America at war! (1941--) -- Part 2

Monday, 18 January

The President’s morning callers were Lieutenant General Mark W. Clark, Commanding the Fifth Army, who arrived at 10:05 and departed at 11:10; Mr. Robert D. Murphy, who conferred with the President and Mr. Hopkins from 10:45 until 12:45; and General George C. Marshall, who called at 12:45 and departed five minutes later.

The Prime Minister lunched with the President, Mr. Hopkins, and Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt at Dar es Saada at 1:15 p.m. and departed at 2:40.

The President left the grounds of his villa for the first time at 4:10 this afternoon.

Here follows a description of the President’s inspection of the Third Battalion of the Thirtieth Infantry Regiment which was guarding the President’s camp.

The President returned to his villa at 4:50, for the Combined Chiefs of Staff were scheduled to confer with him, starting at five o’clock.

The following American and British military representatives of their respective Army, Navy, and Air Forces, conferred with the President, the Prime Minister, and Mr. Hopkins from 5:00 until 6:30 p.m.

Field Marshal Sir John Dill General George C. Marshall
General Sir Alan F. Brooke Admiral E. J. King
Adm. of the Fleet Sir Dudley Pound Lt. Gen. H. H. Arnold
Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal Brig. Gen. John R. Deane
Lt. General Sir Hastings L. Ismay
Vice Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten
Brigadier E. I. C. Jacob

Shortly before seven o’clock, Mr. Hopkins had the pleasure of seeing his son, Sergeant Robert Hopkins, who had secured leave of absence from the Signal Corps company to which he was attached and which was then engaged in active operations at the front. Sergeant Hopkins went in to pay his respects to the President, and later his father took him to call on the Prime Minister.

Mr. Murphy called just before dinner, but stayed with the President only about five minutes, departing at 7:45.

Mr. Hopkins had accepted an invitation to dine with General Patton this evening, and so he was not present when the President, Lt. Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Lieutenant Franklin Jr. sat down to dinner with their guests for the evening, Admiral McIntire, Captain McCrea, and a young Army Officer, Lieutenant Richard Ryan, a grandson of Thomas Fortune Ryan, and a friend of the family.

The President retired about eleven o’clock.

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary, War Department General Staff to the President’s Special Assistant

Casablanca, January 18, 1943.

Memorandum for: Mr. Hopkins

We received the following message last night from General Eisenhower:

Yesterday Commander Butcher was told by Mr. Hopkins that the President probably would wish to see the war correspondents before he departs. As virtually all correspondents in this theatre headquarter at Algiers, it would be necessary to fly them to Casablanca. Suggest 15 representative U.S. and British correspondents to be chosen by General McClure. (General McClure handles public relations for General Eisenhower). Please advise whether correspondents desired. If so, when and whether the number is satisfactory.

Will you let me know what the President’s wishes in this matter are so that I may inform General Eisenhower?

FRANK McCARTHY
Lt. Col., GSC

U.S. State Department (January 19, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 10 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
General Marshall General Brooke
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Lieutenant General Arnold Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Dill
Rear Admiral Cooke Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Brigadier General Hull Lieutenant General Ismay
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Major General Kennedy
Colonel Smart Air Vice Marshal Slessor
Commander Libby
Secretariat
Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob
Lieutenant Colonel Grove

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 19, 1943, 10 a.m.

Secret
  1. Conduct of the War in 1943
    (C.C.S. 155)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a draft memorandum prepared as a result of their meeting the previous day. Certain amendments were suggested and agreed.

The Committee:
Approved the memorandum as amended.

  1. Suggested Procedure for Dealing with the Agenda of the Conference
    (C.C.S. 155/1)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff considered a note, prepared by the Combined Staffs suggesting the procedure to be followed for dealing with the major questions on the agreed Agenda of the Combined Chiefs of Staff (C.C.S. 140). Certain alterations were suggested to the tentative program of meetings set out in the annex to these minutes.

The Committee:
Approved the suggested procedure subject to the Annex being revised as agreed at their meeting.

  1. Strategic Responsibility and Command Set Up for Dakar French West Africa

Admiral King said that no question of land forces was involved in West Africa. Admiral Glassford had proposed that the West African Coast from Cape Bojador to the Western boundary of Sierra Leone should be placed under French naval command. The French naval forces should be responsible for such operations off shore as might be necessary in that area. He understood that M. Boisson and Admiral Collinet were both agreeable to this suggestion.

The proposed arrangement would include the air cover for offshore operations. The difficulty would be the lack of equipment of the French air forces. He suggested that to overcome this difficulty we should set out to familiarize the French with modern aircraft. To do this it would be necessary to give them up to date equipment and adequate training and to include them, so far as possible, in actual operations. He said that the West African coast from Cape Bojador southwards was a British sphere, and his proposal was that the French in their area should work under Admiral Pegram. We should have to decide whether to deal with the French as full allies or whether it would be necessary to exercise some degree of control over them.

Sir Dudley Pound said that he had formed the impression that Admiral Collinet was all out to help and that the arrangement which Admiral Glassford proposed was based on the assumption that the French would fully cooperate.

Sir Charles Portal said that he was in general agreement with the suggestions put forward by Admiral King.

It was essential that all coastal air operations in West Africa should be coordinated by the British Air Commander who would be working in cooperation with the British Naval Commander. He was fully alive to the importance of giving the French airmen at Dakar some equipment to enable them immediately to take a share in air operations in the proposed French sub-area. For this purpose he proposed, subject to the agreement of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, to allot them 2 Sunderland Flying Boats and 4 Hudson patrol bombers which, to begin with, would be operated by British crews with the more experienced French crews alongside them until they were fit to take over themselves.

He was less anxious about the reliability of the French than about their technical ability and training. So far, they had neither the equipment, training or experience of coastal air operations in modern war. He proposed, therefore, that the less experienced French air crews, together with the appropriate maintenance personnel, should be withdrawn to British training establishments, with the object of forming them, if they turned out to be any good and as soon as the equipment could be made available into two squadrons, one of Catalinas and one of Wellington patrol bombers. He agreed that the equipment of these coastal squadrons in West Africa should be a British responsibility, but pointed out that owing to present shortage of suitable aircraft and the necessity for adequate training of crews, the formation of the proposed two squadrons was not likely to be practicable in the immediate future.

General Arnold said that the United States concept was gradually to draw in French air force personnel as they became trained and equipped for operational work over a period of about a year. He agreed that in French West Africa this would be a British responsibility.

General Marshall said that he was in favor of proceeding with a definite program for reequipping the French forces. This would, of course, imply French acceptance of our organization and training methods, and would inevitably delay the progress of equipping our own forces. He thought, however, that we should do the thing wholeheartedly; and he was prepared, subject to General Eisenhower’s views, to modify the United States program in order to equip French forces up to a strength of 250,000. All the equipment provided for the French would be at the expense of United States troops forming in America. He proposed to make use of French shipping to bring it over.

General Somervell said that General Giraud had agreed to turn over 160,000 tons of French shipping to the Allied pool. Out of this tonnage General Giraud proposed that 85,000 tons should be allocated to meet French civil requirements, leaving 75,000 tons for shipping equipment for the French forces. General Somervell calculated that this would enable them to be equipped at the rate of about one division a month. No allowance was made in this program for the carriage of coal and oil which was at present being shipped by the British.

The Committee:
Agreed:
a) That the West African Coast (offshore) from Cape Bojador (Rio de Oro) southward shall be an area under command of a British Naval Officer for naval operations and of a British Air Officer for air operations in cooperation with naval forces.

b) That subject to (a), a sub-area extending from Cape Bojador to the western boundary of Sierra Leone and all forces operating therein shall be under French Command.

c) That in the French sub-area the intention will be to enable French air units to take over air duties as rapidly as equipment and training permit.

  1. Publication of Results of the Conference

Sir Alan Brooke drew the attention of the Committee to the decision which the President and the Prime Minister had made at their meeting the previous day that:

a) The results of this conference should be communicated to Stalin in the form of a document setting out our intentions for 1943.

b) A communiqué should be prepared for issue to the Press when the conference is finished.

Sir Alan Brooke suggested that a small subcommittee should be appointed to draft a suitable document for approval by the Committee at the end of the conference.

The Committee:
Agreed:
To appoint a subcommittee for this purpose consisting of:

  • United States Representatives:
    • Brigadier General Hull
    • Colonel Smart
    • Commander Libby
  • British Representatives:
    • Lt. General Ismay
    • Major General Kennedy
    • Air Vice Marshal Slessor

Hopkins-Harriman-Poniatowski meeting, morning

Present
United States France
Mr. Hopkins Count Poniatowski
Mr. Harriman

Hopkins Notes

[Extracts]

Casablanca, January 19, 1943.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Had a call from Count Poniatowski, who is acting as General Giraud’s civilian aide, who wanted to see me, but I sent for Harriman because I had learned that at one time he had been Harriman’s brother-in-law.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Had a long talk with Count Poniatowski and Harriman. I did not tell him that de Gaulle had refused to come, because the President thinks that is British business and that they should acquaint Giraud of this fact. The Count told me what they proposed to say to de Gaulle in case he came down. It boils down that they are going to tell him that Giraud is going to be the top dog and that they will be glad to play with de Gaulle all around the world in a secondary capacity. He also told me the things he wanted to take up with the President, which included the adequate arming of the French Army, adjustment of exchange rates, the organization of a new French layout with Giraud in charge and de Gaulle No. 2 man, and then some other vague business about French sovereignty. I told him that there would be no trouble with the President about the arming of the French Army and the exchange rates, although I couldn’t say what those rates would be, and that I thought the President thought that Giraud should land on top, but as far as sovereignty is concerned, he is treading on very difficult ground because the President stuck by his position that sovereignty rested exclusively with the French people, and that he would recognize no one, not even Giraud, as representing France. I told Harriman to see the President and tell him what had gone on at this conference, and I went over to see Churchill.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Hopkins-Churchill conversation, morning

Present
United States United Kingdom
Mr. Hopkins Prime Minister Churchill

Hopkins Notes

[Extracts]

Casablanca, January 19, 1943.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The Prime Minister told me he wanted to see me this morning. He had not yet heard from London about de Gaulle and seemed to be unhappy about the President’s decision to close up the conference with the Chiefs of Staff here on Wednesday afternoon.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I found Churchill in bed and he told me that while the second raid on Berlin looked pretty good, the weather had been bad and he was not sure how much damage had been done. He told me that he was sure his forces attacking Tripolitania were much further along than they had anticipated and that that was very good. I asked him what was bothering him about winding up the business with the Chiefs of Staff on Wednesday and he told me that he didn’t have anything specific in mind, that he thought the Chiefs of Staff were going to work out a pretty good agreement. He did tell me, however, that he intended to fly to Cairo as soon as the President left and work out the new Middle East Command with General Wilson in charge, and that he wanted to meet the President of Turkey perhaps in Cyprus, and push him pretty hard on the business of getting Turkey into the war, and giving us some adequate air bases, and to attack Roumanian oil fields. He told me he intended to take the line that Turkey should not wait until the last minute, but that if they were recalcitrant he would not hesitate to tell the Turks that in the event of their remaining out, he could not undertake to control the Russians regarding the Dardanelles and that their position would be intolerable.

I arranged to have dinner with Harriman and Churchill tonight because the President and Elliott are dining with General Patton. The Prime Minister was anxious that the President not tell Giraud that de Gaulle had refused to show up, because he was hoping to get a message from de Gaulle any minute. He said he wanted to come to see the President around five or six o’clock tonight. I went back to the house and told the President that the Prime Minister did not want Giraud told.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Roosevelt-Tedder meeting, 11:25 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Air Chief Marshal Tedder

Roosevelt-Giraud conversation, noon

Present
United States France
President Roosevelt General Giraud
Mr. Hopkins Captain Beaufre
Mr. Murphy
Captain McCrea
Lieutenant Colonel Roosevelt

McCrea Notes

Secret

Casablanca, 19 January 1943.

The President received General Henri Giraud at 12:00 noon this date. Present also were Mr. Harry Hopkins, Mr. Robert D. Murphy, Captain John L. McCrea, Lieutenant Colonel Elliott Roosevelt, and Captain A. Beaufre, Aide-de-camp, to General Giraud.

The President stated to General Giraud that he had been giving consideration to suggesting the formation of a “Committee for the Liberation of France,” to consist of General Giraud, General de Gaulle, and a civilian. The President stated that he recognized the choice of a civilian would no doubt be a matter of some concern to both Generals Giraud and de Gaulle. In this connection, he stated that there were no doubt many Frenchmen who would be unacceptable to Generals Giraud and de Gaulle, and that the important thing to do was to agree on someone of experience as a civil administrator, and unquestioned honesty. The President stated that he did not wish to appear as suggesting anyone, but that he had heard much favorable comment about M. Roger Cambon and M. Boisson. General Giraud stated that M. Petryon [Peyrouton] too had much in his favor. The President stated that under the circumstances, of course, General Giraud would be the senior member of such a committee and that General de Gaulle might be designated as Chief of Staff, or Inspector-General, or some such convenient title. The civilian member of the committee would be the Aide for Civil Administration, and that it was expected this latter member would relieve General Giraud of many of the duties which he now performs in connection with the civil administration. The impression that I gathered was that the formation of such a committee would meet with the approval of General Giraud. “No distractions,” said the General, “should be permitted to interfere with the conduct of the war.”

In response to a question by the President, General Giraud stated that practically all the political prisoners in North Africa had now been set free. It was stated that many of these prisoners had been confined since the start of the war. He stated that the political prisoners remaining in confinement were so held because of other crimes with which they were charged.

The President asked General Giraud that if the value of the franc were re-pegged in North Africa giving a higher value to the franc, would anyone stand to make a fortune out of such a revaluation. Both General Giraud and Mr. Murphy then explained to the President that there were no large money operators in North Africa. It was stated that no doubt a few people would stand to benefit by such a revaluation, but not in an alarming amount. The President then asked if anyone in France with a considerable amount of francs would stand to benefit by such a re-pegging. Both General Giraud and Mr. Murphy then explained to the President that the French Colonial monetary system is entirely divorced from the Bank of France, and that a revaluation such as proposed by the President would affect only the colonial franc and not the franc of the Bank of France.

The President stated that he had met with the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the evening of January 18 and that the subject of equipping the North African French Army had been given much consideration. The President stated that he was pleased to inform General Giraud that General Marshall was enthusiastic about the prospects of such an army and that he (General Marshall) had stated to the President that it was his intention to see that such an army was equipped with our latest and best material rather than from our surplus supplies of older material. General Giraud received this statement with much satisfaction and assured the President that a French army so equipped would give a good account of itself against the enemy.

General Giraud then raised the question of propaganda. He stated that propaganda was a well-recognized weapon, but that it had to be used with care. Specifically, he stated that propaganda intended for the French people must be directed by Frenchmen. He admitted that the United Nations had an interest in such propaganda and that it was only right that our interests be given consideration, but that in the final analysis, a Frenchman should pass on propaganda directed towards the French people. To this the President and Mr. Murphy agreed.

At 12:40 p.m., the President and General Giraud withdrew to the terrace where motion and still pictures were made. After a number of shots had thus been made, the President directed Mr. Hopkins, Captain McCrea, and Captain Beaufre to join the party, and additional pictures were made.

At 12:50 p.m., General Giraud and his aide, Captain Beaufre, withdrew.

JOHN L. McCREA
Captain, U.S. Navy

Hopkins Notes

[Extract]

Casablanca, January 19, 1943.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

I attended the conference between the President, Giraud, Murphy, Captain McCrea, Elliott, and Giraud’s Military Aide, Captain Beaufre. The President laid out to Giraud in a masterful fashion, his concept of French resistance, emphasizing the fighting. McCrea has made complete minutes of this meeting. I gained a very favorable impression of Giraud. I know he is a Royalist and is probably a right-winger in all his economic views, but I have a feeling that he is willing to fight. He is about six feet, two inches and a man of about 63 or 64. He has the appearance of health and vigor. He spoke with a good deal of modesty, but with confidence. Had a feeling that he had made up his mind that he was going to do whatever the President wanted in Africa. Apart from fighting in the war, it is impossible to tell whether or not he has political ambitions. He did not give me that impression except when he stressed later, with great vigor, his determination to head the civil as well as the military areas in Africa.

Giraud speaks no English, but the President’s French seemed to me to be better than usual, and Murphy, who did the interpreting, didn’t have much to do. It was only when the President wanted to be perfectly sure that Giraud knew what he was saying on an important matter, that he had Murphy interpret. Giraud laid out his problem[s], which his aide had previously told me, and the President settled them all to Giraud’s complete satisfaction, but on the sovereignty point he was adamant, and insisted that Giraud, at the moment, act only as a representative in North Africa, and that he not in any sense speak for France, and that the understanding about all other French possessions should be worked out only when de Gaulle arrived. The President and Giraud then went out on the back porch and a flock of Army photographers took pictures of them, and later of McCrea, Giraud’s aide and me with the President and Giraud. On the whole I thought it was a very satisfactory conference and I am sure that Giraud and the President have mutual confidence in each other.

. . . . . . . . . . . . . .

U.S. Navy Department (January 19, 1943)

Communiqué No. 255

Pacific and Far East.
U.S. submarines have reported the following results of operations against the enemy in the waters of these areas:

  1. One destroyer sunk.
  2. One large cargo ship sunk.
  3. One medium-sized transport sunk.
  4. One medium-sized cargo ship sunk.
  5. One small patrol vessel sunk.
  6. One large tanker damaged.
  7. One small cargo ship damaged.

These actions have not been announced in any previous Navy Department communiqué.

Brooklyn Eagle (January 19, 1943)

President orders strikers back to mines in 48 hours

Sees nation injured – threatens to take action if defied

Last Japanese stronghold in Papua captured

Remnants of 15,000 army fighting in rags and near starvation

1,291 casualties listed by Navy; 36 in Boro, Long Island

14 local men reported dead, 9 missing and 13 wounded between Dec. 16 and 31

U.S. subs sink 5 more ships in Pacific zone

Washington (UP) –
U.S. submarines, striking at enemy shipping in the Pacific and far East areas, have sunk five more enemy ships and damaged two others, the Navy announced today.

Ships sunk included were a destroyer, a large cargo ship, a medium-sized cargo ship and a small patrol vessel.

Damaged were one large tanker and one small cargo ship.

Today’s announcements brought to 112 the total of enemy ships sunk as a result of U.S. submarine operations in the Pacific since Pearl Harbor. Twenty-two others have been probably sunk and 29 damaged.

Fuel oil ration for industries cut 40%

Reduction is ordered in 17 Eastern states for first 1943 quarter

Says only defeatists call for smaller Army


Drafting of men with children expected soon

Peggy on stand in Flynn case

‘We’re not winning transportation battle,’ Navy says

625 Allied and neutral ships sunk by Axis in the Western Atlantic

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Service needs tripled blood donations in 1943

1280px-American_Red_Cross_Logo.svg

Washington (UP) –
Four million pints of blood are needed by the Army and Navy during 1943, chairman Norman H. Davis of the American Red Cross announced today.

That is more than three times the amount received from volunteer donors at Red Cross centers last year.

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War hero, 24, to make film debut in Sahara – to produce Night Fighters

By Jane Corby

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The Pittsburgh Press (January 19, 1943)

Ernie Pyle V Norman

Roving Reporter

By Ernie Pyle

A forward airdrome in French North Africa – (Jan. 18)
While bad weather stymies the ground fighting in Tunisia, the air war on both sides has been daily increasing in intensity until it has reached a really violent tempo.

Not a day passes without heavy bombing of Axis ports, vicious strafing of cities and airdromes, losses on both sides and constant watchful patrolling.

Here, at one of our airdromes, all of us can assure you that being bombed is no fun. Yet these tired, hard-worked Americans jokingly decided to send a telegram to Allied headquarters asking them to arrange for the Jerrys to stop there each evening and pick up our mail.

I am living at this airdrome for a while. It can’t be named, although the Germans obviously know where it is, since they call on us frequently. Furthermore, they announced quite a while ago by radio that they would destroy the place within three days.

I hadn’t been here three hours till the Germans came. They arrived just at dusk. And they came arrogantly, flying low. Some of them must have regretted their audacity, for they never got home. The fireworks that met them were beautiful from the ground, but must have been hideous up where they were.

They dropped bombs on several parts of the field, but their aim was marred at the last minute. There were no direct hits on anything. Not a man was scratched, though the stories of near misses multiplied into the hundreds by the next day.

One soldier who had found a bottle of wine was lying in a pup tent drinking. He never got up during the raid just lay there cussing at the Germans:

You can’t touch me, you blankety-blanks! Go to hell, you so-and-so’s!

When the raid was over, he was untouched, but the tent a foot above him was riddled with shrapnel.

Another soldier made a practice of keeping a canteen hanging just above his head. That night when he went to take a drink, the canteen was empty. Investigation revealed a shrapnel hole, through which the water had run out.

Another soldier had the front sight of his rifle shot off by a German machine-gun bullet.

Some of the soldiers were actually picking tiny bits of shrapnel out of their coats all the next day. Yet, as I said, not a drop of American blood was shed.

When this airdrome was first set up the soldiers dug slit trenches just deep enough to lie down in during a raid, but after each new bombing the trenches get deeper.

Everybody makes fun of himself but keeps on digging. Today some of these trenches are more than eight feet deep. I’ll bet there has been more whole-hearted digging here in two weeks than WPA did in two years.

The officers don’t have to hound their men. They dig with a will of their own, and with a vengeance. If we stay here long enough we’ll probably have to install elevators to get to the bottom of the trenches.

After supper you see officers as well as men out digging. Each little group has its own trench design. Some are just square holes. Some form an L. Some are regulation zigzag.

The ground here is dry, and the trenches don’t fill up with water as they do in the coastal and mountain camps. The earth is as hard as concrete. You have to use an ax as well as a pick and shovel.

You’d love our air-raid alarm system. It consists of a dinner bell hanging from a date palm tree outside headquarters. When the radio watchers give the order the dinner bell is rung. Then the warning is carried to the far ends of the vast airdrome by sentries shooting revolvers and rifles into the air. At night it sounds like a small battle.

When the alarm goes, the soldiers get excited and mad too. When the Germans come over, the anti-aircraft guns throw up a fantastic Fourth of July torrent of red tracer bullets. But to the soldiers on the ground that isn’t enough, so they let loose with everything from Colt .45s up to Tommy guns.

If the Germans don’t kill us, we’ll probably shoot ourselves.

U.S. State Department (January 19, 1943)

Meeting of the Combined Chiefs of Staff, 4 p.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom France
General Marshall General Brooke General Giraud
Admiral King Admiral of the Fleet Pound
Lieutenant General Arnold Air Chief Marshal Portal
Lieutenant General Somervell Field Marshal Dill
Rear Admiral Cooke Vice Admiral Mountbatten
Brigadier General Hull Lieutenant General Ismay
Brigadier General Wedemeyer Major General Kennedy
Colonel Smart Air Vice Marshal Slessor
Commander Libby Air Vice Marshal Inglis
Major Codman Lieutenant Colonel Hirsch
Secretariat
Brigadier Dykes
Brigadier General Deane
Brigadier Jacob

Combined Chiefs of Staff Minutes

January 19, 1943, 4 p.m.

Secret
  1. Axis Oil Position
    (C.C.S. 158)

The Combined Chiefs of Staff had before them a note by the Assistant Chief of British Air Staff (Intelligence) summarizing the latest British views on the Axis oil position (C.C.S. 158).

Sir Charles Portal said that the British had fully realized the great strategical importance of oil targets in Germany, but for tactical reasons these were extremely difficult to attack. The most important targets were the synthetic oil plants and the Rumanian oil refineries. Unfortunately the latter, from bases at present available, were at extreme range of our bombers; and he felt that it would be a mistake to make light and sporadic attacks on Ploesti, which would do little harm and only result in an increase of the German air defenses. It would be better to wait until we had the Turkish air bases before starting our attacks. The synthetic oil plants were in the Ruhr and elsewhere, but they were very small targets which needed precision bombing to put out of action. Recent developments in radio navigation increased the chances of success on these targets, and great hopes were placed on the possibility of daylight precision bombing by the U.S. Air Forces. When a sufficient force had been built up in a few months’ time, it might be possible to resume attacks on these targets more effectively, provided of course that this could be achieved without prejudice to the U-boat warfare.

General Arnold pointed out that the Ploesti fields – which were roughly equidistant from Sicily, Benghazi, Cairo, and Aleppo – were within range of the B-24 with a load of 4,000 pounds of bombs or under.

Sir Charles Portal pointed out that one of the chief difficulties was getting the necessary meteorological information, without which long-distance attacks of this nature were unlikely to be successful. It was becoming increasingly difficult to obtain information from secret radio stations in the Balkans owing to the activities of the Gestapo.

Air Vice Marshal Inglis confirmed that in the British view the Rumanian oil supplies were vital to Germany. Her stocks were so low that she depended on Rumanian oil for about thirty-three percent of her total need.

General Somervell said that the latest American estimate was less optimistic about the shortage of oil in Germany than the British. It was believed that Germany would have a surplus of about 40,000,000 barrels at the end of 1943 instead of the 10,000,000 barrels which she had at the end of 1942, owing to the opening up of new sources in Hungary and elsewhere. It was, therefore, calculated that even if the whole of the Rumanian production were knocked out early in the year, she would still have enough for operations in 1944. There were two tetraethyl lead factories however, the destruction of which would hamstring the production of German aviation fuel.

Sir Charles Portal suggested that this latest American information should be immediately given to the British Intelligence Staffs with a view to the production of an agreed estimate.

General Marshall emphasized the importance of making great efforts against German oil if we could be sure that it formed a really critical target. U.S. aircraft in the Southwest Pacific were bombing targets at a greater distance from their base than Rumania from the present bases available. We might have to wait a long time before the Turkish bases could be used.

Sir Charles Portal said that we must be sure our bombing would be really effective. The value of attacks on German oil had to be balanced against the needs of Husky, for which we should try to cause the maximum loss to the German air forces in the Mediterranean during the coming months. Only by this means could we hope to obtain the necessary air superiority on which depended the success of the operation.

After some discussion,

The Committee:
a) Took note that the Axis oil situation is so restricted that it is decidedly advantageous that bombing attacks on the sources of Axis oil – namely, the Rumanian oilfields and oil traffic via the Danube, and the synthetic and producer gas plants in Germany – be undertaken as soon as other commitments allow.

b) Directed the Combined Intelligence Committee to submit as early as possible an agreed assessment of the Axis oil situation based on the latest information available from both British and U.S. sources.

  1. Allied Plans Relating to Turkey
    (C.C.S. 157)

In discussing C.C.S. 157, Sir Alan Brooke said that the plans for inducing Turkey to enter the war on the side of the United Nations were largely political and that the military efforts were designed to further the political negotiations.

He said that Turkey is in need of specialized equipment and that it would be preferable to furnish operating units rather than the equipment alone. The Turkish people are not particularly adept in handling mechanized equipment, but they seem to have a strong desire to attempt it. As a result, we shall probably have to furnish the equipment with certain personnel to train Turkish troops in its use.

Sir Alan Brooke then presented the following draft resolution which he recommended be approved by the Combined Chiefs of Staff:

The Combined Chiefs of Staff recognize that Turkey lies within a theater of British responsibility, and that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British in the same way that all matters connected with China are handled by the United States of America.

In particular, the British should be responsible for framing and presenting to both Assignment Boards all bids for equipment for Turkey. The onward despatch to Turkey from the Middle East of such equipment will be a function of command of the British Commanders-in-Chief in the Middle East. They will not divert much equipment to other uses except for urgent operational reasons, and will report such diversions to the appropriate Munitions Assignment Board.

General Somervell stated that just prior to his departure from Washington, an agreement had been reached between the State Department and the British Joint Staff Mission as to methods by which munitions should be supplied to Turkey.

Sir Alan Brooke said that this agreement was not acceptable in London. He pointed out that any agreements previously made were superseded by the agreement arrived at on January 18th between the Prime Minister and the President which provided that all matters connected with Turkey should be handled by the British in the same way that all matters connected with China are handled by the United States.

General Marshall stated that he desired more time to study the resolution referred to above and requested that action with regard to it be postponed until the meeting of January 20th. He said that there was some confusion in his mind as to just what was intended with regard to Turkey. The President had said that he had hoped to arrange for Turkey’s permission for the passage of munitions en route to Russia through Turkish territory. C.C.S. 157 indicates that certain arrangements have already been made regarding the supply of munitions to Russia. In addition, the decision has been reached to make certain troop concentrations available to assist Turkey in the event that she enters into the war on the side of the United Nations. He asked Sir Alan Brooke what he considered the probabilities with regard to Turkey would be.

Sir Alan Brooke said that the British had an agreement to assist Turkey if she were attacked. The agreement includes furnishing Turkey 26 squadrons of pursuit aviation. In order that these squadrons might be able to operate quickly, certain necessary equipment had already been sent there. This had been a defensive agreement, but the intention is now to operate an offensive from Turkey. The present plan is that Turkey should merely hold the Axis forces beyond her frontier and thus secure air bases from which the United Nations could operate against Rumania.

He said it was hoped that we could induce Turkey to come into the war. This might be accomplished by political moves. Certain territorial promises might be made to Turkey at this time. For example, they might be promised the “Duck’s Bill” in Syria, control of the Dodecanese, certain parts of Bulgaria, and assurance that her communications in the Bosphorus will be unhampered. The more apparent a victory by the United Nations becomes, the more will Turkey desire to have a place at the peace table. This might be sufficient inducement for her to join the United Nations. In any event, our efforts with regard to Turkey will not be very costly, but they may provide an opportunity for appreciable gains.

General Marshall said that he had no doubt about the value of bringing Turkey into the war. He thought that if she could be induced to join us at the right moment, the results might play a determining part in the conclusion of the war. He asked Sir Alan Brooke what he thought Turkey’s reaction might be if we effected a large concentration in the rear of her borders.

Sir Alan Brooke said it would strengthen the United Nations in the eyes of Turkey and give tangible evidence that we are ready to assist her. He said that the capture of the Dodecanese by the United Nations would give Turkey a feeling of confidence in their power but that these islands could be much more easily captured by an operation from Turkey, once she had joined in with us. He added that there is no possibility of doing operation Husky and capturing the Dodecanese simultaneously.

Sir Charles Portal said that holding the Dodecanese would facilitate operations in Turkey by insuring the use of the port of Smyrna.

The Committee:
a) Agreed to consider the proposed resolution on Turkey, quoted above, at the meeting on January 20th.

b) Took note of the paper under consideration.

  1. Meeting With General Giraud

General Marshall said that the Combined Chiefs of Staff were much honored by the presence of General Giraud and were very pleased that it had been possible to arrange the meeting. He hoped that General Giraud would express his views, and in particular that he would indicate the present status of the French forces and the rapidity with which they could be built up.

General Giraud said that he was proud at being able to participate in the work of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The French army had now reentered the war and had not only the will to fight but also the experience and knowledge. As an example, he might mention a message which he had that morning received on the telephone from his Chief of Staff; this was to the effect that the Germans had yesterday attacked the junction of the British and French armies between Medjes el Bab and Pont du Fahs with 80 tanks supported by infantry. On the British front the attack had completely broken down and 10 tanks had been knocked out. On the French front an attack by 50 tanks had been made against a battalion locality. The battalion had held its ground all day, and it was not until the evening that certain advanced posts were evacuated by order of the battalion commander. He had not had any further news but he understood that the situation was in hand. The action showed the quality of the French troops. They had not been able to knock out any tanks as they had no antitank guns. They had, however, prevented the German infantry from supporting their tanks and had held their ground. Similar examples had occurred on the whole front during the last two months. Such troops were worthy of modern arms.

On the existing cadres, the French army could form three armored divisions and ten mobile infantry divisions. It would also be possible to raise the following air forces:

  • 50 fighter squadrons with 500 aircraft.
  • 30 light bomber squadrons with 300 aircraft.
  • 200 transport aircraft.

Such a force was an indispensable accompaniment for a modern army. The French pilots had already given proof of what they could do. One squadron of the Groupe Lafayette, armed with 12 P-40 aircraft, had been fighting for the last six days; they had shot down five enemy aircraft for the loss of one. He was particularly anxious to receive: first, fighter aircraft in the supply of which he hoped the British would participate; and, subsequently, light bombers so that he could equip the pilots of whose quality he had intimate knowledge and who would quickly master the new equipment. He realized that there were considerable difficulties due to the shortage of shipping and the needs of the Allied forces. Some of the aircraft, however, could fly from America, and possibly the fighters might be flown in from aircraft carriers. He felt confident that the French army could make a great contribution to the European campaign if it were properly equipped. He estimated that the campaign in North Africa would be over in two months’ time; and in this campaign he included the capture of Sicily, Sardinia and Corsica, which he regarded as forming a direct prolongation of Africa and as bases for further action.

General Marshall said that he was very glad to have heard General Giraud’s views. Speaking on behalf of the U.S. Army, air and ground, he explained that he was going into the details of how quickly modern equipment could be provided for the French Army. He knew that the shipping question was under detailed consideration by Admiral King and French Naval officers. General Somervell, the Head of the Services of Supply, had already called on General Giraud to discuss these matters and had reported thereon to him. The question of priority of delivery of items and the method to be adopted in equipping French Units would be taken up with General Giraud. General Arnold had been conferring with French officers to see what could be done to provide air equipment. It was in the interests of the U.S.A. to bring the French forces to a high state of efficiency, and everything possible would be done to obviate the difficulties of distance. It was not a question of whether to equip the French Army, but rather of how to carry it out. Availability of equipment was not the limiting factor, but transport.

Sir Alan Brooke expressed, on behalf of the British Chiefs of Staff, great pleasure at the report which General Giraud had given of the state of the French Army. With the more limited resources at the disposal of the British, they would do what they could to help in providing modern equipment. He fully realized the important part which the French forces would play in bringing the war to a successful conclusion.

Admiral King said that arrangements were well in hand for the rehabilitation in rotation of the French warships. Resources would not permit of them being dealt with all at once. He welcomed the officers and men of the French Navy who were now joining in the struggle for victory.

Sir Dudley Pound said that the navies of the Allies were now fighting in every ocean of the world and the U-boats were extending their activities further and further afield. The combined British and American naval forces were less than we should like to have to meet this menace, and the help of the French naval forces would be most welcome. From his experience at the beginning of the war, he knew the value of French naval assistance, and he knew also that this help would be of the same quality now as then.

Sir Charles Portal said that he had the clearest recollection from two wars of the skill and high performance of the French air forces. He, therefore, hoped that they could be equipped as soon as possible to fight once more alongside the Allies. Within the limit of British resources, which were considerably strained, everything would be done to hasten the day of this collaboration.

General Arnold said that he had been trying for some time to find the most effective use for the French pilots, who had proved their ability to take over and operate skillfully American equipment. He hoped that this study would soon be completed.

Sir John Dill said that he felt inspired by the presence of General Giraud, knowing as he did how much General Giraud had suffered for France. It was a matter of great pleasure, therefore, to have the General back to lead France to victory.

General Giraud said that in the early days of the war he had worked in the closest touch with the British Army. The cooperation between all arms at that time, and particularly between the 1st French Army and the Second Corps, of which Sir John Dill was the distinguished Commander, had showed how close such contact could be. Now once more cooperation had been resumed. In September 1940, when he was in a German prison camp, he had told the German generals that they had lost the war. Their attempt to invade Great Britain had failed, and though he could not prophesy how long the war would last, Germany could never win. Sooner or later the U.S. would come to the help of Great Britain. The Germans had asked him to sign a paper to say that he would not escape during the period of two hours each day when the French generals were allowed outside. He had said that he refused to sign any paper in German. They had asked him whether he was planning to escape as he had done in 1915. He had said:

Never mind what I am thinking. You are my jailers, I am your prisoner. It is your duty to guard me; it is my duty to escape. Let us see who can carry out his duty best. It took a year to get away, but now I am here amongst you once more.

The Combined Chiefs of Staff expressed with applause their warm approval of the statement made by General Giraud who then withdrew from the meeting.