Pegler: On Yugoslav Partisans
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Board studies plan to ease credit curbs
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Attempt to record Yank invasion is failure
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U.S. State Department (November 22, 1943)
President Roosevelt to Marshal Stalin
Cairo, 22 November 1943
Secret
Op priority
I have arrived in Cairo this morning and begin [begun?] discussions with the Prime Minister. Conferences will follow with the Generalissimo by the end of the week. He will thereupon return to China. The Prime Minister and I with our senior staff officers can then proceed to Teheran to meet you, Mr. Molotov and your staff officers. If it suits your convenience I could arrive the afternoon of November 29. I am prepared to remain for two to four days depending upon how long you can find it possible to be away from your compelling responsibilities. I would be grateful if you would telegraph me what day you wish to set for our meeting and how long you can stay. I realize that bad weather sometimes causes delays in travel from Moscow to Teheran at this time of the year and therefore would appreciate your keeping me advised of your plans.
I am informed that your Embassy and the British Embassy in Teheran are situated close to each other whereas my Legation is some distance away. I am advised that all three of us would be taking unnecessary risks by driving to and from our meetings if we were staying so far apart from each other.
Where do you think we should live?
I look forward to our talks with keen anticipation.
ROOSEVELT
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The Ambassador to the Soviet Union to the Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs
Cairo, 22 November 1943
Secret
The British and ourselves are sending representatives from Cairo to Tehran tomorrow, November 23, to make the physical arrangements for the Conference including the living quarters and security in all details. It would be helpful if you would advise our Commanding General in Tehran, General Connolly, what representative of the Soviet Government he should get in touch with to coordinate our planning with yours. I would be grateful if you would also cable me in Cairo that this has been arranged.
I had a most hospitable welcome and interesting afternoon during our unexpected stop in Stalingrad for which I am very grateful.
I look forward to seeing you. Regards.
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Roosevelt-Churchill dinner meeting, 8 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Admiral Leahy |
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The Secretary of State to the President
Washington, November 22, 1943
Secret
For the President from Secretary Hull:
Steinhardt reports Turkish Government has now made official reply to Eden’s recent proposals, summarized as follows:
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Turkey does not share British opinion that war between Turkey and Germany would not result from Turkey’s granting air bases, and Turkey is consequently unwilling to do so.
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Turkey believes she should take effective part in war on Allied side.
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However, the British have not supplied indispensable minimum arms promised by Churchill at Adana, nor has German strength deteriorated to extent contemplated at Adana before Turkey would be asked to come in.
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Consequently, Turkey’s coastal cities, communications, military bases, and industries would be promptly destroyed and Turkey would become liability instead of asset.
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Moreover, Eden’s proposals would leave Turkey as isolated belligerent, since they do not provide for collaboration of Turkey in action undertaken by Great Britain as contemplated in Anglo-Turk Alliance.
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Thus, demand that Turkey enter war before end of year would entail sacrifices beyond Turkey’s material capacity and inconsonant with Turkish Government’s elementary duty toward the people.
Steinhardt also reports from reliable Turkish sources that:
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Von Papen recently informed Turkish Government cession of even one Turkish air base would lead to immediate war declaration by Germany and Bulgaria with disastrous consequences for Turkey.
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Bulgaria has decided on active and effective cooperation with Germany in event of Turkish concessions to Allies, agreeing to immediate joint attack to occupy Thrace and Straits within three days, meanwhile destroying Istanbul from air and paralyzing Turkish communications in order to make prompt Allied assistance impossible.
Helsinki reports November 19 that it is clear that the Finnish Government as a result of intense German pressure, and despondency following Moscow Declaration has decided to continue in more strict collaboration with Germany.
The Chargé at Lisbon has been unable to arrange an interview with the Prime Minister before November 22. The Chargé has learned that the Portuguese apparently do not wish to be consulted or informed regarding the use of facilities at Horta and Teceria [Terceira?] by United Nations’ forces, since they consider this to be a matter entirely between the British and the Americans. The Chargé intends to ask Salazar to confirm this position particularly as it applies to the use of American engineering personnel.
I assume that the British are keeping you informed on developments in Lebanese crisis. We have been supporting the British from the beginning. Murphy informs us the question of authorizing Catroux to order recall Helleu approved by Committee by vote of 12 to 3. Three dissenting members were de Gaulle, Pleven and Diethelm.
CH
American-British preliminary meeting, 9 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | General Brooke | |
| Admiral Leahy | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Admiral King | Field Marshall Dill | |
| General Arnold | Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Lieutenant-General Stilwell | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Lieutenant-General Carton de Wiart | |
| Major General Stratemeyer | Brigadier Hollis | |
| Major General Wheeler | ||
| Major General Chennault | ||
| Major General Wedemeyer | ||
| Captain Royal |
Leahy indicates that the Combined Chiefs joined the President’s dinner party after the meal and that “Mountbatten outlined his plans and his needs for the Burma campaign which had been assigned to him at the Québec Conference held in August 1943.” Alan Brooke states that the purpose of the meeting was “to discuss Dickie Mountbatten’s plans and to prepare for meetings with Chiang Kai-shek.” Arnold mentions Chiang as one of the participants, while the Log indicates that Chiang, Madame Chiang, and three Chinese generals were present. It appears doubtful that the Chinese contingent actually attended.
Völkischer Beobachter (November 23, 1943)
Neuer USA.-Vorstoß –
Die Gilbertinseln angegriffen
dnb. Tokio, 22. November –
Nach einer Verlautbarung des Kaiserlichen Hauptquartiers griffen starke Marineeinheiten des Feindes, die Flugzeugträger und Schlachtschiffe einschlossen, am Morgen des 19. November die Inseln Makin und Tarawa der Gilbertgruppe an.
Die letzten Nachrichten von dort besagen, daß am 21. November die Kämpfe zwischen den japanischen Verteidigern und den Angreifern immer noch im Gange sind, nachdem es einem Teil der feindlichen Kräfte gelungen war, auf den Inseln zu landen.
Bougainville-Kosten in Menschen und Dollars –
Die ‚brutale Wahrheit‘ für die USA
dnb. Tokio, 22. November –
Ein kürzlich in der New York Times erschienener Leitartikel, in dem „mehr Wahrheit und weniger Bemäntelung“ der eigenen Verluste durch die USA.-Zensur verlangt wird, wurde am Montag vom Sprecher des japanischen Informationsamtes zum Anlaß genommen, den Korrespondenten unter Hinweis darauf, daß Washington sich immer noch nicht zu einem Eingeständnis des durchschlagenden japanischen Erfolges in den fünf Schlachten bei Bougainville habe entschließen können, die USA.-Verluste in Form ausführlicher Aufstellungen anschaulich zu machen.
Einleitend zitierte der Sprecher die New York Times, die wörtlich geschrieben hatte:
Der Zustand muß aufhören, daß dem Publikum immer nur eine Art von „Traumkrieg“ vorgesetzt wird, in dem nur der Feind Schläge erleidet. Die brutale Wahrheit würde am besten dazu dienen, die breiten Massen aus ihrer Lethargie zu erwecken. Washington weigert sich, sein Versprechen einzulösen und ein wahres Bild der Lage zu geben, weil befürchtet wird, daß der Eindruck zu niederschmetternd sein würde.
An Hand ausführlicher Tabellen, die den Korrespondenten überreicht wurden, gab der japanische Sprecher dann die „brutale Wahrheit“ bekannt. Aus der ersten Aufstellung, die dem merkantilen Denken der Nordamerikaner vielleicht am besten entspricht, haben die Vereinigten Staaten in der Zeit vom 27. Oktober bis zum 17. November einen Verlust an Kriegsschiffsraum erlitten, dessen Herstellung die Summe von 626 Millionen Dollars gekostet hat. Diese Summe umfasse nur die sicher versenkten Einheiten und deren Herstellungskosten nach vorsichtiger Schätzung. Tatsächlich dürfte der Feind so viel Schiffsraum verloren haben, daß die Summe von einer Milliarde Dollar den Wiederaufbau kaum decken dürfte.
Ebenso durchschlagend wie die Versenkung von Kriegsschiffsraum sind die Verluste der ausgebildeten Mannschaften, die dabei ums Leben gekommen sind. Nach einer weiteren ausführlichen Aufstellung, die sich in sofort versenkte Schiffe mit 80 bis 100 Prozent, versenkte mit 30 bis 40 Prozent und beschädigte mit 10 Prozent Verlustannahme gliedert, haben die Nordamerikaner in dem gleichen Zeitraum bei der Versenkung oder Beschädigung von 80 Kriegsschiffen einen Minimalverlust von 10.095 Mann oder einen Maximalverlust von 24.045 Mann an Besatzungen erlitten.
Wie der Sprecher abschließend noch einmal darlegte, seien die feindlichen Verluste nach den vorsichtigsten Schätzungen zusammengestellt und dürften sich tatsächlich auf weit höhere Ziffern belaufen.
U.S. Navy Department (November 23, 1943)
CINCPAC Communiqué No. 19
Central Pacific.
Our forces have captured Makin. On Tarawa, the Marines have consolidated their positions and are making good progress against enemy concentrations on eastern end of Betio Island with capture assured. The situation on Abemama is well in hand.
Raids are being continued against the Marshalls by carrier aircraft and Army Seventh Air Force Liberators.
U.S. State Department (November 23, 1943)
U.S. Delegation memorandum
Cairo, November 23, 1943
Comments on reports that the Generalissimo is deeply concerned over the Soviet Government’s attitude toward his regime and its intention to support the Chinese communists
In Moscow there are definite indications that the Soviet Government:
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In the post-war period wants peace within China and a strong central government,
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Recognizes that this objective can be obtained only through the Generalissimo,
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Will insist on a more liberal policy based on democratic principles and improvement in social conditions,
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Desires some solution of the Chinese communist problem either by the Generalissimo’s acceptance of them as an independent political party or by bringing them into the Government in some manner,
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Does not have ambitions in respect to Chinese territory in general. This view is supported by their recent withdrawal from the Province of Sinkiang. The recognition of Outer Mongolia’s independence was for military protection against the Japanese advance. There is no indication yet as to the Soviet Government’s attitude regarding the question of a warm water port, although it would be consistent for them to agree to the independence of Korea under some type of trusteeship in which the four great powers would participate.
The Chinese Ambassador in Moscow has expressed opinions along these lines.
Harriman-Vyshinsky conversation, forenoon
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | Soviet Union | |
| Ambassador Harriman | Mr. Vyshinsky | |
| Mr. Bohlen |
Memorandum by the Ambassador to the Soviet Union
Memorandum of Conversation
Cairo, November 23, 1943
Secret
While waiting to see the President, I followed up Mr. Hopkins’ request that I obtain more information about the attitude of the Soviets on some of the Mediterranean problems.
I bluntly told Vyshinski of the serious view we took of the French Committee’s actions in Lebanon. I said we could not permit the French Committee to destroy the confidence of the world in the sincerity of American principles on freedom and democracy. I asked him what the Soviet Government’s views were in the matter. He said he had not been instructed but he was quite sure there could be no other point of view for his Government.
Next I asked him what he thought about the King of Italy. He said he was going to keep his mind open till he could judge the situation on the ground but he certainly made it clear that he was predisposed not to favor the retention of the King. He said:
We have all stated the principles which we are going to apply in Italy as agreed to in the Moscow Conference and these certainly must be put into effect.
He said that any elements or institutions which tend to impede these principles will have to be moved out of the path and anything that assists in the implementation of these principles should be encouraged.
I then asked him whether he had any recent information about Mihailović. He said he had none. I said I had none either but I thought it was time to tell Mihailović “that he should fish, cut bait, or go ashore.” He heartily agreed with this statement and added that, from his point of view, up to the present Mihailović had not only not been helpful in the prosecution of the war but had even been harmful.
Roosevelt conversations with various callers, forenoon
The following foreign persons called on the President: Vyshinsky; Mountbatten; Churchill and his daughter, Mrs. Sarah Oliver; Chiang and Madame Chiang; and the Chinese Generals Shang, Lin, and Chu. The calls were apparently of brief duration and were primarily of a courtesy nature.
Vyshinsky was accompanied by Harriman and by Bohlen, who acted as interpreter.
Vyshinsky was on his way to Algiers to serve as the Soviet representative on the Tripartite Advisory Council for Italy set up at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 1943. He asked to see the President for the purpose of paying his respects. The President expressed to Vyshinsky the need for close cooperation between the three powers represented on the Council for Italy. The President explained the difficulties he was having with de Gaulle, and he touched on the idea of a trusteeship for immature countries, mentioning Morocco in this connection. Vyshinsky expressed general agreement with the views of the President and appeared impressed with the frank manner in which the President spoke.
Chiang-Hurley conversation, forenoon
Madame Chiang asked whether Roosevelt and Churchill were to meet with Stalin, to which Hurley replied that such a meeting was scheduled but not for Cairo. There was discussion of the pending plan for American-British-Chinese military cooperation in Burma.
The President to the President’s personal representative
Cairo, 23 November 1943
My Dear General Hurley: You are directed to proceed to Tehran in Iran for the accomplishment of a mission on the conditions outlined in the Secretary of State’s message to you dated at Washington, November 5, 1943, as modified by the Secretary of State’s message to you dated at Washington November 19, 1943.
As my personal representative you are also directed to perform additional duties, the nature and the object of which I have outlined to you personally.
Plenary meeting, 11 a.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt (in the Chair) | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | General Brooke | |
| Admiral Leahy | Air Chief Marshal Portal | |
| General Marshall | Admiral of the Fleet Cunningham | |
| Admiral King | Field Marshall Dill | |
| General Arnold | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Lieutenant General Stilwell | Admiral Mountbatten | |
| Lieutenant General Somervell | Lieutenant General Carton de Wiart | |
| Major General Stratemeyer | ||
| Major General Wheeler | ||
| Major General Chennault | ||
| Major General Wedemeyer | ||
| China | ||
| Generalissimo Chiang | ||
| Madame Chiang | ||
| General Shang | ||
| Lieutenant General Lin | ||
| Major General Chu | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier Hollis | ||
| Captain Royal |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
November 23, 1943, 11 a.m.
Secret
Southeast Asia Operations
The President, extending a warm welcome to the Generalissimo and Madame Chiang Kai-shek, and to the Chinese Delegation, said that this was an historic meeting and a logical consequence to the Four Power Conference recently concluded in Moscow. The effect of this meeting would, he hoped, not only bear fruit today and in the immediate future, but for decades to come. He suggested that Admiral Mountbatten might be asked to give a general survey of intended operations in Southeast Asia. The ground to be covered mainly concerned the land, since seagoing operations were in progress all the time. There was, he felt sure, unanimous agreement that every effort should be made to send more equipment to China, with a view to accelerating the process by which we could launch an air offensive against the heart of Japan itself.
Admiral Mountbatten then outlined the operations he proposed for the coming campaign in Burma. Apart from current air operations by British-U.S. air forces and two Chinese divisions operating from Ledo, the first land movement would take place in mid-January. The 15th British Indian Corps would advance on the Arakan front with a view to taking up an improved line. This Corps would not, however, be restricted to a defensive role, but would exploit success wherever possible. For this purpose, a West African brigade would be deployed on an outflanking movement. At the same time the 4th British Indian Corps (Imphal Force) would start operations with the object of capturing Minthami, Mawlaik, and Sittaung and advancing as far as possible to the southeast.
Admiral Mountbatten then explained the natural difficulties with which the Allied Forces had to contend. Our lines of communication ran through one of the most difficult countries in the world, served by a one-meter gauge railway which, nevertheless, had been worked up to carry 3,100 tons a day, with the hope that this might be increased by a further 500 tons a day. After leaving the railway and the Brahmaputra River, the communication was by roads now being built. All this was being done in thick jungle and across mountains running north and south across the line of communications. The Japanese in Burma were at the end of an excellent line of communication up the Irrawaddy from Rangoon, with a railway running through Indaw to Myitkyina. They had vast resources and adequate equipment and a force of some five divisions, which was likely to be augmented by a sixth division. In order to make good the disparity between our extremely difficult and the Japanese relatively good communications, we had adopted the expedient of air supply on a large scale.
In February General Wingate intended to make three thrusts with his Long-Range Penetration Groups. One would be from Chittagong; the second would support the 4th Group in the Tamu area; and the third would help the Chinese forces operating from Ledo. It was hoped that the 3rd Group would, by the use of gliders operating ahead of the Yunnan forces, disrupt and muddle the Japanese. Meanwhile, the Ledo forces would move down in the Myitkyina direction to link up at Bhamo with the main operations of the Yunnan forces advancing on Lashio. In mid-March the 5th Indian Parachute Brigade would seize the airfield at Indaw, after which the 26th Indian Division would be flown in to Indaw by transport aircraft and thereafter be maintained by air.
It was hoped in these operations to surprise the Japanese by using novel methods of supply and by the boldness of our advance through what they might consider to be impassable country. Subject to the Generalissimo’s permission, General Stilwell had agreed that the Ledo force should come under the 14th Army Commander until it reached Kamaing, after which it would revert to the command of General Stilwell. Admiral Mountbatten enquired whether this arrangement was agreeable to the Generalissimo.
The Generalissimo said that he would like to see the proposals illustrated on a map before giving his decision.
Admiral Mountbatten then gave certain logistic information for the air route over the “hump.” He had promised the Generalissimo to work the supply over this route up to 10,000 tons a month. For November and December, the figure would be 9,700 tons. For January and February, however, it would drop to 7,900 tons. In March the figure should rise again to 9,200 tons. Twenty-five additional first-line transport aircraft were required and this demand had been put to the Combined Chiefs of Staff with, he understood, every prospect of the demand being met.
The Prime Minister said that these were important military operations of a much greater magnitude than ever previously contemplated for this theater. The plans had not yet been examined by the Chiefs of Staff, but this would be done at the earliest opportunity, possibly the same day. In all there was an Allied force of approximately 320,000 men who would apply pressure on the enemy in this theater. They would have a qualitative as well as a quantitative supremacy over the enemy. He had high hopes of these operations, the success of which largely depended on surprise and secrecy and ignorance on the part of the enemy as to the lines of approach and the points of attack.
Owing to the surrender of the Italian Fleet and other naval events of a favorable character, a formidable British Fleet would be established in due course in the Indian Ocean. This would ultimately consist of no less than 5 modernized capital ships, 4 heavy armored carriers, and up to 12 auxiliary carriers, together with cruisers and flotillas. This force would be more powerful than any detachment which it was thought that the Japanese could afford to make from their main fleet in the Pacific, having regard to the U.S. naval strength in the Pacific theater. In addition to all this Admiral Mountbatten would have formed by the spring an amphibious “circus” for use in such amphibious operations as might ultimately be decided upon, but for which preparations were now going ahead with all speed.
The Generalissimo said that in accordance with the view he had expressed at Chungking, the success of the operations in Burma depended, in his opinion, not only on the strength of the naval forces established in the Indian Ocean, but on the simultaneous coordination of naval action with the land operations.
The Prime Minister said that naval operations in the Bay of Bengal would not necessarily be coordinated with and linked to the land campaign. Our naval superiority in this area should ensure the security of our communications and a threat to those of the enemy. It should be remembered that the main fleet base would be anywhere from 2,000 to 3,000 miles away from the area in which the armies were operating. Thus, no comparison could be made with these operations and with those carried out in Sicily, where it had been possible for the fleet to work in close support of the Army.
The Generalissimo considered that the enemy would reinforce Burma and that this could only be stopped by vigorous naval operations.
The Prime Minister said it would be disastrous if we could do nothing to prevent the Japanese bringing large reinforcements by sea through the Malacca and Sunda Straits. We could not guarantee to cut off reinforcements by sea entirely, but we should do everything to prevent their arrival.
The Generalissimo said he was not clear as to the timing of the concentration of the naval forces in the Indian Ocean. He was convinced that simultaneous naval and land operations gave the best chance of success for the operations. Burma was the key to the whole campaign in Asia. After he had been cleared out of Burma, the enemy’s next stand would be in North China and, finally, in Manchuria. The loss of Burma would be a very serious matter to the Japanese and they would fight stubbornly and tenaciously to retain their hold on the country.
The Prime Minister said he was unable to agree that the success of the land operations entirely hinged on a simultaneous naval concentration. The fleet could not, in any event, be assembled by January, nor, indeed, until sometime later. The ships had to be tropicalized and fitted with special equipment. Some would be starting soon, but the build-up to full strength would not be achieved until the late spring or early summer of 1944. It seemed, however, on the whole improbable that in the meanwhile the enemy would send naval forces in any strength to the Bay of Bengal.
The President enquired about the railway communications between Siam and Burma.
Admiral Mountbatten said that the Japanese had recently completed the railway from Bangkok to Thanbyuzayat (15º55’N 97º40’E) and this would improve their facilities for maintaining forces in Burma to an appreciable degree.
The Prime Minister thought that the Japanese were mainly relying upon road and rail communications from the Malay Peninsula to maintain their forces in Burma. As we did not possess shore air bases, it was not possible for us to threaten the Japanese communications in the Gulf of Siam. He wished to emphasize the great importance he attached to the operations in Southeast Asia, which would be driven forward with all vigor and dispatch. He hoped to have a further talk with the Generalissimo when some other details of the British naval situation would be communicated.
In conclusion, the President said that the matter could not be carried any further that morning. He hoped that the Generalissimo would take this opportunity of meeting the Chiefs of the American and British Staffs and to discuss these important problems frankly with them.
Memorandum by the British Chiefs of Staff
Cairo, 23 November 1943
Secret
CCS 401/1
VLE airfields (B-29) in the China-Burma-India Area
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As the United States Chiefs of Staff will be aware, the President has already telegraphed to the Prime Minister with regard to the provision of suitable airdromes in India and China for the operation of B-29 aircraft against Japan in the spring of 1944. The Prime Minister has instructed the Commander in Chief, India, to render every possible assistance in the construction of the four air bases in India and has so informed the President. An examination of the project has been undertaken and we are satisfied that the difficulties involved, including the movement of the extra tonnage required through the port of Calcutta, can be overcome.
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We therefore accept the recommendations of the United States Chiefs of Staff contained in paragraph 7 of CCS 401 and are issuing the necessary instructions to the British authorities concerned.
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If the necessary work in India is to be completed in time, it is essential that the United States units and equipment required should arrive in Calcutta by 15 January; otherwise the work will not be completed by 1 April and in fact would have to be stopped to allow resources temporarily diverted owing to airfield construction to be sent through to Ledo.
Roosevelt-Churchill luncheon meeting, 1:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Hopkins | Mrs. Oliver | |
| Commander Thompson | ||
| Mr. Martin |
The Prime Minister’s private secretary to the President’s special assistant
Cairo, November 23, 1943
Secret
Mr. Hopkins. (Private)
Colonel Warden asked me to send you this telegram to see. Could you please let me have it back.
J. M. MARTIN
[Enclosure]
The British Minister in Saudi Arabia to the British Foreign Office
Jedda, 15 November 1943 SecretWar Cabinet Distribution – Repeated to Minister of State Cairo.
475. My telegram No. 455.Ibn Saud has sent me a message from Mecca to the effect that United States representative in Jedda asked him the following questions on November 13.
(1) Has Saudi Arabian Government asked His Majesty’s Government for arms?
(2) If so when did they make their request to His Majesty’s Government?
(3) What arms did Saudi Arabian Government ask for?
(4) Has anything been promised by His Majesty’s Government?
(5) What has arrived?
(6) Are arms being supplied by His Majesty’s Government as a gift or against payment?
(7) Did His Majesty’s Government offer to supply arms or did the question arise out of a demand from Saudi Arabian Government?
Ibn Saud informed my United States colleague that His Majesty’s Government had promised to supply 50 light reconnaissance cars but that none had arrived to date. He did not know if payment was expected or whether they were being supplied under Lease Lend in accordance with the list of Saudi Arabian arms requirements submitted to His Majesty’s Government by Saudi Arabian representative in London for supply under Lease Lend.
I feel my United States colleague’s action in putting these questions to Ibn Saud is unfortunate as it would appear to show 1) a lack of collaboration between His Majesty’s Government and United States on this question and 2) United States distrust of any information given them by His Majesty’s Government.
I venture to suggest that we should come to some agreement with United States over the quantities of war material to be supplied to Saudi Arabian Government as soon as possible and inform Ibn Saud accordingly.