America at war! (1941--) -- Part 2

Aircraft workers given pay increases

Roosevelt, Churchill wait major war development

Prospective capitulation of Italy may be keeping Prime Minister in Washington

Yank bombers make landings in Switzerland

By Paul Ghali

New officer is sent to 8th Air Force

Millett: War may break up family yet mother remains brave

Some women sit around and feel sorry for selves but others find causes worth serving
By Ruth Millett

Ernie Pyle V Norman

Roving Reporter

By Ernie Pyle

Ernie Pyle returned to the United States today for a well-earned rest after 14 months spent in Ireland, England, Africa and Sicily. The following column and several others still to be printed were written before he left Sicily.

Somewhere in Sicily, Italy – (by wireless)
When the 45th Division went into reserve along the north coast of Sicily after several weeks of hard fighting, I moved on with the 3rd Division, which took up the ax and drove the enemy on to Messina.

I am still doing Engineers, and it was on my very first day with the 3rd that we hit the most difficult and spectacular engineering job of the Sicilian campaign.

You’ve doubtless noticed Point Calava on your maps. It is a great stub of rock that sticks out into the sea, forming a high ridge running back into the interior. The coast highway is tunneled through this big rock, and on either side of the tunnel the road sticks out like a shelf on the sheer rock wall.

Our Engineers figured the Germans would blow the tunnel entrance to seal it up. But they didn’t. They had an even better idea. They picked out a spot about 50 feet beyond the tunnel mouth and blew a hole 150 feet long in the road shelf. They blew it so deeply and thoroughly that if you dropped a rock into it, the rock would never stop rolling until it bounced into the sea a couple of hundred feet below.

We were beautifully bottlenecked. You couldn’t bypass the rock, for it dropped sheer into the sea. You couldn’t bypass over the mountain; that would take weeks. You couldn’t fill the hole, for it would keep sliding off into the water.

All you could do was bridge it, and that was a hell of a job. But bridge it they did, and in only 24 hours.

Infantry crawls across chasm

When the first Engineer officers went up to inspect the tunnel, I went with them. We had to leave the jeep at a blown bridge and walk the last four miles uphill. We went with an infantry battalion that was following the retreating Germans.

When we got there, we found the tunnel floor mined. But each spot where they’d dug into the hard rock floor left its telltale mark, so it was no job for the Engineers to uncover and unscrew the detonators of scores of mines. Then we went on through to the vast hole beyond, and the engineering officers began making their calculations.

As we did so, the regiment of infantry crawled across the chasm, one man at a time. You could just barely make it on foot by holding on to the rock juttings and practically crawling.

Another regiment went up over the ridge and took out after the evacuating enemy with only what weapons and provisions they could carry on their backs. Before another 24 hours, they’d be 20 miles ahead of us and in contact with the enemy, so getting this hole bridged and supplies and supporting guns to them was indeed a matter of life and death.

Room for only so many

It was around 2 p.m. when we got there and in two hours the little platform of highway at the crater mouth resembled a littered street in front of a burning building. Air hoses covered the ground, serpentined over each other. Three big air compressors were parked side by side, their engines cutting off and on in that erratically deliberate manner of air compressors, and jackhammers clattered their nerve-shattering din.

Bulldozers came to clear off the stone-blocked highway at the crater edge. Trucks, with long trailers bearing railroad irons and huge timbers, came and unloaded. Steel cable was brought up, and kegs of spikes, and all kinds of crowbars and sledges.

The thousands of vehicles of the division were halted some 10 miles back in order to keep the highway clear for the engineers. One platoon of men at a time worked in the hole. There was no use throwing in the whole company, for there was room for only so many.

At suppertime, hot rations were brought up by truck. The 3rd Division Engineers went on K ration at noon, but morning and evening they get hot food up to them, regardless of the job.

If you could see how they toll, you would know how important this hot food is. By dusk, the work was in full swing and half the men were stripped to the waist.

The night air of the Mediterranean was tropical. The moon came out at twilight and extended our light for a little while. The moon was new and pale, and transient, high-flying night clouds brushed it and scattered shadows down on us.

Then its frail light went out, and the blinding nightlong darkness settled over the insidious abyss. But the work never slowed nor halted throughout the night.

Clapper: Alliances

By Raymond Clapper

U.S. State Department (September 7, 1943)

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Washington, 7 September 1943.

Secret
CCS 270/7

Plans for the Use of the Azores

With reference to CCS 270/4, the U.S. Chiefs of Staff present to the British Chiefs of Staff for their information a brief outline of operations in the Azores contemplated by the U.S.:
a. The employment of anti-submarine aircraft initially in the coverage of all convoys on the Middle Atlantic lanes, and eventually for patrol around the Azores as necessary to obtain effective anti-submarine aircraft coverage of the Middle Atlantic.

b. The employment initially of not to exceed two naval support groups from the Azores bases in anti-submarine operations on Middle Atlantic convoy routes; to be subsequently expanded should adjustment of convoy routes dictate.

c. Operations of air transport service and ferry delivery service to the United Kingdom, the Mediterranean areas, India and China.

It is estimated that the above proposed operations will require the following facilities:
a. For U.S. Naval surface craft: San Miguel Island. One operating and supply base at Ponta Delgada.

b. For U.S. Naval aircraft:
(1) Fayal Island. One seaplane base at Horta, with, sufficient facilities to accommodate 6 ASW seaplanes, and 6 NATS seaplanes.

(2) San Miguel Island. One landplane base with three 6,000 ft. runways, and facilities for 12 VLR landplanes and 1 group (approximately 30) of CVE aircraft, capable of expansion to provide for 4 squadrons of VLR aircraft.

c. For U.S. Army Air Force aircraft:
(1) Terceira Island. One landplane base at Lagens Field with two 7,000 ft. runways for air transport and ferry operations, and accommodations for 3,500 personnel.

(2) Flores Island. One landplane base with two 7,000 ft. runways for air transport and ferry operations. If the terrain of Flores Island does not permit adequate air base construction, the base may be placed on Santa Maria Island. Housing facilities to be provided to accommodate 3,300 personnel.

d. Existing cable systems and communications facilities essential to the operations of U.S. forces based on and operating through the Azores and to the operations of U.S. forces in the North African and European theaters of operations.

Ultimate U.S. forces for which accommodations will be required are estimated to amount to:

U.S. Army 6800
U.S. Navy 1400

The U.S. Chiefs of Staff plan preliminary preparations at this time in order that these facilities can be established in the Azores at the earliest practicable date.

U.S. State Department (September 8, 1943)

President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to the Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ

Washington, September 7, 1943.
[September 8, 1943, 1:15 a.m.]

Secret
Operational priority

7194.

From President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to General Eisenhower, personal and secret.
Your No. W9412 Dated September 7, 1943.

The President and the Prime Minister approve the following for press release. This release will be made by them jointly at a press conference in Washington at 1830 B on September 8, 1943.

At this moment General Eisenhower is broadcasting the following announcement:

The Italian Government has surrendered its armed forces unconditionally. As allied commander-in-chief, I have granted a military armistice, the terms of which have been approved by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States, and of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, acting in the interests of the United Nations. The Italian Government has bound itself to abide by these terms without reservation. The armistice was signed by my representative and the representative of Marshal Badoglio, and becomes effective this instant. Hostilities between the armed forces of the United Nations and those of Italy terminate at once. All Italians who now actively help to eject the German aggressor from Italian soil will have the assistance and support of the United Nations.

Marshal Badoglio has undertaken simultaneously to make an announcement of the armistice, and his message to the Italian armed forces and people will be issued forthwith.

The President and the Prime Minister added that the armistice is strictly a military instrument, signed by soldiers. No political, financial or economic terms are included. These will be imposed later. The granting of an armistice does not necessarily imply recognition of any Italian government, or acceptance of Italy as an ally or collaborator.

Völkischer Beobachter (September 8, 1943)

Das Ziel des Sowjetimperialismus: Dardanellen und Persischer Golf –
Roosevelt als Schrittmacher Moskaus

Roosevelts Leibagitator

Von unserem Lissaboner Berichterstatter C. E. Frhrn. v. Merck

Um die militärische und politische Vorrangstellung –
Washington sichert die britische Beute

Von unserer Stockholmer Schriftleitung

Die Versenkungserfolge Japans vom August –
Japanische Gegenoffensive bei Salamaua

Verstärkte Abwehr zersprengt feindliche Verbände –
53 viermotorige Terrorbomber abgeschossen

dnb. Aus dem Führer-Hauptquartier, 7. September –
Das Oberkommando der Wehrmacht gibt bekannt:

Im Süden der Ostfront standen unsere Truppen gestern in sehr schweren Abwehrkämpfen gegen starke sowjetische Infanterie- und Panzerkräfte. Von der übrigen Ostfront werden bis auf örtliche Kampftätigkeit am Kubanbrückenkopf und im hohen Norden keine besonderen Ereignisse gemeldet.

Einheiten der Kriegsmarine wiesen im Finnischen Meerbusen an der Ostküste der Logabucht Landungsversuche sowjetischer Stoßtrupps ab und schossen dabei zwei kleine Landungsboote in Brand. Bei einem Nachtgefecht wurde ein feindliches Schnellboot versenkt.

Der Feind verlor gestern an der Ostfront 144 Panzer und 59 Flugzeuge.

Auf der kalabrischen Halbinsel hatten unsere Sicherungstruppen nur geringe Gefechtsberührung mit dem Feinde. Nördlich Palmi wurde ein britischer Angriff abgewiesen.

Feindliche Bomberverbände drangen am gestrigen Tage, begünstigt durch unsichtiges Wetter, in den südwestdeutschen Raum ein. Sie wurden durch Jagdflieger und Flakartillerie zersprengt und kamen dadurch nicht zu einem einheitlichen Angriff. Mehrere schwer beschädigte feindliche Flugzeuge landeten auf Schweizer Gebiet. Bombenwürfe auf die Städte Stuttgart und Straßburg verursachten Personenverluste und Schäden.

In der vergangenen Nacht griffen britische Bomber das Gebiet von München an. Auch sie wurden bereits vor Erreichen des Zieles zersprengt. Es entstanden Schäden in Wohnvierteln und an öffentlichen Gebäuden der Stadt sowie in einigen Ortschaften Südbayerns. Die Bevölkerung hatte Verluste.

Bei den gestrigen Tages- und Nachtangriffen vernichteten Luftverteidigungskräfte nach bisher vorliegenden unvollständigen Meldungen 53 viermotorige britische und nordamerikanische Bomber.

Verbände der Luftwaffe bekämpften in der vergangenen Nacht wirksam stark belegte Flugzeugstützpunkte des Feindes im Raum von Cambridge. Zwei deutsche Flugzeuge werden vermißt.


Italienischer Wehrmachtbericht –
Bomben auf Biserta

dnb. Rom, 7. September –
Der italienische Wehrmachtbericht vom Dienstag lautet:

Im Verlauf des geordneten und langsamen Rückzugmanövers an der Küstenzone Südkalabriens haben sich zwischen feindlichen Voraustruppen und Nachhuten der Verteidigung lebhafte Kämpfe entwickelt. In den Gewässern Siziliens wurde ein Schiff von einem unserer Flugzeuge torpediert: deutsche Flugzeuge haben über den Hafen von Biserta zahlreiche Bomben abgeworfen.

Eine bedeutende Anzahl viermotoriger feindlicher Flugzeuge hat das Zentrum der Stadt Neapel angegriffen und schwere Schäden verursacht. Ebenso wurden Ortschäften in der Provinz Neapel und Salerno angegriffen, wobei schwere Schäden entstanden sind. Drei feindliche Flugzeuge wurden von italienisch-deutschen Jägern abgeschossen, ein weiteres wurde von der Artillerie eines Geleitzuges zerstört.


Die Kämpfe in Kalabrien

An der Nordküste Kalabriens verstärkten sich die gelandeten Briten am 4. und 5. September weiterhin durch Zuführung von Truppen und Material. Trotz sehr starken feindlichen Jagdschutzes griffen deutsche und italienische Kampfflugzeuge die Landungsstellen und Übersetzfahrzeuge wiederholt an, brachten dem Feind durch Bombentreffer empfindliche Verluste an Menschen und Material bei und schossen in Luftkämpfen mehrere britische und nordamerikanische Flugzeuge ab.

Mit den nachgeführten Kräften versuchte der Gegner in das Gebirge einzudringen, doch lieferten hier die deutsch-italienischen Sicherungen, deren Widerstand durch das zerklüftete Bergland erleichtert wurde, den vorgehenden Briten schwere, für den Feind verlustreiche Gefechte.

Auch an den folgenden Tagen führten Briten und Kanadier mehrere solcher Unternehmen durch. Die deutsch-italienischen Truppen beschränkten sich weiter auf hinhaltende Verteidigungskämpfe und erschwerten durch umfangreiche Sprengungen und Feuerüberfälle das Vordringen der feindlichen Verbände.

Europäische Juden möchten Palästina ‚industrialisieren‘ –
Araber sollen Kulis werden

Eigener Bericht des „Völkischen Beobachters“

U.S. State Department (September 8, 1943)

Roosevelt-Churchill meeting, 10:55 a.m.

Present
United States United Kingdom
President Roosevelt Prime Minister Churchill
General Marshall Field Marshal Dill

Memorandum by the U.S. Chiefs of Staff

Washington, 8 September 1943

Secret
CCS 339

Directive for the Control Commission and AMG in Italy

It is necessary that General Eisenhower be furnished immediately with a Directive for his use in the event that the Conditions of Surrender are accomplished. The Directive should inform him:

a. Whom he shall designate as Military Governor for occupied Italy.

b. The Basic Organization of the Control Commission and its relationship with Allied Military Government and the Italian National Government, as General Eisenhower requested in his Naf 340.

Facts bearing on the problem

a. General Eisenhower, pursuant to the Directive furnished him for HUSKY, established Allied Military Government. He designated General Alexander as Military Governor and empowered him to exercise the functions of Allied Military Government in Sicily. Recently General Eisenhower requested authority to extend the jurisdiction of Allied Military Government under General Alexander to areas of continental Italy captured in the near future. General Eisenhower was given such authority. General Eisenhower cabled that he did not intend that the authority given the Commanding General, 15th Army Group, would include supervision of the Italian National Government.

b. General Eisenhower, in his Naf 340, outlined his preliminary plans for handling the Control Commission, Allied Military Government in Italy, and the Italian Government. This planning has been done in the absence of any such Directive from the Combined Chiefs of Staff. A reply to Naf 340 has been sent to General Eisenhower, which confirms his present planning program, but which does not constitute an adequate Directive. The reply states that he will receive such a Directive in the near future.

Discussion

a. Control Commission
The Control Commission referred to in this Paper is created by the authority contained in Paragraph 37 of the comprehensive surrender terms Document in General Eisenhower’s possession and is quoted herewith:

There will be appointed a Control Commission representative of the United Nations, charged with regulating and executing this instrument under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief.

With reference to the term “United Nations” mentioned above, the Document states in the preamble that the United States and United Kingdom governments are acting on behalf of the United Nations. This explains the reason for establishing a Control Commission consisting of personnel furnished generally by the U.S. and U.K.

b. Jurisdictional Authority of AMG and the Control Commission. The jurisdictional authority of the Control Commission, the Allied Military Government in Italy (AMG), and the Italian Government can be explained as follows:

(1) The Control Commission is charged in the Instrument of Surrender with regulating and executing its provisions. Therefore, the Commission enforces the Surrender Conditions; it does not govern. The Commission operates under the orders and general directions of the Allied Commander-in-Chief. In the performance of its duties, the Commission functions through existing governmental agencies, whether it is territory being governed by the Italian Government, or by AMG.

(2) AMG is a governing body, and constitutes the sovereign authority in occupied Italy.

(3) The Italian Government constitutes the sovereign authority in unoccupied Italy.

(4) The Control Commission operates throughout Italy and makes use of both governments as its operators in order to assure compliance with the provisions of the Surrender Terms. The Control Commission is not an administrative governmental agency, and does not infringe upon the functions of the Italian Government or AMG.

(5) The division of Italy into occupied and unoccupied areas is based on military considerations and not on economic self-sufficiency. Hence it is of the utmost importance that there be close coordination between the policies and operations of AMG, the Italian Government, and the Control Commission.

Conclusion

a. Conflicts in the operation of AMG and the Control Commission may well ensue in actual practice unless one individual is the head of both agencies. To insure complete cooperation and coordination between AMG and the Control Commission, and to insure that the same policies prevail in both occupied and unoccupied territories, it is proposed that General Eisenhower designate an American officer of high rank to serve both as Military Governor of Italy and Deputy President of the Control Commission.

b. The Enclosure is a proposed Directive to General Eisenhower.

c. We are informed that the British members of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee concur in the proposed Directive subject to comment from London.

Recommendation

That the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the enclosed Directive and submit it to the President and the Prime Minister for their approval.

Enclosure

Draft Directive on Military Government in Italy

Secret

Directive to General Eisenhower from the Combined Chiefs of Staff

In the event that the terms of surrender are concluded, it is of the utmost importance that the Control Commission for Italy and AMG follow uniform policies and procedure in their dealings with the Italian Government and people. Their functions must be completely coordinated under one supreme authority. To accomplish this, you will announce yourself as President of the Control Commission, and appoint a Deputy President who will also be the Military Governor of occupied Italy.

Allied Military Government. The Directives for AMG for HUSKY will serve as a basis for AMG in Italy. As circumstances require, you will acquaint the Italians and Italian Government with the areas over which AMG has extended or will extend its jurisdiction.

Control Commission.
a. Functions. To enforce and execute the Instrument of Surrender under your orders and general directives.

b. Organization. The Control Commission will be divided into three sections: (1) Military, (2) Political, (3) Economic and Administrative. Each Section will be in charge of a Vice-President, and will be divided into sub-commissions to conform as nearly as practicable with the Organization of Italian Ministries.

c. The Military Section will be divided into the following sub-commissions: (1) Naval Forces, (2) Land Forces, (3) Air Forces, (4) Prisoners of War, (5) War Material Factories, and (6) Material Disposal.

d. The Economic and Administrative Section will be divided into the following sub-commissions: (1) Interior, (2) Justice (Law, Order, Police, Prisons), (3) Finance, (4) Foreign Trade, (5) Industry and Commerce, (6) Public Works and Utilities, (7) Fuel, (8) Food, (9) Agriculture, (10) Public Health, (11) Labor, (12) Transportation, (13) Communications (Postal Telegraph, and Telephone, Radio).

e. The Political Section will be divided into the following sub-commissions: (1) Foreign and Internal Affairs, (2) Civilian Internees and Displaced Persons, (3) Information, Press, Censorship, and (4) Fine Arts and Archives.

f. Where the functions of the various Sections overlap, liaison and, if necessary, exchange of personnel, will be arranged between the sub-commissions concerned.

g. A suitable Secretariat should be established.

h. You may assume that each Government will assume expenses of the personnel it furnishes, and that other expenses will be shared equally.

Personnel.
a. Allocation of posts between U.S. and U.K. The Commission will be organized generally on an Anglo-American basis, according to the most convenient alternation of posts and preserving the ratio in numbers of 50/50; at any rate, in the higher posts.

b. The allocation of the principal posts between U.S. and U.K. is as follows:

Deputy President of the Commission U.S.
Vice President in charge of the Military Section U.S.
Deputy Vice President in charge of the Military Section U.K.
Vice President in charge of the Political Section U.K.
Deputy Vice President in charge of the Political Section U.S.
Vice President in charge of the Economic and Administrative Section U.K.
Deputy Vice President in charge of the Economic and Administrative Section U.S.

In the event a vacancy should occur in the posts of the Deputy President, Vice Presidents, or Deputy Vice Presidents, such a vacancy will be filled by a person of the same nationality.

The posts of heads of the sub-commissions will, insofar as possible, be distributed equally between the U.S. and U.K., and the assistant heads will similarly be of opposite nationality.

Except in special cases, the personnel of the Military and Economic and Administrative Sections should have a military status, and the personnel of the Political Section should have a civilian status. The Deputy President of the Commission should be military.

The Vice President of the Economic and Administrative Section will be the Chief Civil Affairs Officer of Allied Military Government.

It is contemplated that provision will be made for representation of the interested United Nations at the Headquarters of the Control Commission. Further instructions will be sent to you on this point.

The channel of communication for instructions and directives and all matters of policy will be to and from the Allied Commander-in-Chief, through the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

The Chief of Staff to the Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

AFHQ North Africa, 8 September 1943

Secret
Urgent

W–9423/1907. Following cipher message has just been received (to AGWar from[for] Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFor for British Chiefs of Staff from Smith signed Eisenhower. This is Naf 365. Delivery times to both addresses immediately required.)

Owing to changes in the situation which has broken down and the existence of German forces in the Rome area it is no longer possible to accept immediate armistice since this proves [would mean?] that the capital would be occupied and the government taken over forcibly by the Germans. Operation GIANT 2 no longer possible because of lack of forces to guarantee airfields. General Taylor ready to return to Sicily to present views of the government and awaits orders. Communicate means and location you prefer for this return. Signed Badoglio.

CinC is now in conference with Commanders at Advanced Command Post and has this information. Decisions taken will be communicated to you at the earliest possible moment. They probably will be to call off GIANT 2 (this is inevitable) and to go ahead with all other plans. Question of whether announcement of armistice should be made as originally scheduled is most important. It might have great effect on Italian resistance and after all we have the signed document which was completed in good faith by an authorized representative of the man who now retracts. It is possible but not probable that Ambrosio will leave Rome and go ahead with the original plan from some other location. In any case we would like to have at the earliest possible moment your thought on whether or not we should proceed with the armistice announcement for the tactical and deception value it might have. Certainly the Italian government itself deserves no consideration. This is Eyes Only.

The Chief of Staff, U.S. Army to the Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ

Washington, September 8, 1943

Secret
7196.

It is the view of the President and the Prime Minister that the agreement having been signed you should make such public announcement regarding it as would facilitate your military operations. (To Eisenhower or Smith personal attention from Marshall) No consideration need be given to the embarrassment it might cause the Italian Government.


President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to the Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ

Washington, September 8, 1943

Secret
Urgent

From President and Prime Minister to General Eisenhower, Algiers.

We agree with line you are taking as indicated in your 387 and are withholding all announcements here and in London until we know what you have said and done.

ROOSEVELT
CHURCHILL

The Commander-in-Chief, AFHQ to the Combined Chiefs of Staff

Algiers, 8 September 1943

Secret
Urgent

W–9443/1972. Supplementing Naf 365, I have just completed a conference with the principal commanders and have determined not to accept the Italian change of attitude. To AGWar for the Combined Chiefs of Staff and to USFor for the British Chiefs of Staff signed Eisenhower. This is Naf 387. We intend to proceed in accordance with plan for the announcement of the armistice and with subsequent propaganda and other measures. Marshal Badoglio is being informed through our direct link that this instrument entered into by his accredited representative with presumed good faith on both sides is considered valid and binding and that we will not recognize any deviation from our original agreement. Acknowledge time of delivery to both addresses is desired immediately.