Chinese action laid before the Combined Chiefs of Staff until he had had a further consultation with the President and General Marshall.
Sir Alan Brooke said that it appeared that the operations set out in subparagraphs 2a, b, c, and d of CCS 405 were acceptable. The remaining proposals appeared unrealistic, particularly in view of the logistic difficulties which General Marshall had mentioned at a previous meeting. He could not see how Formosa could he attacked from the mainland of China without any landing craft.
Admiral Leahy said that he agreed with Sir Alan Brooke’s views. Subparagraphs 2a, b, c, and d were acceptable to the United States Chiefs of Staff; the remaining proposals were matters for the future, requiring detailed examination, particularly in view of the serious logistic implications. He suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff should so inform the Chinese representatives.
General Marshall reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff that up till now the Generalissimo’s sole interest had been in the provision of a large United States Air Force in China and a large number of transport aircraft. He had taken each step in the direction of the formation of ground forces with reluctance. Months had passed before he would agree to the training of the Chinese troops at Ramgarrh [Ramgarh]. More months had passed before he agreed to an increase in their numbers. Negotiations with the Indian government had necessitated further delay. Yet another period had passed before the Generalissimo would agree to the habilitation of the Yunnan force. Now, for the first time, the Generalissimo had shown an active interest in and an admission of the importance of the formation and employment of Chinese ground forces. He (General Marshall) personally had confidence in the value of Chinese troops provided they were properly led. Their powers of endurance should prove immensely valuable in the type of warfare in which they were to be employed. He considered that the Generalissimo’s new proposals should be given the most careful and sympathetic consideration. These factors and the value of China once Germany had collapsed and the flow of supplies to the East had increased, should be borne most carefully in mind when considering the Generalissimo’s plan.
Admiral King pointed out that the Generalissimo’s proposals must be considered in relation to the overall plan for the defeat of Japan. He agreed with General Marshall as to the importance of the change of heart shown by the Generalissimo in his latest proposals, and felt that he should not be discouraged if it could possibly be avoided.
General Arnold mentioned the problem of the employment of some two thousand heavy bombers which would be available on the defeat of Germany. Available bases in the Aleutians, Maritime Provinces, and the Islands were all of limited capacity.
Sir Charles Portal suggested that this great force might be used against shipping.
General Arnold pointed out that the bases he had mentioned would in fact be used by heavy bombers employed against shipping. His point was that only by using them out of China could the heart of Japan itself be attacked. Attacks on Japanese oil resources and shipping, while valuable, would not produce the final result.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff then discussed Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek’s views with regard to the employment of naval forces in the Bay of Bengal.
General Stilwell said he believed that the Generalissimo would be satisfied if we could guarantee naval security in the Bay of Bengal.
Sir Andrew Cunningham said that it would be right to say that we should have general control of the Bay of Bengal but he could not absolutely guarantee its complete security. He believed that the Prime Minister intended in due course to inform the Generalissimo of the British naval forces to be employed in the Bay of Bengal but felt that this information should be imparted by the Prime Minister himself and not by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Admiral Mountbatten explained that in discussing amphibious operations with the Generalissimo in Chungking, he had pointed out that it was intended to launch an amphibious operation in the spring, probably to synchronize with the Burma land operations. From the air bases made available by the amphibious operation it was hoped to be able to interfere with seaborne supplies, both through Rangoon and Bangkok. He believed that the Generalissimo was in fact interested in this action rather than in the actual provision of naval forces in the Bay of Bengal.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed:
a. That the operations proposed in paragraph 2a to d inclusive, of CCS 405 are, in general, in consonance with the present concept of operations against Japan as expressed in CCS 397, Specific Operations for the Defeat of Japan, 1944.
b. That the operations proposed in paragraphs 2e to h inclusive, of CCS 405 go beyond the present concept of operations in China and require detailed examination and study with particular reference to logistic difficulties.
c. That the study indicated in b above, together with an examination of the employment for the defeat of Japan of the heavy bombers that would become available when Germany has been eliminated from the war, should be included in the general study of the overall plan for the defeat of Japan now being conducted by the Combined Staff Planners.
Estimate of enemy situation, 1944 – Pacific-Far East (CCS 300/2)
Sir Alan Brooke said that there appeared to be minor discrepancies with regard to the estimate of enemy forces available, which could be discussed by the Combined Intelligence Committee. In other respects, the paper could be accepted as an estimate of the situation.
Admiral Leahy agreed with this view.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Accepted and noted for future information the estimate of the enemy situation, 1944 – Pacific-Far East, set out in CCS 300/2.
Future operation in the Southeast Asia Command (CCS 390/1)
Sir Alan Brooke said that he noted that the United States Chiefs of Staff were not able to provide the forces necessary for CULVERIN. With regard to BUCCANEER, he would like to defer consideration of this operation until the Conference was further advanced.
Admiral Mountbatten said that the Japanese forces in CULVERIN had increased from one to three divisions. He was, however, prepared to accept a risk and to undertake Operation CULVERIN with smaller forces if this should be considered necessary. His chief concern was to be in a position to cut the Japanese lines of communication into Burma and to obtain an air base from which he could attack the Malacca Straits, Rangoon, and Bangkok. BUCCANEER, though not providing so many airfields, was approximately the same distance from Bangkok as was CULVERIN, and so offered almost equal strategical advantages; it could be undertaken with the forces now available to him. He would propose to launch BUCCANEER probably some two to three days after the launching of the land campaign in North Burma. This would disperse the Japanese air effort. The Burma operations and BUCCANEER each had a considerable effect on the other and had been planned and considered together.
After further discussion, the Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved CCS 390/1 but agreed to suspend final decision regarding Operation BUCCANEER until later in the SEXTANT Conference in order to allow the operation to be considered in relation to the other operations to be undertaken.
Combined Chiefs of Staff – United Chiefs of Staff (CCS 406)
Sir Alan Brooke said that he would like further time to consider the proposals put forward by the United States Chiefs of Staff.
General Marshall explained that the United States Chiefs of Staff had given only very brief consideration to this matter but had felt that it would be valuable to outline a possible course of action before pressure was exerted from any quarter to widen the membership of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Admiral King said that, as he saw it, the United Chiefs of Staff would consist of one representative of the Chiefs of Staff of each nation who would act as spokesman. This proposal would reduce the difficulties to their simplest possible terms if the issue were to be forced upon the United States and British Chiefs of Staff.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer action on this paper.
The present situation in the Southeast Asia Command
The Combined Chiefs of Staff then entered into a general discussion of the situation in the Southeast Asia Command.
Admiral Mountbatten, in reply to a question, explained that the grounding of a vessel carrying spare aircraft engines would result in a deficit in air lift over the “hump” for December of some 2,100 tons. The backlog thus caused had not been included in his calculations and he suggested that the Combined Planners should look into this question. His plans were not made on wide margins of safety and did not make allowance for acts of God since he realized fully that too heavy demands from his theater would have direct repercussions on the operations in other theaters. In reply to a further question, Admiral Mountbatten said that his Royal Air Force transports were being used to the full. They were not being employed in China since there were insufficient numbers to train his parachute troops and long-range penetration groups. It had been necessary for United States aircraft to fly in supplies to the British units in Fort Hertz.
General Stratemeyer asked if it was possible for the Royal Air Force to provide old bombers which were not operationally fit, for use as transport aircraft.
Sir Charles Portal said that he did not feel that worn-out aircraft, even if available, could be used for this task. Manpower also was short and the production of British bombers was a direct measure of the weight of attack on Germany.
In further discussion of the possibility of interrupting Japanese communications, Sir Charles Portal pointed out that air bombing alone could not completely stop the use of enemy ports.
Admiral Mountbatten agreed with this view but explained that he had great hopes that heavy bombing of Japanese occupied ports would result in strikes of dock labor and a resulting slowing up in the flow of supplies.
General Arnold felt that our present calculations with regard to air transport possibilities had been wrongly based on a 100 percent figure of accomplishment. This figure was never achieved, and it would be safer to “lower our sights” with regard to target figures and accept as a bonus any increase on this lower figure.
In reply to a question by Sir Charles Portal, Admiral Mountbatten said that the airport at Blair in BUCCANEER had a 1,650-yard runway and was capable of operating three squadrons.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of the above statements.
At this point General Shang Chen, Lieutenant General Lin Wei, Vice Admiral Yang Hsuan Ch’eng, Lieutenant General Chou Chih Jou, Lieutenant [Major] General Chu Shih Ming, Major General Tsai Wen Chih and Major General Chennault entered the meeting.
Sir Alan Brooke, in welcoming the Chinese Representatives, said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were very pleased to have this opportunity to meet with them and discuss around the table plans for future operations in China. These discussions should lead to definite conclusions. Admiral Mountbatten had that morning put forward his plans and he suggested that the Chinese Representatives should ask any further questions that they might wish and put forward their own suggestions with regard to these plans.
General Chu, on behalf of General Shang Chen, explained that the Chinese Representatives had not had sufficient time to study these plans and would prefer to discuss them on the following day.
Admiral Mountbatten suggested that the Chinese Representatives should give an outline of the state of readiness of the Yunnan Force and of the detailed plans for its employment. He pointed out that the success of our efforts to open the land route to China was dependent on the successful operation of the Yunnan Force in coordination with the British attacks.
General Stilwell then outlined in detail the Chinese Forces available and their state of readiness. There were, at present, certain shortages of personnel which were being rapidly made good. The ten assault divisions would first be brought up to strength and any deficiencies in pack transport would be compensated for by the use of manpower.
With the aid of a map General Stilwell outlined the three coordinated attacks which would be made by the Yunnan force. He believed that sufficient tactical air forces were available to support these operations.
General Chennault and General Stratemeyer explained the arrangements which had been made for the coordination of the air effort with that of the ground forces.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Took note with interest of the above statements.
b. Agreed to meet again with the Chinese Representatives at 1530 hours on 24 November.
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Cairo, 23 November 1943
Secret
CCS 406
Combined Chiefs of Staff – United Chiefs of Staff
Reference: CCS 127th Meeting, Item 4
-
The discussion in the CCS 127th Meeting concerning the Chinese military representatives meeting with the Combined Chiefs of Staff was the first of a series of such problems which will arise, particularly as our cooperation with the Soviets and Chinese develops. It would seem highly desirable to find a solution which will permanently (a) maintain the exclusive American-British character of the Combined Chiefs of Staff while avoiding these embarrassing complications and (b) furnish adequate and satisfactory machinery for discussions by the principal Allies at the Chiefs of Staff level, as military problems arise or political considerations make such meetings desirable.
-
As a solution it is suggested:
a. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff be recognized as an exclusive American and British Body, and
b. That a “United Chiefs of Staff” be set up at the Chiefs of Staff level to include the principal Allies – that is, for the present, the four “Moscow” powers. -
The United Chiefs of Staff would function only when necessity arose, and would provide for attendance either by all members or by only those concerned in the problems to be discussed. This arrangement would give an “out” to China or Russia as the case might be. The proposed United Chiefs of Staff should consist of a single representative of the Chiefs of Staff of each nation. This representative would not necessarily have to be the same official at all meetings. Our Allies could not complain of being left out of Combined Chiefs of Staff discussion, since in theory, at least, the Combined Chiefs of Staff would be the lesser of the two bodies.
-
Such a “United Chiefs of Staff” should be considered as a flexible organization designed to meet situations as they develop, including possible inclusion of other Allies at a later date, on the same basis of participation when concerned.
The President to the Director of War Mobilization
23 November 1943
Urgent
Extremely important and urgent that I know at once whether the present schedules for production and completion of landing craft can be increased during January, February, March, April and May. On the assumption that landing craft takes precedence over all other munitions of war will you let me know how many additional landing craft by types can be delivered during the months of January, February, March, April and May? List each month separately. Call conference of all interested departments. Very urgent.
ROOSEVELT
The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, November 23, 1943
Secret
For the President from Secretary Hull:
As the Russian Army approaches the Polish frontier the Polish Government is showing its extreme anxiety over the future of Poland and I believe that I should send you a rather full summary of developments.
The following are the principal points of a confidential memorandum from the Polish Premier to you which has been handed to me by the Polish Ambassador:
The Prime Minister referred to the Polish Government’s memorandum of October 6 which among other things expressed the hope that normal Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations could be restored in order that the Polish and Soviet Governments could then endeavor to settle their mutual problems and asked for British-American guarantees of the independence and integrity of Polish territory as well as the security of its inhabitants. To assure this the October 6 memorandum made the impractical suggestion that American-British troops should be stationed in Poland to prevent friction and possible reprisals. That memorandum indicated that if the Soviet Government should openly attempt to communize Poland after its armies had occupied Polish territory this might cause the Polish population as an act of desperation to retaliate in self-defense.
The latest memorandum dated November 18 appeals to you:
…to intervene with Marshal Stalin with a view to restoring Polish-Soviet relations, safeguarding the interests of the Polish State and the life and property of its citizens after the Soviet troops have entered Poland.
The memorandum asserts that “the unwillingness of the Polish Government to enter into discussions on frontier questions is based on the following considerations:”
-
Poland has never given up the fight against Germany since 1939 and is fully entitled to emerge from the war without reduction of territory.
-
Soviet claims to Eastern Poland comprises half of total Polish territory and contain important centers of Polish national life.
The memorandum continues:
The Polish Government could not see their way to enter into a discussion on the subject of territorial concessions above all for the reason that such a discussion in the absence of effective guarantees of Poland’s independence and security on the part of the United States and Great Britain would be sure to lead to ever new demands. The attribution to Poland of East Prussia, Danzig, Opole, Silesia and the straightening and shortening of the Polish Western frontier are in any case dictated by the need to provide for the stability of future peace, the disarmament of Germany and the security of Poland and other countries of Central Europe. The transfer to Poland of these territories cannot therefore be fairly treated as an object of compensation for the cession to the USSR of Eastern Poland which for reasons adduced above does by no means represent to the USSR a value comparable to that which it has for Poland. The attempt made to prejudice the fate of Polish Eastern territories by means of a popular vote organized under Soviet occupation by the occupying authorities is without any value either political or legal. It would be equally impossible to obtain a genuine expression of the will of the population inhabiting these territories in view of the ruthless methods applied there today and those which have been applied in the past by consecutive occupants.
The memorandum then states that:
A rising in Poland against Germany is being planned to break out at a moment mutually agreed upon with our Allies either before or at the very moment of the entry of Soviet troops into Poland.
In accordance with the principles adopted in Quebec, the Polish Government is entitled to exert sovereign authority over Polish lands as they are liberated from the enemy. Consequently, in case the entry of Soviet troops into Poland takes place after the reestablishment of Polish-Soviet relations, the Polish Government would be anxious, as it has already informed the American Government, to return immediately to Poland together with the Commander-in-Chief, and to cooperate there in the further struggle against Germany.
The entry of Soviet troops on Polish territory without previous resumption of Polish-Soviet relations would force the Polish Government to undertake political action against the violation of Polish sovereignty while the Polish local administration and army in Poland would have to continue to work underground. In that case the Polish Government foresee the use of measures of self-defence wherever such measures are rendered indispensable by Soviet methods of terror and extermination of Polish citizens.
Asserting that the Moscow Conference did not bring the question of resumption of Polish-Soviet relations nearer to a satisfactory solution, the memorandum states that the Polish Government has reason “to fear that in present conditions the life and property of Polish citizens may be exposed to danger after the entry of Soviet troops into Poland and the imposing on the country of Soviet administration. In that case desperate reaction of the Polish community may be expected following the violation of the principle adopted in Quebec assuring to the United Nations their liberty and their own administration.”
The memorandum further indicates that the Polish Government does not believe that the principles applied to Italy as adopted at the Moscow Conference would be satisfactory for Poland which is not an enemy country but a member of the United Nations. Moreover, it is stated that the presence of a few American and British liaison officers in Poland would not assure proper safeguards in the administration of the territory occupied by the Red Army.
When the Ambassador handed me the above memorandum, he also delivered a personal message to you from the Polish Prime Minister stating that he is anxious to submit to you personally and verbally certain alternatives for the solution of existing difficulties and would be grateful for the opportunity of doing so. He added “I am ready to undertake the necessary journey at any time and in complete secrecy.”
In presenting the Polish Prime Minister’s request to see you the Ambassador indicated that Mikolajczyk wished to join you and Mr. Churchill to which I replied that I did not believe it would be possible to arrange this since you would be busily engaged in military matters of great urgency.
Subsequent to this Ambassador Biddle telegraphed on November 20 that Mikolajczyk and the Polish Foreign Minister had insisted that they should be consulted in advance concerning any decisions that might be taken involving Polish interests.
The Poles indicated that decisions taken without full consultation with the Polish Government upon which the underground in Poland stakes its hope would undoubtedly lead to a serious crisis in that quarter. Furthermore, it would create a crisis in Polish circles in England, the Middle East, and might have “serious repercussions among Americans of Polish origin.” Mikolajczyk interjected that even a man condemned to death was granted a last word before the court.
The Polish Foreign Minister referred to a formula which Mr. Eden, he said, is considering which envisaged dividing Poland into regions in which respectively the military administration of the “liberating forces” and the Polish Government might function. He added that it was logical that whatever formulae were advanced would meet with counter proposals and the Polish Government considered it of the utmost importance that its representatives be on hand during these discussions.
In pressing for arrangements so that he could meet you Mikolajczyk said that there were things he could present orally but could not put in writing at this time.
On the basis of the foregoing and the extremely agitated state of mind of the Polish Ambassador here it is apparent that the Polish Government feels that it is in a desperate position. This may well lead to unfortunate public outbursts. In an effort to calm the Ambassador I made it clear to him that I had emphasized at Moscow my friendly and earnest interest in his country and had urged Molotov to find a basis for reestablishing diplomatic relations with Poland; that once these relations were restored ways and means could be found to work out and adjust their differences. I told the Ambassador that as a friend of Poland I would continue to watch every opportunity to be of service to both Governments.
I also pointed out to the Ambassador that I regretted to find on my return Polish attacks on the Four-Nation Declaration when this Declaration means everything to the future of Poland. I also indicated my regret at shortsighted Polish agitation in this country of a thoroughly unfriendly nature which has manifested itself in other ways than condemning the Four-Nation Declaration.
We are making every effort here and through Biddle in London to convince the Poles, official and unofficial, that they must take a calmer outlook and not prejudice their case by undue public agitation regarding our policies.
With the approach of the Red Army to former Polish territory it would appear that every friendly opportunity should be taken to bring about a resumption of Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations. If this is not possible at the moment, I believe we should exert all our influence to persuade the Polish Government to give instructions to its underground army to launch at the opportune moment a full-fledged attack on the Germans behind their lines and to assist the Red Army in its battle. The Polish Government should realize that if this is achieved the British and ourselves will be in a better position to convince the Soviet Government of the Polish Government’s desire to make a material contribution to the shortening of the war, and to collaborate with the other United Nations after the war in working for the establishment of an organization of peace-loving nations for the maintenance of international peace and security.
HULL
The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, November 23, 1943
For the President from Secretary Hull
Marshal Stalin, who is at the front, states that he will arrive not later than the 28th or 29th at the appointed place.
Roosevelt-Chiang dinner meeting, 8 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | China | |
| President Roosevelt | Generalissimo Chiang | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Madame Chiang | |
| Dr. Wang |
The conversation touched on the following topics that are not mentioned in the Chinese summary record: The formation of a coalition government in China, British rights in Shanghai and Canton, the use of American rather than British warships in future operations based on Chinese ports, and the future status of the Malay States, Burma, and India.
Dinner party of the British Chiefs of Staff, evening
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| Admiral Leahy | General Brooke | |
| Admiral King | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| General Arnold | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Field Marshal Dill |
Churchill-Marshall dinner meeting, evening
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General Marshall | Prime Minister Churchill |
There was discussion of operations in the Dodecanese, the capture of Rhodes, the deployment of landing craft, the progress of the Italian campaign, aid to the guerrillas in the Balkans, the relation of operations in the Mediterranean to the date of OVERLORD, and coordination of the command of strategic air operations.
The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, November 23, 1943
Secret
For the President from Secretary Hull:
Lisbon reports that an interview with Salazar regarding Azores facilities has been fixed for November 23, 1943, 5:00 p.m. The British Ambassador has received instructions to support approach to Portuguese. The Chargé plans to ask Salazar to confirm that Portuguese Government does not object to use by American forces of Horta and Terceira facilities or to participation by United States engineering units in improvement of these facilities. The Chargé intends at the same interview, informally to sound out Salazar regarding desire United States Army and Navy for the further facilities required.
CH
The Pittsburgh Press (November 23, 1943)
1,000 planes drop 2,300 tons –
Berlin shattered by RAF in greatest raid of war
Huge fires rage in city; government buildings may have been hit
By James W. Grigg, United Press staff writer
…
Yanks ashore on third isle in mid-Pacific
Marines invade Apamama, widening offensive in Gilberts
By William F. Tyree, United Press staff writer
Yanks widen invasion of the Jap-held Gilbert Islands, with Marines storming ashore on Apamama (inset map) as heavy fighting raged on Makin and Tarawa Islands to the north. U.S. bombers attacked Nauru Island, near the Gilberts. In the Solomons, to the south, Jap forces were reported trapped on Bougainville. In the New Guinea area (lower left), Australian troops were closing in on the Japs at Sattelberg, 10 miles from Finschhafen.
Pearl Harbor, Hawaii –
Marine veterans of the Solomons expanded the American mid-Pacific offensive today by storming a third Gilbert Islands atoll as other forces slowly crushed the bitterly resisting Japs on Tarawa and Makin.
The invasion of the Gilbert Islands marks the beginning of a new drive aimed directly at Japan across the Central Pacific, Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox said in Washington.
Bringing an increasingly heavy weight of men, ships and planes to bear on Japan’s cracking ocean outpost system, U.S. commanders sent Marines of the 2nd Division to win a landing on Apamama, 80 miles south of Tarawa.
Statement brief
Their success was announced by the unadorned statement, “we have landed on Apamama Atoll,” included in Adm. Chester W. Nimitz’s Pacific Fleet headquarters communiqué.
The report was equally blunt on other operations in the 72-hour-old invasion drive through the island-studded seaways protecting Japan’s broad empire conquests.
Improve positions
It said:
Our troops have improved their positions on Tarawa and Makin Atolls, but are still encountering considerable enemy ground resistance.
Tokyo radio today began making extravagant claims of success off the Gilberts. A broadcast quoted a communiqué as claiming a medium-sized aircraft carrier and a destroyer were sunk and 125 planes shot down around the Gilberts since last Friday. Loss of 15 planes was admitted. “Severe” fighting on the islands is continuing, especially on Tarawa, the Japs said.
While the fighting raged, Army Liberator bombers operating nonstop from undisclosed bases raided Nauru, phosphate mining island 500 miles west of the Gilberts, and the Marshalls, to the north, to prevent the Japs from sending air fleets from their nearby bases.
New Yorkers in action
Scene of the new landing by Marines who learned to whip the Japs at Guadalcanal was a coral islet 12 miles by five which had a pre-war population of 841. Wording of the communiqué indicated resistance was less on Apamama than on the other two islands, which were the most powerfully-developed in the chain astride the equator.
Other units of the 2nd Marines handled Tarawa while infantrymen of the 27th Division – New Yorkers – invaded Makin, it was announced, Lt. Col. James Roosevelt, son of the President, who accompanied Col. Evans F. Carlson’s Marine Raiders in a sweep of Makin in August 1942 aided the Army forces by landing with them.
The Marines were under Maj. Gen. Holland McT. Smith of Montgomery, Alabama, and Maj. Gen. Julian C. Smith of Elkton, Maryland, while a third Smith, Maj. Gen. Ralph Smith of Tucson, Arizona, was in charge of the 27th Division.
Other commanders of the operations were revealed as VAdm. John H. Hoover of Great Falls, Montana (chief of land-based air operations which preceded the attacks), VAdm, Richmond K. Turner of Carmel, California, Solomons veteran (commander of amphibious forces), and VAdm. Raymond A. Spruance of Indianapolis, Indiana, chief of all the invasion forces.
Berlin radio, quoting Tokyo, added to the Jap claims two large aircraft carriers damaged, one of which was presumed sunk, a medium-sized carrier damaged and presumed sunk; a battleship, a heavy cruiser and a transport damaged or set afire.
At the same time, reports carried from Tokyo by Berlin gave the first hint the Japs may be planning to give up the Gilberts, Berlin said that it was:
…stated in Tokyo that the invasion of the Gilberts was viewed without alarm since the Gilberts are of no importance for Japan as far as her defenses is concerned.
Ready for naval battle
While there was no indication the Japs were trying to send in reinforcements to save their positions, the strong fleet sent to back the invasion was believed waiting to repel any enemy effort – even to fighting a major sea battle.
CBS correspondent Webley Edwards, broadcasting from Honolulu last night, said the forces may “plow on through” toward Truk, the great Jap sea-air base 1,300 miles northwest.
It can now be revealed that the Army, Navy and Marine forces, in a move to coordinate all operations, set up a joint board for the Pacific with representatives of the services planning together the procedure for training and attack.
Hard fight forecast
Even while training was in progress, the commanders expressed belief the Japs would be hard to push out of the Gilberts, where they have had two years to develop airfields and defenses along the narrow sand beaches fringed by coconut trees.
Adm. Turner said:
They are probably out there waiting for us. But we are going to get them. They are wise to the ways of taking advantage of terrain and they’re probably dug in. We will dig them out.
During the training he expressed belief some losses must be expected. Gen. Holland Smith said he “never saw” such cooperation between forces.
May last week
While military experts refused to comment, observers believed the battle would not last longer than a week among the 16 islands in the Gilberts chain, the first two of which were invaded at dawn Saturday.
The choice of the two strongest islands in the group 2,400 miles southwest of Hawaii for the initial invasion indicated that the leaders believed conquest of those pinpoints would collapse the Japanese elsewhere in the group quickly.
British drive near junction
Canadians repulse German attack in Italy
By Harrison Salisbury, United Press staff writer
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Selfless expansionism for peace.
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Hmm… what if they had a german spy here? Wouldn’t the germans know that the allies were going to make naval landings?
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Didn’t the Poles take Half of Belarus and Ukraine here in the russian civil war? So how are they important centres of Polish national life?
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Threatened with demotion –
Apology for blow at soldier saves post for Patton
Eisenhower ordered general to make amends after incident in Sicily hospital tent last August
By Donald Coe, United Press staff writer
Private’s letter tells of slapping
Mishawaka, Indiana (UP) –
Pvt. Charles Herman Kuhl wrote to his family from Sicily last August saying he was slapped and kicked by Lt. Gen. George Patton, his wife revealed today.The letter, dated Aug. 4, said:
Gen. Patton slapped my face yesterday and kicked me in the pants and cussed me. This probably won’t go through, but I don’t know. Just forget about it in your letter.
In later letters, Mrs. Kuhl said, the soldier told of appearing at a hearing and of receiving apologies from the general.
Allied HQ, Algiers, Algeria –
Lt. Gen. George S. Patton Jr. struck a shell-shocked soldier twice in a Sicilian hospital tent last August but apologized for his conduct when Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower threatened to “break him” unless he made full amends at once, it was revealed officially today.
A high staff officer, in disclosing the incident, said Gen. Eisenhower explained in reprimanding Gen. Patton that the only reason the chief of the U.S. 7th Army was not relieved of his command immediately was that Army commanders were hard to find and the services Gen. Patton was performing were valuable.
The revelation of the personal exchange between Gens. Eisenhower and Patton showed that the general, known as “Old Blood and Guts,” was ordered to clear himself with all the troops under his command on pain of losing his rank.
The official version revealed Gen. Patton told the soldier he struck:
Why, in the last war, we used to shoot people like you.
The disclosure followed by a day an official statement that Gen. Patton had not been reprimanded and no soldier had ever disobeyed his orders. A spokesman said that had been a “half-truth,” and apologized for it. He said it had been issued in a desire to hold up the full story until it could be presented to all correspondents.
The soldier whom Gen. Patton struck was an artilleryman. After the general left the hospital, the soldier kept asking attendants what would happen to him. He said:
Think of the disgrace. I have a wife and kids. What will they think?
There was no indication of the future disposition of Gen. Patton as a result of the revelation of the incident, which had been an open secret since a couple of weeks after it occurred. However, it was emphasized that Gen. Patton was still regarded by the Army as valuable command material.
He was allowed to retain command of the 7th Army only after he explained that “my feelings got the better of me” and acknowledged in public that he never should have done what he did.
He still holds the command of the 7th Army, which has been in Sicily since the start of the Italian operations and has been completely out of the news since the Sicilian campaign ended.
The War Department in Washington said there was no command, that it was a theater problem and that all details would come from Gen. Eisenhower’s headquarters.
An investigation showed the 24-year-old soldier twice refused to leave the frontlines and finally did so only upon orders and was back in the fighting a week later after Gen. Patton saw him.
Gen. Eisenhower obtained a full report and “took the hide” off Gen. Patton for his action, the officer said.
Gen. Patton apologized to the hospital commander, a nurse and a doctor who watched the episode. This apology was witnessed by C. R. Cunningham, United Press correspondent. He also apologized to the soldier and to the men of the divisions under his command.
Merrill Mueller, NBC correspondent, and Demaree Bess, of The Saturday Evening Post, made a thorough investigation.
Later, Gen. Eisenhower was understood to have asked correspondents not to transmit reports of the incident.
Gen. Patton directed operations in both Tunisia and Sicily, once during the latter campaign disembarking on a beachhead to command a drive against a serious German counterattack. He goes into battle packing pearl-handled frontier model revolvers.
Incident related
As related by the staff officer, here is what happened.
Gen. Patton, on a visit to an evacuation hospital in Sicily early in August, found a soldier in bed wearing the lining to a steel helmet and crying. Gen. Patton asked him what was wrong.
The soldier said:
My nerves, I guess. I can’t stand those shells going over.
Gen. Patton replied angrily:
You are yellow-bellied. Get out of this hospital and back up to your unit at the front.
Blow reported
The soldier continued crying while Gen. Patton, who is 57 and who has gained a reputation for picturesque curses, grew more angry, raging at the soldier.
He finally struck the soldier with the back of his hand, knocking off his headgear, which rolled across the floor. The nurse tried to stop him but the doctor ordered her away. Gen. Patton then went around to others in the tent, telling them all “yellow-bellies” should be sent back to the front.
Gen. Patton returned a second time to the soldier’s bedside, cursed him some more, and again struck him with the back of his hand. The nurse fled crying. The commanding doctor also left because he could not stop the general.
The doctor who had admitted the soldier then escorted Gen. Patton to a car and the general drove off, without investigating how the soldier had been admitted. The incident was seen by at least three hospital staff members as well as most patients.
Talks on shell shock
Mr. Cunningham said that he sat in Gen. Patton’s office during the general’s talk with the hospital commander, nurse and doctor. The doctor, he said, was a psychiatrist. Gen. Patton talked at length on the appearances of shell shock, praised medical work in the Sicilian campaign and then said it was often difficult to tell whether a soldier was actually suffering from such shock or merely trying to escape the front.
In modern war, he said, there should be competent medical authorities who could determine quickly whether a man actually has such a break in nerve. Several times during the meeting, Mr. Cunningham said, a member of Gen. Patton’s staff opened the door to report a similar case had been found and each time Gen. Patton promised to look into it at once. Finally, he thanked them all for coming and invited the nurse to ride back to the hospital in his small private plane.
Inquiry demanded by Congressmen
Washington (UP) –
Senator Claude Pepper (D-FL) said today that Lt. Gen. George S. Patton “should have been court-martialed” for striking a shell-shocked soldier in Sicily, and from other members of Congress rose demands for an inquiry into the case.
House Republican Whip Leslie Arends (R-IL) said there should be “some investigation” as soon as all details of the incident were available. However, no actual steps toward an inquiry were taken in either House or Senate.
Gives source of news
Drew Pearson, columnist and radio commentator who first revealed the Patton incident in a Sunday night broadcast, said his information that Gen. Patton had been reprimanded by Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower came from “high War Department officials.” The War Department has not commented on the incident.
Mr. Pearson, in a statement today, proposed that the Senate Truman Committee investigate “the high-ranking officers’ self-protective club.” Mr. Pearson said:
When a soldier strikes an officer, he is shot. When an officer strikes a soldier, it is denied.
Articles of War cited
The Articles of War, governing conduct of the Army, do not specifically prohibit a superior officer from striking a subordinate or an enlisted man. However, students of military law said charges may be brought for such an act under Article 95 of the Articles of War which covers conduct unbecoming an officer or gentleman. Conviction would result in dismissal.
Chairman Andrew J. May (D-KY) of the House Military Affairs Committee, which would normally handle any Patton investigation for the House, said he considered it “a closed case.”
‘Up to Army’
“It is up to the Army to discipline its commanding officers,” Mr. May said, adding that the incident:
…does hurt morale and I believe it has hurt morale more on the home front than on the battlefront.
Mrs. Patton, the general’s wife, apparently referring to yesterday’s denial of the incident by Algiers, criticized the “spreading of nasty gossip.”
She had nothing to say concerning the admission today in Algiers of the denials, but added:
The War Department has denied it. I go by what the War Department says.
The War Department made no denial here.
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