Background of news –
‘Emotional armor’ for troops
By North American Newspaper Alliance
…
Poll: Cost of living, ration tasks worry public
People also concerned with post-war problem, father draft
By George Gallup, Director, American Institute of Public Opinion
…
Sailors to wear gray
Washington –
The Navy announced today that enlisted men will soon wear gray uniforms for work aboard ship in place of the present white uniforms.
Many facts about W. Wilson cut from screen biography
Reason is they’re so incredible, filmgoers would refuse to believe them!
By Ernest Foster
…
U.S. State Department (September 3, 1943)
Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 2:30 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| General Marshall | Field Marshal Dill | |
| Vice Admiral Horne (representing Admiral King) | Lieutenant General Macready | |
| Major General Giles (representing General Arnold) | Air Marshal Welsh | |
| Vice Admiral Willson | Commodore McCall (representing Admiral Noble) | |
| Rear Admiral Cooke | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Brigadier General Hull | Brigadier McNair | |
| Brigadier General Wood | Air Commodore Warburton | |
| Captain Lowe | Captain Tollemache | |
| Colonel Peck | Commander Gill | |
| Colonel Todd | Brigadier Wernher | |
| Colonel Smart | Brigadier White | |
| Colonel Bathurst | ||
| Colonel Taylor | ||
| Colonel Stratton | ||
| Colonel Hammond | ||
| Colonel Stratton | ||
| Commander Freseman | ||
| Commander McClusky | ||
| Major Chapman | ||
| Secretariat | ||
| Brigadier General Deane | Brigadier Redman | |
| Captain Royal | Commander Coleridge |
Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes
September 3, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret
Reports of discussion and conclusions reached on Items 1 and 2 are contained in Supplementary Minutes, issued with limited distribution.
Data as Basis for Allocation of Landing Craft (CCS 333)
Admiral Horne suggested that since the 1st of the month was already passed, the instructions should be altered so that reports are rendered immediately and subsequently on the 1st of every month.
Sir John Dill agreed with this suggestion. He considered that the best method of collecting the reports would be for the British and U.S. Chiefs of Staff to collect initially reports from those theaters and areas for which they were respectively responsible, including the U.S. and the U.K., while the report from the North African Theater would be rendered directly to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. All these reports would then be collated in Washington and would be available to the Combined Chiefs of Staff. He suggested that the actual form of these reports might well be worked out by the Navy Department and Admiralty in consultation.
General Marshall drew attention to the importance of clearly understood reports which should be rendered in exactly similar forms. He reminded the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the difficulties which had been experienced in evaluating reports on availability of aircraft.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Approved the recommendation of the United States Chiefs of Staff that a detailed report covering the status of all types of landing ships and craft should be submitted by the commanders concerned immediately and on the 1st of each month hereafter.
b. Agreed that the U.S. and British Chiefs of Staff should be responsible for collecting the data regarding the theaters and areas for which they were responsible and should forward them to the Combined Chiefs of Staff, data from a combined theater such as North Africa to be submitted direct to the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
c. Directed the Secretaries to work out in direct touch with the naval staffs the form that the reports should take covering in general the items listed in paragraph 5 of CCS 333.
Hospital Ships (CCS 228/6)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff:
a. Agreed to the suggestion of the Canadian Government that the words “attached to the armed forces” should be inserted after the words “combatant, and noncombatant personnel” in paragraph 2e(2) of CCS 228/3. (Subsequently published as CCS 228/7.)
b. Took note that the U.S. Chiefs of Staff had no objection to paragraph 2 of CCS 228/3 being promulgated in a Confidential Book by the British Admiralty.
Propaganda
a. Propaganda Plans (CCS 332)
Sir John Dill said that he agreed with the proposals put forth in this paper. This method had been tried in connection with the present operations against Italy and had produced quick and successful results.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendation of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff that the directive in the Enclosure to CCS 332 should be sent to all theater commanders.
b. Propaganda Committee (CCS 310/1)
General Marshall put forward certain amendments to the proposed recommendation to the President and Prime Minister contained in CCS 310/1.
General Marshall mentioned the importance of coordination between the propaganda decisions given in India to cover the Southeast Asia Command, and those in Washington to cover the Pacific. In this connection he considered that the U.S. representatives in India should be charged with the responsibility for keeping in close touch with the propaganda for the Pacific decided on in Washington. Mr. Elmer Davis was satisfied with the proposals put forward in CCS 310/1 though he would have preferred either that the entire direction should be centered in Washington, or that at least an additional committee should have been set up in Algiers to deal with the Mediterranean.
Sir John Dill said that he believed that the propaganda with regard to Europe must be dealt with as a whole and not split as between London and Algiers. He referred to the difference of organization for propaganda in London and Washington. In the British view the civilian representatives should be from the State Department and Foreign Office and these representatives should preside. It was also felt that PWE and OWI should be represented on the committees.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the submission to the President and Prime Minister of the recommendations contained in CCS 310/1 as amended. (The amended paper subsequently published as CCS 310/2.)
British and U.S. Secrecy Definitions (CCS 210/2)
Sir John Dill said he was glad to accept the proposals put forward by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff with regard to secrecy definitions. He felt it only right to say, however, that while he would communicate the United States’ suggestion that the British “Most Secret” should be dropped, this was so firmly established that he had serious doubts as to whether it could be eliminated.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations of the U.S. Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 2 of this paper.
Intelligence and Quasi-Intelligence Activities in India (CCS 196/2–196/3)
Sir John Dill said that he accepted the U.S. Chiefs of Staff views on the two British reservations. He felt sure that satisfactory integration would be achieved in the Southeast Asia Command. He hoped, however, that the U.S. memorandum did not mean that the existing arrangements whereby certain U.S. officers worked with British intelligence organizations, and vice versa, would be affected.
General Marshall assured him that this was not the intention.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the proposal made by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff, as outlined in CCS 196/2 with the first reservation to that proposal suggested by the British Chiefs of Staff in paragraph 4 of the same paper. (The detailed proposal with the accepted amendments included and the accepted reservation incorporated will be subsequently published as CCS 196/4.)
Planning for the Handling of Civil Affairs in Enemy Occupied Areas Which May Become Theaters of Operations (CCS 190/7)
General Marshall suggested that the word “military” should be inserted before the word “directive” in the new paragraph 6 of the directive to the Combined Civil Affairs Committee contained in CCS 190/7. He explained that this word was in order to insure that directives to theater commanders on these matters should be passed through the Combined Chiefs of Staff and not through political channels.
Sir John Dill said that the new paragraph 6 as amended could be accepted, but that the Dominion approval had not yet been obtained.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the revised wording of paragraph 6 of CCS 190/6/D, as set out in CCS 190/7, subject to inserting the word “military” before the word “directive” in the first sentence. It is understood that the concurrence of the Dominions has yet to be received.
Dutch Marine Landing Force (CCS 331)
Sir John Dill suggested that the Dutch approach might have been prompted by a feeling that more equipment could be obtained from the United States than had been possible from the United Kingdom. He suggested that the word “appreciation” might be substituted for the word “interest” in the suggested reply to the Netherlands Mission.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer action on this paper.
Reports of discussion and conclusions reached on Items 10, 11, 12 and 13 are contained in Supplementary Minutes, issued with limited distribution.
Combined Chiefs of Staff Supplementary Minutes
September 3, 1943, 2:30 p.m.
Secret
Operation BAYTOWN
General Marshall informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the contents of a signal he had just received from General Eisenhower with regard to the progress of Operation BAYTOWN.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note, with interest, of this statement.
Artificial Harbors for Combined Operations (CCS 307/2)
General Marshall suggested an amendment to the recommendation contained in paragraph 3e of CCS 307/2, since he understood that the 25 tugs referred to were not immediately available.
It was pointed out that the tugs would be required in the United Kingdom by the 1st March and that in view of North Atlantic weather conditions, those coming from the United States should cross before November.
Admiral Horne said that this point was fully appreciated and every effort would be made to get all available tugs over as soon as possible.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the recommendations of the Combined Administrative Committee contained in paragraph 3 of CCS 307/2, subject to amending the first sentence of paragraph 3e to read as follows:
That twenty-five tugs and suitable towing vessels be made available as expeditiously as practicable from the …
Slowness of Buildup for AVALANCHE (CCS 334)
General Marshall informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the contents of a telegram which he had sent to General Eisenhower asking if, by the holding of any vessels in the Mediterranean, the buildup for AVALANCHE could be increased. He also informed the Combined Chiefs of Staff of the reply which had been received from Major General Whiteley, in the absence of General Eisenhower, explaining that the rate of buildup was limited not by lack of shipping but by the capacity of the ports.
General Hull said that an examination had been made to see if any assistance could be rendered to General Eisenhower by permitting him to hold any landing craft which were passing through his command. This examination had shown that the only vessels available were 8 British LSTs en route to India and due in the Mediterranean on the 4th of September, and 10 U.S. LSTs which had been in the Mediterranean and were now on the way out, also en route to India.
It was pointed out that these LSTs were already fully loaded for India.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Took note of this paper.
Liberated Yugoslav Prisoners (CCS 294/1)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a report by the Combined Staff Planners containing certain recommendations. A revised Appendix “B” containing a draft telegram from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to General Eisenhower was also presented.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Approved the dispatch of the draft reply to General Eisenhower contained in Appendix “B” to CCS 294/1, as amended, and agreed to defer action on the remainder of the paper.
Operations of Red Air Force Subsequent to TIDAL WAVE (CCS 255/1)
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to defer action on this paper.
Possible German Use of Gas
The Combined Chiefs of Staff: Agreed to recommend to the President and Prime Minister that a special warning should be issued to Germany as to the retaliation they might expect should they now resort to the use of gas.
Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff
Washington, 3 September 1943.
Secret
CCS 255/1
Operations of Red Air Force Subsequent to TIDAL WAVE
In CCS 255 the U.S. Chiefs of Staff suggested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff recommend to the President and Prime Minister that at the proper time, subsequent to TIDAL WAVE, they jointly request Premier Stalin to have the Russian Air Force undertake a follow-up mission against the TIDAL WAVE objective.
At their 98th Meeting on the 18th of June, it was noted that the proposal contained in CCS 255 had been submitted to the British Chiefs of Staff, from whom a reply had not yet been received. It was further noted that the British Chiefs of Staff would be informed that the proposal was not intended to be presented to the President and Prime Minister until after TIDAL WAVE had been accomplished.
Now that TIDAL WAVE has been accomplished, the United States Chiefs of Staff wish to renew the proposal contained in CCS 255 and recommend that immediate action be taken with a view to implementing this proposal.
Report by the Combined Staff Planners
Washington, 3 September 1943.
Secret
Enclosure to CCS 294/1
Liberated Yugoslav Prisoners
| References: | a. CCS 294 |
| b. CCS 317 |
The problem
-
a. To formulate a policy with regard to the use of liberated Yugoslav, Polish, Greek and other Allied Nations’ prisoners of war in active operations,
b. To determine the machinery for arming and equipping such forces if established, and
c. To determine the responsibility for emergency relief of civilian internees released in enemy territory. -
To consider in connection with the above the message from General Eisenhower contained in MAT 16.
Facts bearing on the problem
-
On 1 August 1943 General Eisenhower cabled the War Department stating that the Yugoslav Delegate for Near, Middle East and North Africa had made representations concerning 70,000 to 80,000 Yugoslavs in 68 concentration camps in Italy of which 30,000 to 40,000 are said to be fit for military service. (Appendix “A”). In order to deal with the Yugoslav request and subsequent requests, General Eisenhower asks that policy decision be made on four specific questions. (Appendix “A”). From a memorandum by the Yugoslav Ambassador in Washington, dated 28 July 1943 (enclosed in memorandum for Combined Chiefs of Staff from Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, 27 August 1943), it appears that only some 6,500 of the Yugoslavs in Italy are Yugoslav army prisoners of war.
-
Assuming that Yugoslav prisoners in Italy are immediately liberated, it would not be possible to equip them for large scale operations prior to the summer of 1944 except at the expense of other forces.
-
It appears that the majority of the internees have been in concentration camps for long periods, some at least since the conquest of Yugoslavia in April-May, 1941. It is therefore unlikely that any of them will be fit to undertake military duties without first undergoing a prolonged period of rehabilitation.
-
The whole question of equipping allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals was considered at QUADRANT by the Combined Chiefs of Staff in CCS 317 Series. Except for French Forces, on which a decision was reached, the question is still under consideration on that level.
Conclusions
- a. It is not possible to decide on the future employment of Yugoslav and other European liberated prisoners until the study initiated in CCS 317 is complete.
b. It is unlikely that it will be possible to equip or train any large numbers in the immediate future.
c. In any case, liberated prisoners are unlikely to be of much value without a prolonged period of rehabilitation.
Recommendations
- It is recommended that:
a. For the present, Yugoslav, Polish, Greek and other military formations, beyond those now operating with Allied forces, be not used in active operations except that released prisoners of war may be used as replacements or reinforcements for existing units at the discretion of the Allied Governments concerned.
b. The study of the extent to which it will be possible in the future to equip allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals be continued (vide CCS 317).
c. The direct responsibility of the theater commander for emergency relief of civilian internees released in occupied enemy territory should continue until such time as the government concerned can assume responsibility for its own subjects.
d. Any key men amongst the liberated personnel who are specially asked for by the government-in-exile concerned, should be despatched to the desired destination.
e. While any movement within his theater should be at General Eisenhower’s discretion and with the shipping available to him, no movement outside his area should be permitted without the concurrence of the government concerned.
-
The probable existence of factions amongst internees and prisoners of war points to the undesirability of returning any of these to their homelands without the concurrence of the government concerned.
-
It is recommended that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve and forward to General Eisenhower the cablegram contained in Appendix “B”, in reply to his cablegrams NAF 305, dated 1 August, and MAT 16, dated 24 August 1943.
Appendix “A”
Algiers, 1 August 1943.
Secret
The Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ to the War Department
WO-6293, NAF 305. Jovan Dnonovich, delegate Yugoslav Government for Near, Middle East and North Africa, has made representations concerning 70 to 80,000 Yugoslavs in 68 concentration camps in Italy, of which 30 to 40,000 are fit for military service. He makes the following specific proposals:
To incorporate in the Italian surrender terms that the Yugoslav prisoners, internees and confinees must be left in the places where they now are.
That the Allied Force Headquarters receive a Yugoslav Military mission whose duty would be to care for all the Yugoslavs found in Italy. A civil section would compose a part of this mission and it would take charge of the persons unfit for military service.
To designate an Italian Island for the purpose of organizing a Yugoslav Army. In his opinion Sicily would be the most fitting.
To separate and group into camps in Tunisia and Algeria the persons who are not fit for military service and those who cannot be employed in the different services.
That the equipment, armament and maintenance of the Yugoslav forces, which exceed the financial possibilities of the Yugoslav Government, be accomplished by means of the Lend Lease agreement.
That the Yugoslav units form a part of the National Yugoslav Army with Yugoslav cadres and under the orders of Allied Force Headquarters.
That the use of the Yugoslav Forces, as soon as they have been organized and armed, will be decided by an agreement between the Yugoslav Government and the Governments of the United States of America and Great Britain. He is of the opinion that it would be most fitting to use these forces for operations in the Balkans and especially in Yugoslavia.
This is the first of many requests of similar nature that we shall probably receive. In order to deal with it and subsequent requests the following policy decisions are needed:
-
Are we to use Yugoslav, Polish, Greek and other military formations in active operations? If so, are these forces to be employed anywhere or only in areas affecting their home countries.
-
If the answer to 1 is in the affirmative what machinery for arming and equipping these forces is to be established.
-
It is assumed that we should assume direct responsibility for emergency relief of civilian internees released in enemy territory. Are we to assume continuing direct responsibility or are we to assist the Government concerned in caring for them.
-
In the light of our shipping problem it is presumed that we would agree to a minimum in transporting these persons from the areas in which they are found.
Provision for the release of interned Nationals of the Allied Nations was included in surrender terms for Sicily and will be incorporated in such instruments in the future.
**Appendix “B”**
Draft Telegram from the Combined Chiefs of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ
In answer to NAF 305 of 1 August requesting policy directive with regard to Yugoslavs interned in Italy the following policies have been adopted by the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
-
For the present, Yugoslav, Polish, Greek and other military formations, beyond those now operating with Allied forces are not to be used in active operations except that released prisoners of war may be used as replacements or reinforcements for existing units at the discretion of the Allied Governments concerned.
-
The study of the extent to which it will be possible in the future to equip Allies, liberated forces and friendly neutrals will be continued by the Combined Chiefs of Staff.
-
The direct responsibility of the theater commander for emergency relief of civilian internees released in occupied enemy territory is to continue until such time as the government concerned can assume responsibility for its own subjects.
-
Any key men amongst the liberated personnel who are specially asked for by the government-in-exile concerned, are to be dispatched to the desired destination.
-
While any movement within your theater will be at your discretion and with the shipping available to you, no movement outside your area is to be permitted without the concurrence of the government concerned.
-
In view of the probable existence of factions amongst internees and prisoners of war, none of these is to be returned to his homeland without the concurrence of the government concerned.
Policy set forth in paragraph 5 above answers your MAT 16 of 24 August.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill
Washington, 3 September 1943.
Secret
Memorandum for the President and Prime Minister
SUBJECT: GAS WARFARE
Messages from General Eisenhower have indicated that the Italians have reason to believe that the Germans may resort to gas warfare against Italy in the event that she withdraws from the Axis.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff consider therefore that a special warning should be given to Germany as to the retaliatory measures that she may expect. It is clear that for security reasons such a warning should not be given until the results of the present negotiations with Italy have been announced.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff recommend therefore that if you agree arrangements should be set in hand for the necessary warning to be issued by our two governments.
We feel that General Eisenhower should be informed of your decision.
For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
J. G. DILL
Field Marshal
WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
The President’s Personal Representative in North Africa to the Secretary of State
Algiers, September 3, 1943.
Secret
1526.
Secret from Murphy.
Following recognition by the Allied Governments and the consequent clarification of the Committee’s position, de Gaulle has raised the issue regarding the control by the Committee over military affairs. He has sent a highly confidential memorandum to Giraud requesting that the latter agree to a more clearly defined control of the Committee over the CinC and military activities and the limitation of military authority to operations against the enemy and organization of the armed forces. The memorandum further states that the powers exercised by the CinC in accordance with French law establishing a “state of siege” should be turned over to the responsible civil administrators and that all secret services should be amalgamated under one direction and controlled by the Committee.
The memorandum in question was reported to me in the greatest secrecy and it is requested that its existence not be divulged.
Further in this connection, the appointment of a defense commissioner has been suggested as well as the possibility of having only one president of the Committee which in this case would be de Gaulle. The divergence with respect to the military authority is being further emphasized by Giraud’s insistence that he alone has the authority to speak for the army, and that the rearmament furnished by the United States of America was given to him in his personal capacity.
The question of the organization and control of resistance movements and the authority to designate civilian administrators in territories of metropolitan France as they are liberated have been brought to the fore in the Committee’s discussions. It seems clear that the extreme elements of the Gaullist faction have decided that the time has come to make a further effort to reduce Giraud’s power as the CinC as well as to increase de Gaulle’s own control over even the civilian moderate elements of the Committee. It is understood that the discussions which have taken place in the last few days in the Committee meetings have led to no solution as yet.
The moderate element of Committee insist, however, that whatever solution is reached the decision will preserve collective responsibility of all members which is basis of its recognition by Allied Governments.
As discussions of this nature continue the fear is beginning to be expressed that unless Committee is able to eliminate the personal differences and devote more attention to prosecution of the war the people of France when liberated will have lost respect for Committee and it will lose possibility of speaking for them when time comes. It is likely, however, that until French Army is able to participate more actively in prosecution of the war the principal attention here will be centered on these political matters.
The Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ to the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Algiers, 3 September 1943.
Secret
Urgent
W-9077/47. This afternoon I was present while my Chief of Staff signed for me and General Castellano signed for Marshal Badoglio the short-term military armistice with Italy, (To AGWar for Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFor for British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower cite FHDSC.) This is NAF 354. Formal signature will take place after the announcement of the armistice which as you know is to be timed to fit our operational plans. The present document was absolutely necessary as the basis for definite military planning with the Italian representatives and will be kept secret for the time being. At the final signing to take place later we will arrange to have the highest-ranking Italian officials present. I repeat that today’s event must be kept secret or our plans will be ruined. This ends NAF 354.
The Adviser on Political Relations to the Secretary of State
Washington, September 3, 1943.
Memorandum
S-Mr. Secretary: With reference to the attack on AMGOT contained in the recent issue of War and the Working Classes published in Moscow, the following points concerning the purpose of Allied Military Government in occupied territory may be of interest.
In the earlier drafts creating the structure for Allied Military Government and which served as a basis for the present directives to General Eisenhower the following statement appears, “Since these operations will involve military occupation of enemy territory, in contrast to the operations in North Africa, and will be conducted under the unconditional surrender principle, the administration should be definitely military in character as a part of progressive military operations.”
It is clear that from its inception AMGOT was designed for the administration of enemy territory. Its purpose is threefold:
(a) To preserve order;
(b) To secure the safety of the Allied forces operating in the territory; and
(c) To make available the resources of the territory or country for the further military operations of the Allies against Germany.
To accomplish these purposes, the Allied Military Government is conceived as having supreme military authority by reason of the conquering of the territory or country by the Allied military forces. Thus, the Allied military Commander of the operations is himself the Military Governor of the territory although for certain purposes he delegates his authority to a member of his staff as Military Governor who in turn has a Chief Civil Affairs Officer and the necessary staff.
Allied Military Government as presently organized for the administration of Sicily is perfectly consistent with, the policy of unconditional surrender. Indeed, unconditional surrender would be quite meaningless if our principal pre-occupation in Italy were the return of that country to the normal democratic processes of administration rather than the further prosecution of the war against Germany. Our position with respect to our European Allies would be quite indefensible if we concentrated on the restoration of enemy territory such as Italy to the normal processes of life and failed to use every available resource in the country for the defeat of Germany and the liberation of the territory of our Allies from German domination. Italy for her sins must pay the price required by the United Nations. It is inevitable that her complete liberation from foreign domination must be postponed until her European Axis partner has been defeated.
AMGOT has no political aspects. It is purely military administration of enemy territory which is being used for the further prosecution of the war by the United Nations. It is temporary in the sense that it will not outlive the military requirements of the area. It is non-political through necessity.
JAMES CLEMENT DUNN
The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet to the Secretaries of the Combined Chiefs of Staff
Washington, 3 September 1943.
Secret
Enclosure to CCS 335
CominCh File FF1/L11–7
SERIAL: 001863
SUBJECT: ALLOCATION OF CVE TYPE SHIPS TO ENGLAND.
REFERENCE: (A) REPORT OF ALLIED ANTI-SUBMARINE SURVEY BOARD, SERIAL 0011, DATED 27 AUGUST, 1943.
There is great need for additional CVE type ships in anti-submarine operations. I am aware of the policy of the Royal Navy that basic and extensive alterations are necessary in CVEs, built in the United States, to U.S. naval specifications, before these ships can be operated by the British.
With reference to paragraph 16(e) of the enclosure, it is my view that further efforts should be made to advance the date of operational readiness of these ships rather than change allocations already agreed upon.
E. J. KING
Enclosure
Washington, 27 August 1943.
Secret
The Allied Anti-Submarine Survey Board to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Fleet
SERIAL: 0011
SUBJECT: EMPLOYMENT OF CVE’S IN OFFENSIVE ACTION AGAINST U-BOATS.
The Board has given consideration to the recent success in the Anti-Submarine War and the marked falling off in tonnage of shipping lost. It is felt that in certain quarters the past successful months and the present lull may tend to distract attention from the Battle of the Atlantic, as, in fact, has occurred during similar lulls in the past.
The number of submarines at sea today, considering the number potentially available, is very low. The cause of this temporary reduction in enemy effort is not entirely certain, but the Board, cannot believe that this situation will continue indefinitely. It is possible that at least 150 submarines could suddenly appear in the Atlantic, which, regardless of A/S tactics which have proved so successful during the past few months, might well result in a serious increase in sinkings.
The Board has moreover given consideration to the change in tactics employed by U-Boats on passage to and from the Bay of Biscay ports. The recent success of the Bay air and surface offensive has caused the enemy to adopt a route close to the coast of Spain where effective air support can be afforded to his submarines and where the Bay A/S patrols are least effective. This has met with a considerable degree of success and a consequent falling off in the U-Boat sinkings. There is thus a gap in the offensive as a whole.
It is considered essential that this gap in the Bay offensive should be closed insofar as is possible and it would appear that with this change of the enemy tactics the only really satisfactory remedy is the immediate employment of CVEs on offensive A/S operations in the Southern approaches to the Bay. A minimum of two CVEs on station would be required for this purpose.
In addition to the above the Board wishes strongly to point out the other pressing A/S commitments for these valuable vessels. The proportion of independent shipping sunk during the war far exceeds that sunk while in convoy. There will never be sufficient escorts to protect all ships at sea but it is not generally appreciated that at any one time there are on the high seas a very large percentage of unescorted ships. The belief that unless the enemy returns to an offensive against the Atlantic lifeline he has lost the U-Boat war cannot be wholly subscribed to. Should the enemy be able and decide to operate a hundred submarines against independent shipping it will only be necessary for each submarine to sink one ship per month for our shipping losses to return to the unacceptable figure of previous months. It may well be that with defeat of “pack tactics” the enemy may resort to this dispersed form of U-Boat warfare providing he can find a means of breaking through the blockade of his bases.
In the opinion of the Board, apart from the Bay, the most pressing need is for a carrier in the Cape-Mozambique Channel area. A large percentage of sinkings in the past months have been in this area and in July alone 12 out of the 14 ships sunk were unescorted. The distances involved make the employment of a CVE the only practicable form of offensive against these U-Boats. (It is understood that the carrier (HMS UNICORN) originally assigned the Eastern Fleet is now employed on special operations.)
It is also possible that the Bay offensive may force the enemy to make greater use of the Northern approaches. It is possible to cover this area by air and, with the reinforcements recently sent to the Bay offensive, it may now be possible to detach a squadron from the Bay to strengthen an offensive against this Northern U-Boat route. Should, however, aircraft not be available for this route, it would appear that consideration must be given to the employment of a CVE when available.
During the visit of the Board to West Africa the Board was impressed with the lack of proper escorts in the area. Subsequently, although a comparatively large number of U-Boats operated in this area, the fact that there has been only one U-Boat sunk or even probably damaged bears out the opinion formed during the Board’s visit. The desirability of having an escort carrier in this command should therefore be kept in mind when planning future requirements.
It is also desired to stress the importance of the time factor. The disasters which overcame the U-Boat during the months of May, June and July undoubtedly resulted in a serious weakening of morale. If the most is to be made of this weakening it is essential in no way to relax the pressure but to continue to harass and sink U-Boats so that the crews have no chance of regaining their morale. Should they do so and regain the initiative the effect on Allied grand strategy might well be serious.
It is apparent from operations in the past 6 months that the use of Support Groups and particularly Support Groups with CVEs had a very large share in the successful anti-U-Boat campaign. The CVE was originally developed for A/S operations; but it is fully appreciated that the increasingly rapid developments in Allied strategy have created urgent demands for this valuable type of craft for operations other than anti-U-Boat offensives. At the same time, it appears that an unduly small proportion are now being employed on anti-submarine work.
CCS 203, dated 24 April, 1943 (Annex I to App C) sets up 31 CVEs as the minimum for Atlantic A/S operations and although a large number of this type have been placed in commission, at the present moment only five (all U.S. Navy) are actually being used in the Atlantic for this purpose. Of the 13 British CVEs in commission in the Atlantic none are at this moment being used for A/S work. Of the 6 that are operational 4 are allocated to CinC Mediterranean for special operations, one is refitting and one has serious defects. Of the remaining seven two are working up, 4 are undergoing modifications and one is assigned for deck landing training.
It is understood that seven CVEs are allocated to the British for delivery in the next three months. However, extensive modifications required by the Admiralty, together with working-up time, etc., involves a delay of 24 to 30 weeks from the time of delivery to date of becoming operational. These modifications cover changes in gasoline installations, bomb stowage, and fighter direction.
At the present stage of the war these delays are not considered acceptable. By the employment of larger crews, the U.S. Navy have proved that they can operate these ships most successfully without these very lengthy modifications. Failing some drastic cut in these delays it appears to the Board that it is worthy of consideration that as many of these next seven CVEs as they are able to man and equip with planes be reallocated to the U.S. Navy so that an adequate proportion may be employed on A/S operations immediately. It is estimated that all seven could be operational by about the end of January, 1944 which would effect an overall saving of at least three months. A subsequent readjustment of the British allocation should be made.
In the opinion of the Board no considerations should be allowed to stand in the way of getting the maximum number of these highly valuable ships into service in the shortest possible time.
Conclusion:
In conclusion the Board wishes to stress that the present lull in the enemy’s Atlantic offensive in no way justifies any relaxation of the Allied Anti-Submarine effort. On the contrary, it is essential to maintain the maximum pressure that operational commitments permit in order to ensure that the enemy has no time to improve his present weakened state of morale.
Recommendations:
The following recommendations are now made:
(a) That a minimum of two British CVEs on station be employed now against the U-Boats passing in and out of the Southern approaches to the Bay.
(b) That one British CVE be allocated to the Cape-Mozambique Channel area for offensive A/S operations.
(c) That steps be taken to increase the offensive against the Northern passage and that failing adequate shore-based aircraft consideration be given to the employment of a CVE when available.
(d) That the inadequacy of A/S offensive measures in West Africa be kept in mind with a view to allocation of a CVE to this area in due course.
(e) That failing a drastic reduction in delay in getting British CVEs into operation, consideration be given to the U.S. Navy manning some or all of the next 7 CVEs allocated to Britain with a view to a higher proportion of these vessels being employed on A/S operations with the minimum delay.
J. M. MANSFIELD
Rear Admiral, RN
J. L. KAUFFMAN
Rear Admiral, USN
The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill
Washington, 3 September 1943.
Secret
Memorandum for the President and Prime Minister
SUBJECT: PROPAGANDA COMMITTEE.
Enclosed is a proposal which has been agreed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff and is submitted for your approval.
For the Combined Chiefs of Staff:
J. G. DILL
Field Marshal Head of the British Joint Staff Mission in Washington
WILLIAM D. LEAHY
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Chief of Staff to the Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy
[Enclosure]
The Combined Chiefs of Staff to President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill
Washington, 3 September 1943.
Secret
CCS 310/2
Propaganda Committee
We have been examining the possibility of establishing Anglo-American machinery for the coordination of propaganda in an emergency, and wish to make the following proposal and recommendations.
The proposal
To establish coordinating authorities with power of decision for Anglo-American policy in propaganda.
Basis of proposal
Recent experience in the European theater demonstrated that existing Anglo-American machinery for the coordination of and dissemination of instructions for propaganda operations in an emergency neither functions with sufficient speed nor avoids contradiction when operating under conditions of emergency.
The present procedure in obtaining agreed decision on propaganda policy from the responsible authorities of the two Governments is too protracted for the immediate unified action required by emergency developments.
Recommendation
We recommend for your approval:
a. That Anglo-American Committees of equal membership be set up forthwith for the emergency coordination of Anglo-American propaganda policy in each of three theaters:
(1) In Washington for the Pacific Theater,
(2) In London for the European Theater,
(3) In New Delhi for the South East Asian Theater.
b. That these Committees be empowered, in relation to the theaters concerned, to make ad hoc decisions when emergency developments occur which make such decisions necessary or desirable and under such conditions to issue special directives on propaganda policies for the appropriate agencies of the two Governments and of the Theater Commanders.
c. That these decisions and directives be binding for all propaganda operations directed to the theater concerned until revised by the normal process of consultation between the two Governments.
d. That the Combined Chiefs of Staff be charged with responsibility for securing the establishment of these three Committees in these three places, and that priority should be given for the immediate creation of the Committee which would be responsible for propaganda in connection with impending operations in the Mediterranean.
e. These Committees to consist of:
- One representative of U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- One representative of British Chiefs of Staff.
- One representative of U.S. State Department.
- One representative of British Foreign Office.
- One representative of U.S. Office of War Information.
- One representative of British Political Warfare Executive.
These committees to have power to call in further assistance as and when necessary.
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 4:40 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Admiral King | Lieutenant General Ismay | |
| Rear Admiral McCain | Brigadier White | |
| Rear Admiral Badger | Mr. Bernal | |
| Rear Admiral Moreell | Lieutenant Commander Grant | |
| Rear Admiral Brown | Minister of Information Bracken | |
| Rear Admiral Land |
Minutes
Most secret
Admiral King said that three ways of providing Floating Airfields had already been examined, namely:
(a) The Armstrong Seadrome. This would be deep in draft, massive in construction, and take a long time to build. This ruled it out for any operation in the near future.
(b) The use of Naval Pontoons. This would give a very low freeboard, and could not therefore be used in any sea chop.
(c) The use of dry dock sections. An airfield so constructed would have much greater molded depth and could be sunk so as to give stability and yet retain considerable freeboard. The connections between the units would require considerable further experiment.
Admiral King explained that the production of any special form of Floating Airfield would naturally impinge upon the output of other equipment. He mentioned, by way of example, that it had been decided to step up the output of landing craft by 25 to 35 per cent, and that this involved a reduction of 35 to 48 in the libertyship programme.
In conclusion, Admiral King suggested that an Ad Hoc Committee consisting of Admirals McCain, Moreell and Badger should at once study the question from every aspect, and submit a report to the President and Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister explained the great operational advantages which we would derive from the possession of airfields of this character. He said that he wanted at least three of them to be delivered in the Indian Ocean within the next nine months. His idea was that the airfields would be attended by special ships carrying the aeroplanes and the necessary fuel.
It was suggested that escort carriers were now coming out in very large numbers, and that their use would satisfy the operational requirements prescribed by the Prime Minister.
The Prime Minister agreed, but was doubtful whether they could be provided in adequate numbers. In any case it would seem advisable to have two or three airfields in addition to any escort carriers that could be provided.
There was some discussion about the number of machines that could operate from a floating field of the size contemplated.
Admiral McCain put the figure at about 40, whereas Professor Bernal said that the British Fleet Air Arm experts in England estimated that, by a slight increase in the width, it would be possible to operate 150.
A general discussion followed on the production aspect and the quantity of steel that would be required.
In conclusion, The President and Prime Minister agreed that a Sub-Committee should be set up on the lines proposed by Admiral King, and instructed to report as soon as possible.
The Prime Minister asked, and Admiral King agreed, that Professor Bernal should be summoned by the Committee whenever his technical advice was desired.
Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 5:50 p.m.
| Present | ||
|---|---|---|
| United States | United Kingdom | |
| President Roosevelt | Prime Minister Churchill | |
| Mr. Harriman |
The Pittsburgh Press (September 3, 1943)
More planes for airmail work sought
Increased volume, fewer aircraft cause delays
…