America at war! (1941--) -- Part 2

[NormanStewart]

CANDIDLY SPEAKING —
Gallantry is lost

By Maxine Garrison

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[NormanStewart]

GM war output hits daily rate of $10 million

Third quarter earnings jump to 87¢ per share

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Vinson assailed for oil price increase rejection

Congressmen threaten to attach rider to ‘some bill administration wants’ to defeat ruling

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[NormanStewart]

White House statement on seizure of the coal mines
November 1, 1943

For some time, we have not been producing the coal which we need to fight the war. When we should be working to increase to the utmost the production of coal, production has stopped because of the failure of the miners to return to their work.

I have been obliged to direct the Secretary of the Interior to take immediate possession of the mines and to operate them for the government.

Because I appreciate the desire of the miners to work under a contract, I have authorized the Secretary of the Interior to enter into collective bargaining contracts with representatives of the miners to govern the terms and conditions of employment during the period of government operation. Such contracts will be made in accordance with the recent opinion of the National War Labor Board and will be subject to its approval in accordance with the provision of the War Labor Disputes Act.

As President of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, I call upon every miner to return without a day’s delay to the mines.

The grievances of the miners have been heard. They have been fairly dealt with. The government offers the miners a fair contract. They have no right in wartime to refuse to work under it.

Coal must be mined. The enemy does not wait. The failure to mine coal at this critical moment is impeding the prosecution of the war and endangering the lives of our sons and brothers, the sons and brothers of the miners, on the battlefields.

The mines will be opened by the government on Wednesday morning. Every miner will be expected to be at his post of duty, ready to work for his government.

[NormanStewart]

President Roosevelt’s message to Congress on the food program
November 1, 1943

To the Congress:

Food is as important as any other weapon in the successful prosecution of the war. It will be equally important in rehabilitation and relief in the liberated areas, and in the shaping of the peace that is to come.

The first major objective of our food program is to raise in the most efficient manner enough food and the right kinds of foods to meet our needs. That includes: first, the needs of our armed forces; second, the needs of our civilians at home; and, third, the amount required for our shipments abroad for the essential needs of our fighting allies.

The second major objective is to see that the food for our civilians at home is divided as fairly as possible among all of the people in all sections of the country, and that it is obtainable at reasonable prices.

I have not been content merely with a program for 1944 crops. I am thinking also about the balance of this year, and about the earlier months of 1944 before the crops are harvested. While the question of production for 1944 is an essential one, we must not lose sight of the necessity for keeping the prices of our present food supply at reasonable levels. We must see to it not only that the prices of food do not go up any further, but that the prices of those foods which have gotten out of line are actually reduced.

One of the great difficulties is that the steps necessary to attain these two major objectives sometimes become inconsistent with each other. For example, one of the inducements for increased production of food by farmers is to see that they get an adequate price for their products. Such a price is necessary in order to get production. However, if these prices are too high the result will be that by the time the food reaches the grocery store or butcher shop, the housewife will have to pay too high a price for it. This in turn may force a rise in wages and an increase in the prices which farmers have to pay for what they buy. On the other hand, if the butcher shop or grocery store gets an insufficient price from the consumer for meat or groceries, then the farmer in turn will get too low a price to encourage him to raise as much food as we need. In both of these cases, our production and price objectives are not likely to be achieved unless the government assists with equalization payments or other aid.

The efforts of this Administration have consistently been directed at this double target of raising as much food as possible without placing too great a burden on the American housewife in her efforts to feed her family.

In the main our efforts have been successful. In the case of some foods, however, the objectives have not yet been attained. New measures are being taken in an effort to attain them.

The increase of food production during this war has been far greater than the comparable increase in production during the last war. If, for example, we take the 1935-39 average as the base of 100, the production in 1939 was 106, in 1942 it was 126, and in 1943 it will be 132. If we use the same base of 100, the production in 1914 was 81; in 1918 it was 90, and in 1919 it was also 90.

In other words, by the fourth year of this war – 1942 – our food production has increased more than twice as much as it did in the same period of the last war.

The 1942 crop was the largest in the history of the United States. But food production for the current year 1943, in spite of less favorable weather, will exceed the 1942 production.

Crops will be slightly lower this year than in 1942; but livestock will be so much higher than in 1942 that the total of all food is expected to exceed the 1942 record output by about 5%. This will mean that our total farm production – crops and livestock – will be more than 30% larger than the average annual production for the five years preceding the outbreak of the war in 1939.

Most of us do not realize how much food actually is being raised in 1943. Here are some illustrative figures:

• 55 billion quarts of milk, an increase of 14% over the 1935-1939 average
• 10 billion pounds of beef and veal (dressed weight), an increase of 27%
• 1 billion pounds of lamb and mutton (dressed weight), an increase of 13%
• 60 billion eggs (including non-farm), an increase of 50%
• 4 billion pounds of chicken (dressed weight), an increase of 63%
• 13 billion pounds of pork (dressed weight), an increase of 78%
• 3 billion pounds of lard, an increase of 73%
• 3 billion pounds of peanuts, an increase of 125%

This record was established in the face of three major handicaps: shortage of manpower, shortage of farm machinery, and shortage of fertilizer. This record production for 1943 is an amazing tribute to the patriotism, resourcefulness, and ability of the American farmer.

Much credit is also due to the patriotic men and women who spent so much time and energy in planting twenty million victory gardens in the United States and helped to meet the food requirements. It is estimated that about eight million tons of food were produced in 1943 in these victory gardens.

The increase in our farm output since Pearl Harbor has been the largest of any similar period in history. It called for hard work, ingenuity, cooperation, and teamwork on the part of farmers, processors, and distributors, as well as all the state and federal officials concerned with the food problem. They all deserve the thanks of the American people.

Due to the shortage of regular farm labor, heroic and successful efforts have been made to obtain help from the adult residents of villages and cities – both men and women, on a part-time as well as a full-time basis. High school boys and girls have also been enrolled to help in critical areas during the vacation period and after school hours. They too deserve our thanks.

The record for 1943, in getting additional farm help in places where it was needed, is very impressive. For example, during May, June, July, and August of this year, 900,000 workers registered for farm work; 48,500 workers were brought in this year from Mexico, 4,700 from the Bahamas, and 8,800 from Jamaica. This additional help was used on farms in shortage areas all over the United States. Altogether 1,750,000 placements on farms were made.

We have also made use of prisoners of war for the raising and harvesting of crops. Essential farm labor has been deferred from the draft. Where emergencies have developed, the Army has assigned soldiers to assist in saving crops that otherwise would be lost.

One of the great difficulties – the shortage of farm machinery and of spare parts – developed, of course, because of the imperative need for steel for the war program. There was only a fixed amount of steel available; and it had to be divided as efficiently as possible among the critical needs for war – ships, big guns and small weapons, tanks, new war factories and new additions to war factories, railroad cars, and a number of other vital products. It was necessary to use our best judgment in determining just where we should use the available supply of steel.

The allotment of steel for farm machinery for use in 1944 has been increased by doubling the amount available for use this year. Furthermore, no limit has been placed on the production of repair parts.

This new farm equipment, however, while it will be available for the 1944 production, was not available for 1943. However, the farmers kept their own machinery in better order. They clubbed together in the making of repairs. They joined hands in the use of farm machinery by more than one farm family. The ingenious and resourceful farmers of America, by this cooperative use of machinery, were able to turn out this record crop of 1943.

Even with this all-time high food production for 1943 there were still shortages in certain parts of the country in our food supply. This was not due to lack of production but rather to the extraordinary demands for food – demands never before made in history.

The increased demands for food came from three principal sources. The largest increase in demand has come from our own civilians here at home. Many of our workers in war factories, in the mines, on the farms, and in other essential pursuits are eating more and better food than they ate before the war began. Many of them for the first time are approaching an adequate diet – so essential to the well-being of our people and to maximum war production. Even after making allowances for the rise in the cost of food since 1939, the average American family is not only spending more for food but eating more food than before the outbreak of the war. This has been one of the predominant factors in the greatly increased demand on our food supply.

The second increased demand for food has come from our nine million soldiers, sailors, and Marines – who had and, of course, always will have first call on all articles of food. These service men naturally consume much more food in the Army and Navy – and they are getting better food on the average-than they did in civilian life.

The third great demand was for our Lend-Lease shipments of food to our allies.

There has been a lot of loose talk about impending “meat famine” and “meat shortages” for the coming winter.

During the October-March period, this winter’s estimated total meat production, excluding poultry, will amount to 14.4 billion pounds, dressed weight, as compared with 12.5 billion pounds during the same period last year, and 11.4 billion pounds two years ago. As a matter of fact, this winter’s estimated meat production will be by far the largest on record.

Estimated poultry production during the October-March period this winter will amount to 2.3 billion pounds, as compared with 1.9 billion pounds last winter and 1.7 billion pounds two years ago. The production of poultry has increased about 60% since 1939.

During the next six months, we will also produce an estimated 2.2 billion dozens of eggs, as compared with 2.1 billion dozens a year ago and 1.8 billion dozens two years ago. Egg production has increased about 40% since 1939.

Also, even though our animal numbers will be at an all-time high this winter, the 1943-44 total supply of feed grains will, except for last year, be the largest supply on record and approximately 20% above the 1937-41 average. On a per-animal basis, the feed supply will not be as large as in the last several years, but it will be about equal to the average of the ten years ending in 1932.

From the standpoint both of increased production and of price control, the food effort in this war is a far greater success than that of the First World War. Facts bear out this statement, but I suppose that facts are not going to deter those who want to create dissatisfaction or those who spread scares such as “food shortage” and “meat famine.”

Our food plans for the future are, of course, predicated on the assumption that we must not only continue our shipments overseas but actually increase them. The war is by no means won, and the global effort must be continued and accelerated. The requirements for our armed forces will be increased, not only because they will have a larger number of men and women than in 1943, but because more of them will be stationed in distant parts of the world.

The average soldier or sailor eats approximately five and one quarter pounds of food per day – almost half as much again as the average civilian, who eats only three and three-quarters pounds per day. The greater the number of men in the armed forces the larger are the demands on our food supply.

In the last war we fed four million people in uniform – largely concentrated in the United States and in France. In this war by the end of 1943 we will have almost eleven million men in uniform, and they will be scattered in all parts of the world. At the beginning of this year our armed forces totaled about seven million; at the end of this year the estimated strength will be 50% higher. That is the reason why in 1942 approximately only 7.5% of our food production was allotted to our armed forces whereas in 1943 the figure will be about 14%. As our Army grows, as more men are sent overseas, larger food reserves will have to be accumulated, and civilian belts will have to be tightened. Furthermore our armed forces require more of the so-called “protective” foods such as meat, fats and oils, milk and canned goods – foods which are, therefore, bound to run short for the increased civilian demands.

Our armed forces are now eating in each month 328 million pounds of meat, 34 million dozens of eggs, 28 million pounds of butter, 221 million pounds of potatoes – and staggering amounts of other foodstuffs. And the quality of this food is the best that we can give them. The armed forces of our allies will also increase in 1944 and they will have to receive food assistance from us.

The amount of food going to Lend-Lease is gradually increasing. In 1941 it was 2% of our food production; in 1942, approximately 6%. This year because of increasing Russian shortages and other needs it will probably reach 10%. In 1941 and 1942 England was the largest recipient of Lend-Lease food but owing to the German invasion of the Ukraine in 1942 more food has had to be sent since then to the Soviet Union. In fact, Russia, in the first six months of 1943, received one-third of all our Lend-Lease food shipments.

All these war uses will require about one-fourth of our total food supply for the year beginning October 1, 1943, leaving about three-fourths for our civilian population. This three-fourths, however, because of our increased production will amount approximately to as much, per capita, as was used during the 1935-39 period.

I am sure that the American people realize that every pound of food which we send to our fighting allies is helping our own soldiers in their battles and is speeding the day when all our fighting men and women will come home.

The food that is sent to Russia is almost all for the use of the Russian Army.

Although British farmers, by strenuous efforts, have succeeded in increasing their production from 40% of Britain’s needs to 60%, she still has to rely upon imports in order to avoid starvation. American food provides only 10% of the entire British food supply – and yet it has been a great help in feeding Montgomery’s Army and the RAF and in sustaining the millions of workers in vital British factories, shipyards, and mines. I think it is safe to say that England could not have continued in the war without the help she received in American and Canadian food.

When Russia was invaded, 40% of her usual food production was lost. Emergency food shipments were sent from Great Britain and the Middle East, but we also had to step up our own shipments. I am sure that no one will disagree with the wisdom – to say nothing of the need and obligation – of sustaining the gallant Russian fighters with American food.

The fact is that with all our shipments, civilian diets in England and in Russia – particularly in Russia – are far below our worst shortage periods. In fact, in Russia food for civilians has been cut to the barest minimum.

Through Lend-Lease, the United States seeks to put a share of its food resources to the most effective use against the enemy. Conversely, through reverse Lend-Lease, the striking power of our own armed forces abroad has been greatly augmented by substantial quantities of food provided by our allies. The United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand have provided the largest amount of food, but we have also received food under reverse Lend-Lease from other parts of the British Empire and are receiving increasing quantities of foodstuffs from the French in North Africa.

Some illustrative figures may indicate the importance to our war effort and to our national economy of the food which we obtain from our allies as reverse Lend-Lease aid without payment.

Although we did not start receiving food under reverse Lend-Lease from Australia and New Zealand until a year or more after our Lend-Lease program started, the amounts received – in comparison to what we have Lend-Leased – are relatively large.

Thus, for example, through August of this year, the United States has received from Australia and New Zealand more than 90 million pounds of beef and veal, compared to a total of 99 million pounds of beef and veal which the United States has provided under outgoing Lend-Lease to all Lend-Lease countries combined. In July and August 1943, Australia and New Zealand supplied us roughly the same amount of beef and veal under reverse Lend-Lease as we Lend-Leased to all countries.

We have received – from Australia and New Zealand alone – 55% of the amount of butter and 16% of the amount of lamb and mutton which we have exported under Lend-Lease to all countries.

During the year 1943, the United Kingdom is providing under reverse Lend-Lease substantial quantities of many foodstuffs – such as flour, bread, potatoes, sugar, vegetables, coffee, and cocoa – in order to supplement the food our forces receive from the United States. The foodstuffs received from the United Kingdom under reverse Lend-Lease save valuable shipping space and include such commodities as fresh vegetables which cannot readily be shipped from the United States.

The United States is supplying much of the pork that England consumes. The delivery of beef to our Army from the Southern Dominions and the shipment of pork to England from the United States is a good example of sharing among the United Nations, on the basis of what each has to contribute to total war.

Most of the food for the American Armed Forces in the South and Southwest Pacific comes from the land and factories of that area. In order to provide for our troops, Australia and New Zealand have expanded their food production and processing facilities. Despite this, however, the large food requirements of our forces have caused shortages of many foods for the Australians and New Zealanders. Nevertheless, these two countries continue to supply our food requirements as reverse Lend-Lease without payment by us.

A certain small percentage of food will have to be used as the United Nations liberate presently occupied countries, until such time as the populations of these countries can have a chance to become self-supporting.

For example, a very small percentage of our food now goes to feed the liberated people of North Africa and Sicily and Italy. This includes only the bare necessities of life. Feeding people in this area is not only a military necessity, it provides strength for the hard work that has to be done by them in order to produce new supplies of food and other goods. Already the people of French Africa, with some assistance from us in expanding their agricultural production, have been able to produce a sufficiently good harvest in 1943 so that they can now even supply food to our forces there. This not only saves shipping but augments our own food supply. The people of French Africa, without payment, and under reverse Lend-Lease arrangements, have also supplied the Allied forces with substantial quantities of flour for use in the Italian campaign. This, too, has helped our food, as well as our shipping situation.

Agreements have just been concluded to provide the United Nations with more than 100,000 tons of fruit and vegetables. The 1944 harvests in North Africa, aided by American agricultural supplies and a year of peaceful cultivation, should ease the strain on the food supply of the United States still further. In North Africa, we and the other United Nations have truly beaten our swords into plowshares.

Food supplied to the liberated peoples also pays other dividends. It prevents epidemics. It is a potent psychological and morale weapon for those starving people whose countries are still overrun by the Axis. While starvation has been the weapon used by the Axis resulting in disease, misery, and death, the United Nations are using food as one of their most potent weapons to shorten the war and win a lasting peace.

The War Food Administration has accordingly raised its sights for 1944. A preliminary calculation calls for the planting of 380 million acres of crops, as compared with 364 million acres in 1943. That will be the largest farm planting in history and should result in the breaking of food production records for the eighth successive year.

The War Food Administration, with my approval, has requested the Congress to extend the life of the Commodity Credit Corporation and to furnish additional funds. I regard this as vital to the war food program. It will also enable us to carry out our pledge to the farmers, that we will assure them against a price collapse for the two years following the war.

Of course, the goals set by the War Food Administration will be meaningless unless the farmers themselves are willing to adopt them as their own goals, and are able to fulfill them. Therefore, the War Food Administration is discussing the national needs with the state war board of each state, and with representative farmer groups and leaders and public officials in each state interested in agriculture. In this way determination will be made by consultation with the farmers themselves and with federal and state officials as to what parts of the national requirements can be contributed by each state.

The county war boards and local committees of farmers will also be consulted as to how the state quotas should be apportioned among the various counties of the respective states.

The state and local people will also be consulted about the extent of government support prices and government loans and government purchases that will be necessary to attain the goals of production set. In other words, the farm program of production and prices for 1944 is going to be formulated finally, only after consultation with the farmers of the nation and those who are interested in farming. Upon the basis of this collective judgment, the final goals for the year’s production will be formulated well in advance of the production season, so that each farmer may know what to count upon.

In order to obtain the great production level of 1943, it was necessary to assure the farmers that their return would be sufficiently high to encourage them to plant and at the same time it was necessary to insure the consumer against prices for food which would be too high for him to purchase. This could be done only with the use of government funds, and in order to bring about the proposed increased production for 1944 it will be necessary to use additional government funds.

All of the restrictions on acreage which were imposed by the AAA program in former years have been removed for 1944, as they were for 1943 with few exceptions. Only tobacco marketing quotas will be maintained – in order to encourage tobacco farmers to put more of their land into food products.

There are some people who, for political reasons, now maintain that these early acreage restrictions which were put into effect in 1933 and subsequent years are partially responsible for the present shortage. Of course, the facts are otherwise. When these restrictions were imposed the farmers’ income had dwindled away to practically nothing; they were unable to get decent prices for their crops because they raised so much more than people were able to buy, and also because the foreign market for their products had practically disappeared. As a result of this glut, this stifling excess of supply over demand, farm prices faded away to almost nothing; and it was necessary to restrict production by taking inferior land out of production in order to save agriculture from the complete bankruptcy which was threatening it in 1932.

The farmers themselves voted to do this, because of conditions which consumers well understood and appreciated, for they knew that that was the only road to salvation for agriculture and for the country as a whole.

Since the present war began, however, and the demand for food has outstripped the supply, these restrictions have been lifted and there are now no limitations on the production of food.

Another fact which is often overlooked by the critics of our acreage adjustment program is that more acres were put into soil-improving crops and legumes and that many conservation practices were instituted – such as terracing, cover cropping, and contour farming – which actually improved the soil so much that, although less acreage was in production, more food per acre was produced. In fact the great improvement in our soil which resulted from our agricultural programs has made possible the record food production of recent years.

In planting for 1944, we are determined not to repeat the blunder of the First World War – plowing, and planting crops without regard to the fitness of the land, and without regard to proper soil conservation. The “dust bowl” which was created by these practices has caused too much sorrow and suffering and financial loss in recent years to let us forget the lesson.

The increased production goals for 1944 involve not only an increase in the total food production but also shifting production from one kind of food to other kinds which are more necessary. The plan calls for the right amount of the right things in the right places – and the objective will be to stretch our food supply as far as possible. Accordingly, the largest increases in production will be for those crops which furnish food for direct human consumption.

Plans are also under way to increase our food supply by the development and procurement of food abroad. I have already mentioned how our assistance in developing food production in North Africa has made and will make available food for our armed forces abroad under reverse Lend-Lease. Other sources of foreign food may be available to us. The functions of handling foreign food development are being centralized in the Foreign Economic Administration so that our food supply can be augmented in the most effective way.

In order to induce farmers to increase production to these new goals and at the same time keep the cost of food down, it will be necessary to increase the amount of government funds which were used for these purposes in 1943.

[NormanStewart]

Government funds have been used in various different ways in order to see that the farmer got a fair price for his product a price high enough to encourage him to raise more crops without raising the price to the consumer. All of these administrative methods of guaranteeing a minimum price to the farmer for his products – whether they take the form of non-recourse loans, or guaranteed prices, or subsidy payments, or actual purchase and resale – are generically called price supports and are included in the price support programs. The purpose of the price support program is primarily to encourage the farmer to grow a crop with the assurance that, no matter what happens, he is going to get a certain definite return for it. If the price which the ultimate consumer pays as fixed by the price regulations is less than an amount which will pay the farmer this return, then the government absorbs the loss and sees to it that the farmer gets what was guaranteed to him. The farmer also enjoys this guarantee when prices in the market fall below the support level. If the price which the consumer has to pay as fixed by the price regulations is high enough to pay the farmer his support price, then of course there is no loss to the government.

In certain commodities the War Food Administration knows in advance that it will have to bear part of the cost. Nevertheless, the charge will be a necessary part of the program to produce enough food, without having the consumer pay too much for it.

We cannot and should not expect the farmers of the nation to increase their production all over the United States if they face the definite risk of loss by reason of such production. We do not expect industrial war plants to take such risks and there is no reason why the farmers should.

I am attaching herewith a statement of the commodities for which Commodity Credit Corporation support prices were in effect during 1943 (Schedule A). The Congress will notice that in some of the commodities such as cotton, corn, wheat, tobacco, and rice these support prices have been in effect for several years.

I am also attaching a statement showing the cost to the government of this support price program for 1943 (Schedule B). The Congress will notice that production of only a fraction of the commodities required any outlay by the government. In other words, in the majority of the products, the price which the consumer paid was high enough to cover the support price; whereas in a small percentage of the crops, the price which the consumer paid was not high enough to pay the farmer the price which was promised. For these items, the Commodity Credit program for 1943 cost the government $350 million. The administrative expenses of the Commodity Credit Corporation in carrying out the program were less than 3%.

This cost does not include the Reconstruction Finance Corporation program for reducing the prices of meat and butter, which will amount to an additional $450 million per year.

I am sure that the Congress and the people feel that this expenditure of $800 million per year is a moderate sum to pay in order to help accomplish the objectives which we have in mind – greater production and lower consumer prices – for a whole year. In fact it is about equal to the cost to us of waging this war for three days.

We are only applying here the same principle which has proved so effective in the production of other war materials – such as copper, lead, zinc, aluminum, and others.

Every nation now in the war has used some form of government equalization payments in order to hold down the cost of living and at the same time to allow a fair return to the farmers. A good part of the great success of the stabilization program in both Canada and Britain is due to the effective use of government funds in this way.

Although this program cannot hold the line without the enforcement of a firm price control and without an adequate tax and savings program to absorb excess purchasing power, nevertheless it is equally true that the firmest price control and the wisest fiscal policy cannot do the job themselves without the use of price supports.

When properly used they have three important advantages: First, they stimulate production of certain necessary and select crops. Second, by preventing price increases, they eliminate inflationary tendencies. Third, they encourage the distribution of food through normal legitimate channels instead of black-market operators, who are willing to pay higher prices to farmers with the expectation of selling above ceiling prices.

When effectively used, this program not only performs this necessary function in stabilization of the cost of living, but it also results in great savings to the government and to consumers. The expenditure of very small sums makes it possible to avoid pyramiding price increases all down the line – from the producer through the processors, wholesalers, jobbers, and retailers – the cost of which runs to extremely large amounts.

In the case of copper, for example, it has been estimated that every dollar paid by the government to subsidize and increase production has saved the government $28.

In the case of the coal and oil transportation subsidy, very moderate payments have avoided major increases in prices. If there had been increases in the prices of these basic items, they would have increased the cost of producing practically every commodity manufactured on the east coast.

In the case of food, the money spent by the government has not only assured us increased production, but, directly and indirectly, has saved the government and consumers billions of dollars.

The agencies charged with responsibility for stabilizing the cost of living will, from time to time, place before the Congress the programs necessary to hold the line. These will require money. I strongly urge the Congress to give serious consideration to their requests. I am confident that the executive and legislative branches of the government can pull in harness to get the job done.

The administration of the food program has certainly resulted in a great benefit to farmers. Farm income last year reached an all-time peak – and this year it will be higher still. The increase in the prices that farmers pay for the commodities they buy, on the other hand, has been held to very much less than the increase in the prices they receive for their farm products.

In consequence, the net income of farm operators – income after all expenses – has risen to the highest level ever enjoyed by farmers. The average annual realized net income of the farm operators of the nation during the five prewar years, 1935 to 1939, was $4,668,000,000. The realized net income for 1939 was $4,430,000,000. In 1942, it was $9,500,000,000. The estimate for 1943 is $12,475,000,000.

We cannot, however, look at the total income of farm operators by itself. We must also look at the income of the farmer in relation to the income of the rest of the country.

The average income per farmer since the outbreak of the war in 1939 has risen more than the average income of the other parts of the population. This was also true between 1910 and 1914, which is the primary base period for parity calculation. In 1942, the increase in the average income per farmer over the parity base period was 38% greater than the increase in the average income of the other people in the country. In 1943, it was 50% greater.

In plain language, the farmer, this year, is not only better off in relation to others in the population than he was before the war broke out; he is better off than he was in the base period 1910 to 1914, and better off than he has been in any year since that time.

This is just and desirable.

All through the twenties, and through the early years of the thirties, per-capita farm incomes were far below fair levels. The nation has profited from the fact that this injustice has been corrected.

It has been argued that the farm population has been receiving a decreased proportion of the national income. This is true. But it does not deny the fact that the average individual farmer is more prosperous today, as compared with the rest of the population, than he has been in thirty years. Any seeming contradiction is resolved by the fact that the non-farm population has increased during this thirty-year period by more than 50%, while the farm population has remained virtually unchanged.

While, therefore, the proportion of the national income going to the farm population as a whole has declined, the income per farmer has increased more than the per-capita income of the rest of the country.

The present program of management of farm prices – prices received and prices paid – has not injured the American farmer in the past. I am sure that it will not in the future.

In addition to these favorable prices and incomes, the farmer has been guaranteed government support of the prices he receives for war crops, not only during the war, but for two years afterward – a guarantee against postwar disaster afforded to no other group. The farmer has been assured that the bottom will not fall out of his market – as it did after the last war. This guarantee has made it possible for him to increase his investment in plant and equipment with the certainty that the investment would continue to pay dividends. It has also assured to the nation a farm production large enough to meet our war requirements.

The support price program, coupled with the program to meet special farming costs without raising prices to consumers, is an essential part of winning the war. The subsidies that are used cannot properly be called producer subsidies or consumer subsidies. They are war subsidies. The costs which they cover are war costs. On the farm as in industry the war has pushed costs above the levels that prevailed before the outbreak of war, and above the levels that will prevail when victory has been won. These are costs of war, and it is entirely appropriate that they should be met out of the public treasury, just as are the costs of producing tanks and planes and ships and guns. There is no valid reason why the present stabilization subsidies should not be continued as well as the support prices to farmers, so long as they are clearly in our national interest- as they are stabilizing the cost of living in time of war.

In the Stabilization Act of October 2, 1942, the Congress directed that the cost of living be stabilized as far as practicable at the level of September 15, 1942. Between that date and May 15, 1943, however, the cost of living rose 6.2%. This was a serious increase, constituting a grave threat to the entire stabilization program. It was particularly serious because the cost of living, since January 1941, had risen considerably more than the Little Steel formula had permitted wages to rise.

Obviously, wages cannot be stabilized at a certain level unless there is also a stable cost of living. Obviously, too, the millions of people with incomes fixed long before the war – salaried white-collar workers, clergymen, schoolteachers, other state, county, and city officials, policemen, firemen, clerks, old-age pensioners, those living on insurance policies, dependents of men at the front – all had to be protected against the rise in the cost of living which was eating steadily into the buying power of their unchanged incomes. So much public attention has been directed at the increased income of workers in war plants that it has been diverted from this great mass of our population many of whose incomes have remained fixed all during the war.

It is essential that we keep prices down also in order to prevent the spiral of inflation from beginning. As soon as the price of food goes up materially, workers naturally demand higher wages in order to meet those prices. Higher wages will, in turn, boost all production costs- for civilian and military items both. This in turn will cause farmers’ costs to rise and will result in even higher prices for food. No one can tell where the end will be. A higher cost of food can increase the total cost of the war in geometrical progression.

In the face of this situation, I issued an order in April 1943 to hold the line; and, at the time it was issued, I said:

To hold the line, we cannot tolerate further increases in prices affecting the cost of living or further increases in general wage or salary rates… The only way to hold the line is to stop trying to find justifications for not holding it here or not holding it there.

Although last May the cost of living did stand 6.2% above the September 1942 level, not all the items in the family budget showed this increase – or anything like it. On the contrary, the greater part of the budget was firmly stabilized. Thus, rent had increased not at all over the eight-month period; house furnishings had increased by only a little over 1%; clothing by 1.7%; fuel, electricity, and ice by 1.3%; and miscellaneous items, such as laundry services and drug supplies, by 3.5%.

The major portion of the increase in the cost of living – to be precise, three-fourths – was attributable to the failure to stabilize one sector of the economy – food prices. These prices rose by 13%. Even with regard to the foods themselves, however, the record was not all so black. Most of the family food budget – in fact the whole range of foods except only fresh fruits and vegetables – was held to an increase of less than 4%. It was the remainder of the food budget – the fresh fruits and vegetables – that did the real damage. Fresh fruits and vegetables rose 58% between September 1942 and May 1943, and accounted for over three-fifths of the increase in the entire cost of living during that period.

To put this somewhat differently, 90% of the cost of living had been largely stabilized. Ten percent of the cost of living had been permitted to get out of hand. That was the situation which confronted us last May.

The “easy” way out of this situation would have been to let wages rise above the base date level in the same degree that the cost of living had risen. That is what some did urge. That would have been a serious blunder. For if the line had been relaxed on the wage front, we may rest assured that the resulting pressure of costs would have forced prices and the cost of living up once more, thus calling for still another rise of wages. Just as the Stabilization Act is to the everlasting credit of the Congress, so the wholehearted support which responsible organized labor gave to the hold-the-line policy stands to the everlasting credit of labor in the United States. The responsible labor leadership saw that the easy way out was no way out at all, and they rejected it. Instead, they threw their full energies into making effective the program to reduce the cost of living, the program to bring the cost of living back into balance with wages.

The “hold-the-line” order was designed to undo the damage that had been done, and to prevent any further damage. The rise in the cost of living having resulted almost entirely from the increase in certain food prices, the program was quite properly designed to bring those food prices back to their September levels as far as possible.

Reductions in cabbage and lettuce resulted from squeezing the water out of the price structure by reducing excessive margins of distributors wherever they were found to exist.

The retail prices of meat and butter were reduced by 10%. In these instances, the prices received by farmers and distributors did not permit reduction without bringing returns to unreasonably low levels. Accordingly, an equalization payment was paid by the government to the processor to enable him to reduce the price of these products without loss to himself and without reducing the price he paid the farmer. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation undertook to make these payments to processors of meat and butter, so that retail costs of these foods might be held down while the producers received large enough returns to encourage output.

The public treasury has been using, as food production aids, other forms of payments under the Agricultural Adjustment Act and so-called Section 32 operations for supporting prices.

Additional or subsidy payments have been made to industry in order to secure wartime production of many essentials, including copper, zinc, aluminum, and other critical materials. We have paid premiums to speed up construction of ships and other war materials.

In consequence of these programs, the rise in the cost of living, which had proceeded without interruption from the early months of 1941, was brought to an abrupt halt. In June 1943, the cost of living fell to 5.9% above the September 1942 level, in July to 5.2%, and in August to 4.8%. It is true that in September 1943, the cost of living rose by nearly 0.5%. It was not due to food but mainly to the cost of clothing.

There is now being put into effect a program, recently announced, to reduce the retail prices to consumers of other items: apples, onions, potatoes and sweet potatoes, peanut butter, lard, and vegetable shortening.

Furthermore, preparations are being made to establish ceilings at levels substantially below current retail prices on other winter vegetables.

A major part of these decreases will be made possible without the use of subsidies and by means of a reduction of margins and returns which are excessively high. In some cases, however, it will be necessary, in order to hold the retail price at reasonable levels, for the government to absorb part of the cost of transportation, to take a moderate loss on purchase operations, and to make direct payments.

In addition, we intend to assure to the consumer that part of the savings in price to which he is entitled, and to prevent it from being dissipated by ceiling violations.

This program is intended substantially to effectuate the directive of the Congress. We are confronted, however, by acute pressures elsewhere, which threaten to break through the line. There are two situations which require immediate action. These are milk and bread – basic items in every family’s diet. In the case of milk, increases in feed costs and other costs have brought the dairyman’s returns down to a level far below that of producers of other farm commodities. Adequate production of this vitally important food is threatened. A program has just been announced by the War Food Administration to help meet the milk situation. This is discussed hereafter in connection with the problem of supplying feed to dairy farmers. A program to prevent an increase in the price of bread is now being developed.

In the four years following July 1914, the advance in food prices was 67% as compared with a rise of 47% in the last four years. In the four years of the last war, the greatest rise in the costs of the average family occurred in prices for clothing and house furnishings. House furnishings rose 82%, and clothing 90%. The General Maximum Price Regulation of May 1942 prevented such an extreme increase in this war. From August 1939 to September 1943, the increases in clothing and house furnishings were only one-third as much as in the same period of the last war.

Since August 1939, the month before the war broke out in Europe, the total cost of living in the United States has increased not quite 26%, as compared with an advance of 53% in the same period in the last war.

The price of grains used as feed for cattle has also advanced to a greater degree than the price of dairy products. Grain prices have advanced more than 60% since 1941, while the price of dairy products has advanced only about 40%.

To those who recognize the importance of milk, butter, and cheese in maintaining a healthy, vigorous civilian population, this increased cost has given real concern about the supply of dairy products.

In order to enable dairy producers to obtain feed for their cattle without raising the price of their milk and other dairy products to the consumer, the War Food Administration has adopted a program of making payments to dairy farmers based on the increased cost of their purchased feed since September 1942. The payments will be made directly to the dairy farmer, except in those cases where it may be desirable to make the payment to him through a cooperative association or other marketing agency.

While the program as announced is for a three-months’ period, some form of equalization payment will probably be necessary as long as the margin between feed costs and dairy prices remains unfavorable.

In order to relieve the pressure on our feed supply, the War Food Administration has announced a reduction in the support price for hogs effective on October 1, 1944 and has removed certain slaughter quotas. The purpose of this is to encourage hog raisers to market their hogs earlier and at lighter weights.

In addition to this program, the War Food Administration is bringing in large quantities of grain from Canada for feeding purposes. This movement has been hampered by a series of transportation difficulties, including the late blocking of Buffalo Harbor with ice and the unusual fog during this summer on the Great Lakes.

In spite of these difficulties, there has been shipped from Canada to the United States during 1943 up to date approximately 125 million bushels of feed of all kinds. As much additional grain will be brought in as transportation facilities will permit.

Furthermore, every effort will be made to see that the supply of feeds is distributed equitably throughout the country, the War Food Administration taking such steps and absorbing such transportation costs as may be necessary to secure this objective.

The greatest difficulty in the food program has been to bring about a fair and equitable distribution of the available food supplies. It is obvious that there is not enough to furnish all civilians with all the food they want. As I have said, this is the result, to a great extent, of the fact that so many civilians have so much more money to spend than there are civilian supplies of all kinds, including food, to go around.

There are some who advocate taking off all restrictions on food because of the vast food production which the American farmers have raised. But with the great excess of purchasing power now in the pockets of the American people, the supply would never last. We might have a feast for a few months, but then there would be a real shortage – not only for civilians at home but for our own fighting men and those of our allies.

I am confident that the civilian population of the United States is ready to give up certain eating habits and accept certain shortages. They know that they must, if the war is to be won. A sharp line will have to be drawn between the luxuries of life and the necessities of life. A shortage in sirloin steaks or in choice fruits does not mean that the war food program has failed.

In view of the fact that more food is wanted than actually exists, it is necessary to have regulations and rationing which are sometimes very burdensome. But they are the only way to insure that everybody gets a fair share irrespective of his economic or social or political standing.

Some of them are needed to hold back from commercial channels a portion of the supply which was produced during months of high production so that the civilian supply can be kept on a fairly even keel month in and month out. This is particularly true of perishable foods and vegetables where the supply conditions change sharply from season to season. For example, last year there was a good crop of potatoes, but the American people ate up the entire year’s supply in ten months so that in the last two months there were few potatoes available in many parts of the country. This kind of situation must be avoided. We cannot afford to eat up a year’s supply in ten months and do without for the balance of the year. We must find a way to husband all of these supplies, spacing consumption evenly through the year. Fortunately, we have an abundant supply of potatoes this year.

One of the difficulties has been the uneven geographical distribution of food supplies. Certain parts of the country have had abundance, while others have gone without. Part of this is caused by transportation difficulties; part is caused by the fact that excessive demand has made it profitable to sell within the area in which the crops are grown rather than to ship to other markets. This makes it necessary for the government to develop programs to insure orderly geographic distribution of all important foods. National interest requires that every part of the country obtain a fair share.

More equal geographic distribution and a more even distribution through the year could be accomplished by the extension of rationing to some of the important foods which are not today rationed. However, for the perishable items, this would entail especially serious administrative difficulties. Therefore, it is planned that the government itself either purchase or otherwise control certain foods or absorb the transportation costs – in order to stretch consumption through the year, and to insure distribution that is fair to all parts of the country. Such operations would also go a long way toward stamping out black markets. These devices will be used selectively and only to the extent necessary to achieve the objective of year-round, orderly distribution.

Control and distribution by rationing has involved many difficult administrative problems, most of which have been solved by experience. No one would contend that mistakes were not made. Nevertheless, there has been steady improvement. A recent survey has shown that 93% of American housewives agree that a good job – a job fair to all – has been done.

Unfortunately, the 7% who are not satisfied are more vocal than the 93% who are. Many reasons explain this.

Although civilians with their greatly increased purchasing power will not be able to purchase all the food for which they have the money, there will be a sufficient amount of good wholesome food for the people of the United States.

From a nutrition standpoint the civilian per-capita food supply during this year of 1943 will compare favorably with the average for the prewar period 1935 to 1939.

There have been inconveniences to the American dining table – even shortages of certain foods. But no American has gone hungry – in fact the American people as a whole are eating more now than they did before Pearl Harbor.

The American people realize that unless every farmer does his share to get full production and unless every civilian plays fair and does not seek to get more than his proper share of the limited supply, they may be depriving some of our soldiers or fighting allies of needed food to sustain them in their struggle.

There has been loose talk in some quarters about the need for a food “czar” to have full control of food – including not only production and distribution but prices, rationing, and transportation. The fact is that the production and allocation and distribution of food of all kinds are all now under the control of one man – the War Food Administrator.

The War Food Administration is the agency which allocates available supply of food to civilian, military, and Lend-Lease needs.

That part of the food supply which is allocated to civilians, insofar as rationing and ceiling prices are concerned, comes under the supervision of the Office of Price Administration. The Office of Price Administration does not ration food on its own initiative, but only on the recommendation of the War Food Administration. In other words, the War Food Administration determines when the demand for food of a certain kind so exceeds the supply of that food that rationing is required. When such determination is made, the Office of Price Administration takes charge of the actual mechanics of rationing.

This is the most logical procedure, because it places the actual administration of rationing – the ration coupons, the ration boards, the ration regulations – in the same body of citizens that rations gasoline, fuel oil, shoes, and the other products, and it leaves the determination of the necessity for rationing food in the War Food Administration. There can be no reason, in logic or necessity, for setting up a new ration board in all the localities in the United States for each different product.

With respect to prices, it is true that the War Food Administration should be concerned with the fixing of price ceilings. It is. No price ceiling on agricultural commodities is fixed by the Office of Price Administration without the concurrence of the War Food Administration. In other words, the Office of Price Administration and the War Food Administration either agree on a price or any disagreement is settled by the Director of Economic Stabilization. In this way the Food Administrator has a great deal to say about the price of food – but not all. For the price of food should be kept in proper relationship to the prices of other commodities; and therefore, it has been deemed advisable to put all price fixing and enforcement in one agency. There is no reason why the War Food Administration should have its own corps of price enforcement officials to duplicate the work of the other price enforcement officials in the Office of Price Administration.

With respect to transportation, it would be impossible to give the War Food Administrator complete control over the transportation of food because every car used to transport food is a car which is also greatly in demand for the transportation of other war products. Obviously there must be an agency which apportions the transportation facilities among the various war needs and it would disrupt prosecution of the war and result in chaos if the War Food Administrator were able to take a car needed for steel or weapons or chemicals or equipment and use it for food transportation.

The case is exactly the same for prices as for transportation. We cannot permit any part of the program, food or rubber, or any other, to have a free hand in bidding materials and manpower away from other equally essential parts of the war effort. If in transportation chaos would result, how shall we characterize the consequences on the price front where the relationships are even more complex and delicate than in transportation?

The fact is that the administration of food is now properly centered in one man and one agency, except only where such administration might encroach upon other war agencies which deal with such separate but relevant subjects as price control, transportation, etc.

There have been many complaints about the existence of black markets in food. It is an unfortunate fact that many persons who complain of black markets are themselves individually encouraging them by their patronage. Some black markets exist in all nations which have rationing. The operators of these black markets are unpatriotic – and as they are caught, they will be punished. But we should all attach as much blame to those of our citizens who hurt their neighbors and their nation by paying exorbitant prices in black markets. Vigorous efforts are being made by the appropriate government agencies to stamp out black markets.

[NormanStewart]

The objectives of our food program will, as in the past, be to grow and raise as much foodstuffs as is humanly possible.

We shall maintain our fighting men as the best fed in all the world.

We shall guarantee that every individual of our civilian population will have an ample and healthful diet. Everyone may be assured that there will be enough food to go around. No one needs fear that only a comparatively few people will be able to afford an adequate and varied diet.

We shall assist in fulfilling the requirements of our fighting allies for food and shall also assist in assuring that the liberated peoples will be given sufficient food to regain their physical and economic strength.

Our farmers will receive a return over and above their costs of production that will compensate them decently and adequately for their long and arduous work. At the same time, the consumers of the nation will be protected against rising costs which are properly chargeable to the war effort itself.

The price support program is proving reasonably successful on both fronts: increasing production and maintaining fair food prices for the consumer. I am convinced that to abandon our present policy would increase the cost of living, bring about demands for increased wages which would then be justifiable, and might well start a serious and dangerous cycle of inflation without any net benefit to anyone.

Some people say, “a little inflation will not hurt anyone.” They are like the man who takes the first shot of opium for the sensation he thinks it will give him. He likes it, although he swears that he will not make it a habit. Soon he is taking two – and then more and more – and then he loses all control of himself.

Inflation is like that. A little leads to more. I am unalterably opposed to taking the first shot by Congressional, or by any other, action. The nation cannot afford to acquire the habit. We have children to think of.

Those who are advocating an inflation course will have to be ready to accept responsibility for the results. We have so far been following a tried path and are getting along fairly well. This is no time to start wandering into an untried field of uncontrolled and uncontrollable prices and wages.

With the same determination that has led our fighting men to conquer their military objectives, we at home shall reach the objectives of our food program. We will get the production that we have set as our goal. We will see that the supplies of food are distributed fairly and equitably and at stable prices that are fair to the consumer. To do this we shall have to draw upon that basic characteristic of a democracy – a characteristic that has its roots in the American farm community. We shall draw on our teamwork, teamwork of the farmer, and the consumer, and the distributor, and the government in both its legislative and executive branches.

The accomplishments of the past year have been great. We shall demonstrate to the Axis how the teamwork of a free people can make even those records fall. We shall demonstrate that freedom and teamwork make the people of a democracy the most efficient producers in the world – whether it be of battleships, tanks, planes, guns, or of the produce of the soil.

[NormanStewart]

U.S. State Department (November 1, 1943)

740.0011 Moscow/340

Secret Protocol of the Moscow Conference

Moscow, November 1, 1943.

SECRET PROTOCOL of the Conference attended by the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. Anthony Eden, and the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, V. M. Molotov, which was held in Moscow from the 19th to the 30th October, 1943.

The following took part in the Conference:

USA:

• Mr. Harriman
• Major General Deane
• Mr. Hackworth
• Mr. Dunn
• Mr. Bohlen
• and experts

UK:

• Sir A. Clark Kerr
• Mr. Strang
• Lieutenant General Sir Hastings Ismay
• Mr. Wilson
• and experts

Soviet Union:

• Marshal Voroshilov
• Mr. Vyshinski
• Mr. Litvinov
• Mr. Sergeyev
• Major General Gryzlov
• Mr. Saksin
• and experts

Agenda
1. Consideration of measures to shorten the duration of the war against Hitlerite Germany and her Allies in Europe (proposed by USSR)	See the Most Secret Protocol of the Conference.
2. (a) Four-Nations Declaration concerning general security (proposed by USA)	(a) The text of a declaration was agreed. The Declaration was signed on October 30. (see annex 1).
(b) The establishment of a Commission of the three Powers (proposed by USSR)	(b) It was recognised as desirable that representatives of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union should conduct, in a preliminary fashion, an exchange of views on questions connected with the establishment of an international organisation for the maintenance of international peace and security, the intention being that this work should be carried out in the first instance in Washington, and also in London and Moscow.
3. The setting up of machinery for dealing with questions requiring current and close collaboration, with particular reference to the functions and scope of the Politico-Military Commission in Algiers (proposed by UK)	(a) It was decided to set up a European Advisory Commission in London (see annex 2).
(b) It was decided to set up an Advisory Council for Italy (see annex 3).
4. Exchange of views on the situation in Italy and the Balkans (proposed by UK)
(a) Information about the position in Italy and the Balkans.	(a) A written and oral exchange of information took place.
(b) Proposal of the USSR about policy in regard to Italy.	(b) The text of a declaration was adopted (see annex 4).
(c) Proposal of the Soviet Government as regards the transfer to the Soviet Union of part of the Italian Navy (one battleship, one cruiser, eight destroyers, four submarines) and of the Merchant Fleet (to a total of 40,000 tons) which was at the disposal of the Anglo-American forces as a result of the capitulation of Italy.	(c) Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull did not raise any objection to the proposal of the Soviet Government but reserved their final answer.
5. Methods of dealing with current political and economic issues and those which may arise as the war progresses (proposed by USA)	See the decision under point 3(a).
6. Attitude towards the French Committee with special reference to its position in Metropolitan France and the establishment of eventual French government (proposed by UK)	An exchange of views took place upon the document presented to the Conference by the Governments of the USA and the UK: “Basic scheme for Administration of liberated France” (see annex 5).
In connection with questions put by the Soviet Delegation and observations made by them, the document in question was referred for examination to the European Advisory Commission.
7. A. Treatment of Germany and other enemy countries in Europe.	An exchange of views took place, which showed identity of view on the main questions.
(a) International military, political, and economic control over Germany during the armistice period.	The question was referred for detailed study to the European Advisory Commission.
(b) Steps toward ultimate settlement of future status of German Government, frontiers and other questions, length of armistice period (proposed by USA)
B. Agreement in principle in regard to treatment of Germany and other enemy countries in Europe.
(a) During the armistice period, e.g. control commission, etc.
(b) At peace settlement, e.g. frontiers, military occupation, disarmament, reparations, decentralization of the German Government etc. (Austria) (proposed by UK)	(b) The text of a declaration about Austria was adopted (see annex 6).
8. Question of agreements between the major and minor Allies on post-war questions (proposed by UK)	An exchange of views took place. Note was taken of Mr. Eden’s statement that he had no objection to the conclusion of the Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty, the draft of which had been communicated to him.
9. Common policy towards Turkey (proposed by UK)	The question was considered in the discussion on point 1.
10. Common policy in Persia (proposed by UK)	The following proposal, which was worked out by a committee appointed by the Conference, was accepted: “(a) After an exchange of views, the Committee detects no fundamental difference in the policy towards Iran of any of the three Governments; (b) the Committee was unable to reach agreement on the expediency of making any immediate declaration or declarations with regard to Iran; and (c) the issue of such a declaration or declarations might be further considered by the representatives of the three Governments in Tehran, with a view to the three Governments coming to a decision about the expediency of issuing such a declaration or declarations after the signature of the proposed Irano-American Agreement and after appropriate consultation with the Government of Iran.”
11. Relations between the USSR and Poland and policy in relation to Poland generally (proposed by UK)	An exchange of views took place.
12. Future of Poland and Danubian and Balkan countries, including the question of confederations (proposed by UK)	An exchange of views took place. Note was taken of the statement of the Soviet Delegation (see annex 7).
13. Peace feelers from enemy states (proposed by UK)	An exchange of views took place. The following resolution was adopted on the line to be taken in the event of peace-feelers being received from enemy countries: “The Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States of America and the Soviet Union agree to inform each other immediately of any peace-feelers which they may receive from the Government of, or from any groups or individuals in, a country with which any one of the three countries is at war. The three Governments further agree to consult together with a view to concerting their action in regard to such approaches.”
14. Policy regarding Allied territory liberated through the advance of the Allied forces (proposed by UK)	An exchange of views took place. The question was referred to the European Advisory Commission.
15. A. Post-war economic cooperation with the USSR (proposed by UK)	It was considered necessary to continue the examination of the questions raised.
B. Economic matters for reconstruction (proposed by USA)
(a) Cooperation in the rehabilitation of war damage in the USSR	(a) It was considered desirable to start conversations between the People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the United States Embassy in Moscow.
(b) Joint action for assistance to other countries.	(b) The statement of the United States Secretary of State on paragraph (b) “Joint action for assistance to other countries” is attached to this Protocol (see annex 8).
(c) Collaboration on an international basis dealing with matters such as food and agriculture, transport and communications, finance and trade, and the International Labor Office.	(c) The memorandum of the United States Secretary of State on paragraph (c) “Bases of our program for international economic collaboration” is attached to this Protocol (see annex 9).
(d) Questions of reparations.	(d) An exchange of views took place in the course of which there was some difference of opinion on some points in the memorandum which had been put forward.
16. Common policy towards resistance movements in Yugoslavia (proposed by UK)	This question was removed from the Agenda of the Conference at the suggestion of Mr. Eden.
17. Question of joint responsibility for Europe as against separate areas of responsibility (proposed by UK)	This was dealt with under point 12 of the Agenda.
18. Declaration about the responsibility of the Hitlerites for atrocities (proposed by UK)	The text of a declaration was adopted (see annex 10).
19. Mutual exchange of military information (proposed by UK)	The following resolution was adopted: “It is agreed that in order to ensure that all information regarding the common enemy is available to all the Allies engaged in his destruction, the Allies should keep each other mutually and constantly informed of all technical military information reaching them regarding the German Army, Navy and Air Force, the fighting value of enemy formations and the tactics used.”
20. Publication of Conference documents.	It was decided to publish the documents reproduced in annexes 1, 4, 6, and 10 to the present Protocol.

Signed at Moscow, November 1, 1943

CORDELL HULL
V. MOLOTOV
ANTHONY EDEN

[NormanStewart]

ANNEX 1

Declaration of Four Nations on General Security

The Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China;

united in their determination, in accordance with the Declaration by the United Nations of January 1, 1942, and subsequent declarations, to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they respectively are at war until such powers have laid down their arms on the basis of unconditional surrender;

conscious of their responsibility to secure the liberation of themselves and the peoples allied with them from the menace of aggression;

recognizing the necessity of ensuring a rapid and orderly transition from war to peace and of establishing and maintaining international peace and security with the least diversion of the world’s human and economic resources for armaments;

jointly declare:

1. That their united action, pledged for the prosecution of the war against their respective enemies, will be continued for the organization and maintenance of peace and security.

2. That those of them at war with a common enemy will act together in all matters relating to the surrender and disarmament of that enemy.

3. That they will take all measures deemed by them to be necessary to provide against any violation of the terms imposed upon the enemy.

4. That they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.

5. That for the purposes of maintaining international peace and security pending the reestablishment of law and order and the inauguration of a system of general security, they will consult with one another and as occasion requires with other members of the United Nations with a view to joint action on behalf of the community of nations.

6. That after the termination of hostilities they will not employ their military forces within the territories of other states except for the purposes envisaged in this declaration and after joint consultation.

7. That they will confer and cooperate with one another and with other members of the United Nations to bring about a practicable general agreement with respect to the regulation of armaments in the post-war period.

ANNEX 2

European Advisory Commission

1. The Governments of the United Kingdom, United States of America and the Soviet Union agree to establish a European Advisory Commission composed of representatives of the three Powers. The Commission will have its seat in London and will meet as soon as possible. The presidency will be held in rotation by the representatives of the three Powers. A joint secretariat will be established. The representatives may be assisted where necessary by technical advisers, civilian and military.

2. The Commission will study and make joint recommendations to the three Governments upon European questions connected with the termination of hostilities which the three Governments may consider appropriate to refer to it. For this purpose the members of the Commission will be supplied by their Governments with all relevant information on political and military developments affecting their work.

3. As one of the Commission’s first tasks the three Governments desire that it shall as soon as possible make detailed recommendations to them upon the terms of surrender to be imposed upon each of the European states with which any of the three Powers are at war, and upon the machinery required to ensure the fulfillment of those terms. The Commission will take into account, as part of the material for its study of these matters, the memorandum of July 1, circulated by the United Kingdom Government to the Governments of the United States of America and the Soviet Union, regarding the principles which should govern the conclusion of hostilities with European enemy States. The Commission will also take account of the experience already gained in the imposition and enforcement of unconditional surrender upon Italy.

4. Representatives of the Governments of other United Nations will, at the discretion of the Commission, be invited to take part in meetings of the Commission when matters especially affecting their interests are under discussion.

5. The foregoing terms of reference will be subject to review by the three Governments if circumstances should arise which call for an extension of the membership and competence of the Commission.

6. The establishment of the Commission will not preclude other methods of consultation on current or other issues which the three Governments think it desirable to discuss. There may for example be questions calling for special consideration. These questions may be handled by tripartite discussions in one or other of the three capitals (Washington, London, or Moscow, as may be found most convenient) between the head of the Foreign Ministry and the permanent diplomatic representatives of the other two Governments.

7. There may also be questions calling for international or special tripartite conferences.

ANNEX 3

Advisory Council for Italy

1. An Advisory Council for Italy will be established forthwith, composed in the first instance of Representatives of the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Soviet Union and the French Committee of National Liberation. Representatives of Greece and Yugoslavia will be added as full members of the Council as soon as practicable, in view of the special interests of these two countries arising from the aggressions of Fascist Italy upon their territory during the present war.

2. Each Representative will be assisted, where necessary, by a small staff of technical advisers, civilian and military. The Council will establish itself as soon as possible in Italy at the same place as the Headquarters of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

3. The Council will keep itself closely informed of current Italian affairs and advise the respective Governments and the French Committee of National Liberation in regard to problems relating to Italy, other than military operational questions. The members of the Council will be supplied by the respective Governments and by the French Committee of National Liberation with all relevant information on political and military developments affecting their work. They will make joint or several recommendations to their Governments or to the French Committee, but will not have power to take final decisions. They will not, of course, concern themselves with the military functions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

4. The Council will have the duty in particular of watching the operation of the machinery of control in Italy which will be enforcing the terms of surrender.

5. The Council will advise the Allied Commander-in-Chief in his capacity as President of the Allied Control Commission on general policy connected with the work of control. For this purpose it will maintain close touch with the Allied Commander-in-Chief as President of the Control Commission and will have the right to ask him for information or explanations on matters affecting the Council’s work. It will maintain close touch with such other technical inter-Allied bodies as may be established in Italy and will be entitled to obtain information and explanations from them on matters affecting its work.

6. The Allied Commander-in-Chief will continue as in the past to receive instructions from the United Kingdom and the United States Governments through the Combined Chiefs of Staff in Washington.

7. When, in the opinion of the Allied Commander-in-Chief, it is possible to bring direct military control of the Italian administration to an end, the Commander-in-Chief will relinquish the presidency of the Allied Control Commission. The Advisory Council for Italy will thereupon assume the direction of the work of the Allied Control Commission.

ANNEX 4

Declaration Regarding Italy

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union have established that their three Governments are in complete agreement that Allied policy towards Italy must be based upon the fundamental principle that Fascism and all its evil influences and emanations shall be utterly destroyed and that the Italian people shall be given every opportunity to establish governmental and other institutions based upon democratic principles.

The Foreign Secretaries of the United States of America and the United Kingdom declare that the action of their Governments from the inception of the invasion of Italian territory, in so far as paramount military requirements have permitted, has been based upon this policy.

In the furtherance of this policy in the future the Foreign Secretaries of the three Governments are agreed that the following measures are important and should be put into effect:

1. It is essential that the Italian Government should be made more democratic by the introduction of representatives of those sections of the Italian people who have always opposed Fascism.

2. Freedom of speech, of religious worship, of political belief, of the press and of public meeting shall be restored in full measure to the Italian people, who shall also be entitled to form anti-Fascist political groups.

3. All institutions and organisations created by the Fascist regime shall be suppressed.

4. All Fascist or pro-Fascist elements shall be removed from the administration and from the institutions and organizations of a public character.

5. All political prisoners of the Fascist regime shall be released and accorded a full amnesty.

6. Democratic organs of local government shall be created.

7. Fascist chiefs and other persons known or suspected to be war criminals shall be arrested and handed over to justice.

In making this declaration the three Foreign Secretaries recognize that so long as active military operations continue in Italy the time at which it is possible to give full effect to the principles set out above will be determined by the Commander-in-Chief on the basis of instructions received through the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The three Governments parties to this declaration will at the request of any one of them consult on this matter.

It is further understood that nothing in this resolution is to operate against the right of the Italian people ultimately to choose their own form of government.

ANNEX 5

Civil Affairs for France

The primary purpose of the Allied landing in France will be the defeat of Germany. Subject only to this, it will be the object of the Allied forces to bring about the earliest possible liberation of France from her oppressors, and the creation of conditions in which a democratically constituted French authority may be able to assume the civil administration. The ultimate aim of the Allies is the free and untrammelled choice by the French people of the form of Government under which they wish to live. Meanwhile and until this stage is reached, the largest measure of personal and political liberty compatible with military security shall be restored to the French people. As far as the over-riding interests of military operations allow, there shall be freedom of speech, of opinion, of the press and of correspondence. The French flag shall be used on French public buildings.

With these considerations in mind, the following principles may be laid down as governing the civil administration of liberated French territory on the mainland during the period of hostilities.

1. In all liberated areas the Supreme Allied Commander must, so long as and in so far as military necessity requires, have supreme authority in order that the prosecution of the war against Germany may continue unhampered.

2. The civil administration under the Supreme Allied Commander shall, as far as possible, be conducted by French citizens. The Director of Civil Affairs must be a French officer appointed by the Supreme Allied Commander from the French contingent or French Liaison Mission connected with the military operations in France.

3. The two Governments will inform the French Committee of National Liberation that the Supreme Allied Commander will invite the French military authorities to appoint a military mission on civil affairs to his headquarters. The Supreme Allied Commander shall in the planning of civil affairs consult the French military authorities appointed to assist in this work and give consideration to the policies recommended by them. When operations start, the French Military Liaison Mission shall be associated in the direction of civil affairs.

4. Military control of civil affairs will be of as short duration as is practicable. The time of termination of military control will be decided by CCS on the recommendation of the Supreme Allied Commander.

5. If circumstances permit, the transfer of civil responsibility to French hands may be progressive.

6. In order to achieve the eventual aim of free and untrammelled choice by the French people of the form of government under which they wish to live, the Supreme Allied Commander shall do his best to hold the scales even between all French political groups sympathetic to the Allied cause.

7. One of the first tasks of civil affairs staff of the Supreme Allied Commander on entering French territory will be to establish relations with resistance groups within France and to secure their cooperation in civil matters.

8. The Supreme Allied Commander shall have no dealings or relations with the Vichy regime except for the purpose of liquidating it. He will not retain or employ in any office any person who has wilfully collaborated with the enemy or who has deliberately acted in a manner hostile to the Allied cause.

ANNEX 6

Declaration on Austria

The Governments of the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States of America are agreed that Austria, the first free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination.

They regard the annexation imposed upon Austria by Germany on March 15, 1938, as null and void. They consider themselves as in no way bound by any changes effected in Austria since that date. They declare that they wish to see reestablished a free and independent Austria, and thereby to open the way for the Austrian people themselves, as well as those neighboring states which will be faced with similar problems, to find that political and economic security which is the only basis for lasting peace.

Austria is reminded, however, that she has a responsibility which she cannot evade for participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation.

ANNEX 7

The Future of Poland and Danubian and Balkan Countries, including the Question of Federations

The Soviet Government consider the liberation of small countries and the restoration of their independence and sovereignty as one of the most important tasks in the post-war arrangement of Europe and in the creation of lasting peace. For this purpose the defeat of aggressive force, as a result of the victory of the Allies and the removal of the threat of new aggression, at any rate in the first years after the war, will create favorable conditions. The Soviet Government consider that the small countries will require some time, which cannot yet be definitely calculated and which will not be the same for all of them, to enable them fully to orientate themselves in the new situation created as a result of the war and in the re-created relationships with neighboring and other States, without being subjected to any outside pressure to join this or that new grouping of states. The premature and possibly artificial attachment of these countries to theoretically planned groupings would be full of danger both for the small countries themselves, as well as for the future peaceful development of Europe. Such an important step as federation with other states and the possible renunciation of part of their sovereignty is admissible only as a result of a free, peaceful and well-considered expression of the will of the people. It is to be feared that neither the existing émigré governments nor even the governments which will be set up immediately after the conclusion of peace under conditions still not sufficiently normal, will be able fully to ensure the expression of the real will and permanent aspirations of their people. The creation of such federations by the decisions of émigré governments, which, in virtue of their special situation, cannot be closely bound with their people, might be interpreted as imposing on the people decisions not in conformity with their wishes. It would be particularly unjust if countries which had become satellites of Hitlerite Germany should at once be placed, as equal members of any such federation, in conditions as favorable as those of other small states which had been the victims of attack and occupation at the hands, among others, of those same satellites, and thus freed from the consequences of their part in the Hitler-Mussolini crimes.

Moreover, some of the plans for federations remind the Soviet people of the policy of the “cordon sanitaire,” directed as is known, against the Soviet Union and therefore viewed unfavorably by the Soviet people.

For these reasons the Soviet Government consider it premature from the point of view of the interests both of the small countries themselves, and of the general post-war settlement of Europe, now to plan and thus artificially to encourage combinations of any states in the form of federations and so forth. They will in due course be ready to re-examine this question in the light of the experience of post-war cooperation with other United Nations and of the circumstances which may arise after the war.

ANNEX 8

Joint Action for Assistance to Other Countries

1. In the immediate post-war period, the most urgent matters of relief and rehabilitation in third countries presumably will be taken care of on a cooperative basis, mainly through the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration.

2. We believe that it would be desirable to have the longer-range work of reconstruction dealt with on a cooperative, joint-action basis. In this connection, economic and financial experts of the United States have given preliminary study to the possibility of setting up an international lending agency which would supplement the facilities which may be offered by private investors, private financial institutions, and governmental lending agencies.

3. The important question of the amount of aid for rehabilitation from the long-range viewpoint will of course have to be determined, from time to time in the future, by each Government in the light of developments relating to the ability of a given nation to render material aid, while at the same time receiving the necessary support of public opinion.

ANNEX 9

Bases of Our Program for International Economic Cooperation

The basic objective of our economic policy is to help create conditions which would enable each country after the war to restore its economic activity as rapidly and as effectively as possible, and thereafter to improve progressively its production, distribution, employment and living standards. All this requires a large measure of international cooperation in many directions.

The first obvious steps, some of which will need to be undertaken even before the attainment of complete victory, relate to international cooperation in providing relief and to cooperative arrangements for the handling of economic problems involved in the occupation of enemy territories and operations in liberated countries. Arrangements required for these purposes are now under way through the negotiations looking to the convocation of a United Nations Conference on Relief and Rehabilitation and through such measures as the creation of the Mediterranean Commission.

Beyond these steps, international cooperation in the economic field will be indispensable for the following purposes:

1. Bringing about an expansion of international trade on a nondiscriminatory basis. To this end we believe that consideration needs to be given to the following:

The conclusion of a general convention to which all of the important countries of the world would be parties, which would lay down the rules and principles that should govern trade relations between nations. Such a convention would contain provisions whereby each country would abstain from practices such as nations in the past have adopted in a futile attempt to benefit themselves at the expense of world trade and the welfare of other nations. It would make provision for concrete steps whereby the participating countries would abandon preferences and discriminations, reduce their trade barriers and refrain from export dumping practices. The agreement or agreements would be so drawn as to enable a state-trading country to adhere on an equitable basis.

2. The orderly regulation and ultimately the elimination of arrangements, public or private, to restrict production and trade in individual commodities. To this end we believe that consideration should be given the following:

a. The conclusion of special international agreements relating primarily to the marketing of commodities in chronic over-supply or subject to extreme variation in prices.

b. International arrangements for the regulation of cartel activities.

3. The establishment of stable foreign exchange rates and of the inter changeability of currencies. To this end discussions are now in progress among the United Nations looking to the creation of an International Stabilization Fund.

4. Promotion of the development of resources and industries where-ever international assistance is necessary for this purpose. To this end consideration is being given to the possibility of creating appropriate international investment agencies and other improved facilities for international investment and for exchange of technical information and personnel.

5. Improvement of facilities for shipping, air traffic and other means of transportation. This will involve:

a. International consideration of the reestablishment of the merchant fleets of the world, the adjustment of ship-building activity, and related topics.

b. International agreement on all aspects of commercial aviation, including passenger and freight traffic arrangements, landing rights, rights of transit, exchange of technical information questions of subsidization.

c. Similar international discussions regarding problems involved in the improvement of other transportation facilities.

6. Improvement of means of telecommunication. This will require the extension of international collaboration already existing in this sphere.

7. Improvement of nutrition and consumption in general. The United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture, held at Hot Springs, Virginia, May 18 to June 3, 1943, laid the foundation for international collaboration in this field with regard to the consumption of agricultural products. This work is being carried forward by the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture. It looks forward to the promotion of appropriate domestic policies for each country and to the establishment of a permanent international organization in this field.

8. Improvement of labor standards and conditions. This involves; primarily development of the work which has been well carried on by the International Labor Organization.

It is clear that in connection with most of these subjects there will be need for organized discussions among the United Nations, both informal and in formal conferences. We believe that the time has come for the establishment of a Commission comprising representatives of the principal United Nations and possibly certain others of the United Nations for the joint planning of the best procedures to be followed in these matters. Such a Commission might consist of technical economic experts of the United States, the United Kingdom, Soviet Union, China, and possibly certain other countries such as Canada, the Netherlands and Brazil.

Even before the establishment of such a Commission we believe it to be of the greatest importance that our government and the governments of each of the major United Nations should confer with each other on the technical level as freely and as promptly as possible with the view to exploring the problems which are bound to confront them and the world.

The Government of the United States has recently addressed an invitation to the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to send to Washington a group of economic experts to engage in discussions with our experts of matters relating to Article VII of the Mutual Aid Agreement. Similar invitations were extended to the Governments of the United Kingdom and of China.

In response to this invitation, the British Government has sent such a group of experts to Washington, and as a result a most fruitful informal interchange of views has taken place between us on many topics of basic importance in the fields of monetary stabilization, international investment, commercial policy, commodity arrangements and related questions. These conversations provided an opportunity to discover the extent to which there is common ground and the extent to which there are differences of importance in the points of view of those whose expert advice may frequently be utilized in the formulation of policy.

It is particularly important that similar conversations be arranged soon between Soviet and American experts. It is our earnest hope, therefore, that the Soviet Government, which participated in the Hot Springs Conference and is now participating in the work of the Interim Commission and in the discussions relating to relief, will find it possible to arrange for such an interchange of views in the near future.

[Attachment]

Memorandum concerning the Washington meeting between British and American economic experts with reference to Article VII of the Mutual-Aid Agreement

In the informal discussions which ended on October 18 in Washington between United States and United Kingdom economic experts the following general topics were explored:

1. Commercial policy.
2. International commodity arrangements.
3. Cartels.
4. Coordination of measures to promote employment.

Parallel with these discussions further exchanges of views took place at the Treasury with regard to monetary stabilization. There was also a preliminary exchange of views on the subject of promotion of international investment.

The following are brief summaries of the topics discussed under each of the four headings listed above. It will be noted that in each case no attempt was made to reach definite conclusions but rather to prepare an orderly agenda for further study by each of the respective governments and for possible further informal joint conversations.

1. Commercial policy

Consideration was given to the relative effectiveness and feasibility of the multilateral as compared with the bilateral method for bringing about a reduction of tariffs. In this connection a number of formulas were examined and compared without, however, at this stage attempting a selection. Consideration was also given to the substantial abolition of preferences and discriminations and the question of the relation of action in this field to the reduction of tariff barriers.

The need for and feasibility of the abolition on a multilateral basis of quantitative restrictions on trade were examined. The question of abolishing export taxes and restrictions was similarly considered as was the general question of subsidies.

The subject of state trading of various types and the need for harmonizing the interests of countries employing such a system with those of other countries was examined. Although no attempt was made to reach definitive conclusions it was apparent from the discussions that this problem should present no great difficulties.

Finally, provisional consideration was given to the need for creating some international body to facilitate the application of such basic principles of commercial policy as may be developed.

2. International commodity arrangements

The problems discussed were:
(a) Short-term price fluctuations in primary products.

(b) Periodic slumps in demand and in prices as related to the business cycle.

(c) Excess capacity in relation to past stimulation of high-cost production and to special wartime measures affecting production.

Methods of dealing with these problems were considered, having regard to securing efficient production and, at the same time, to mitigating the hardship on producers in making adjustments to conform to demand.

The methods included:
(a) Buffer stocks.
(b) Quantitative regulation schemes.

The discussion included the possibility of stating principles which might govern arrangements for dealing with commodity problems and the possible relation of such arrangements to existing inter-governmental and private international commodity schemes and to other parts of the international economic system, including commercial policy agreements.

3. Cartels

Consideration was given to problems likely to arise in the post-war world from the activities of international cartels. The interchange of views was not so extensive as in the case of the other topics discussed. It was agreed that much further discussion was needed. The officials recommended that each group separately should examine the problems arising from international cartels and appropriate measures, national and international, to solve them with a view to joint discussion at some future date.

Preliminary views were presented by the United States officials on the possible consequences of international cartels in obstructing production and trade and in endangering national and international security.

The United States officials proposed that further consideration should be given to the possibility of intergovernmental undertakings:

(a) To register all non-governmental international agreements for the establishment of enduring relationships between private business enterprises;

(b) To introduce measures to make information about registered agreements available to governments or to international institutions;

(c) To prohibit practices by international cartels inimical to the expansion of production, trade and consumption including, inter alia, price fixing and restrictions on the exploitation of inventions.

4. Employment policies

The problems discussed under the foregoing three heads relate to a wide complex of policies which influence the level of employment in individual countries and in the world as a whole. Some of these policies are of a domestic nature, but facilities should be provided for consultation and for the exchange of information between governments on these matters as well as on matters of a more directly international nature with a view to the harmonization of policies.

The experts therefore discussed:
(a) The desirability of establishing an international advisory economic staff charged with the study of international economic questions with particular reference to the harmonization of measures, national and international, for the maintenance of high levels of productive employment.
(b) The functions and organization of such a staff.
(c) The character of the governing body to which it should be responsible.

[NormanStewart]

ANNEX 10

Declaration of German Atrocities

The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union have received from many quarters evidence of atrocities, massacres and cold-blooded mass executions which are being perpetrated by the Hitlerite forces in the many countries they have overrun and from which they are now being steadily expelled. The brutalities of Hitlerite domination are no new thing and all the peoples or territories in their grip have suffered from the worst form of government by terror. What is new is that many of these territories are now being redeemed by the advancing armies of the liberating Powers and that in their desperation, the recoiling Hitlerite Huns are redoubling their ruthless cruelties. This is now evidenced with particular clearness by monstrous crimes of the Hitlerites on the territory of the Soviet Union which is being liberated from the Hitlerites, and on French and Italian territory.

Accordingly, the aforesaid three allied Powers, speaking in the interests of the thirty-two United Nations, hereby solemnly declare and give full warning of their declaration as follows:

At the time of the granting of any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi party who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting part in the above atrocities, massacres and executions, will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be created therein. Lists will be compiled in all possible detail from all these countries having regard especially to the invaded parts of the Soviet Union, to Poland and Czechoslovakia, to Yugoslavia and Greece, including Crete and other islands, to Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxemburg, France and Italy.

Thus, the Germans who take part in wholesale shootings of Italian officers or in the execution of French, Dutch, Belgian or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, or who have shared in the slaughters inflicted on the people of Poland or in territories of the Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know that they will be brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice may be done.

The above declaration is without prejudice to the case of the major criminals, whose offences have no particular geographical localisation and who will be punished by the joint decision of the Governments of the Allies.

ROOSEVELT
STALIN
CHURCHILL

[NormanStewart]

740.0011 Moscow/341

Most Secret Protocol of the Moscow Conference

Moscow, November 1, 1943.
Secret

MOST SECRET PROTOCOL of the Conference between the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Mr. A. Eden, and the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. V. M. Molotov, which took place in Moscow from the 19th through the 30th of October 1943.

The following took part in the discussions:

For the United States:	Mr. Harriman,
	Major General Deane,
	Brigadier General Vandenburg [Vandenberg],
	Captain Ware.
For the United Kingdom:	Sir A. Clark-Kerr,
	Lieutenant General Ismay.
For the USSR:	Marshal K. E. Voroshilov,
	A. Ya[.] Vyshinski,
	Major General Gryzlov.

“The consideration of measures to shorten the duration of the war against Hitlerite Germany and her allies in Europe”

Proposed by the Soviet Delegation on the 19th October, 1943

On the question put on the agenda of the Conference of representatives of the Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by the People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov on the 19th October, 1943, made the following proposals which were handed in writing to Mr. Anthony Eden and Mr. Cordell Hull:

For the purpose of shortening the duration of the war it is proposed:

1. To put into effect such urgent measures on the part of the Governments of Great Britain and United States of America in 1943, which will ensure the invasion of Anglo-American armies into Northern France and which, together with the powerful blows of the Soviet forces against the main forces of the German army on the Soviet-German front, must radically undermine the military strategic situation of Germany and lead to a definite shortening of the duration of the war.

In this connection the Soviet Government considers it necessary to determine whether the statement made by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt in the beginning of June, 1943, to the effect that Anglo-American forces will carry out the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944, remains in force.

2. To propose to the Turkish Government on behalf of the three Powers that Turkey immediately enters the war.

3. To propose to Sweden on behalf of the three Powers that she should provide the Allies with air bases for the struggle against Germany.

(a) With regard to point (1) of the proposals of the Soviet Delegation of 19th October 1943, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, Mr. Eden, and the Secretary of State of the United States of America, Mr. Hull, on the 20th October 1943, endorsed the statement made by the British Lt-General Ismay and the American Major-General Deane (see appendices: statement of Lt-General Ismay and statement of Major-GeneraI Deane) as being an accurate presentation of the most recent decisions of their Governments, taken at the Quebec Conference in August 1943.	The People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs, V. M. Molotov, stated that the Soviet Government take note of Mr. Eden’s and Mr. Hull’s statements, as well as of the statements of Lt-General Ismay and Major-General Deane, and express the hope that the plan of invasion by Anglo-American troops of Northern France in the spring of 1944, contained in these statements, will be carried out on time.
With regard to the question put by the Soviet Delegation: whether the statement made by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt in the beginning of June, 1943, to the effect that Anglo-American troops will carry out the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944, remains in force, Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull gave an affirmative reply declaring that the decision to undertake the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944 had been reaffirmed at the recent conference in Quebec, subject to the conditions quoted by General Ismay in his statement. Mr. Eden and Mr. Hull added that this decision has not been changed and that preparations to carry out the above mentioned operation are being pressed forward as rapidly as possible.
(b) With regard to points (2) and (3) of the proposals of the Soviet Delegation (regarding Turkey and Sweden)	Mr. Hull, Mr. Eden, and V. M. Molotov recognize the desirability of the Governments of the United States of America, United Kingdom and Soviet Union continuing to study the question of Turkey and Sweden.
(c) The United States delegates placed the following proposals before the conference. (1) That, in order to effect shuttle bombing of industrial Germany, bases be made available in the USSR on which U.S. aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired, and rearmed. (2) That more effective mutual interchange of weather information be implemented. In order to effect this, it is essential that means of communication between the USA and the USSR be strengthened. (3) That air communication between these two countries be improved.	V. M. Molotov said that the USSR agrees to the United States proposals in principle and that the appropriate Soviet authorities will be given instructions to meet with Generals Deane and Vandenberg for the consideration of concrete measures which would be necessary to carry out these proposals.

CORDELL HULL
B. MOJIOTOB
ANTHONY EDEN

1 Nov 1943

[Appendix 1]

Statement made at the Moscow Conference by the Chief of Staff to the British Minister of Defence

October 20, 1943
Secret

I am instructed to address myself to the following proposal put forward by the Soviet Delegation:

In order to shorten the duration of the war it is being proposed:

That the Governments of Great Britain and the USA take in 1943 such urgent measures as will ensure the invasion of Northern France by Anglo-American armies and, coupled with powerful blows of Soviet troops on the main German forces on the Soviet-German front, will radically undermine the military-strategical situation of Germany and bring about a decisive shortening of the duration of the war.

In this connection the Soviet Government deems it necessary to ascertain whether the statement made in early June, 1943, by Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt to the effect that Anglo-American forces will undertake the invasion of Northern France in the spring of 1944 remains valid.

The answer to both the points raised by the Soviet Delegation is provided by the decisions taken at the recent Anglo-American Conference at Quebec, which was presided over by the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain and attended by the Chiefs of Staff of the two countries. Thus I shall be speaking on behalf of the American Delegation as well as the British Delegation; but my American colleague, General Deane, will, I hope, interrupt if I say anything with which he does not agree, and will in any case amplify and explain those matters which are predominantly American interests.

Let me say at the outset in all truth that at every single Anglo-American Conference since we have been in the war together, the thought uppermost in all our minds has been so to arrange our affairs as to ensure the maximum possible diversion of enemy land and air forces from the Russian front. I do not for a moment suggest that in so doing we have thought only of Soviet interests. On the contrary, it has been unanimously and invariably recognized as the soundest strategy in the interests of the Allies as a whole. Let me also say that the urgency of the business has always been present in our minds. Thus the following resolution was adopted at one of our earliest Conferences and was absolutely confirmed less than two months ago at Quebec:

The overall objective is:

In co-operation with Russia and other Allies to bring about at the earliest possible date repeat at the earliest possible date the unconditional surrender of the Axis in Europe.

I should not, however, like to be inferred that we can concentrate the whole of our combined resources against the Axis in Europe. It is essential for us to maintain and extend unremitting pressure against Japan for the purpose of continually reducing her military power and attaining positions from which her ultimate surrender can be forced. If the Conference so desires, further information on this subject will be furnished by General Deane.

I now turn to describe the decisions taken at Quebec as to the operations to be undertaken in 1943-44 for the defeat of the Axis powers in Europe. First, there is the bomber offensive. I mention this first, as not only does it come first in chronological order, but it is an essential prerequisite to the invasion of North West Europe. It was decided that the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial and economic system, the disruption of vital lines of communication and the reduction of German air combat strength by the prosecution on an ever-increasing scale of the day and night bomber offensive against Germany and German Occupied Europe from all convenient bases, should continue to have the highest strategic priority.

As is well known, the American Air Force stationed in the United Kingdom carry out precision bombing by day whenever the weather is suitable, while the British Royal Air Force concentrate more particularly on area bombing against German war industry by night. The prodigious scale of the damage which has already been done is not generally recognized. The American Delegation have therefore brought with them an officer who can give as full details as the Conference may desire of the effects of the day bombing, while the British Delegation have similarly brought with them an officer who can unfold the story of the British night bombing offensive. The graph which I now pass round shows the steadily mounting weight of bombs that have been cast on German war industry by the Royal Air Force alone during the past few months. In August alone it amounted to over 20,000 tons. The graph also shows by way of contrast, the weight of bombs cast on England when the whole weight of the German Air Force was concentrated on us.

It is also to be noted that this combined bomber offensive is to be prosecuted from all convenient bases. It is hoped that shortly we will be in possession of airfields in the vicinity of Rome, which will enable us to attack important war industries in Southern Germany, Austria, Czechoslovakia and Rumania with almost the same intensity that we have been attacking Northern Germany during the past year. These industries have hitherto been out of reach or at extreme range.

I now turn to the cross-Channel operation which it has been decided to undertake in 1944. It has been decided that the invasion of Northern France by Anglo-American forces will be the primary U.S./British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe in 1944. This invasion is to be launched as soon as practicable after weather conditions in the English Channel become favourable.

The scale of the initial assault is to a large extent dictated by the quantity of special assault shipping and special landing craft which is available when the time comes. Both in the United States and in the United Kingdom the greatest efforts are being made to increase the production of these vital craft. The recent success of the antisubmarine campaign has enabled us to take the risk of turning over a larger part of our shipbuilding capacity to the construction of this type of vessel. It is to be remembered that these special craft are essential not only for the assault itself, but for maintaining and reinforcing the invading armies across open beaches until such time as deep-water ports have been captured and put into order. At a conservative estimate, it is calculated that we will have to maintain and reinforce over the beaches for a period of two or three months. It is for this reason, apart from any other, that it is a physical impossibility to undertake the operation in the period of winter storms. Comparatively settled weather is essential.

I cannot yet give details of the scale of the initial assault as this is still under urgent and detailed examination, but our plans and preparations are based on being able to get about 18 divisions ashore after 14 days, together with an appropriate strength of supporting aircraft. After 90 days we hope to have 30 divisions ashore, again with an appropriate strength of supporting air formations. Thereafter three to five divisions per month will be sent from the United States direct to the theatre of operations.

The German strength in France and the Low Countries is estimated at 40 divisions at the present time, including coastal, GAF and training divisions. The beach and coast defences of France and the low Countries have been built up over the long period of German occupation. Our experience at Dieppe showed without any doubt that, even to gain a footing in North West Europe, is a most formidable operation. Moreover, the enemy disposes of excellent lateral communications across Europe which enable him to move reinforcements to the West by road and rail far quicker than we could reinforce our initial lodgments by sea. The enemy rate of reinforcement is thus limited by the availability of his forces and not by his communications.

In view of the above, it was agreed at Quebec that certain conditions must be present for the invasion to have a reasonable prospect of success. We are fairly confident that these conditions will be fulfilled.

First, there must be a substantial reduction in the strength of the German fighter force in North West Europe between now and the date of the assault. It is expected that the ever-increasing Anglo-American bomber offensive will produce this result.

The second condition is that the German reserves in France and the Low Countries as a whole must not be more on the day of the assault than about 12 full strength, first quality, mobile divisions. This is of course exclusive of coastal, training and German Air Force divisions. Furthermore, it must not be possible for the Germans to transfer from other fronts more than 15 first quality divisions during the first two months of the operations.

It is hoped that these conditions may be rendered possible by the following:
(I) The softening effect of the Anglo-American bomber forces.

(II) The maintenance of unremitting pressure by Anglo-American land and air forces in Italy.

(III) Allied landings in Southern France – threatened or actual, synchronizing with the invasion of Northern France.

(IV) Operations in the Balkans by guerrilla forces which will be sustained by sea and by air.

(V) And lastly, but of course by far the most important of all, co-ordinated pressure on the Eastern front by the Soviet forces.

The third condition is that the problem of beach maintenance of large forces in the tidal waters of the English Channel over a prolonged period must be overcome. The success of our plans depends on our ability to construct at least two artificial ports. The experiments which have been pursued for some time hold out good promise.

I now turn to the decisions covering operations in Italy. These were conceived in three phases.

(I) First phase:
The elimination of Italy as a belligerent and establishment of air bases in the Rome area and, if feasible, further north;

(II) Second phase:
Seizure of Sardinia and Corsica;

(III) Third phase:
The maintenance of unremitting pressure on German forces in Northern Italy and the creation of the conditions required for the cross-Channel assault and of a situation favorable for the eventual entry of our forces, including the bulk of the re-equipped French Army and Air Force, into Southern France.

It is to be particularly noted that operations in Italy are to be carried out by the forces already in the Mediterranean theatre. Seven U.S. and British battle-tried divisions are to be brought back in the near future from the Mediterranean to the United Kingdom in order to form the spearhead for the assault across the Channel. These are divisions which have had experience in amphibious warfare. It has been laid down that, wherever there is a shortage of resources of any kind, the governing principle will be that they will be distributed and employed with the main object of ensuring the success of the invasion of Northern France.

The operations described above will stretch our resources to the limit. It has therefore been decided that Operations in the Balkan area will be limited to the supply of the Patriot Armies by air and sea transport, to minor Commando forces and to the bombing of strategic objectives.

That concludes my survey of the decisions taken at Quebec. It remains to say a few words about the urgent measures which are being taken to give effect to these plans. In the first place, U.S. divisions are being concentrated in the United Kingdom at the greatest rate that shipping resources allow, and their training in amphibious operations pressed forward vigorously. General Deane will elaborate this point. Secondly, United States air forces in the United Kingdom are being reinforced at the greatest possible rate. General Deane will also speak on this point. Thirdly, it is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the United Kingdom is being turned into one vast airfield. Fourthly, a cross-Channel invasion on the scale contemplated against long prepared defences, manned by German troops, is an operation of a character which has never before been attempted in the history of war. It requires most extensive and elaborate administrative preparations at the ports of embarkation and on the lines of communication leading to the ports. All these measures are being pressed forward with the greatest vigour.

[Appendix 2]

Statements made at the Moscow Conference by the U.S. military observer

October 20, 1943
Secret

In the first proposal submitted by the Soviet delegates they recommended that urgent measures be undertaken in 1943 which would insure an invasion of Northern France. I should like to outline some of the measures that are now underway.

In the first place we consider the combined bomber offensive from the United Kingdom as being by far the most positive and important preparation for a cross-channel operation. In this connection we should welcome an opportunity to make a complete presentation to you gentlemen, and to such others as you may wish, which would give a comprehensive picture of what has been accomplished in the bomber offensive and what is planned for the future. As a preview to this presentation I have asked General Vandenberg to present pictures of our most recent bombing operation against Marienburg. Target in this instance was the Focke-Wulf aircraft factory. It was moved to Marienburg by the Germans for security reasons. Its destruction was almost complete. This particular picture was selected as an illustration because the objective was the most distant from the United Kingdom that has been attacked thus far and also it is the closest to the Soviet front. (At this point General Vandenberg displayed several pictures of bombing operations and explained their significance.)

As I have said, our most urgent preparation for a cross-channel operation is the bomber offensive of the British-American air forces from the United Kingdom and from the Mediterranean. The mission of the offensive is the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic systems, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened. It is estimated that the bomber offensive shall be far enough advanced by 1 May 1944 to permit the release of its entire strength to support a cross-channel operation. The buildup of the force necessary for the bomber operations will be, for the most part, accomplished by the addition of United States formations. At the present time the United States has in the neighborhood of 20 Groups of 4-engined heavy bombers in the United Kingdom. It is planned that this force will be expanded to approximately 48 Groups or approximately 2,300 aircraft by 1 April 1944. Planned fighter aircraft expansion will be from approximately 9 Groups at present in the United Kingdom to 31 Groups by 1 April 1944. This should amount to approximately 2,300 fighter aircraft by that date. The EAF strength will be about the same and the existing formations will be maintained and kept at full operation strength.

The expansion indicated above is progressing on schedule, the necessary ground installations are being constructed, the ground crews and the operating personnel are being assembled. In order to furnish fighter support for the cross-channel operation it is necessary that approximately 100 additional airfields be constructed in Southern England. This construction is underway and will be completed prior to the time the operation is launched.

The cross-channel operation agreed upon calls for a buildup of 30 mobile infantry and armored divisions to be in the United Kingdom by April 1944. This force will include appropriate corps, armies, and service troops and will be utilized for securing the initial bridgehead.

The buildup of the ground and air force in Britain will necessitate transporting more than one million men from the United States to Great Britain in the next seven or eight months. This will require the unloading of 400 personnel ships and over 1,000 cargo vessels in the United Kingdom during that period. To do so will tax the port capacity of Britain to the utmost and require that it be diverted exclusively to this purpose.

Approximately 3,300 assault ships and craft will be necessary for the operation. To obtain these the landing craft program has been expanded 35% in the United States despite resulting dislocation in the over-all production program.

It must be expected that German forces will accomplish almost complete destruction of German port facilities in France prior to their capture. It will therefore be necessary to support the operation initially over the beaches, a condition which will probably exist for the first 90 days of the occupation. In the early stages it is estimated that 15,000 tons of supplies per day will be necessary. This figure will increase as the operation expands.

I have presented but a few of the preparations that are now being made. I have selected them because they are of major importance, but as you know for an operation of the magnitude contemplated there are a great many others. The military mission of the United States in Moscow is authorized to keep the Soviet thoroughly informed as to the progress of our preparations. It is hoped that this mission will be utilized as a medium for closer collaboration between our respective staffs.

With a view to measures which might be adopted for hastening the conclusion of the war against Germany I have been authorized to make certain proposals which I shall read and then distribute the translation of them for your information. The proposals are as follows:

• That, in order to effect shuttle bombing of industrial Germany, bases be made available in the USSR on which U.S. aircraft could be refueled, emergency repaired, and rearmed.

• That more effective mutual interchange of weather information be implemented. In order to effect this, that USA and USSR communications be strengthened.

• That improved air transport be effected between the two countries.

Later, in response to a question presented by Mr. Molotov as to the validity of the decision for a cross-channel operation I made the following statement:

The decision to undertake a cross-channel operation in the spring of 1944 was reaffirmed at the last conference in Quebec. Now it must be understood that such decision, as is the case with any military decision made far in advance, is subject to certain conditions existing at the time the operation is to take place. The conditions in this case have been stated to you. We confidently feel that these conditions will exist and are proceeding with full scale preparations to launch the attack. One can only appreciate the firmness of the decision by witnessing the intensive spirit with which preparations are now being carried out. I have spoken previously of the landing craft program which has recently been expanded in the United States. The effects of such a readjustment are felt not only in England but throughout the breadth of the United States including the California coast. Such a change in production effects [affects] the shipyards along the coast and the engine manufacturers in the middle west. It is inconceivable that such dislocation of industry would be permitted if the intention to launch the operation was questionable.

[NormanStewart]

The Secretary of State to the President

Moscow, November 1, 1943

Secret
Op priority

Personal and secret for the President from the Secretary of State.

Mr. Eden sent me today a cable which he had dispatched to the Prime Minister covering the points of his conversation with Molotov on the Turkish question yesterday afternoon 31 Oct. as follows:

From the Secretary of State for the Prime Minister.

1. Molotov and I discussed the Turkish question this afternoon. Ismay and the Ambassador were with me.

2. Our urgent need for airfields in southwest Anatolia was explained by me and later Ismay developed this point in detail. I explained that I was prepared to see the Turkish Foreign Minister in Cairo on my return journey to the United Kingdom and inform him that we required (a) immediate use of airfields; and (b) authority to pass submarines in company with two or three merchant ships carrying important stores into Black Sea.

I should tell him if he were not to concede these points at once that our supply of arms and equipment would stop forthwith. I said that this would be a first step only and if Turkish acquiescence did not involve her in war with Germany we should be prepared to consider within a month the [idea of?] presenting Turkey with a formal demand on part of Soviet Union, United Kingdom and United States to enter war immediately.

3. Molotov disagreed with this sort of approach. “Why should time be wasted with relatively trivial matters such as bases when it was our right to insist that Turkey immediately enter war as a full partner and it was her duty to comply.

4. The first two sentences of your paragraph two were quoted textually to Molotov without moving him. He reiterated again and again that if our three countries were really determined that Turkey should enter the war she would have no choice; and he stressed the fact that while the Conference had for the most part gone exceedingly well, to his military colleagues it had been a bitter disappointment that not one suggestion presented by the Russian Delegation for shortening the war had been approved; and also that alternative proposals to that end had not been put forward by either the Americans or ourselves. Obviously he felt that this was a sore which might fester once the good effects of the Conference had worn off. Why could it not be decided here and at once that it was desirable for Turkey to come into the war now. Once that principle was accepted our tactics could be considered further.

5. I replied that our Government was in complete agreement that before the end of the year Turkey should enter the war, and that I was prepared to sign at once on the dotted line to that effect. Question of tactics was only difference between us. He wanted only one bite on cherry while I wanted two. I [dwelt?] further on fact that in southwest Anatolia airfields were urgently needed for our operations, not only to prevent a disaster at Eros [Leros?] and Damos [Samos?], but also to make it possible for us to capture and support Rhodes which we felt was the key to the Aegean and would lead to substantial results; and I pointed out that if we were to make a formal demand to Turkey to enter the war and she were to refuse there was a danger that we would not only have gained nothing but also would have lost all chance for airfields.

6. Obviously Molotov was pleased by my statement that we shared fully the Russian view that Turkey should be brought into war this year; but he did not agree to my argument that if we attempted to rush things our air bases might be lost. “In any case” he said “let us agree as far as the principle is concerned and later work out the tactics.” I agreed to this and stated that I would give much to be able to put the coping stone on the Conference’s work by arriving at an agreement on Turkish problem. Tomorrow afternoon I shall see him again.

7. During discussion Molotov asked if American Delegation would go with us in this matter. I replied that I could not say for sure. As a matter of fact Hull and I had had a talk before by [my] meeting with Molotov and he indicated that he was in favor of the line I proposed to take with the Russians.

End of Eden’s message.

I have replied to Mr. Eden as follows:

My Dear Mr. Eden Thank you for your letter of Oct 31 enclosing a memorandum of your conversation with Mr. Molotov on the afternoon of October 31st on subject of Turkey.

I am quote [quite?] glad to have benefit of your enclosure. While as I stated to you some days ago I should be glad to see a full examination and if necessary reexamination of the Turkish matter in the direction of Turkey’s entry into the war, I must repeat what I stated to you and Mr. Molotov during the earlier stages of the discussion of Turkey, that the Government at Washington must make the decision. I shall therefore be glad to acquaint my Government with the scope and nature of your conversation with Mr. Molotov on yesterday in which you propose more advanced and expeditious steps that [than] theretofore. Sincerely yours Cordell Hull.

End letter.

Mr. Eden called on me this afternoon to acquaint me with a further conversation he had today with Molotov in which he again urgently asked for agreement that the British bring pressure on the Turks to give them use of air bases. He explained that he had had word from Prime Minister that unless this privilege was forthcoming from the Turks promptly it would be impossible to hold Leros.

Molotov continued to object but after a long discussion they finally came to following agreement.

Soviet Govt would approve the British immediate demands on Turkey for the air bases and Eden agreed that British Govt would join with Russia at a later date to bring pressure on Turkey to come into war before end of year.

Molotov asked whether I would join in this and add it as a part of the Conference understandings. I explained to Mr. Eden that I had no authority to join in such an agreement. Eden has undertaken to explain this to Molotov. If there is time Eden will put his verbal agreement with Molotov into memorandum form.

You may wish to reexamine this question from the standpoint of Turkey’s entry into the war. Politically I would favor this. Since the British and Russians are going forward with the matter you may wish to send instructions to Harriman.

[NormanStewart]

The Pittsburgh Press (November 1, 1943)

Russian pact with Allies outlaws separate peace

China joins in agreements at Moscow; post-war organization urged

…

[NormanStewart]

Strike closes all coal mines

Papers drafted for government seizure of pits

…

[NormanStewart]

Food subsidy called vital by Roosevelt

Program will help shorten war and prevent price collapse, he says

…

[NormanStewart]

Allies thrust into Nazi line

Key junction captured in stiff battle
By Harrison Salisbury, United Press staff writer

…

[NormanStewart]

Fliers pound Rabaul again

1,059 Jap planes blasted in October
By Don Caswell, United Press staff writer

…

[NormanStewart]

I DARE SAY —
A little too previous

By Florence Fisher Parry

…

[NormanStewart]

Max Reinhardt, producer, dies

Native of Austria created stage show The Miracle

…

[NormanStewart]

Chinese want investments

But foreign capital faces control in country

…

[NormanStewart]

The election front –
Significant trends in U.S. to be shown

New York and New Jersey voting expected to provide major Democrat-GOP tests
By Lyle C. Wilson, United Press staff writer

…