U.S. Army drinks little, is best behaved; survey shows soda pop is favored beverage
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FBI charges noted author with helping in desertion
Ursula Parrott arrested; hiding of soldier alleged
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Wedges widen in Jap lines
Enemy force threatened with isolation
By Brydon Taves, United Press staff writer
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Belief in own publicity a menace to movie stars
That’s the warning given the top players by Joan Crawford, concerning fictional ‘puffs’
By Ernest Foster
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‘Shootin’ iron’ with a past is cherished possession of Jory – it was made in 1862
Film actor says woman gave it to him
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Roving Reporter
By Ernie Pyle
Oran, Algeria – (by wireless)
If you want a touch of native life in your North African stories, here’s a little example.
Lt. Nat Kenney, of Baltimore, had an old broken-down motorcycle that he rode about the country. One day he took off for Arzew, about twenty miles from his camp. He passed a monstrous-looking lizard lying on the pavement, so he stopped and went back.
The lizard was about a foot long, plus six inches of tail. The thing kept changing color. Its eyes could move separately, and in any direction. It was an evil-looking customer indeed. Nat poked it gingerly with his shoe, but it didn’t attack him. Then he poked it with his gloved hand, and still it didn’t try to bite. Then he stuck his hand in front of its nose, and the lizard crawled up on the glove, just as if it had been waiting for Nat all the time.
Lizard hat-band
So Nat held still and the lizard continued its crawl – up his arm, over his shoulder, up the back of his neck and clear to the top of his head. There it curled up, resting on the top of his cap and looking forward snakelike over his brow. Nat, crowned with this dragon, got back on his motorcycle and rode into Arzew.
He parked the motorcycle and walked down the street. He kept running into soldiers he knew. They would start to salute, and right in the middle of the salute their mouths would fly open and they would gurgle out:
Lieutenant, for God’s sake don’t!
Nat had dinner with the lizard still poised comfortably on top of his head, spent a pleasant hour walking around the town and startling his friends, then got back on the motorcycle and rode back almost to Oran. Finally, he stopped at a field hospital where he knew some of the doctors. He left his friend there for them to experiment with.
‘I’d like a stripe’
Altogether the lizard spent about three hours and rode about thirty miles on top of Nat’s head. The army began to think of transferring Lt. Kenney to Iceland for fear he would go riding to town next with a camel on his handlebars.
A local French newspaper had a small piece from America recently saying – if I read it correctly – that the maximum age for induction into the U.S. Army had been lowered from 45 to 37. That’s good news to us old duffers who fled America to escape the draft, but they might have decided it a little sooner.
The next time I have dinner with Gen. Eisenhower (what next time?) I’ll have to speak to him about this business and tell him to get busy. I’d kind of like to sport a few stripes myself. I’m due for a six-months foreign stripe already, and although I haven’t been wounded and don’t expect to be, they might give me a stripe for being awfully tired.
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Our ‘poorhouse in the Caribbean’ –
Tugwell administration assailed as spendthrift by Puerto Ricans
We’re guinea pigs, say critics
By S. Burton Heath, special to the Pittsburgh Press
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Millett: If you’re doing your duty, you’re ‘woman of the year’
There are thousands who are devoting strength, brains and endurance to winning the war
By Ruth Millett
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U.S. State Department (December 30, 1942)
740.0011 Pacific War/3030: Telegram
The Ambassador in China to the Secretary of State
Chungking, December 30, 1942.
[Received December 30 — 9:25 a.m.]
1567.
Dr. K. C. Wu, Political Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs, acting as Government spokesman at weekly press conference December 29, stated China faces new year with brightest future from military, political and economic standpoint but hopes that Allied counteroffensive can soon be launched in Far East; that Chinese resistance for 5 years has proved China’s ability to withstand alone Japanese onslaught so far as war in China was concerned; that Chinese prosecution of war was hampered by shortage of material necessary for large scale counteroffensive; that China will immediately counterattack and recover lost territory if furnished equipment; and that “we hope that the material promised us will be forthcoming.” He asserted that United Nations have tendency to over emphasize European front while under emphasizing war in Asia; that war in Europe has reached turning point with operations in North Africa and Russian successes; and that while Americans and Australians have “shown up very well” in South Pacific they have not started counter offensive; and concluded with warning against complacency and over optimism, stating last lap of journey is usually the hardest.
GAUSS
811.917/234
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in China
Washington, December 30, 1942.
185.
The Secretary of State refers to enclosure no. 1 of the Embassy’s dispatch No. 693, dated October 21, 1942 concerning a Chinese complaint regarding adverse criticism appearing in American periodicals, indicating some misunderstanding on the part of Second Secretary O. Edmund Clubb, with reference to the operation of American censorship.
In his conversation with Mr. Shao Yu-Lin, Mr. Clubb stated that it was his opinion that censorship of information was not performed by the OWI but was effected through such particular agencies as the War Department, State Department, and the Navy Department.
In this connection reference is made to Diplomatic Serial Number 3524 of July 3, 1942, which transmits copies of the revised Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press, issued by the Office of Censorship, and that agency’s press release of June 24, 1942 setting forth the reasons why the revisions contained in that code are necessary. There is enclosed for the information of the Embassy, the original Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press issued by the Office of Censorship on January 15, 1942.
The Office of Censorship under the direction of Mr. Byron Price, is the sole agency responsible for enforcing the Code just mentioned. The heart of that Code is that each journalist ask himself in reference to what he is writing: “Is this information I would like to have if I were the enemy?”, and then act accordingly. If the writer is in doubt on this subject or if his material seems to him to come from doubtful authority or to be in conflict with the general aims of wartime censorship, the Code requests that he submit his article to the Office of Censorship. But unless his article is to be transmitted outside of the United States, through the open mail, by cable or by radio – in which case its submission to Censorship is automatic – he is under no legal compulsion to submit his piece to the Office of Censorship. Thus, the operation of wartime censorship in this country is on a purely voluntary basis.
This Department exercises no direct functions in regard to censorship, but occasionally the Office of Censorship refers to the Department of State articles or news stories of a questionable character, merely for guidance as to whether or not such articles or news stories would be detrimental to the foreign policy of this Government. The suppression, or even revision, of any such article or news story may not be effected unless it is in violation of a specific clause of the Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press.
740.00112 European War 1939/7562: Telegram
The Chargé in Sweden to the Secretary of State
Stockholm, December 30, 1942 — 10 a.m.
[Received 3:55 p.m.]
3740.
Stahle who returned together with Boheman on December 27 yesterday called on me and later discussed with Klath at considerable length seriousness with which Swedish Government views probable consequences of American and British insistence that two Göteborg ships be released. He stated that informal Swedish Cabinet decision was negative as to ships but that their cargo could be reloaded if two new ships are sent to Sweden especially for that purpose. An alternative would be to assign airplanes in sufficient number and size to transport most important part of cargo. He estimated cargo at about 8,000 tons, valued at 30,000,000 crowns, of which about 1,000,000 pounds sterling represented ball bearing production equipment.
Stahle reiterated that Germans would immediately cut off Göteborg traffic if ships were released (see Legation’s 3643, December 22, 4 p.m.). This would in Swedish Government’s opinion mean that traffic cannot be resumed during war. He feels that it would be advisable to reconsider whole question to determine whether cargo on these two ships is of sufficient value to counterbalance such subsequent disadvantages as:
-
Severing sole Swedish contact with United Nations and canceling only means available for political influence on Swedish future course of action.
-
Driving Sweden into hands of Axis as only supplier of essential commodities, including petroleum for air and naval forces. This would mean increased Axis pressure and gradual decline of any Swedish opposition to German demands which would be sure to increase while Swedish possibilities of resistance would be broken.
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Probable cancellation of all Swedish export licenses for Allies and stoppage all air service across North Sea.
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Possibility of Sweden considering herself released from British war trade agreement under which exports of several hundred commodity items are restricted. This would mean heavy increases in exports to continent of typical Swedish products extremely useful to Axis war efforts. For instance, arsenic is a commodity included in restricted group.
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Creating a situation under which German demands upon Sweden could not be resisted for any length of time and finally resulting in more or less complete Swedish subservience.
In conclusion, Stahle again strongly urged that whole problem be given most careful consideration by responsible officials in Washington and London.
Repeated to London.
GREENE
740.00112 European War 1939/7553: Telegram
The Chargé in Sweden to the Secretary of State
Stockholm, December 30, 1942 — 3 p.m.
[Received 4:07 p.m.]
3709.
British Minister has just shown me a telegram from his Government defining only basis on which ultimatum concerning Norwegian ships lying in Göteborg could be lifted, that is, for Swedish Government to guarantee to grant a demise charter for some Swedish ships suitable for proceeding to Great Britain with cargoes from Dicto and Lionel with a speed not, less than 15 knots which could be loaded with cargoes or at least the most essential parts of cargoes of those ships by January 15. Mallet is presenting this proposal to Foreign Office today with statement that if Swedish Government makes such an offer British Government will give it very earnest consideration and a very early reply. Ship must, of course, be in good running order, adequately fueled and equipped with paravanes and labor facilities, for transfer of cargo must be guaranteed.
Repeated to London.
GREENE
851R.00/203: Airgram
The Consul General at Casablanca to the Secretary of State
Casablanca, December 30, 1942 — 5 p.m.
[Received January 28, 1943 — 11 a.m.]
A-12.
Moroccan public reaction almost 100 percent favorable to appointment of General Giraud. Press of all political tinges has expressed enthusiasm in tones of unusual sincerity. Left and Gaullist elements feel this is a step away from totalitarian tendencies. Right and monarchists feel Giraud can be trusted to maintain order. Army pleased at reacquiring predominance over Navy and certain that now its expansion and rearming will not be hampered by politicians. Slight lukewarmness observed in Navy and upper circles of Residency where loss of independence and prestige is feared.
All sides unite however in praising Giraud’s glorious past, his uncompromising anti-German attitude in past two years and his will to fight. Since all Frenchmen can unite around him they feel that final victory is thus assured.
RUSSELL
860H.01/430: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador to the Yugoslav Government-in-Exile, at London
Washington, December 30, 1942 — 6 p.m.
Yugoslav Series No. 4.
Your 9, December 23.
Your informal efforts to assist in bringing about a better understanding among the elements constituting the Yugoslav Government have the Department’s [Page 839]full approval. You are authorized to continue these conversations and to express the friendly interest of the Department in the general Yugoslav question, some aspects of which are of direct concern to a considerable element of the American people. For your guidance in this connection the following points may be kept in mind as background.
-
The disputes between the Serb and Croatian elements in the United States have had a deplorable effect on our national unity, extending even into groups of other national background. In the lack of authoritative guidance from the Government in London Yugoslav official representatives and refugee personalities have contributed and still continue to contribute to this disunity. The public spectacle of discord within Yugoslav official circles here has nullified the efforts of American Government agencies to restore harmony among the foreign language newspapers and the foreign-born groups.
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It is generally felt in this country that Mr. Fotitch through his apparent support of the Pan-Serb element is to a considerable degree responsible for this situation. Nevertheless his official actions have been correct and the Department would prefer that he remain here provided the Yugoslav Government can agree on some definite policy and require his adherence to it. One of the difficulties hitherto as been that the Embassy and other Yugoslav officials here have expected this Government to promote the idea of Yugoslav unity which their own actions have tended to destroy.
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The Ministers resident in New York are considered to be more representative of the Yugoslav element here than is the Embassy, but lack of teamwork here and lack of sympathy with some of their colleagues at London have made them something of a burden. If they are to remain in this country and their informal activities tolerated they must be brought into line with whatever unified policy their Government may adopt. Particularly the Information Center at New York should be responsible in reality as well as in theory to the Embassy.
Among these Ministers Mr. Yevtitch52 has shown the broadest views and the best understanding of the problems arising in the course of the war. It might be well to inquire whether he would not be useful for consultation at London from time to time.
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The … and … have been definitely objectionable in their influence on American citizens of Yugoslav origin. The Department would be relieved to have … transferred to some other field of activities. The … would probably conform to firm instructions from the Embassy.
-
The Mihailovich-Partisan dispute has gained some prominence in the American press. This Government has full confidence in Mihailovich and statements about to be made will probably restore somewhat the prestige lost largely as a result of the disputes referred to above. One of the most effective charges against him has been that he too has lost respect for his own Government’s belief in Yugoslav unity.
The Department realizes of course that some of the problems suggested above are inherent in any government deprived of contact with its people. Because of America’s deep interest in the future of Yugoslavia it is hoped that the few leaders available will rise to the responsibilities of these times.
HULL
740.0011 European War 1939/26979a
The Secretary of State to the Secretary of War
Washington, December 30, 1942.
My Dear Mr. Secretary: I think it would be appropriate if an American message on New Year’s Day could be sent to General Draža Mihailovich, the leader of the patriot forces operating within Yugoslavia. This message would be most effective if it could be conveyed in the form of a personal telegram of greeting to General Mihailovich from General Eisenhower as the commander of the American forces in the European area. If you agree, may I suggest something like the following as a suitable text?
General Draža Mihailovich
Commanding General of the Yugoslav Forces in Yugoslavia
The American forces in Europe and Africa send greetings to their comrades in arms the resourceful and gallant Yugoslav military units under your splendid leadership. These brave men banded together on their native soil to drive the invader from their country are serving with full devotion the cause of the United Nations.
May the New Year bring them full success.
In this connection I think it is worth mentioning that although the President and other officials of the Government have referred to the fine achievements of the Yugoslav patriots in various statements, there has not been any communication with General Mihailovich from American sources. Two messages from British military authorities have recently been sent to him, one from General Alexander, and the other from Brigadier Vale on behalf of the General Staff.
It is my understanding that a telegram such as that suggested above could be transmitted to General Mihailovich through the system of communications now operated by the Yugoslav military authorities in Egypt.
Sincerely yours,
CORDELL HULL
851R.00/136: Telegram
The Chargé in the United Kingdom to the Secretary of State
London, December 30, 1942 — 7 p.m.
[Received 9:30 p.m.]
7441.
Department’s 6631, December 29, 4 p.m.
Kuh was given this story by French contacts at Carlton Gardens. With the possible exception of point 4 it represents closely the views of all the Fighting French. None of them to whom I have talked personally or whose conversations have been reported to me has shown any conception of an agreement with General Giraud and North African elements on any basis other than de Gaulle and National Committee political supremacy. As I have reported (please see my telegram 7407, December 29, 6 p.m.) they consider that de Gaulle is the one man to whom the French people have entrusted their hope for a better future. Furthermore their jobs are at stake. I see no indication that our British friends are endeavoring to discourage the high and unrealistic hopes of the National Committee and de Gaulle’s immediate entourage.
Repeated to Murphy.
MATTHEWS
740.0011 European War 1939/26849a
The Under Secretary of State to President Roosevelt
Washington, December 30, 1942.
My Dear Mr. President: I am sending you herewith the suggested instruction to General Eisenhower and to Murphy, of which I understand you will also wish to send a copy by cable to Mr. Churchill.
The Secretary asked me to let you know that he approves this suggested statement about policy, but feels very strongly indeed that you should simultaneously make a public statement with regard to our policy towards France and particularly with regard to General de Gaulle’s present efforts to obtain complete control over all French territories and activities. He is sending you a suggested draft for such a statement.
Believe me
Faithfully yours,
SUMNER WELLES
[Enclosure]
Suggested instruction to General Eisenhower and to Mr. Murphy
In view of General Giraud’s recent conversations with you on the subject of the recognition by the United States of French sovereignty in North Africa, and in view of recent statements made by the Fighting French National Committee in London and newspaper articles apparently inspired by the latter relative to the immediate need for the creation of a provisional French government to be installed in North Africa, the President desires that the following statement be sent to you which sets forth the policy of the Government of the United States with regard to the French people and French territory and possessions.
You should be guided by this statement in your conversations with General Giraud as well as in the determination of all questions which have inherent in them political aspects.
The supreme objective of the United States is the defeat of the Axis powers, and in the achievement of that objective, in cooperation with the other United Nations, the Government of the United States desires the cooperation of all elements of French resistance.
It hopes that General de Gaulle and all other elements of French resistance will be willing to cooperate with General Giraud as Commander-in-Chief of the French forces in North Africa in every effective and practicable manner for the attainment of the defeat of Germany and her allies. The Government of the United States believes that satisfactory arrangements of a military character can undoubtedly be made between General Giraud and General de Gaulle for the coordination of such cooperative effort between them and their associates. Such coordination would provide a basis for this Government to work with a unified French command, and would be favored by the United States.
Effective protection of French interests abroad may be worked out as the situation develops.
The Government of the United States will continue the policy it has pursued since June 1940 of dealing, in all French territories, with the French authorities in effective control of such territories actively resisting the Axis. The Government of the United States recognizes the sovereignty of the French people over French territories and, subject solely to the rights legitimately pertaining to its military forces, desires that civil administration by French authorities in North Africa be maintained. The relationship of the United States to such civil administration will remain incidental to its military operation.
The Government of the United States, as one of its war objectives, intends, in cooperation with the other United Nations, to bring about the liberation of France. It will take no step which will in the slightest degree impair the right of the French people to determine with complete freedom their own destinies and to select their own government, once France has been liberated. It considers that the most effective results for all concerned can be attained if the military effort is kept divorced from political considerations. For these reasons, the Government of the United States will not accord recognition to any provisional government of France, no matter how constituted and no matter where constituted, until the French people have themselves been afforded the opportunity freely to select such government.
The Government of the United States therefore believes that until such time has come, its cooperation with the forces of French resistance in North Africa and elsewhere must properly be concentrated along the lines of military and naval endeavor and in the rendering of such relief and economic assistance as may be found desirable and necessary by the French authorities in North Africa and in other French territories.
740.0011 European War 1939/26831: Telegram
The Chargé at Tangier to the Secretary of State
Tangier, December 30, 1942 — 8 p.m.
[Received 9:40 p.m.]
926.
My 881, December 22, 10 p.m.
General Orgaz informed me this afternoon he would be very happy to meet General Patton at the frontier at Arbaoua on any day between now and January 8th with the exception of January 1st, 3rd and 6th. He is leaving for Madrid the 8th. When questioned he expressed a preference for the 4th or 5th but stated he would make his plans to conform with the convenience of General Patton. Orgaz said he wished [to give?] to General Patton and the members of his staff who may accompany him a luncheon at Larache where he and General Patton would be able to talk together. He asked me to let him know as soon as possible the date and approximate hour for the rendezvous at the frontier and the names, rank and order of seniority of the accompanying officers.
Orgaz stated he expected I would also be present and that I would also be his guest for lunch. I thanked him and stated it was my understanding the meeting was a purely military one and for that reason I would be unable to accept his kind invitation. He was insistent and said “I expect you to be present if only in a private capacity”. In view of his insistence I felt I might give offense and that he might misinterpret my insistence on being unable to be present. I therefore would appreciate urgently the Department’s instructions.
Orgaz said he would like to be informed by General Patton as to what military ceremonies he might desire and if there were any particular dishes he could offer him. I stated it was my understanding the visit was to be effected with as little ceremony as possible and that I would be happy to convey his gracious intentions to General Patton. Orgaz added he had only the simple fare of a soldier to give General Patton but he wished to receive him with all the courtesies and hospitality which a Spanish officer might offer.
I informed him General Patton wished Major Bernadoni, Assistant Military Attaché to be present as interpreter. Silvela, Spanish Consul who speaks perfect English who was acting as interpreter for me will also be present at Orgaz’s orders.
Repeated to Algiers for Murphy, to Casablanca for the necessary information to be telegraphed to us as soon as possible and to Madrid.
CHILDS
851R.20/49a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Chargé in the United Kingdom
Washington, December 30, 1942 — 9 p.m.
6662.
A draft telegram outlining our position in North Africa was presented to the White House this morning.
To clear any possible misunderstanding the contents of such a telegram should not be communicated to anyone until further specific instructions are received.
HULL
U.S. State Department (December 31, 1942)
851R.50/29
Memorandum by the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, to the Secretary of State
Washington, December 31, 1942.
The following paragraph is quoted from a personal letter received this morning from General Eisenhower:
This morning I received your telegram concerning the functions of the State Department in developing the economy of this particular theater. I agree with every word of it and I can assure you that no trouble whatsoever will occur in the execution of the plan. I shall be obliged if you will assure the Secretary of State of my desire to assist him in every possible way. The sooner I can get rid of all these questions that are outside the military in scope, the happier I will be! Sometimes I think I live ten years each week, of which at least nine are absorbed in political and economic matters.
G. C. MARSHALL
860H.20/94
The Under Secretary of State to the Yugoslav Ambassador
Washington, December 31, 1942.
My Dear Mr. Ambassador: I have given further attention to the memorandum which you left with me on December 19, in which you quoted the text of a report recently made by General Mihailović concerning the military action against the Ustaše, Germans, and Italians in Croatia, and have noted particularly General Mihailović’s statement that whatever Partisan fighting is now in progress against the forces of occupation and the Ustaše in Croatia is carried on by units under General Mihailović’s command. The series of newspaper articles to which you referred have also come to my attention. In this connection I have also given further study to your memorandum of December 16, which contained related information.
As I have repeatedly assured you, the Government of the United States has complete confidence in the patriotism of General Mihailović, and full admiration for the skill, endurance, and valor with which he and the Yugoslav patriots associated with him have continued their noble struggle for the liberation of their country. We consider that the military actions in Yugoslavia to which you refer constitute an important element in the general conduct of the war of the United Nations against the Axis powers.
Believe me,
Yours very sincerely,
SUMNER WELLES
740.0011 European War 1939/26833: Telegram
The Chargé in Finland to the Secretary of State
Helsinki, December 31, 1942 — 2 p.m.
[Received December 31 — 9:51 a.m.]
1301.
Officer cited my 1300 today expressed great indignation last night at what he termed stupidity of Witting which resulted in suppression of our and Finnish Legation’s propaganda activities. He said he hoped there would soon be a new Foreign Minister in Helsinki and intimated he thought there would be.
McCLINTOCK
740.00112 European War 1939/7536: Telegram
The Chargé in Sweden (Greene) to the Secretary of State
Stockholm, December 31, 1942 — 4 p.m.
[Received December 31 — 2:42 p.m.]
3722.
Boheman appeared before Committee of Foreign Affairs of Riksdag yesterday and presented all British arguments. Committee including Chairman Unden and many very friendly to Great Britain and United States voted unanimously to advise against releasing two ships now lying in Göteborg.
Mallet saw Boheman yesterday afternoon and presented suggestion about ship to take off cargoes from Dicto and Lionel (see my 3709, December 30, 3 p.m.). Boheman appeared relieved at this slight possibility but was non-committal. He promised to expedite consideration.
Repeated to London.
GREENE
840.48 Refugees/3504: Telegram
The Ambassador in Mexico to the Secretary of State
Mexico City, December 31, 1942 — 5 p.m.
[Received 11:06 p.m.]
1250.
Embassy’s telegram No. 1243, December 30, 7 p.m.
The Foreign Office has issued a statement containing the text of the exchange of notes between Padilla and Sikorski regarding a limited arrangement for the admission of Polish refugees to Mexico. The number of Poles accepted will be in accordance with the capacity of the country.
Transportation to Mexico will be without expense to the Mexican Government. Expenses of their sojourn will be borne by the Polish Government. Repatriation at the expense of the Polish Government will take place at the first propitious moment after the [war]. Poles while in Mexico will be distributed where they can contribute to the economy of Mexico without [conflicting] with Mexican citizens.
Texts of the notes will be forwarded by airmail.
MESSERSMITH
U.S. War Department (December 31, 1942)
Communiqué No. 281
North Africa.
One of our forward patrols engaged a small enemy detachment, inflicting casualties and taking some prisoners. Our artillery shelled enemy positions in the Heidous area. Roads leading from Tunis were bombed and machine-gunned by our aircraft during the night of December 28-29.
One enemy fighter was shot down by our patrolling fighters yesterday. The bomber attacked Sousse and other objectives. No aircraft is missing.
U.S. Navy Department (December 31, 1942)
Communiqué No. 234
South Pacific.
On December 29th and 30th, “Catalina” patrol bombers (Consolidated PBY) made several harassing attacks on enemy installations in the Munda area of New Georgia Island. Results were not reported.
On December 30:
-
At 2 a.m., a force of “Airacobra” (Bell P-39) and “Wildcat” (Grumman F4F) fighters attacked and destroyed five enemy barges at Vangunu Island in the central Solomons.
-
At dawn a “Dauntless” (Douglas SBD) dive bomber destroyed a large caliber enemy gun on Guadalcanal.
-
At 6 a.m., “Dauntless” dive bombers, with “Wildcat” escort, attacked enemy installations in the Rekata Bay area of Santa Isabel Island. Buildings on the east side of the bay were bombed and strafed and three float-type planes were strafed on the water.
The Pittsburgh Press (December 31, 1942)
Allied drive for Tripoli from 3 sides
Axis raids Casablanca; big de Gaulle force comes from south
By Edward W. Beattie, United Press staff writer
Bulletins
London, England –
The British Navy was in contact with enemy forces in northern waters today, the Admiralty said tonight. An enemy cruiser was damaged and withdrew from the action and an enemy destroyer was last seen in a sinking condition. The Admiralty announced that the operations were continuing.London, England –
Adolf Hitler in an order of the day told the German Armed Forces today that:The year 1943 perhaps will be a difficult one but certainly it will be no more difficult than the past one.
The order was broadcast from Berlin.
…
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